



Säkerhetspolisen

Förundersökningsprotokoll Tilläggsprotokoll

Terroristförteckning EU, USA, Storbritannien, Australien och Nya Zeeland

0105-K5-23
AM-4640-23

Grov utpressning, försök till
Grovt vapenbrott, fullbordat
Finansiering av terrorism, grovt brott, försök till

STOCKHOLMS TINGSRÄTT
Avdelning 4

INKOM: 2023-06-09
MÅLNR: B 1069-23
AKTBIL: 48



Myndighet
Säkerhetspolisen

Enhet
Utredningsenheten

Handläggare (Protokollförare)
Säkerhetspolis 70087

Undersökningsledare
Hans Ihrman

Polisens diarienummer
0105-K5-23

Tilläggsprotokoll

till 0105-K5-23

Arkiv/Åkl. ex

Åklnr
AM-4640-23

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Datum
2023-05-26

Personer i ärendet

Förtursmål Nej	Beslag Finns	Målsägande vill bli underrättad om tidpunkt för huvudförhandlingen Ja
Ersättningsyrkanden		Tolk krävs Ja / turkiska
Misstänkt (Efternamn och förnamn) Güngör, Yahya		Personnummer 19820665-4991
Brott		Förhandsgodkännande enligt RB 48:10 Nej
Information om att förenklad delgivning kan komma att användas av polis och tingsrätt är överlämnad vid ett personligt sammanträffande		
Information om att tillgänglighetsdelgivning kan komma att användas av tingsrätt är överlämnad vid ett personligt sammanträffande		
Underrättad om slutförd förundersökning / utredning enligt RB 23:18a 2023-05-29, muntlig underrättelse		Yttrande senast (rådrum) 2023-06-08
		Resultat av slutunderrättelse
Försvare Aydin, Ilhan, förordnad 2023-02-06		
Underrättad om slutförd förundersökning / utredning 2023-05-29, muntlig underrättelse		Yttrande senast (rådrum) 2023-06-08
		Resultat av slutunderrättelse

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EU:s terroristförteckning

EU ser regelbundet över förteckningen över personer, grupper och enheter inblandade i terroristdåd som omfattas av sanktioner.

Här får du veta mer om

| Sanktioner mot terrorister

| Restriktiva åtgärder som sätts in

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| Förfarande för uppförande på och avförande från förteckningen

| Sanktioner mot terrorister

Sanktioner mot terrorister

Som ett led i kampen mot terrorism efter attackerna den 11 september 2001 upprättade EU i december samma år en **förteckning över personer, grupper och enheter inblandade i terroristdåd som omfattas av restriktiva åtgärder**. Dessa extra åtgärder, som fastställdes i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp, antogs för att genomföra FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 1373 (2001). Förteckningen omfattar personer och grupper aktiva både i och utanför EU. Den ses över regelbundet, åtminstone var sju till åtta månader.

Sedan september 2016 har EU möjlighet att självständigt tillämpa sanktioner på Isil/Daish och al-Qaida och på personer och enheter som har samröre med eller stöder dem. Dessförinnan kunde sanktioner endast tillämpas på personer och enheter som uppförts på förteckningar av FN eller av enskilda EU-länder.

De **13 personer och 21 grupper och enheter** som är uppförda på förteckningen omfattas av **frysning av penningmedel** och andra finansiella tillgångar inom EU. Dessutom är det förbjudet för personer och enheter från EU att göra finansiella medel tillgängliga för personer och enheter uppförda på förteckningen.

Restriktiva åtgärder som sätts in

Kriterierna för uppförande av personer, grupper och enheter på förteckningen anges i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp. Där anges också vilka handlingar som klassas som terroristdåd och vilka restriktiva åtgärder som ska sättas in. Dessa restriktiva åtgärder är

- åtgärder som rör frysning av penningmedel och finansiella tillgångar
- åtgärder som rör polisiärt och rättsligt samarbete

Till följd av undertecknandet av fredsavtalet i Colombia den 26 september 2016 upphävde rådet EU:s restriktiva åtgärder mot **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc)**.

› Colombia: EU upphäver sanktionerna mot Farc (pressmeddelande 27.9.2016)

Personer, grupper och enheter uppförda på förteckningen omfattas både av frysning av penningmedel och andra finansiella tillgångar och av skärpta åtgärder som rör polissamarbete och straffrättsligt samarbete.

Enligt rådets förordning nr 2580/2001 fryses alla penningmedel och andra finansiella tillgångar som tillhör dessa

- personer
- grupper
- enheter

Dessutom får inga penningmedel, finansiella tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser

göras tillgängliga för dem, vare sig direkt eller indirekt. Alla dessa är **externa terrorister**.

- › Förteckning över personer, grupper och enheter som omfattas av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism (EU-lagstiftning)

En andra grupp personer och enheter som är uppförda på förteckningen omfattas bara av skärpta åtgärder som rör polissamarbete och straffrättsligt samarbete. Alla dessa är **interna terrorister**.

- › Förteckning över personer, grupper och enheter som omfattas av skärpta åtgärder inom polissamarbete och straffrättsligt samarbete – endast de som är markerade med en asterisk (EU-lagstiftning).

I rådets beslut (Gusp) 2016/1693 och rådets förordning (EU) 2016/1686 fastställs EU:s rättsliga ram för införande av reserestriktioner för personer och frysning av tillgångar för personer och enheter som har konstaterats ha samröre med Isil/Daish eller al-Qaida.

Kriterier för uppförande på förteckningen

I den gemensamma ståndpunkten står det att förteckningen ska upprättas utifrån exakta uppgifter som visar att en rättslig eller likvärdig behörig myndighet har fattat ett beslut om den berörda personen, gruppen eller enheten. Beslutet kan röra

- inledande av undersökningar eller åtal för ett terroristdåd eller ett försök att utföra eller underlätta ett sådant dåd
- en fällande dom för sådana dåd

Personer, grupper och enheter som enligt FN:s säkerhetsråd har anknytning till terrorism och som FN:s säkerhetsråd har utfärdat sanktioner mot kan också föras upp på förteckningen.

Förfarande för uppförande på och avförande från förteckningen

Rådet ser över förteckningen regelbundet, åtminstone var sjätte månad. Förutom denna regelbundna översyn kan rådet när som helst anta ett beslut om att föra upp personer, grupper och enheter på förteckningen eller avföra dem från denna.

Förslag om uppförande på och avförande från förteckningen

Personer, grupper och enheter kan föras upp på förteckningen på grundval av förslag från medlemsländerna som bygger på ett beslut av en behörig myndighet i en medlemsland eller ett tredjeland. En begäran om avförande från förteckningen kan göras av de personer, grupper och enheter som förts upp på förteckningen eller av ett medlemsland eller ett tredjeland.

Behandling i arbetsgruppen

Arbetsgruppen för restriktiva åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism behandlar och utvärderar information för uppförande på och avförande från förteckningen. Därefter ger den rådet rekommendationer.

Rådets godkännande

Rådet godkänner ändringarna av förteckningen, vilka publiceras i EU:s officiella tidning. För varje person, grupp och enhet som omfattas av restriktiva åtgärder i enlighet med rådets förordning nr 2580/2001 (frysning av penningmedel och andra finansiella tillgångar) ger rådet även en motivering som förklarar hur kriterierna för uppförande på förteckningen har uppfyllts.

Meddelande

När rådet har fattat ett beslut om uppförande på förteckningen informeras varje person, grupp eller enhet som omfattas av restriktiva åtgärder enligt rådets förordning nr 2580/2001 om detta, antingen per brev om så är möjligt eller genom ett meddelande i EU:s officiella tidning.

› Fullständig arbetsmetod för fastställandet av EU:s terroristförteckning

Vad finns det för handlingsalternativ för personer, grupper eller enheter uppförda på förteckningen?

Personer, grupper och enheter uppförda på förteckningen kan

- begära att rådet ska ompröva fallet mot bakgrund av styrkande handlingar
- överklaga den behöriga nationella myndighetens beslut enligt nationella förfaranden
- överklaga rådets beslut vid tribunalen om de omfattas av restriktiva åtgärder i enlighet med rådets förordning nr 2580/2001

› Arbetsmetod för fastställandet av EU:s terroristförteckning

Vad gör EU för att bekämpa terrorism?

Gör en resa över två årtionden och lär dig mer om hur EU-länderna har samarbetat allt närmare för att bekämpa terrorismen: från att hindra terrorister att köpa vapen eller bygga bomber till att försöka motverka radikaliserings i första hand.





Relaterade dokument

- › Rådets gemensamma ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism (2001)
- › Rådets förordning nr 2580/2001 om särskilda restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter i syfte att bekämpa terrorism (2001)
- › Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2016/1693 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Isil (Daish) och al-Qaida samt personer, grupper, företag och enheter som har samröre med dem (2016)
- › Rådets förordning (EU) 2016/1686 om införande av ytterligare restriktiva åtgärder mot Isil (Daish) och al-Qaida samt fysiska och juridiska personer, enheter eller organ som har samröre med dem (2016)

Ämnen:

Dela





**Council of the
European Union**

**Brussels, 23 November 2016
(OR. en)**

**14612/1/16
REV 1**

LIMITE

**CORLX 456
RELEX 965
FIN 801
COTER 120
CFSP/PESC 941
COMET 1**

'I' ITEM NOTE

From:	Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party
To:	Permanent Representatives Committee
No. prev. doc.:	10826/1/07 REV 1
Subject:	Fight against the financing of terrorism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Establishment of a Council Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (COMET WP)

1. On 27 June 2007 the Permanent Representatives Committee endorsed the mandate, practical arrangements and revised working methods of the Working Party on implementation of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (the CP 931 Working Party) (doc. 10826/1/07 REV 1).
2. On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, as well as Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them.

3. On 12 September 2016, the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) agreed that the assessment of the impact and functioning of Council Decision 2016/1693/CFSP and examination of appropriate possible improvements should be entrusted to the CP 931 Working Party with an enlarged scope. RELEX also agreed that the name, mandate, practical arrangements and the working methods of the CP 931 Working Party should be adapted accordingly.
4. In several meetings in November 2016, RELEX discussed the name, enlarged mandate, practical arrangements and working methods of the working party with an enlarged scope. On 22 November 2016, RELEX reached agreement on the draft mandate and practical arrangements for the work of the Council Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (COMET WP) and the revised working methods as set out in Annexes I and II respectively.
5. Coreper, having noted the above, is invited to:
 - endorse the mandate and practical arrangements for the work of the Council working party with an enlarged scope, as set out in Annex I;
 - endorse the revised working methods, as set out in Annex II;
 - agree to make the mandate, practical arrangements and working methods public.

ANNEX I**Establishment of a Council Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism****Name**

The Working Party on implementation of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism ("COCOP") is renamed "Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism" (hereafter referred to as the "COMET WP").

Mandate

The terms of reference of the "COMET WP" are to:

- examine and evaluate information with a view to listing and de-listing of persons, groups, undertakings and entities , as well as assess whether the information available meets the criteria set out in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and Articles 2(2) and 3(3) and (4) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 (EU autonomous restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida);
- make recommendations for listings and de-listings under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Articles 2(2) and 3(3) and (4) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 to be reflected in the necessary proposals for legal acts from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) or by a Member State which will be examined by the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) and endorsed by the Permanent Representatives Committee with a view to their adoption by the Council; and

- prepare the regular review of the lists as foreseen respectively in Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and in Article 6(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693;
- assess the impact and functioning of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Council Decision 2016/1693/CFSP and suggest, as appropriate, possible improvements.

Practical arrangements

The following practical arrangements will be put in place:

- as stipulated in Annex II, point 3 of Council Decision 2009/908/EU the COMET WP is chaired by the six-monthly Council Presidency¹;
- meetings will be held in a secured environment so as to enable discussion up to SECRET UE, and will be held as and when necessary;
- adequate steps will be taken to ensure the confidentiality of the proceedings of the COMET WP;
- the date of the meeting, agenda and organisational details will be classified RESTREINT UE;
- the COMET WP will meet whenever circumstances require, but at least once every semester;

¹ Council Decision 2009/908/EU laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council (OJ L 322, 9.12.2009, p. 28).

- the Council Secretariat will hold any documents relevant for the listing or de-listing of persons, groups, undertakings or entities. Such documents will, if appropriate, bear an EU or national classification marking. The rules on public access to Council documents apply ².

² Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).

ANNEX II**Working methods of the Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (the COMET WP)**

1. The task of the Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (the "COMET WP") is to prepare the implementation of and suggest, as appropriate, possible improvements to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism³ and of Articles 2(2) and 3(3) and (4) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. The COMET WP will examine proposals for listings and de-listings of persons, groups, undertakings and entities, and will prepare the regular reviews of the lists as foreseen respectively in Article 1(6) of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and in Article 6(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693.

Initial proposals for listings

2. In the case of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, initial proposals for listings may be made by Member States; or by Member States or the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) regarding listings on the basis of decision(s) by third States' competent authorities. Initial proposals for listings should include initial draft statements of reasons and specify the decision(s) of the national competent authorities and national procedures used as a basis for the listing proposed, as well as the relevant legal framework of domestic law in relation to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP requirements.

³ OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

3. When a listing proposal under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP is based on a decision by a competent authority of a third State, the EEAS or the relevant Member State will carry out a first basic scrutiny of the proposal in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 1(4) of the Common Position⁴. The EEAS or the Member State will also gather relevant information regarding the legal and procedural safeguards, including judicial or administrative review, available in that third State to ensure respect for the rights of defence of the person, group or entity concerned. The EEAS or the Member State may on this basis ask the third State for additional information deemed necessary. When applying the listing criteria to listing proposals based on a decision by a competent authority of a third State, the COMET WP will check in particular whether the proposal complies with the abovementioned fundamental principles and procedures.
4. Initial proposals for listing of persons, groups, undertakings and entities under Articles 2(2) and 3(3) and (4) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 may be submitted by Member States or the HR. They should include initial draft statements of reasons. The COMET WP will examine whether the information provided meets the criteria set out in Articles 2(2) and 3(3) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693⁵.
5. All relevant information should be presented to the COMET WP in support of pending or new proposals for listings under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP or Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693.

⁴ Common Position 2001/931/CFSP constitutes the CFSP basis for the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism.

⁵ Articles 1(2), 3(3) and (4) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 constitute the CFSP basis for the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2016/1686.

Exchange of information among Member States

6. Member States will exchange within the COMET WP information regarding any new facts and developments with regard to previous listings, in particular with regard to the national procedures which led to the adoption of the decision referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
7. Member States may also exchange information on their national systems governing the listing of persons, groups, undertakings or entities. This information exchange could notably:
 - address any new legislative, regulatory or administrative developments and national measures taken for the implementation and enforcement of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, Regulation (EU) No 2580/2011, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 and Regulation (EU) 2016/1686;
 - include national listings on terrorism-related grounds.

Handling of Proposals

8. Material from Member States or, in the context of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, material originating from third States in support of pending or new proposals, or material from listed persons, groups, undertakings and entities that have requested a de-listing, will be circulated to delegations for discussion in the COMET WP.
9. Delegations will have 15 calendar days to check the material and to allow them to forward the information received to their competent national authorities. Exceptionally, the EEAS or a delegation may put forward a justified request to shorten this deadline. A request of this nature does not prejudice the view taken on the issue in the COMET WP.

10. The meetings of COMET WP will be convened by the Presidency on its own initiative or at the request of the EEAS or of a Member State. Delegations will be notified of the meeting at least 15 calendar days in advance. The notice of the meeting will include information on which individual, group, undertaking or entity will be discussed and on what legal basis (Common Position 2001/931/CFSP or Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693). Exceptionally, the EEAS or a delegation may put forward a justified request to shorten the deadline. A request of this nature does not prejudice the view taken on the issue in the COMET WP.
11. If it has been established that a terrorist group, undertaking or entity which is already listed has re-named itself, and that the re-naming did not change the character, and in particular the terrorist objectives, of that group, undertaking or entity, the COMET WP will recommend that the new name be added to the original listing as an alias.
12. The Presidency, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State or the EEAS, may decide to invite a representative from competent bodies, institutions or agencies to attend the meeting of the COMET WP to make a presentation of background information in order to facilitate discussion on a particular subject. Such bodies, institutions or agencies include notably the following: Europol, Eurojust and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). Delegates from other relevant Council working parties (for example the Working Party on Visas, the Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects) - COTER, Working Party on Terrorism - TWP, the Schengen Working Party) may be invited to attend meetings of COMET WP.
13. The COMET WP will make recommendations for listing and de-listing to be reflected in the necessary proposals for legal acts from the HR or by Member States, which will be examined by the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) and endorsed by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) with a view to their adoption by the Council.

14. An appropriate level of confidentiality should be ensured in the follow-up in RELEX and COREPER, and in any deliberations in other Council instances.

Statement of reasons

15. For each person, group, undertaking and entity listed under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP or Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693, the Council will provide a statement of reasons, which will be sufficiently detailed to allow those listed to understand the reasons for their listing and to allow the EU Courts to exercise their power of review where a legal challenge is brought against the listing.
16. The statement of reasons will make clear how the criteria provided for in the underlying legal act (Common Position 2001/931/CFSP or Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693) have been met.
17. The draft statement of reasons will be prepared by the proposing Member State or the EEAS . Each statement of reasons will then be discussed by the COMET WP on a case-by-case basis. The statement of reasons will then be examined by the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) and endorsed by COREPER with a view to its adoption by the Council. After adoption by the Council, the statement of reasons will be kept on the Council's file with the possibility for the listed person, group, undertaking or entity concerned or his/her/its legal representatives to have access to it.

18. With regard to listings under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, the statement of reasons will specify elements in relation to the national decision taken with reference to Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, including the information on the national authority/authorities which took the decision, the nature of the decision and the facts to which it relates, the applicable national definition of terrorism, the national decision-making procedures leading to the decision, as well as the review process attached to it, and the Council's assessment of how the alleged acts relate to the definition of terrorist acts in Article 1(3) of the Common Position.
19. Persons, groups and entities subject only to Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP are those marked with an * in Common Position 2009/468/CFSP.

Notification

20. After a listing decision has been taken by the Council, the General Secretariat of the Council will inform each person, group, undertaking and entity listed under Council Regulations (EC) No 2580/2001 or (EU) 2016/1693, by sending a letter to his/her/its address, wherever the address is available, after entry into force of the listing decision. The letter will include the following standard elements:
- (a) A description of the restrictive measures taken and a mention of the possibility to grant derogations under Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 or Article 5 of Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1693, as appropriate. A reference to the relevant legal acts as published in the Official Journal will be included in the letter and the attention of those listed will be drawn to the possibility of addressing requests to the competent national authorities for an authorisation to use frozen funds for essential needs or specific payments.

- (b) The Council's statement of reasons for the listing of the person, group, undertaking or entity concerned.
 - (c) Reference to the possibility for the person, group, undertaking or entity to send a request to the Council with supporting documents for their listing to be reconsidered. Where appropriate, a deadline will be specified.
 - (d) Reference to the possibility of challenging the Council's decision before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 275, 2nd paragraph, and Article 263, 4th and 6th paragraphs, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, insofar as the listing has given rise to travel restrictions and/or an asset freeze.
 - (e) Request for consent of the listed persons, groups, undertakings and entities to give public access to the statement of reasons.
21. In addition, a notice will be published in the 'C' series of the Official Journal ('Information and Notices') informing the persons, groups, undertakings and entities of the elements set out in paragraphs 20(a), (c), (d) and (e) above. The purpose of the notice is also to inform the persons, groups, undertakings and entities whose address is not known of the possibility to obtain the Council's statement of reasons concerning them.

Review procedure

22. Pursuant to Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, listing decisions taken by the Council will be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every six months. Pursuant to Article 6(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693, the measures referred to in Article 2(2) and Article 3(3) and (4) will be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every twelve months. Those review processes involve the following steps:

- (a) As specified in the procedures for notification set out in paragraphs 20 and 21, the persons, groups, undertakings and entities are informed through the statement of reasons of the specific information that forms the basis for the Council's decision to list and are invited to make their views known for the purposes of the review.
- (b) Member States will inform each other about any new facts and developments with regard to the national procedures which led to the adoption of the decision referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The EEAS will request from relevant third States details of any changes or developments related to the decision of their competent authority on which a listing is based. Any new facts and developments concerning decisions of competent authorities of third States will be circulated to Member States for consideration. The COMET WP will carry out a thorough assessment as to whether the grounds for listings under Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP for each listing are still valid. If, in the course of this assessment, the COMET WP considers that the new information presented requires an amendment to the statement of reasons, it will recommend that the statement of reasons be updated accordingly.
- (c) The COMET WP will also carry out a thorough assessment as to whether the grounds for listings under Article 2(2) and Article 3(3) and (4) of Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 for each listing are still valid, taking into account all relevant considerations, including *inter alia* the person's, group's, undertaking's or entity's record of involvement in terrorist acts and the current status of the group, undertaking or entity. Any new information presented by a Member State or a listed person, group, undertaking or entity will be examined by the COMET WP. If, in the course of this assessment, the COMET WP considers that the new information presented requires an amendment to the statement of reasons, it will recommend that the statement of reasons be updated accordingly.

- (d) Following its assessment under point b or c above, the COMET WP will make recommendations to be reflected in the relevant legal acts, including a new consolidated list of persons, groups, undertakings and entities.
- (e) The persons, groups, undertakings and entities concerned will be informed of the outcome, as specified in the procedures for notification set out in paragraphs 20 and 21.
23. Independently of the above review process, the Council can, at any time, adopt a decision to add additional persons, groups, undertakings or entities to the list, or decide on de-listings, without adopting a new consolidated list. The procedure outlined in paragraphs 6 to 14 is applicable. Any such decision will subsequently be reflected in a new consolidated list adopted on the occasion of the next regular review by the Council.

Requests for de-listing

24. Requests for a de-listing can be made at any time by listed persons, groups, undertakings and entities, any Member State, or a third State in the case of a listing under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP based on a decision by a competent authority of that third State, by submitting information in support of such a request. Requests for de-listing will be discussed in the COMET WP as a matter of priority.

Requests for de-listing are to be sent in writing to the following address:

Council of the European Union
General Secretariat
DG C 1C
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175
1048 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

25. De-listing is necessary if the criteria for listing are no longer met. De-listing may also be necessary or appropriate in other cases, e.g. death of a listed person or the liquidation of a listed entity.
26. Where the General Secretariat of the Council receives a letter from a listed person, group, undertaking or entity or their legal representative contesting their listing, it will acknowledge receipt of the letter.
27. The letter, together with a copy of any supporting documents submitted, will be distributed to delegations with a view to discussion in the COMET WP. The procedure outlined in paragraphs 6 to 14 is applicable.

Communication with listed persons, groups, undertakings and entities or their representatives

28. The General Secretariat of the Council will manage communications with listed persons, groups, undertakings and entities exclusively in writing and will assist the Presidency and the EEAS in following up any requests for reconsideration by listed persons, groups or entities, as well as in preparing the regular reviews.
29. These working methods will be kept under constant review.

(Rättsakter som antagits med tillämpning av avdelning V i Fördraget om Europeiska unionen)

RÅDETS GEMENSAMMA STÅNDPUNKT

av den 17 juni 2002

om uppdatering av gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism och om upphävande av gemensam ståndpunkt 2002/340/GUSP

(2002/462/GUSP)

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DENNA GEMENSAMMA STÅNDPUNKT

med beaktande av Fördraget om Europeiska unionen, särskilt artiklarna 15 och 34 i detta, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 27 december 2001 antog rådet gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism⁽¹⁾.
- (2) Den 2 maj 2002 antog rådet gemensam ståndpunkt 2002/340/GUSP om uppdatering av gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP⁽²⁾.
- (3) I gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP föreskrivs det att en översyn skall ske med jämna mellanrum.
- (4) Det är nödvändigt att uppdatera bilagan till gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP och att upphäva gemensam ståndpunkt 2002/340/GUSP.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Förteckningen över de personer, grupper och enheter i fråga om vilka gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/GUSP är tillämplig återges i bilagan.

Artikel 2

Gemensam ståndpunkt 2002/340/GUSP skall upphöra att gälla.

Artikel 3

Denna gemensamma ståndpunkt får verkan samma dag som den antas.

Artikel 4

Denna gemensamma ståndpunkt skall offentliggöras i Officiella tidningen.

Utfärdat i Luxemburg den 17 juni 2002.

På rådets vägnar

J. PIQUÉ I CAMPS

Ordförande

⁽¹⁾ EGT L 344, 28.12.2001, s. 93.

⁽²⁾ EGT L 116, 3.5.2002, s. 75.

BILAGA

Förteckning över de personer, grupper och enheter som avses i artikel 1 (¹)

1. PERSONER

1. *ALBERDI URANGA, Itziar (ETA-aktivist), född den 7.10.1963 i Durango (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 78.865.693
2. *ALBISU IRIARTE, Miguel (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Gestoras Pro-amnistía), född den 7.6.1961 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.954.596
3. AL-MUGHASSIL, Ahmad Ibrahim (alias ABU OMRAN; alias AL-MUGHASSIL, Ahmed Ibrahim), född den 26.6.1967 i Qatif-Bab al Shamal, Saudiarabien; saudisk medborgare
4. AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, född i Al Ihsa, Saudiarabien; saudisk medborgare
5. AL YACCOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, född den 16.10.1966 i Tarut, Saudiarabien; saudisk medborgare
6. *APAOLAZA SANCHO, Iván (ETA-aktivist; medlem av K.Madrid), född den 10.11.1971 i Beasain (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 44.129.178
7. *ARZALLUS TAPIA, Eusebio (ETA-aktivist), född den 8.11.1957 i Regil (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.927.207
8. ATWA, Ali (alias BOUSLIM, Ammar Mansour; alias SALIM, Hassan Rostom), Libanon, född 1960 i Libanon; libanesisk medborgare
9. * ECHEBERRIA SIMARRO, Leire (ETA-aktivist), född den 20.12.1977 i Basauri (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 45.625.646
10. * ECHEGARAY ACHIRICA, Alfonso (ETA-aktivist), född den 10.01.1958 i Plencia (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 16.027.051
11. * ELCORO AYASTUY, Paulo (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Jarrai/Haika/Segi), född den 22.10.1973 i Vergara (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.394.062
12. EL-HOORIE, Ali Saed Bin Ali (alias AL-HOURI, Ali Saed Bin Ali; alias EL-HOURI, Ali Saed Bin Ali) född den 10.7.1965, alt. den 11.7.1965 i El Dibabiya, Saudiarabien; saudisk medborgare
13. *FIGAL ARRANZ, Antonio Agustín (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Kas/Ekin), född den 2.12.1972 i Baracaldo (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 20.172.692
14. *GOGEOASCOECHEA ARRONATEGUI, Eneko (ETA-aktivist), född den 29.4.1967 i Guernica (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 44.556.097
15. *GOIRICELAYA GONZALEZ, Cristina (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Herri Batasuna/E.H/Batasuna), född den 23.12.1967 i Vergara (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 16.282.556
16. *IPARRAGUIRRE GUENECHEA, Ma Soledad (ETA-aktivist), född den 25.4.1961 i Escoriaza (Navarra), ID-kort nr 16.255.819
17. *IZTUETA BARANDICA, Enrique (ETA-aktivist), född den 30.7.1955 i Santurce (Biscay), ID-kort nr 14.929.950
18. IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (alias GARBAYA, AHMED; alias SA-ID; alias SALWWAN, Samir), Libanon, född 1963 i Libanon, libanesisk medborgare
19. MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (alias ALI, Salem; alias BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah; alias HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith; alias WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), född den 14.4.1965, alt. den 1.3.1964 i Kuwait; kuwaitisk medborgare
20. *MORCILLO TORRES, Gracia (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Kas/Ekin), född den 15.3.1967 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 72.439.052
21. *MÚGICA GOÑI, Ainhoa (ETA-aktivist), född den 27.6.1970 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 34.101.243
22. MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fa'iz (alias MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fayiz), högre underrättelseofficer i HIZBOLLAH, född den 7.12.1962 i Tayr Dibba, Libanon, pass nr 432298 (Libanon)
23. *MUÑO A ORDOZGOITI, Aloña (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Kas/Ekin), född den 6.7.1976 i Segura (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 35.771.259
24. *NARVÁEZ GOÑI, Juan Jesús (ETA-aktivist), född den 23.2.1961 i Pamplona (Navarra), ID-kort nr 15.841.101
25. *OLARRA GURIDI, Juan Antonio (ETA-aktivist), född den 11.9.1967 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 34.084.504

(¹) Personer som är markerade med * skall endast omfattas av artikel 4.

26. *ORBE SEVILLANO, Zigor (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Jarrai/Haika/Segi), född den 22.9.1975 i Basauri (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 45.622.851
27. *OTEGUI UNANUE, Mikel (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Jarrai/Haika/Segi), född den 8.10.1972 i Itsasondo (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 44.132.976
28. *PALACIOS ALDAY, Gorka (ETA-aktivist; medlem av K.Madrid), född den 17.10.1974 i Baracaldo (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 30.654.356
29. *PEREZ ARAMBURU, Jon Iñaki (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Jarrai/Haika/Segi), född den 18.9.1964 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.976.521
30. *QUINTANA ZORROZUA, Asier (ETA-aktivist; medlem av K.Madrid), född den 27.2.1968 i Bilbao (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 30.609.430
31. *RUBENACH ROIG, Juan Luis (ETA-aktivist; medlem av K.Madrid), född den 18.9.1964 i Bilbao (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 18.197.545
32. *SAEZ DE EGUILAZ MURGUIONDO, Carlos (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Kas/Ekin), född den 9.12.1963 i San Sebastián (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.962.687
33. *URANGA ARTOLA, Kemen (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Herri Batasuna/E.H/Batasuna) född den 25.5.1969 i Ondarroa (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 30.627.290
34. * VALLEJO FRANCO, Iñigo (ETA-aktivist), född den 21.05.1976 i Bilbao (Vizcaya), ID-kort nr 29.036.694
35. *VILA MICHELENA, Fermín (ETA-aktivist; medlem av Kas/Ekin), född den 12.3.1970 i Irún (Guipúzcoa), ID-kort nr 15.254.214

2. GRUPPER OCH ENHETER

1. Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), (alias Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September och Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims)
2. "Al-Aqsa-martyrbrigaden"/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
3. Aum Shinrikyo (alias AUM, alias Aum Supreme Truth, alias Aleph)
4. Babbar Khalsa
5. *Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
6. *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Tierra Vasca y Libertad/Baskiska fosterlandet och friheten (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) (E.T.A.) (Följande organisationer är medlemmar av terroristgruppen ETA: K.a.s., Xaki; Ekin, Jarrai-Haika-Segi, Gestoras pro-amnistía, Askatasuna)
7. Gama'a al-Islamiyya ("Islamiska gruppen", Islamic Group), (alias Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, IG)
8. *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre/"Antifascistiska motståndgruppen Första oktober" (G.R.A.P.O.)
9. Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem (Hamas terroristflygel)
10. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
11. International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
12. Kahane Chai (Kach)
13. Kurdiska arbetarpartiet (PKK)
14. Lashkar e Tayyaba (LET)/Pashan-e-Ahle Hadis
15. *Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
16. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK eller MKO)[minus "National Council of Resistance of Iran "(NCRI)] (alias National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, MEK:s militanta flygel), People's Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI), Muslim Iranian Students Society)
17. *Orange Volunteers (OV)
18. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
19. Palestinska islamiska Jihad/Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
20. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
21. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, (alias PFLP-General Command, alias PFLP-GC)
22. *Real IRA
23. *Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
24. Colombias revolutionära beväpnade styrkor (Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia) (FARC)
25. *"Revolutionära kärnor" (Revolutionary Nuclei)/Epanastatiki Pirines

18.6.2002

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26. *Revolutionära organisationen 17 november/Dekati Evdomi Noemvri
 27. Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party (DHKP/C), (alias Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol)
 28. *"Revolutionär folklig kamp" (Revolutionary Popular Struggle)/Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas (ELA)
 29. Den lysande stigen/(Sendero Luminoso) (SL)
 30. *Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
 31. "Förenade självförsvarsgrupperna i Colombia"(United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia) (AUC) (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)
-

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

L 25



Svensk utgåva

Lagstiftning

sextiofemte årgången

4 februari 2022

Innehållsförteckning

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De rättsakter vilkas titlar är tryckta med fin stil är sådana rättsakter som har avseende på den löpande handläggningen av jordbrukspolitiska frågor. De har normalt begränsad giltighetstid.

Beträffande alla övriga rättsakter gäller att titlarna är tryckta med fet stil och föregås av en asterisk.

- ★ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2022/154 av den 3 februari 2022 om ändring av beslut 2011/72/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter med tanke på situationen i Tunisien 18

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II

(Icke-lagstiftningsakter)

FÖRORDNINGAR

RÅDETS GENOMFÖRANDEFÖRORDNING (EU) 2022/147

av den 3 februari 2022

om genomförande av artikel 2.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001 om särskilda restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter i syfte att bekämpa terrorism och om upphävande av genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/1188

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,

med beaktande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001 av den 27 december 2001 om särskilda restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter i syfte att bekämpa terrorism ⁽¹⁾, särskilt artikel 2.3,

med beaktande av förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 19 juli 2021 antog rådet genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/1188 ⁽²⁾ om genomförande av artikel 2.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001, varvid en uppdaterad förteckning fastställdes över personer, grupper och enheter på vilka förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001 är tillämplig (nedan kallad *förteckningen*).
- (2) Där det varit praktiskt möjligt har rådet försett samtliga personer, grupper och enheter med en redogörelse för skälen till att de har uppförts på förteckningen.
- (3) I ett meddelande som offentliggjordes i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning* informerade rådet personerna, grupperna och enheterna på förteckningen om att det hade beslutat att låta dem kvarstå på förteckningen. Rådet informerade även de berörda personerna, grupperna och enheterna om att de av rådet kunde begära en redogörelse för skälen till att de förts upp på förteckningen, om de inte redan hade meddelats en sådan redogörelse.
- (4) Rådet har reviderat förteckningen i enlighet med artikel 2.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001. Vid revideringsarbetet beaktade rådet såväl de synpunkter som erhållits från de berörda som den uppdaterade information som erhållits från de behöriga nationella myndigheterna avseende statusen på nationell nivå för de personer och enheter som är uppförda på förteckningen.

⁽¹⁾ EGT L 344, 28.12.2001, s. 70.

⁽²⁾ Rådets genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/1188 av den 19 juli 2021 om genomförande av artikel 2.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001 om särskilda restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter i syfte att bekämpa terrorism och om upphävande av genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/138 (EUT L 258, 20.7.2021, s. 14.)

- (5) Rådet har kontrollerat att behöriga myndigheter, i enlighet med vad som anges i artikel 1.4 i rådets gemensamma ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp^(?), har fattat beslut beträffande alla personer, grupper och enheter i förteckningen om att de har deltagit i terroristhandlingar i den mening som avses i artikel 1.2 och 1.3 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp. Rådet har också konstaterat att de personer, grupper och enheter på vilka artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är tillämpliga bör fortsätta att vara föremål för de särskilda restriktiva åtgärder som anges i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001.
- (6) Rådet har konstaterat att det inte längre finns någon grund för att behålla en person på den förteckning på vilken artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är tillämpliga.
- (7) Förteckningen bör uppdateras i enlighet med detta, och genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/1188 bör upphävas.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Den förteckning som anges i artikel 2.3 i förordning (EG) nr 2580/2001 återges i bilagan till den här förordningen.

Artikel 2

Genomförandeförordning (EU) 2021/1188 ska upphöra att gälla.

Artikel 3

Denna förordning träder i kraft dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.

Utfärdad i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

^(?) Rådets gemensamma ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp av den 27 december 2001 om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism (EGT L 344, 28.12.2001, s. 93).

BILAGA

FÖRTECKNING ÖVER PERSONER, GRUPPER OCH ENHETER SOM AVSES I ARTIKEL 1

I. PERSONER

1. ABDOLLAHI Hamed (ABDULLAHI Hamed) (alias Mustafa Abdullahi), född 11.8.1960 i Iran. Passnummer: D9004878.
2. AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed (AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Huseyn Mohamed), född i Al Ihsa (Saudiarabien), saudisk medborgare.
3. AL-YACOUB Ibrahim Salih Mohammed (AL-YACUB Ibrahim Salih Mohamed), född 16.10.1966 i Tarut (Saudiarabien), saudisk medborgare.
4. ARBABSAR Manssor (ARBABSAR Mansur) (alias Mansour Arbabsar), född 6.3.1955 eller 15.3.1955 i Iran. Iransk och amerikansk medborgare, passnummer: C2002515 (Iran); passnummer: 477845448 (Förenta staterna). Nationellt ID-nummer: 07442833, giltigt t.o.m. 15.3.2016 (amerikanskt körkort).
5. ASSADI Assadollah (alias Assadollah Asadi), född 22.12.1971 i Teheran (Iran), iransk medborgare. Iranskt diplomatpass nummer: D9016657.
6. BOUYERI Mohammed (alias Abu Zubair, alias Sobiari, alias Abu Zoubiar), född 8.3.1978 i Amsterdam (Nederländerna).
7. EL HAJJ Hassan Hassan, född 22.3.1988 i Zaghdraiya, Saida, Libanon, kanadensisk medborgare. Passnummer: JX446643 (Kanada).
8. HASHEMI MOGHADAM Saeid, född 6.8.1962 i Teheran (Iran), iransk medborgare. Passnummer: D9016290, giltigt t.o.m. 4.2.2019.
9. IZZ-AL-DIN Hasan (IZZ-AL-DIN Hassan) (alias Garbaya, Ahmed, alias Sa'id, alias Salwwan, Samir), Libanon, född 1963 i Libanon, libanesisk medborgare.
10. MELIAD Farah, född 5.11.1980 i Sydney (Australien), australisk medborgare. Passnummer: M2719127 (Australien).
11. MOHAMMED Khalid Sheikh (alias Ali, Salem, alias Bin Khalid, Fahd Bin Adballah, alias Henin, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, alias Wadood, Khalid Abdul), född 14.4.1965 eller 1.3.1964 i Pakistan, passnummer 488555.
12. SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (alias Abdol Reza Shala'i, alias Abd-al Reza Shalai, alias Abdorreza Shahlai, alias Abdolreza Shahlai, alias Abdul-Reza Shahlae, alias Hajj [Haj] Yusef, alias Haji Yusif, alias Hajji Yasir, alias Hajji Yusif, alias Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), född omkring 1957 i Iran. Adresser: 1. Kermanshah, Iran, 2. Mehran-basen (militärbas), provinsen Ilam, Iran.
13. SHAKURI Ali Gholam, född omkring 1965 i Teheran, Iran.

II. GRUPPER OCH ENHETER

1. "Abu Nidal Organisation" – "ANO" ("Abu Nidals grupp") (alias "Fatah Revolutionary Council", alias "Arab Revolutionary Brigades", alias "Black September", alias "Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims").
2. "Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade" ("Al-Aqsa-martyrernas brigad").
3. "Al-Aqsa e.V."
4. "Babbar Khalsa".

5. "Communist Party of the Philippines" ("Filippinernas kommunistparti"), inbegripet "New People's Army" – "NPA" ("Nya folkarmén"), Filippinerna.
 6. Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry for Intelligence and Security (den inre säkerhetstjänsten vid iranska underrättelse- och säkerhetsministeriet).
 7. "Gama'a al-Islamiyya" ("Jamaat al-islamiyya") (alias "Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya") ("Islamic Group", "Islamiska gruppen" – "IG").
 8. "İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi" ("Förtrupperna för ett islamiskt Stororienten") – "IBDA-C" ("Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front").
 9. "Hamas", inbegripet "Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem" ("Izz al-Din al-Qassam-brigaderna").
 10. "Hizballah Military Wing" ("Hizbollahs väpnade gren") (alias "Hezbollah Military Wing", alias "Hizbullah Military Wing", alias "Hizbollah Military Wing", alias "Hisbollah Military Wing", alias "Hizbu'llah Military Wing", alias "Hizb Allah Military Wing", alias "Jihad Council" (och alla underställda enheter, inbegripet dess External Security Organisation)).
 11. "Hizbul Mujahideen" ("Hizbul mujahidin") – "HM".
 12. "Khalistan Zindabad Force" – "KZF".
 13. "Kurdistan Workers' Party" ("Kurdistans arbetarparti") – "PKK" (alias "KADEK" ["Kadek"], alias "KONGRA-GEL" ["Kongra-Gel"]).
 14. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" ("Tamilska befrielsestridarna") – "LTTE".
 15. "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" ("Nationella befrielsearmén") ("National Liberation Army").
 16. "Palestinian Islamic Jihad" ("Palestinska islamiska jihad") – "PIJ".
 17. "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" ("Folkfronten för Palestinas befrielse") – "PFLP".
 18. "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command" ("Folkfronten för Palestinas befrielse – Generalkommandot") (alias "PFLP – General Command").
 19. "Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi" ("Folkets revolutionära befrielsefront/parti") – "DHKP/C" (alias "Devrimci Sol" ("Revolutionary Left"), alias "Dev Sol") ("Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party").
 20. "Sendero Luminoso" – "SL" ("Den lysande stigen").
 21. "Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan" ("Kurdistans frihetsfalkar") – "TAK" (alias "Kurdistan Freedom Falcons", alias "Kurdistan Freedom Hawks" ["Kurdistans frihetshökar"]).
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RÅDETS FÖRORDNING (EU) 2022/148**av den 3 februari 2022****om ändring av förordning (EU) nr 753/2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan**

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, särskilt artikel 215,

med beaktande av rådets beslut 2011/486/Gusp av den 1 augusti 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan ⁽¹⁾,

med beaktande av det gemensamma förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik och Europeiska kommissionen, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Rådets förordning (EU) nr 753/2011 ⁽²⁾ ger verkan åt de restriktiva åtgärder som antas inom ramen för Förenta nationerna.
- (2) Den 22 december 2021 antog Förenta nationernas (FN) säkerhetsråd resolution 2615 (2021). Genom den resolutionen införs ett nytt undantag från de restriktiva åtgärderna för humanitärt bistånd och annan verksamhet i syfte att tillgodose grundläggande mänskliga behov i Afghanistan.
- (3) Den 3 februari 2022 antog rådet beslut (Gusp) 2022/153 ⁽³⁾ om ändring av beslut 2011/486/Gusp i enlighet med FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 2615 (2021).
- (4) Dessa ändringar omfattas av tillämpningsområdet för fördraget och lagstiftningsåtgärder på unionsnivå är därför nödvändiga för att genomföra dem, särskilt för att säkerställa att de tillämpas på ett enhetligt sätt i alla medlemsstater.
- (5) Förordning (EU) nr 753/2011 bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

I artikel 3 i förordning (EU) nr 753/2011 ska följande punkt läggas till:

"4. Punkterna 1 och 2 ska inte tillämpas på tillgängliggörande av penningmedel eller ekonomiska resurser som är nödvändiga för att säkerställa snabbt tillhandahållande av humanitärt bistånd och annan verksamhet som tillgodoser grundläggande mänskliga behov i Afghanistan eller för att stödja sådan verksamhet."

⁽¹⁾ EUT L 199, 2.8.2011, s. 57.

⁽²⁾ Rådets förordning (EU) nr 753/2011 av den 1 augusti 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan (EUT L 199, 2.8.2011, s. 1).

⁽³⁾ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2022/153 av den 3 februari 2022 om ändring av beslut 2011/486/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan (EUT L, s17.).

Artikel 2

Denna förordning träder i kraft dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.

Utfärdad i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

RÅDETS FÖRORDNING (EU) 2022/149**av den 3 februari 2022****om ändring av förordning (EU) nr 101/2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, enheter och organ mot bakgrund av situationen i Tunisien**

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, särskilt artikel 215,

med beaktande av rådets beslut 2011/72/Gusp av den 31 januari 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter med tanke på situationen i Tunisien ⁽¹⁾,

med beaktande av det gemensamma förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik och Europeiska kommissionen, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Genom rådets förordning (EU) nr 101/2011 ⁽²⁾ genomförs en frysning av tillgångar enligt beslut 2011/72/Gusp gentemot vissa personer och enheter som har fastställts vara ansvariga för förskingring av den tunisiska statens medel.
- (2) Den 3 februari 2022 antog rådet beslut (Gusp) 2022/154 ⁽³⁾ om ändring av rådets beslut 2011/72/Gusp vad gäller de villkor under vilka en avlidens persons tillgångar kan fortsätta att vara frusna.
- (3) Den ändringen omfattas av tillämpningsområdet för fördraget och lagstiftningsåtgärder på unionsnivå är därför nödvändiga för att genomföra den, särskilt för att säkerställa att den tillämpas på ett enhetligt sätt i alla medlemsstater.
- (4) Förordning (EU) nr 101/2011 bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Förordning (EU) nr 101/2011 ska ändras på följande sätt:

1. Följande artikel ska införas:

”Artikel 2a

Om en person som förtecknas i bilaga I avlider gäller följande:

- a) När en fällande dom i brottmål för förskingring av statliga medel meddelats mot den personen innan denne avled, ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta till dess att domstolsbeslut om återvinning av de förskingrade statliga medlen och betalning av böter har verkställts.

⁽¹⁾ EUT L 28, 2.2.2011, s. 62.

⁽²⁾ Rådets förordning (EU) nr 101/2011 av den 4 februari 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, enheter och organ mot bakgrund av situationen i Tunisien (EUT L 31, 5.2.2011, s. 1).

⁽³⁾ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2022/154 av den 3 februari 2022 om ändring av beslut 2011/72/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter med tanke på situationen i Tunisien (se sidan 2022/154 i detta nummer av EUT).

b) När ingen sådan fällande dom i brottmål meddelats mot den personen innan denne avled, ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta under en rimlig tid, om inte annat följer av artikel 12.5. Om ett civilrättsligt eller förvaltningsrättsligt förfarande för återvinning av förskingrade statliga medel inletts inom denna tidsperiod ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta till dess att domstolens beslut om återvinning av de förskingrade medlen har verkställts.”

2. I artikel 12 ska följande punkt läggas till:

”5. Rådet ska vid behov ändra förteckningen i bilaga I efter att ha fastställt att villkoren i artikel 2a för att bibehålla frysningen av tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den avlidna personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade inte längre är uppfyllda.”

Artikel 2

Denna förordning träder i kraft dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.

Utfärdad i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

KOMMISSIONENS DELEGERADE FÖRORDNING (EU) 2022/150**av den 17 november 2021****om ändring av rådets förordning (EG) nr 32/2000 vad gäller den volym sill eller strömming som får importeras enligt tullkvot 09.0006**

EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,

med beaktande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 32/2000 av den 17 december 1999 om öppnande och förvaltning av gemenskapens inom Gatt konsoliderade tullkvoter och av vissa andra av gemenskapens tullkvoter, om fastställande av närmare bestämmelser för ändring och anpassning av dessa kvoter och om upphävande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1808/95 ⁽¹⁾, särskilt artikel 10a, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Avtalet genom skriftväxling mellan Europeiska unionen och Konungariket Norge enligt artikel XXVIII i allmänna tull- och handelsavtalet (Gatt) 1994 om ändring av medgivanden när det gäller alla tullkvoter på EU:s lista CLXXV till följd av Förenade kungarikets utträde ur Europeiska unionen (nedan kallat *avtalet*), vilket ingicks genom rådets beslut (EU) 2021/803 ⁽²⁾, ändrar en tullkvot för sill och strömming med avseende på den volym som får importeras. Avtalet trädde i kraft den 10 maj 2021.
- (2) Den ändringen bör återspeglas i förordning (EG) nr 32/2000.
- (3) Förordning (EG) nr 32/2000 bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.
- (4) Eftersom detta avtal bör tillämpas så snart som möjligt bör denna förordning träda i kraft samma dag som den offentliggörs i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*. Eftersom den ändring som görs genom denna förordning är tillämplig på den tullkvotperiod som pågår samma dag som den träder i kraft är det nödvändigt att fastställa övergångsbestämmelser för den perioden.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

*Artikel 1***Ändring av förordning (EG) nr 32/2000**

I bilaga I till förordning (EG) nr 32/2000 ska volymen "31 888 ton" på raden för löpnummer 09.0006 i kolumnen med rubriken "Kvotvolym" ersättas med "33 496 ton"

*Artikel 2***Övergångsbestämmelser för den pågående tullkvotperioden**

1. Den volym som är tillgänglig för återstoden av den tullkvotperiod som pågår den dag då denna förordning träder i kraft ska vara skillnaden mellan den kvotvolym som ändrats genom denna förordning och den kvotvolym som redan tilldelats före den dag då denna förordning träder i kraft.

⁽¹⁾ EGT L 5, 8.1.2000, s. 1.

⁽²⁾ Rådets beslut (EU) 2021/803 av den 10 maj 2021 om ingående på unionens vägnar av avtalet genom skriftväxling mellan Europeiska unionen och Konungariket Norge enligt artikel XXVIII i allmänna tull- och handelsavtalet (Gatt) 1994 om ändring av medgivanden när det gäller alla tullkvoter på EU:s lista CLXXV till följd av Förenade kungarikets utträde ur Europeiska unionen (EUT L 181 21.5.2021, s. 1)

2. Om den kvot som är tillämplig den 3 februari 2022 är uttömd ska den nya tillgängliga kvotvolymen tilldelas aktörerna i kronologisk ordning efter godtagandedatum för deras tulldeklARATIONER för övergång till fri omsättning. Aktörer som importerade sina varor utanför kvoten innan denna förordning trädde i kraft ska, på egen begäran och i den mån återstoden av tullkvoten tillåter det, få ersättning för mellanskillnaden till den tull som redan betalats.

Artikel 3

Ikraftträdande

Denna förordning träder i kraft samma dag som den offentliggörs i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.

Utfärdad i Bryssel den 17 november 2021.

På kommissionens vägnar
Ursula VON DER LEYEN
Ordförande

BESLUT

RÅDETS BESLUT (Gusp) 2022/151

av den 3 februari 2022

om Europeiska unionens åtgärd till stöd för evakueringen av vissa särskilt utsatta personer från Afghanistan

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionen, särskilt artikel 28.1,

med beaktande av förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 10 december 2001 antog rådet gemensam åtgärd 2001/875/Gusp ⁽¹⁾ om utnämning av Europeiska unionens särskilda representant i Afghanistan (*den särskilda representanten*). Mandatet för den särskilda representanten har förlängts flera gånger, senast genom rådets beslut (Gusp) 2017/289 ⁽²⁾, till och med den 31 augusti 2017.
- (2) Den 30 maj 2007 antog rådet gemensam åtgärd 2007/369/Gusp ⁽³⁾ om inrättande av Europeiska unionens polisuppdrag i Afghanistan (Eupol Afghanistan). Eupol Afghanistan har förlängts flera gånger, senast genom rådets beslut (Gusp) 2016/2040 ⁽⁴⁾, till och med den 15 september 2017.
- (3) Den 1 maj 2021 inledde talibanerna en offensiv och började ta kontrollen över allt fler distrikt i Afghanistan. Den 15 augusti 2021 tog talibanernas styrkor kontrollen över Kabul och störtade den konstitutionellt baserade regeringen.
- (4) I ett uttalande av den 31 augusti 2021 om situationen i Afghanistan noterade rådet följande: "Evakueringen av våra medborgare och i möjligaste mån afghanska medborgare som har samarbetat med Europeiska unionen och dess medlemsstater, och deras familjer, har varit en prioriterad fråga och kommer att fortsätta."
- (5) Den 15 september 2021 noterade rådet i sina slutsatser om Afghanistan följande: "Sedan augusti 2021 har det internationella samfundet – inbegripet Europeiska unionen och dess medlemsstater – genomfört en gemensam insats, under extrema omständigheter, för att evakuera tusentals EU-medborgare och tredjelandsmedborgare, däribland afghaner som arbetat för diplomatiska beskickningar och andra utsatta afghaner, på grund av deras principbaserade engagemang för våra gemensamma värden. Detta var en verklig demonstration av EU:s solidaritet."
- (6) Under dessa exceptionella omständigheter har Europeiska utrikestjänsten (utrikestjänsten) sedan den 1 juni 2021 organiserat och skött evakueringen av afghaner, i synnerhet de som har arbetat för den särskilda representanten eller Eupol Afghanistan, andra särskilt utsatta afghaner som har samarbetat med unionen samt deras nära släktingar som står i beroendeställning till dem. Sådana evakueringar bör fortsätta under 2022. Utrikestjänsten upprättade den 1 oktober 2021 en förteckning över de personer som kan komma i fråga för evakuering. Den kan vid behov uppdateras av utrikestjänsten.

⁽¹⁾ Rådets gemensamma åtgärd 2001/875/CFSP av den 10 december 2001 om utnämning av Europeiska unionens särskilda representant i Afghanistan (EGT L 326, 11.12.2001, s. 1).

⁽²⁾ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2017/289 av den 17 februari 2017 om ändring av beslut (Gusp) 2015/2005 om förlängning av uppdraget för Europeiska unionens särskilda representant i Afghanistan (EUT L 42, 18.2.2017, s. 13).

⁽³⁾ Rådets gemensamma åtgärd 2007/369/Gusp av den 30 maj 2007 om inrättande av Europeiska unionens polisuppdrag i Afghanistan (Eupol AFGHANISTAN) (EUT L 139, 31.5.2007, s. 33).

⁽⁴⁾ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2016/2040 av den 21 november 2016 om ändring av beslut 2010/279/Gusp om Europeiska unionens polisuppdrag i Afghanistan (Eupol Afghanistan), med bestämmelser om dess avveckling (EUT L 314, 22.11.2016, s. 20).

- (7) En operativ insats inom ramen för den gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken bör stödja dessa evakueringar.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Mål och tillämpningsområde

1. Unionen ska stödja evakueringen från Afghanistan mellan den 1 juni 2021 och den 31 december 2022 av
 - a) tidigare medlemmar av personal som har arbetat för EU:s särskilda representant i Afghanistan (*den särskilda representanten*),
 - b) tidigare medlemmar av Eupol Afghanistans personal,
 - c) följande andra särskilt utsatta personer
 - tjänstemän eller andra yrkesverksamma inom Afghanistans politiska sektor eller säkerhetssektor (såsom domare, åklagare, polistjänstemän, militär personal och journalister), som har fått utbildning inom ramen för eller som har arbetat med genomförandet av unionens politik,
 - medlemmar av personalen hos tidigare leverantörer till Eupol Afghanistan och den särskilda representanten, och
 - medlemmar av personalen hos leverantörer till unionens delegation i Kabul vilka var anställda i den egenskapen under perioden 16 augusti 2019–15 augusti 2021, och
 - d) försörjningsberoende makar, barn, föräldrar och ogifta systrar till personer som förtecknas i leden a, b eller c.
2. Den evakuering som avses i punkt 1 ska organiseras och skötas av utrikestjänsten under ledning av unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik (*den höga representanten*).
3. Den höga representanten ska vara ansvarig för genomförandet av detta beslut.

Artikel 2

Finansiella bestämmelser

1. Det finansiella referensbeloppet för genomförandet av denna åtgärd ska uppgå till 1 990 000 EUR.
2. Alla utgifter ska förvaltas i enlighet med de regler och förfaranden som gäller för unionens allmänna budget.
3. Kommissionen ska övervaka att de utgifter som avses i punkt 2 förvaltas korrekt. I det syftet ska den ingå den överenskommelse som krävs med utrikestjänsten.

Artikel 3

Ikraftträdande och giltighetstid

Detta beslut träder i kraft samma dag som det antas.

Det ska tillämpas från och med den 1 juni 2021.

Utfärdat i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

RÅDETS BESLUT (GUSP) 2022/152**av den 3 februari 2022****om uppdatering av förteckningen över personer, grupper och enheter som omfattas av artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism och om upphävande av beslut (Gusp) 2021/1192**

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionen, särskilt artikel 29,

med beaktande av förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 27 december 2001 antog rådet gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp ⁽¹⁾.
- (2) Den 19 juli 2021 antog rådet beslut (Gusp) 2021/1192 ⁽²⁾ om uppdatering av förteckningen över personer, grupper och enheter som omfattas av artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp (nedan kallad *förteckningen*).
- (3) I enlighet med artikel 1.6 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är det nödvändigt att med jämna mellanrum se över namnen på personer, grupper och enheter i förteckningen för att säkerställa att det är berättigat att behålla dem i förteckningen.
- (4) I detta beslut anges resultatet av den översyn som rådet har genomfört med avseende på de personer, grupper och enheter på vilka artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är tillämpliga.
- (5) Rådet har kontrollerat att behöriga myndigheter, i enlighet med vad som anges i artikel 1.4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp, har fattat beslut beträffande alla personer, grupper och enheter i förteckningen om att de har deltagit i terroristhandlingar i den mening som avses i artikel 1.2 och 1.3 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp. Rådet har också konstaterat att de personer, grupper och enheter på vilka artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är tillämpliga bör fortsätta att vara föremål för de särskilda restriktiva åtgärder som anges i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp.
- (6) Rådet har konstaterat att det inte längre finns någon grund för att behålla en person på förteckningen.
- (7) Förteckningen bör uppdateras i enlighet med detta, och beslut (Gusp) 2021/1192 bör upphävas.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Förteckningen över de personer, grupper och enheter på vilka artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp är tillämpliga återges i bilagan till detta beslut.

Artikel 2

Beslut (Gusp) 2021/1192 ska upphöra att gälla.

⁽¹⁾ Rådets gemensamma ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp av den 27 december 2001 om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism (EGT L 344, 28.12.2001, s. 93).

⁽²⁾ Rådets beslut (Gusp) 2021/1192 av den 19 juli 2021 om uppdatering av förteckningen över personer, grupper och enheter som omfattas av artiklarna 2, 3 och 4 i gemensam ståndpunkt 2001/931/Gusp om tillämpning av särskilda åtgärder i syfte att bekämpa terrorism och om upphävande av beslut (Gusp) 2021/142 (EUT L 258, 20.7.2021, s. 42).

Artikel 3

Detta beslut träder i kraft dagen efter det att det har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Utfärdat i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

BILAGA

FÖRTECKNING ÖVER PERSONER, GRUPPER OCH ENHETER SOM AVSES I ARTIKEL 1

I. PERSONER

1. ABDOLLAHI Hamed (ABDULLAHI Hamed) (alias Mustafa Abdullahi), född 11.8.1960 i Iran. Passnummer: D9004878.
2. AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed (AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Huseyn Mohamed), född i Al Ihsa (Saudiarabien), saudisk medborgare.
3. AL-YACOUB Ibrahim Salih Mohammed (AL-YACUB Ibrahim Salih Mohamed), född 16.10.1966 i Tarut (Saudiarabien), saudisk medborgare.
4. ARBABSAR Manssor (ARBABSAR Mansur) (alias Mansour Arbabsar), född 6.3.1955 eller 15.3.1955 i Iran. Iransk och amerikansk medborgare, passnummer: C2002515 (Iran); passnummer: 477845448 (Förenta staterna). Nationellt ID-nummer: 07442833, giltigt t.o.m. 15.3.2016 (amerikanskt körkort).
5. ASSADI Assadollah (alias Assadollah Asadi), född 22.12.1971 i Teheran (Iran), iransk medborgare. Iranskt diplomatpass nummer: D9016657.
6. BOUYERI Mohammed (alias Abu Zubair, alias Sobiari, alias Abu Zoubiar), född 8.3.1978 i Amsterdam (Nederländerna).
7. EL HAJJ Hassan Hassan, född 22.3.1988 i Zaghdraiya, Saida, Libanon, kanadensisk medborgare. Passnummer: JX446643 (Kanada).
8. HASHEMI MOGHADAM Saeid, född 6.8.1962 i Teheran (Iran), iransk medborgare. Passnummer: D9016290, giltigt t.o.m. 4.2.2019.
9. IZZ-AL-DIN Hasan (IZZ-AL-DIN Hassan) (alias Garbaya, Ahmed, alias Sa'id, alias Salwwan, Samir), Libanon, född 1963 i Libanon, libanesisk medborgare.
10. MELIAD Farah, född 5.11.1980 i Sydney (Australien), australisk medborgare. Passnummer: M2719127 (Australien).
11. MOHAMMED Khalid Sheikh (alias Ali, Salem, alias Bin Khalid, Fahd Bin Adballah, alias Henin, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, alias Wadood, Khalid Abdul), född 14.4.1965 eller 1.3.1964 i Pakistan, passnummer 488555.
12. SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (alias Abdol Reza Shala'i, alias Abd-al Reza Shalai, alias Abdorreza Shahlai, alias Abdolreza Shahla'i, alias Abdul-Reza Shahlae, alias Hajj [Haj] Yusef, alias Haji Yusif, alias Hajji Yasir, alias Hajji Yusif, alias Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), född omkring 1957 i Iran. Adresser: 1. Kermanshah, Iran, 2. Mehran-basen (militärbas), provinsen Ilam, Iran.
13. SHAKURI Ali Gholam, född omkring 1965 i Teheran, Iran.

II. GRUPPER OCH ENHETER

1. "Abu Nidal Organisation" – "ANO" ("Abu Nidals grupp") (alias "Fatah Revolutionary Council", alias "Arab Revolutionary Brigades", alias "Black September", alias "Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims").
2. "Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade" ("Al-Aqsa-martyrernas brigad").
3. "Al-Aqsa e.V."
4. "Babbar Khalsa".

5. "Communist Party of the Philippines" ("Filippinernas kommunistparti"), inbegripet "New People's Army" – "NPA" ("Nya folkarmén"), Filippinerna.
 6. Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry for Intelligence and Security (den inre säkerhetstjänsten vid iranska underrättelse- och säkerhetsministeriet).
 7. "Gama'a al-Islamiyya" ("Jamaat al-islamiyya") (alias "Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya") ("Islamic Group", "Islamiska gruppen" – "IG").
 8. "İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi" ("Förtrupperna för ett islamiskt Stororienten") – "IBDA-C" ("Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front").
 9. "Hamas", inbegripet "Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem" ("Izz al-Din al-Qassam-brigaderna").
 10. "Hizballah Military Wing" ("Hizbollahs väpnade gren") (alias "Hezbollah Military Wing", alias "Hizbullah Military Wing", alias "Hizbollah Military Wing", alias "Hisbollah Military Wing", alias "Hizbu'llah Military Wing", alias "Hizb Allah Military Wing", alias "Jihad Council" (och alla underställda enheter, inbegripet dess External Security Organisation)).
 11. "Hizbul Mujahideen" ("Hizbul mujahidin") – "HM".
 12. "Khalistan Zindabad Force" – "KZF".
 13. "Kurdistan Workers' Party" ("Kurdistans arbetarparti") – "PKK" (alias "KADEK" ["Kadek"], alias "KONGRA-GEL" ["Kongra-Gel"]).
 14. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" ("Tamilska befrielsestridarna") – "LTTE".
 15. "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" ("Nationella befrielsearmén") ("National Liberation Army").
 16. "Palestinian Islamic Jihad" ("Palestinska islamiska jihad") – "PIJ".
 17. "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" ("Folkfronten för Palestinas befrielse") – "PFLP".
 18. "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command" ("Folkfronten för Palestinas befrielse – Generalkommandot") (alias "PFLP – General Command").
 19. "Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi" ("Folkets revolutionära befrielsefront/parti") – "DHKP/C" (alias "Devrimci Sol" ("Revolutionary Left"), alias "Dev Sol") ("Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party").
 20. "Sendero Luminoso" – "SL" ("Den lysande stigen").
 21. "Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan" ("Kurdistans frihetsfalkar") – "TAK" (alias "Kurdistan Freedom Falcons", alias "Kurdistan Freedom Hawks" ["Kurdistans frihetshökar"]).
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RÅDETS BESLUT (GUSP) 2022/153**av den 3 februari 2022****om ändring av beslut 2011/486/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan**

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionen, särskilt artikel 29,

med beaktande av rådets beslut 2011/486/Gusp av den 1 augusti 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer, grupper, företag och enheter med anledning av situationen i Afghanistan ⁽¹⁾,

med beaktande av förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 1 augusti 2011 antog rådet beslut 2011/486/Gusp.
- (2) Den 22 december 2021 antog Förenta nationernas (FN) säkerhetsråd resolution 2615 (2021), där man uttryckte djup oro över den humanitära situationen i Afghanistan, inklusive den osäkra livsmedelsförsörjningen, och erinrade om att kvinnor, barn och minoriteter har drabbats oproportionerligt hårt.
- (3) FN:s säkerhetsråd beslutade, i sin resolution 2615 (2021), att humanitärt bistånd och annan verksamhet som stöder grundläggande mänskliga behov i Afghanistan inte strider mot punkt 1 a i FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 2255 (2015), samtidigt som leverantörer som åberopar FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 2615 (2021) starkt uppmuntras att göra rimliga ansträngningar för att minimera uppkomsten av fördelar för personer eller enheter som är uppförda på sanktionsförteckningen enligt FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 1988 (2011), oavsett om dessa fördelar är resultatet av direkt tillhandahållande eller omdirigering.
- (4) Beslut 2011/486/Gusp bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.
- (5) Det krävs ytterligare insatser av unionen för att genomföra vissa åtgärder i detta beslut.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

I artikel 4 i beslut 2011/486/Gusp ska följande punkt läggas till:

”6. Punkterna 1 och 2 ska inte tillämpas på hantering och utbetalning av penningmedel, andra finansiella tillgångar eller ekonomiska resurser och tillhandahållande av varor och tjänster som är nödvändiga för att säkerställa snabbt tillhandahållande av humanitärt bistånd och annan verksamhet som tillgodoser grundläggande mänskliga behov i Afghanistan eller för att stödja sådan verksamhet.”

*Artikel 2*Detta beslut träder i kraft dagen efter det att det har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

Utfärdat i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

⁽¹⁾ EUT L 199, 2.8.2011, s. 57.

RÅDETS BESLUT (Gusp) 2022/154**av den 3 februari 2022****om ändring av beslut 2011/72/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter med tanke på situationen i Tunisien**

EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionen, särskilt artikel 29,

med beaktande av förslaget från unionens höga representant för utrikes frågor och säkerhetspolitik, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 31 januari 2011 antog rådet beslut 2011/72/Gusp⁽¹⁾.
- (2) På grundval av en översyn av beslut 2011/72/Gusp är det nödvändigt att fastställa de villkor under vilka en avlidens persons tillgångar kan fortsätta att vara frusna.
- (3) Beslut 2011/72/Gusp bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

I artikel 1 i beslut 2011/72/Gusp ska följande punkter införas:

"2a. Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av artikel 5, gäller följande om en person som förtecknas i bilagan avlider:

- a) När en fällande dom i brottmål för förskingring av statliga medel meddelats mot den personen innan denne avled, ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta till dess att domstolsbeslut om återvinning av de förskingrade statliga medlen och betalning av böter har verkställts.
- b) När ingen sådan fällande dom i brottmål meddelats mot den personen innan denne avled, ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta under en rimlig tid, om inte annat följer av punkt 4. Om ett civilrättsligt eller förvaltningsrättsligt förfarande för återvinning av förskingrade statliga medel inletts inom denna tidsperiod ska de tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade förbli frysta till dess att domstolens beslut om återvinning av de förskingrade medlen har verkställts.

2b. Rådet ska vid behov ändra förteckningen i bilagan efter att ha fastställt att villkoren i punkt 2a för att bibehålla frysningsen av tillgångar och ekonomiska resurser som tillhörde den avlidna personen eller som han eller hon ägde, innehade eller kontrollerade inte längre är uppfyllda."

Artikel 2

Detta beslut träder i kraft dagen efter det att det har offentliggjorts i *Europeiska unionens officiella tidning*.

⁽¹⁾ Rådets beslut 2011/72/Gusp av den 31 januari 2011 om restriktiva åtgärder mot vissa personer och enheter med tanke på situationen i Tunisien (EUT L 28, 2.2.2011, s. 62).

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Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

L 25/19

Utfärdat i Bryssel den 3 februari 2022.

På rådets vägnar
J.-Y. LE DRIAN
Ordförande

KOMMISSIONENS GENOMFÖRANDEBESLUT (EU) 2022/155

av den 31 januari 2022

om förlängning av den åtgärd som Förenade kungarikets arbetsmiljömyndighet vidtagit för att i enlighet med artikel 55.1 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 528/2012 tillåta tillhandahållande på marknaden och användning av biocidprodukten Clinisept + Skin Disinfectant

[delgivet med nr C(2022) 457]

(Endast den engelska texten är giltig)

EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT

med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,

med beaktande av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 528/2012 av den 22 maj 2012 om tillhandahållande på marknaden och användning av biocidprodukter⁽¹⁾, särskilt artikel 55.1 tredje stycket jämförd med artikel 5.4 i protokollet om Irland/Nordirland till avtalet om Förenade konungariket Storbritannien och Nordirlands utträde ur Europeiska unionen och Europeiska atomenergigemenskapen, och

av följande skäl:

- (1) Den 5 maj 2021 antog Förenade kungarikets arbetsmiljömyndighet på Nordirlands arbetsmiljömyndighets vägnar (nedan kallad *Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet*) ett beslut i enlighet med artikel 55.1 första stycket i förordning (EU) nr 528/2012 om att tillåta tillhandahållande på marknaden och användning av biocidprodukten Clinisept + Skin Disinfectant, till och med den 1 november 2021 (nedan kallad *åtgärden*). Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet har i enlighet med artikel 55.1 andra stycket i den förordningen informerat kommissionen och medlemsstaternas behöriga myndigheter om åtgärden och skälen för denna.
- (2) Enligt den information som Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet har lämnat var åtgärden nödvändig för att skydda folkhälsan. Den 11 mars 2020 förklarade Världshälsoorganisationen (WHO) att coronavirusutbrottet (covid-19) kunde betecknas som en pandemi. Förenade kungarikets regering förklarade att risken för Förenade kungariket var "hög" och den 23 mars 2020 trädde restriktiva åtgärder i kraft. WHO rekommenderar att alkoholbaserade handdesinfektionsmedel används som en förebyggande åtgärd mot spridning av covid-19, som ett alternativ till att man tvättar händerna med tvål och vatten.
- (3) Clinisept + Skin Disinfectant innehåller aktivt klor frisatt från natriumhypoklorit som verksamt ämne. Aktivt klor frisatt från natriumhypoklorit är godkänt för användning i biocidprodukter i produkttyp 1 (mänsklig hygien) enligt definitionen i bilaga V till förordning (EU) nr 528/2012.
- (4) Efter att covid-19-pandemin bröt ut har det varit mycket stor efterfrågan på handdesinfektionsmedel i Förenade kungariket, vilket har resulterat i en aldrig tidigare skådad brist på sådana produkter. Innan åtgärden vidtogs var endast ett fåtal handdesinfektionsmedel godkända i Förenade kungariket i enlighet med förordning (EU) nr 528/2012. Covid-19 är ett allvarligt hot mot folkhälsan i Förenade kungariket och ytterligare handdesinfektionsmedel är av avgörande betydelse för att motverka smittspridningen.
- (5) Den 29 oktober 2021 tog kommissionen emot en motiverad begäran från Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet, på Nordirlands arbetsmiljömyndighets vägnar, om förlängning av åtgärden i Förenade kungariket med avseende på Nordirland i enlighet med artikel 55.1 tredje stycket i förordning (EU) nr 528/2012. Begäran grundades på farhågor om att covid-19 skulle kunna äventyra folkhälsan även efter den 1 november 2021 samt på det faktum att det är viktigt att tillåta ytterligare handdesinfektionsmedel på marknaden för att motverka den fara som covid-19 utgör.

(1) EUT L 167, 27.6.2012, s. 1.

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- (6) Enligt Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet är efterfrågan på handdesinfektionsmedel fortfarande hög och därför behöver åtgärden i Förenade kungariket med avseende på Nordirland förlängas.
- (7) De företag som beviljats undantag för handdesinfektionsmedel i enlighet med artikel 55.1 första stycket i förordning (EU) nr 528/2012 efter Världshälsoorganisationens förklaring om pandemin har uppmanats att ansöka om reguljärt produktgodkännande så snart som möjligt. Hittills har dock inga nya ansökningar om reguljärt produktgodkännande inkommit till Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet.
- (8) Eftersom covid-19 fortfarande utgör en fara för folkhälsan, och eftersom denna fara inte i tillräcklig utsträckning kan motverkas i Förenade kungariket med avseende på Nordirland om inte ytterligare handdesinfektionsmedel tillåts på marknaden, bör Förenade kungarikets behöriga myndighet få förlänga åtgärden i Förenade kungariket med avseende på Nordirland.
- (9) Med tanke på att åtgärden löpte ut den 1 november 2021 bör detta beslut ha retroaktiv verkan.
- (10) De åtgärder som föreskrivs i detta beslut är förenliga med yttrandet från ständiga kommittén för biocidprodukter.

HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.

Artikel 1

Förenade kungarikets arbetsmiljömyndighet får på Nordirlands arbetsmiljömyndighets vägnar förlänga åtgärden till och med den 6 maj 2023 i syfte att tillåta tillhandahållande på marknaden och användning av biocidprodukten Clinisept + Skin Disinfectant i Förenade kungariket med avseende på Nordirland.

Artikel 2

Detta beslut riktar sig till Förenade kungarikets arbetsmiljömyndighet, som agerar på Nordirlands arbetsmiljömyndighets vägnar.

Det ska tillämpas från och med den 2 november 2021.

Utfärdat i Bryssel den 31 januari 2022.

På kommissionens vägnar
Stella KYRIAKIDES
Ledamot av kommissionen

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Policy paper

Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations

Updated 26 November 2021

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Proscription criteria

What is a proscribed organisation?

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is concerned in terrorism, and it is proportionate to do. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation:

- commits or participates in acts of terrorism
- prepares for terrorism
- promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism)
- is otherwise concerned in terrorism

What is meant by ‘terrorism’ in the proscription context?

“Terrorism” as defined in the Act, means the use or threat of action which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and must be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

What determines whether proscription is proportionate?

If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary will consider whether to exercise their discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Home Secretary will take into account other factors, including:

- the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities
- the specific threat that it poses to the UK
- the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas
- the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK
- the need to support other members of the international community in

the global fight against terrorism.

Aliases

Section 3(6) of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows the Home Secretary to specify by order that an alternative name or alias is to be treated as another name for a proscribed organisation listed in Schedule 2 to the Act. The Home Secretary can make an order where they believe the proscribed organisation is operating under that alternative name or that an organisation operating under a name not included in Schedule 2 is for all practical purposes the same as the proscribed organisation.

The use of an alternative name which has not been formally recognised in an order does not prevent the police and Crown Prosecution Service from taking action against an individual for proscription offences. For a successful prosecution, it is necessary to demonstrate that (1) the organisation in question, whatever name it professes to be operating under, is for all practical purposes the same as the proscribed organisation listed in Schedule 2; and (2) that the person in question has committed one of the proscription offences in relation to that organisation.

Proscription offences

Proscription makes it a criminal offence to:

- belong, or profess to belong, to a proscribed organisation in the UK or overseas (section 11 of the Act)
- invite support for a proscribed organisation (the support invited need not be material support, such as the provision of money or other property, and can also include moral support or approval) (section 12(1))
- express an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation, reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation (section 12(1A))
- arrange, manage or assist in arranging or managing a meeting in the knowledge that the meeting is to support or further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation (section 12(2)); or to address a meeting if the purpose of the address is to encourage support for, or further the activities of, a proscribed organisation

(section 12(3))

- wear clothing or carry or display articles in public in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation (section 13)
- publish an image of an item of clothing or other article, such as a flag or logo, in the same circumstances (section 13(1A))

What are the penalties for a proscription offence?

The penalties for proscription offences under sections 11 and 12 are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or a fine. The maximum penalty for a section 13 offence is 6 months in prison and/or a fine not exceeding £5,000.

Do the proscription offences apply to all designated and proscribed organisations?

No, the proscription offences set out in sections 11 to 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended by the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019) apply in relation to proscribed organisations i.e. those specified in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. These offences do not apply in relation to groups subject to other designation or sanction regimes such as an asset freeze in the UK as a result of a UN Al Qa'ida, EU CP 931 or UK domestic, asset freeze unless that entity is also proscribed in the UK.

How does proscription help disrupt terrorism?

In addition to the proscription offences, proscription can support other disruptive activity including the use of immigration powers such as exclusion, prosecution for other offences, encouraging removal of on-line material, messaging and EU asset freezes. The resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and are, therefore, liable to be seized.

Do the offences relating to a proscribed organisation apply overseas?

Yes. The section 11 offence of membership of a proscribed organisation has had extra-territorial jurisdiction since 2006. From 12 April 2019, the section 12 and 13 offences of inviting or recklessly expressing support for a proscribed organisation, and the offences of displaying or publishing articles, also have extra-territorial jurisdiction for British nationals and UK residents. The offences do not prevent non-governmental organisations

interacting with proscribed organisations overseas.

Is it an offence to arrange or manage a meeting relating to a proscribed organisation?

Section 12(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that it is an offence to arrange or manage (or assist in the arrangement or management) of a meeting in the knowledge that it is to support a proscribed organisation, to further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. It is also an offence under section 12(3) to address a meeting if the purpose of the address is to encourage support for a proscribed organisation or to further its activities. However, section 12(4) provides a defence, in the case of a private meeting addressed by a member of a proscribed organisation, if a person can prove that they had no reasonable cause to believe that the address would support the proscribed organisation or advance its terrorist activities.

Further, the explanatory notes to the Terrorism Act 2000 (which are designed to provide clarification of the legislation's intent and can be taken into account by the prosecuting authorities when considering whether prosecution is in the public interest and by courts in interpreting Parliament's intentions) explain that the defence in section 12(4) is intended to permit the arrangement of 'genuinely benign' meetings. A 'genuinely benign' meeting is interpreted as a meeting at which the terrorist activities of the group are not promoted or encouraged, for example, a meeting designed to encourage a designated group to engage in a peace process or facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid where this does not involve knowingly transferring assets to a designated organisation.

Deproscription

The Home Secretary will consider deproscription on application only. Section 4 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that the organisation or any person affected by a proscription can submit a signed, written application to the Home Secretary requesting that they consider whether a specified organisation should be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. Proscription decisions in relation to Northern Ireland are a matter for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, therefore deproscription applications for Northern Ireland related groups should be made to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The application must set out the

grounds on which it is made. The precise requirements are contained in the Proscribed Organisations (Applications for Deproscription etc) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2299).

The Home Secretary or Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is required to determine the application within 90 days from the day after it is received. If the deproscription application is refused the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC). The Commission will allow an appeal if it considers that the decision to refuse deproscription was flawed, applying judicial review principles. Either party can seek leave to appeal the POAC's decision at the Court of Appeal.

If the Home Secretary or Secretary of State for Northern Ireland agrees to deproscribe the organisation, or following a successful appeal POAC orders the Secretary of State to lay an order before Parliament for the organisation to be deproscribed it voted into force, the organisation will be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. The Order is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure so must be agreed by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

Section 10 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that evidence of anything done in relation to a deproscription application is not admissible as evidence in proceedings against an individual for an offence under that Act.

Mujaheddin e Khalq (MeK)

The MEK, also known as the Peoples' Mujaheddin of Iran (PMOI), was removed from the list of proscribed groups in June 2008 as a result of judgments of the POAC and the Court of Appeal.

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)

ISYF was removed from the list of proscribed groups in March 2016 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation.

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

HIG was removed from the list of proscribed groups in December 2017 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation.

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

LIFG was removed from the list of proscribed groups in November 2019 following receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation.

Asset freezing

There are also domestic and international financial asset freezing sanctions regimes that involve the listing of terrorist organisations and individuals. The current consolidated list of asset freeze targets designated by the United Nations, European Union and United Kingdom, under current financial sanctions regimes is [available on GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets). (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets>)

List of proscribed international terrorist groups

- 78 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000
- 14 organisations in Northern Ireland that were proscribed under previous legislation

The information about the groups' aims was given to Parliament when they were proscribed.

Users should bear in mind that there is no universal standard for transliterating Arabic and other languages into Latin characters. Therefore, the spelling of the names of proscribed organisations appearing in other publications may differ slightly from that given in this list.

17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17) - Proscribed March 2001

Aims to highlight and protest at what it deems to be imperialist and corrupt actions, using violence. Formed in 1974 to oppose the Greek military Junta, its stance was initially anti-Junta and anti-US, which it blamed for supporting the Junta.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades, including the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions (AAB) - Proscribed June 2014

AAB is an Islamist militant group aligned with Al Qa'ida and the global

jihad movement, currently fighting in Syria and Lebanon. The group began operating in Pakistan in 2009. The Lebanese branch uses the name the Ziyad al Jarrah Battalion and is named after Lebanese 9/11 hijacker Ziyad al Jarrah who participated in the hijacking and crash of United Flight 93.

AAB has increased its operational pace since the onset of the Syrian insurgency, claiming responsibility for a rocket attack launched from Lebanon into northern Israel in August 2013. On 19 November 2013, AAB claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut, which killed at least 22 people and wounded over 140.

On 19 February 2014, the group's media wing, the Al-Awzaey Media Foundation, announced on Twitter and YouTube that the group claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings near the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut killing 11 and wounding 130, in revenge for actions by Iran and Hizballah, in Lebanon and Syria.

The group has threatened to launch further terrorist attacks and has demanded that the Lebanese government free imprisoned jihadists. It has also threatened attacks on Western targets in the Middle East.

Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) - Proscribed March 2001

ANO's principal aim is the destruction of the state of Israel. It is also hostile to 'reactionary' Arab regimes and states supporting Israel.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - Proscribed March 2001

The precise aims of the ASG are unclear, but its objectives appear to include the establishment of an autonomous Islamic state in the Southern Philippine island of Mindanao.

Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) - Proscribed November 2014

The group is a jihadist group based in Egypt and is believed to be a splinter group of Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM), which was proscribed on 4 April. Ajnad Misr has stated that it seeks to protect Egyptian Muslims and avenge alleged abuse against them by the Egyptian security services.

Ajnad Misr is believed to have been active since 20 November 2013, when it attacked an Egyptian checkpoint. It announced its establishment on 23 January 2014 and has claimed responsibility a number of attacks on Egyptian security forces in a military campaign. The claims were made

in three communiqués posted on its Facebook and Twitter accounts on 23 January, 24 January, and 31 January. On the jihadi forum al-Fida', Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, referred to Ajnad Misr in a communiqué issued on January 28, expressing support for the group and identifying it as being responsible for two attacks in Greater Cairo in January. Ajnad Misr has claimed responsibility for the bombing at Cairo University on 2 April that resulted in the death of a policeman and injuries to three others.

Al-Ashtar Brigades including Saraya al-Ashtar, Wa'ad Allah Brigades, Islamic Allah Brigades, Imam al-Mahdi Brigades and al-Haydariyah Brigades - Proscribed December 2017

The group is a Shia militant extremist organisation that was established during 2013. Its aim is to overthrow the Bahraini al-Khalifa ruling family through violent militant operations. It lists the ruling al-Khalifa family, Bahrain security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attacks. The group has been responsible for numerous attacks since being established, which it has claimed responsibility for, including:

- on 1 January 2017 – 10 inmates (all convicted of terrorism offences in Bahrain) were broken out of Jaw Reformation and Rehabilitation Centre, which led to the death of a police officer
- an IED attack in a bus station in Sitrah, which was claimed by the group under the name Wa'ad Allah Brigades on 7 February 2017
- an attack on a police vehicle near the village of al Qadeem on 7 July 2017

The group has promoted violent activity against the Bahraini government, as well as the British, American and Saudi Arabian governments on social media.

Al-Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI) - Proscribed March 2001

The main aim of GI is to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state through all means, including the use of violence. Some members also want the removal of Western influence from the Arab world.

Al Ghurabaa - Proscribed July 2006

Al Ghurabaa / The Saved Sect is an Islamist group which seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Shariah law. The group first emerged as Al Muhajiroun in the UK, in 1996, led by Omar Bakri

Muhammed, who then publicly disbanded the organisation in 2004. The organisation reformed in 2004 under the names Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect. While the Group has some links to groups overseas, it is based and operates within the UK.

The government laid Orders, in January 2010 and November 2011, which provide that “Al Muhajiroun”, “Islam4UK”, “Call to Submission”, “Islamic Path”, “London School of Sharia” and “Muslims Against Crusades” should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed under the names Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect.

The government laid an Order, in June 2014 recognising “Need4Khilafah”, the “Shariah Project” and the “Islamic Dawah Association” as the same as the organisation proscribed as Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect, which is also known as “Al Muhajiroun”.

Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) - Proscribed October 2005

The main aims of AIAI are to establish a radical Sunni Islamic state in Somalia, and to regain the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as Somali territory via an insurgent campaign. Militant elements within AIAI are suspected of having aligned themselves with the ‘global jihad’ ideology of Al Qa’ida, and to have operated in support of Al Qa’ida in the East Africa region.

Al Murabitun - Proscribed April 2014

Al Murabitun resulted from a merger of two Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQ-M) splinter groups that are active in Mali and Algeria, the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, the Al Mulathamine Battalion which included the commando element ‘Those Who Sign in Blood’. The merger was announced in a public statement in August 2013.

Al Murabitun aspires to unite Muslims from “the Nile to the Atlantic” and has affirmed its loyalty to al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the emir of the Afghan Taleban, Mullah Omar.

As at 3 April 2014, the group has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks since the merger but both precursor groups have participated in a number of terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom during the past 13 months. Belmokhtar’s group was responsible for the attack against the In Amenas gas facility in January 2013 that resulted in the death of over thirty people including Britons. In May 2013 the two groups targeted a military barracks in Agadez, Niger and a uranium mine

in Arlit which supplies French nuclear reactors. The suicide attack in Agadez resulted in the deaths of at least twenty people.

Despite previously separating themselves from AQM, citing leadership issues and the desire to expand their control, both precursor groups continued to cooperate and fight alongside AQM fighters in Mali and other regions of West Africa. This activity has continued since the merger.

Al-Mukhtar Brigades including Saraya al-Mukhtar - Proscribed December 2017

The group is a Shia militant organisation that was established during 2013. It lists the al-Khalifa ruling family, Bahrain security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attacks. The group's activities include the continued promotion and glorification of terrorism via social media throughout 2017.

Al Qa'ida (AQ) - Proscribed March 2001

Inspired and led by Usama Bin Laden, its aims are the expulsion of Western forces from Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Israel and the end of Western influence in the Muslim world.

The government laid Orders, in July 2013 December 2016 and May 2017, which provided that the "al-Nusrah Front (ANF)", "Jabhat al-Nusrah li-ahl al Sham", "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" and "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham" should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed under the name Al Qa'ida.

Al Shabaab - Proscribed March 2010

Al Shabaab is an organisation based in Somalia which has waged a violent campaign against the Somali Transitional Federal government and African Union peacekeeping forces since 2007, employing a range of terrorist tactics including suicide bombings, indiscriminate attacks and assassinations. Its principal aim is the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia, but the organisation has publicly pledged its allegiance to Usama Bin Laden and has announced an intention to combine its campaign in the Horn of Africa with Al Qa'ida's aims of global jihad.

Ansar Al Islam (AI) - Proscribed October 2005

AI is a radical Sunni Salafi group from northeast Iraq around Halabja. The group is anti-Western and opposes the influence of the US in Iraqi

Kurdistan and the relationship of the KDP and PUK to Washington. AI has been involved in operations against Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).

Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B) which translates as the Partisans of Islamic Law - Proscribed November 2014

AAS-B is a Sunni Islamist militia group that has an anti-Western rhetoric and advocates the implementation of strict Sharia law. AAS-B came into being in 2011, after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The group was led by Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi and Ahmed Abu Khattalah is an AAS-B senior leader.

AAS-B is involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, frequent assassinations, and attempted assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya. On 11 September 2012, members of AAS-B took part in the attack against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya, killing the US ambassador and three other Americans. In September 2012, Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, in an interview openly stated his support for Al Qa'ida's strategy but denied any links to the organisation. He also confirmed AAS-B had demolished and desecrated Sufi shrines in Benghazi, which the group regard as idolatrous.

AAS-B used its online presence to denounce the 2013 capture and removal from Libya of al Qa'ida operative Abu Anas al-Libi, by American military forces. In August 2013, Ahmed Abu Khattala, a senior leader of the group, was charged with playing a significant role in last year's attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi.

AAS-B continues to pose a threat to Libya and Western interests and is alleged to have links to proscribed organisation Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia and Al Qa'ida.

The US designated AAS-B as a terrorist organisation in January 2014 and the UN listed AAS-B on 19 November

Ansar Al Sharia-Tunisia (AAS-T) - Proscribed April 2014

Ansar Al Sharia-Tunisia (AAS-T) is a radical Islamist group founded in April 2011. The group aims to establish Sharia law in Tunisia and eliminate Western influence. The group is ideologically aligned to Al Qa'ida (AQ) and has links to AQ affiliated groups. It is reported that the group announced its loyalty to AQM in September 2013.

AAS-T's leader, Seif Allah Ibn Hussein also known as Abu Ayadh al-Tunis,

is a former AQ veteran combatant in Afghanistan. He has been hiding following issue of a warrant for his arrest relating to an allegation of inciting the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis that killed four people in September 2012.

Extremists believed to have links with AAS-T are assessed to be responsible for the attacks in October 2011 on a television station and, in June 2012, an attack on an art exhibit. AAS-T is assessed to be responsible for the attacks on the US Embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. The Tunisian government believe AAS-T was responsible for the assassination of two National Coalition Assembly members; Chokri Belaid in February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013.

Additionally, elements of the group are believed to have been involved in the attempted suicide attack, in October 2013, at a hotel in a tourist resort in Sousse where a significant number of British tourists were staying.

Ansar Al Sunna (AS) - Proscribed October 2005

AS is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist extremist group based in central Iraq and what was the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) of Northern Iraq. The group aims to expel all foreign influences from Iraq and create a fundamentalist Islamic state.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) - Proscribed April 2014

ABM is an Al Qa'ida inspired militant Islamist group based in the northern Sinai region of Egypt. The group is said to recruit within Egypt and abroad and aims to create an Egyptian state ruled by Sharia law.

ABM is assessed to be responsible for a number of attacks on security forces in Egypt since 2011. The attacks appear to have increased since the overthrow of the Morsi government in July 2013. The group's reach goes beyond the Sinai, with the group claiming responsibility for a number of attacks in Cairo and cross-border attacks against Israel. ABM has undertaken attacks using vehicle borne improvised explosive devices and surface-to-air missiles. Examples of attacks that the group has claimed responsibility for include:

- in September 2013 an attack on the Egyptian Interior Minister in which a UK national was seriously injured
- the attack on a police compound in Mansoura on 24 December 2013, killing at least 16 people, including 14 police officers

- an attack on a tourist bus in which three South Koreans and their Egyptian driver died on 16 January 2014

Ansaroul Islam also known as Ansar ul Islam and Ansaroul Islam Lil Irchad Wal Jihad - Proscribed March 2019

Ansaroul Islam's overarching aim is to establish dominance over the historic Fulani - kingdom of Djelgoodji (northern Burkina Faso and central Mali) and the implementation of its own strict Salafi Sharia. The group announced its existence on 16 December 2016 and claimed responsibility for an attack on an army outpost in Nassoumboa (Burkina Faso) which killed at least 12 soldiers.

Ansaroul Islam seeks to eradicate Burkinabe state presence from the country's northern regions. Doing so, through attacks on government interests, including on: police stations, schools and civic officials; catalysing the departure of others from the region. Typical methodologies include small arms fire and IEDs. Further, the predominantly Fulani Ansaroul Islam frequently target other ethnic groups leading to substantial internal displacement of persons. Ansaroul Islam is highly likely supported by the federation of Al Qa'ida groups in Mali, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Ansaroul Islam is designated as a terrorist group by the US.

Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa) (Ansaru) - Proscribed November 2012

Ansaru is an Islamist terrorist organisation based in Nigeria. They emerged in 2012 and are motivated by an anti-Nigerian government and anti-Western agenda. They are broadly aligned with Al Qa'ida.

Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA) - Proscribed March 2001

The aim of the GIA is to create an Islamic state in Algeria using all necessary means, including violence.

Asbat Al-Ansar (League of Partisans or Band of Helpers) - Proscribed November 2002

Sometimes going by the aliases of 'The Abu Muhjin' group/faction or the 'Jama'at Nour', this group aims to enforce its extremist interpretation of Islamic law within Lebanon and, increasingly, further afield.

Atomwaffen Division (AWD) also known as National Socialist Order (NSO) – Proscribed April 2021

AWD is a predominately US-based white supremacist group that was active between 2015 to 2020. AWD celebrates a collection of essays which advocate the use of violence in order to bring about a fascist, white ethno-state by initiating the collapse of modern society by means of a 'race war'. This ideology has become known as 'accelerationism'. AWD's online propaganda has encouraged and promoted terrorist acts and this content likely remains influential among accelerationist terrorist groups. AWD has inspired, at least in part, several loosely affiliated franchise groups abroad, including Feuerkrieg Division, which was proscribed in July 2020.

In March 2020, AWD claimed that it had disbanded following pressure from US law enforcement agencies. In July 2020, National Socialist Order (NSO) announced itself online as AWD's 'successor'. AWD is almost certainly now operating under the name NSO in the United States. NSO adheres to the same ideology and has similar accelerationist aims as it did when it was called AWD. Under the name NSO, the organisation has publicly dedicated itself to bringing about 'white power' governments 'by any means necessary' and it is almost certain that 'any means necessary' is intended to be understood as endorsing violence.

Babbar Khalsa (BK) - Proscribed March 2001

BK is a Sikh movement that aims to establish an independent Khalistan within the Punjab region of India.

Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA) - Proscribed March 2001

ETA seeks the creation of an independent state comprising the Basque regions of both Spain and France.

Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) - Proscribed July 2006

BLA are comprised of tribal groups based in the Baluchistan area of Eastern Pakistan, which aims to establish an independent nation encompassing the Baluch dominated areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

Boko Haram (Jama'atu Ahli Sunna Lidda Awati Wal Jihad) (BH) -

Proscribed July 2013

Boko Haram is a terrorist organisation, based in Nigeria that aspires to establish Islamic law in Nigeria and has carried out a number of terrorist attacks that have targeted all sections of Nigerian society.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) - Proscribed March 2001

The main aim of the EIJ is to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. However, since September 1998, the leadership of the group has also allied itself to the 'global Jihad' ideology expounded by Usama Bin Laden and has threatened Western interests.

Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) - Proscribed July 2020

FKD is a white supremacist group founded in late 2018 that has an international footprint, with members across North America and Europe. The group celebrates the concepts promoted in a collection of essays which advocate the use of violence and mass murder in pursuit of an apocalyptic race war.

Whilst the bulk of FKD's activity is online, members have engaged in distributing violent, racist and anti-Semitic propaganda. In mid-2019 the group reportedly called for the deaths of a European Parliament politician and YouTube's chief executive officer.

FKD's members have been arrested on terrorism charges both in the UK and overseas. In 2019, US authorities charged several individuals with a variety of offences, including weapons charges, plotting to bomb a synagogue and attack members of the LGBTQ community, plotting to bomb a major news network, and distributing information related to explosives and weapons of mass destruction.

In September 2019, UK police apprehended a 16-year-old on suspicion of the commission, preparation, and instigation of acts of terrorism. As a result, the group distributed among its members a list of police buildings and an image of the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, with a gun to his head and the words "Race Traitor" across his eyes, urging members to carry out attacks in retaliation for the arrest of one of its followers. In October 2019, a 21-year-old appeared in court in London charged with terror offences relating to his purported support for FKD. He allegedly encouraged the mass murder of members of the Jewish and LGBTQ communities.

FKD members have condoned and glorified acts of terrorism. This

includes the Charleston church shooting; the Synagogue shooting in Pittsburgh; the Oklahoma City bombing; and the Christchurch shooting.

On 8 February 2020 FKD announced on its Telegram channel that it would be dissolving. However, no reason was given for the group's dissolution and it is assessed that the group and its members remain active through other channels.

Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) including GIMF Bangla Team also known as Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and Ansar-al Islam – Proscribed July 2016

GIMF is an Islamist extremist propaganda organisation associated with Al Qa'ida (AQ) and other extremist groups around the world. Its activities include propagating a jihadist ideology, producing and disseminating training manuals to guide terror attacks and publishing jihadi news casts. GIMF releases products in a number of languages including Arabic, Urdu, Bengali, English, German and French.

On 31 December 2015, the GIMF announced the merger of ABT into its ranks, renaming it GIMF Bangla Team. Prior to the merger, using the names ABT and Ansar-al Islam, the group claimed responsibility for the prominent murders and attacks of secular bloggers from 2013 to 2015: including Bangladeshi-American Avijit Roy; Niladri Chatterji Niloy; Ahmed Rajib Haider; Asif Mohiuddin; Oyasiqur Rahman; Ananta Bijoy; Das and AKM Shafiul Islam. The group have been linked to a number of hit lists of bloggers, writers and activists around the world (including nine individuals based in Britain, seven in Germany and two in America, one in Canada and one in Sweden) in 2015.

On 7 January 2016 GIMF Bangla Team published an infographic chronicling attacks carried out against “blasphemers in Bangladesh” from January 2013 to October 2015. The graphic contained names and locations of 13 attacks, eight of which were celebrated as successful assassinations. Bangladesh banned ABT in May 2015.

Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) - Proscribed October 2005

The traditional primary objective of the GICM has been the installation of a governing system of the caliphate to replace the governing Moroccan monarchy. The group also has an Al Qa'ida-inspired global extremist agenda.

Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Hamas) – Proscription extended November 2021

Hamas is a militant Islamist movement that was established in 1987, following the first Palestinian intifada. Its ideology is related to that of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with Palestinian nationalism. Its main aims are to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation, the establishment of an Islamic state under Sharia law and the destruction of Israel (although Hamas no longer demands the destruction of Israel in its Covenant). The group operates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Hamas formally established Hamas IDQ in 1992. Hamas IDQ was proscribed by the UK in March 2001. At the time it was HM government's assessment that there was a sufficient distinction between the so called political and military wings of Hamas, such that they should be treated as different organisations, and that only the military wing was concerned in terrorism. The government now assess that the approach of distinguishing between the various parts of Hamas is artificial. Hamas is a complex but single terrorist organisation.

Hamas commits and participates in terrorism. Hamas has used indiscriminate rocket or mortar attacks, and raids against Israeli targets. During the May 2021 conflict, over 4,000 rockets were fired indiscriminately into Israel. Civilians, including 2 Israeli children, were killed as a result. Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas, frequently use incendiary balloons to launch attacks from Gaza into southern Israel. There was a spate of incendiary balloon attacks from Gaza during June and July 2021, causing fires in communities in southern Israel that resulted in serious damage to property.

Hamas also prepares for acts of terrorism. One incident of preparatory activity is that Hamas recently launched summer camps in Gaza which focus on training groups, including minors, to fight. This is evidence of Hamas being responsible for running terrorist training camps in the region. In a press statement, Hamas described the aim of these camps as to “ignite the embers of Jihad in the liberation generation, cultivate Islamic values and prepare the expected victory army to liberate Palestine”.

Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI) - Proscribed October 2005

The aim of HUJI is to achieve through violent means accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and to spread terror throughout India. HUJI has targeted Indian security positions in Kashmir and conducted operations in India proper.

Harakat-UI-Jihad-UI-Islami (Bangladesh) (HUJI-B) - Proscribed October 2005

The main aim of HUJI-B is the creation of an Islamic regime in Bangladesh modelled on the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Harakat-UI-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A) and Jundallah - Proscribed October 2005

The aim of both HuM/A and Jundallah is the rejection of democracy of even the most Islamic-oriented style, and to establish a caliphate based on Sharia law, in addition to achieving accession of all Kashmir to Pakistan. HuM/A has a broad anti-Western and anti-President Musharraf agenda.

Harakat Mujahideen (HM) - Proscribed March 2001

HM, previously known as Harakat Ul Ansar (HuA) seeks independence for Indian-administered Kashmir. The HM leadership was also a signatory to Usama Bin Laden's 1998 fatwa, which called for worldwide attacks against US and Western interests.

Haqqani Network (HQN) - Proscribed March 2015

The Haqqani Network (HQN) is an Islamist, nationalist group seeking to establish sharia law and control territory in Afghanistan. It is ideologically aligned with the Taliban, and aims to eradicate Western influence, disrupt the Western military and political efforts in Afghanistan. The group is demanding that US and Coalition Forces withdraw from Afghanistan. The group is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin.

HQN has links with a number of terrorist groups in the region including proscribed Central Asian group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). HQN also have long established links with Al Qa'ida (AQ) that were strengthened after the removal of the Taliban by the US when AQ leader Osama bin Laden was probably sheltered by Jalaluddin in North Waziristan (NWA).

HQN continues to play an active and influential role in the Afghan insurgency in the East of the country and is seeking to expand its influence in to other areas of Afghanistan. While it can be difficult to identify specific HQN responsibility for attacks, given the Taliban practice of claiming attacks on behalf of the insurgency as a whole, the group believed to have been responsible for the recent attack against the British Embassy vehicle in November 2014 which killed six people including a UK national and an Afghan member of UK Embassy staff and injuring

more than 30 people.

It is likely that HQN will continue to view Kabul as a key target location due to the concentration of UK and Western interests in the capital.

HQN has been banned as a terrorist group by the USA since September 2012, Canada since May 2013 and the UN since November 2012.

Hasam including Harakat Sawa'd Misr, Harakat Hasm and Hasm - Proscribed December 2017

The group is an extremist group using violent tactics against the Egyptian security forces, and the Egyptian regime. The group announced its creation on 16 July 2016 following an attack in Fayoum Governate, Egypt. In September 2016 the group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of Assistant Prosecutor General Zakaria Abdel-Aziz. On 5 August 2016 the group also claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of the former Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa.

The group have claimed responsibility for over 15 attacks including:

- 8 March 2017 - Small arms fire in Cairo
- 26 March 2017 - IED attack in Cairo
- 1 May 2017 - Small arms fire in Cairo
- 18 June 2017 – IED attack in Cairo
- 7 July 2017 - Small arms fire in Cairo
- 20 July 2017 - Small arms fire in Fayoum Governate
- 30 September 2017 – IED explosion close to the Myanmar Embassy Cairo

Hizballah (Party of God) - Proscribed March 2019

Hizballah is committed to armed resistance to the state of Israel and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel. It supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

Hizballah was established during the Lebanese civil war and in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Hizballah is committed to armed resistance to the state of Israel and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel. It supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Hizballah continues to amass an arsenal of weapons in Lebanon, in direct contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, putting the security of the region at

risk. Its involvement in the Syrian civil war, since 2012, continues to prolong the conflict and the regime's brutal and violent repression of the Syrian people - violating the Lebanese government's policy of disassociation from regional conflicts, increasingly destabilising the region's long-term stability.

Hizballah, as a political entity in Lebanon has won votes in legitimate elections and forms part of the Lebanese government. It has the largest non-state military force in the country.

The UK government proscribed Hizballah's External Security Organisation in 2001. In 2008, the proscription was extended to include the whole of Hizballah's military apparatus, namely the Jihad Council and all the units reporting to it.

Hizballah itself has publicly denied a distinction between its military and political wings. The group in its entirety is assessed to be concerned in terrorism.

The US, Canada, the Netherlands, Israel, the Gulf Co-operation Council and Bahrain also designate the group in its entirety as a terrorist organisation

Imarat Kavkaz (IK) also known as the Caucasus Emirate - Proscribed December 2013

Imarat Kavkaz seeks a Sharia-based Caliphate across the North Caucasus. It regularly uses terrorist tactics and has carried out attacks against both Russian state and civilian targets. The organisation claimed responsibility for the attack on Domodedovo airport in Moscow in January 2011, that killed 35 including one British national and a suicide attack on the Moscow Metro in March 2010 that killed 39. Since then there has been continued activity by Imarat Kavkaz, including renewed threats of terrorist activity in Russia.

Indian Mujahideen (IM) - Proscribed July 2012

IM aims to establish an Islamic state and implement Sharia law in India using violent means.

Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) - Proscribed March 2001

The IAA's aims are the overthrow of the current Yemeni government and the establishment of an Islamic State following Sharia Law.

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) - Proscribed July 2005

The primary strategic goal of the IJU is the elimination of the current Uzbek regime. The IJU would expect that following the removal of President Karimov, elections would occur in which Islamic-democratic political candidates would pursue goals shared by the IJU leadership.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - Proscribed November 2002

The primary aim of IMU is to establish an Islamic state in the model of the Taleban in Uzbekistan. However, the IMU is reported to also seek to establish a broader state over the entire Turkestan area.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al Sham (DAISh) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham - Proscribed June 2014

ISIL is a brutal Sunni Islamist terrorist group active in Iraq and Syria. The group adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. ISIL aims to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law in the region and impose their rule on people using violence and extortion.

ISIL was previously proscribed as part of Al Qa'ida (AQ). However, on 2 February 2014, AQ senior leadership issued a statement officially severing ties with ISIL. This prompted consideration of the case to proscribe ISIL in its own right.

ISIL not only poses a threat from within Syria but has made significant advances in Iraq. The threat from ISIL in Iraq and Syria is very serious and shows clearly the importance of taking a strong stand against the extremists.

We are aware that a number of British nationals have travelled to Syria and some of these will inevitably be fighting with ISIL. It appears that ISIL is treating Iraq and Syria as one theatre of conflict and its potential ability to operate across the border must be a cause of concern for the whole international community.

In April 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting a Shia election rally in Baghdad. These attacks are reported to have killed at least 31 people. Thousands of Iraqi civilians lost their lives to sectarian violence in 2013, and attacks carried out by ISIL will have accounted for a large proportion of these deaths.

ISIL has reportedly detained dozens of foreign journalists and aid workers. In September 2013, members of the group kidnapped and killed the commander of Ahrar ash-Sham after he intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity.

In January 2014, ISIL captured the Al-Anbar cities of Ramadi and Fallujah and is engaged in ongoing fighting with the Iraqi security forces. The group also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik.

ISIL has a strong presence in northern and eastern Syria where it has instituted strict Sharia law in the towns under its control. The group is responsible for numerous attacks and a vast number of deaths. The group is believed to attract foreign fighters, including Westerners, to the region.

The group has maintained control of various towns on the Syrian/Turkish border allowing the group to control who crosses and ISIL's presence there has interfered with the free flow of humanitarian aid.

The government laid an Order in August 2014 which provides that "Islamic State (Dawlat al Islamiya)" should be treated as another name for the organisation which is already proscribed as ISIL. The UK does not recognise ISIL's claims of a 'restored' Caliphate or a new Islamic State. The government laid an Order in February 2019, which provides that "Jaysh Khalid Bin Walid (JKbW) (JKW)" "Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid (KBW)" and "Khalid ibn-Walid Army (KBWA)" should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed as ISIL.

Jaish e Mohammed (JeM) and splinter group Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul) – JeM proscribed March 2001 and Kul proscribed October 2005

JeM and Kul seek the 'liberation' of Kashmir from Indian control as well as the 'destruction' of America and India. JeM has a stated objective of unifying the various Kashmiri militant groups.

Jamaah Anshorut Daulah - Proscribed July 2016

JAD was established in March 2015 following the merger of several Indonesian extremist and terrorist groups aligned to Daesh. JAD has extensive links to Daesh and actively recruits fighters in Syria.

The group is led by the imprisoned extremist cleric Aman Abdurrahman and has close ties to other terrorist groups including Daesh. Its membership includes several former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members. JI

were responsible for the 2002 and 2005 Bali attacks.

JAD was responsible for the attack near Sarinah Mall in Jakarta in January 2016, which was claimed by Daesh and resulted in the deaths of seven people (including the five attackers) and 20 people (including five police officers) being injured.

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM) also known as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Nusrat al-Islam, Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (NIM), including Ansar al-Dine (AAD), Macina Liberation Front (MLF), al-Murabitun, al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb and az-Zallaqa - Proscribed March 2019.

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was established in March 2017, as a federation of Al Qa'ida (AQ) aligned groups in Mali, including AQ-M Sahel Branch (AQ-MSB), Ansar al-Dine (AAD), Macina Liberation Front (MLF) and al-Murabitun. JNIM's area of operations encompasses northern and central Mali, northern Burkina Faso and western Niger (the western Sahel region). JNIM aims to eradicate state and Western presence from these areas, and to institute governance in accordance with a strict Salafist interpretation of Sharia law. Attacks on Western interests in the region and across wider West Africa are one means by which JNIM seeks to achieve these goals. Kidnap of Western nationals for ransom purposes remains a lucrative source of income for the group.

JNIM attacks are typically claimed via az-Zallaqa the group's media foundation, examples include:

- 18 June 2017 - firearms and IED attack on Le Campement Resort in Bamako, in which three civilians and two military personnel were killed;
- 2 March 2018 - VBIED and firearms attack on the French Embassy and Burkinabe Chief of Defence HQ in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso;
- 14 April 2018 - VBIED and firearms attack on Barkhane and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (Minusma) camp in Timbuktu, Mali;
- 22 April 2018 - indirect fire attack on Barkhane and Minusma camp in Timbuktu, Mali;
- 28 June 2018 - VBIED attack on the G5 Sahel Force HQ at Sevare, Mopti region, Sahel; and
- 29 July 2018 - VBIED attack on the Malian Army and BARKHANE convoy in the Gao region, Mali on fire attack on Barkhane and Minusma camp at Aguelhok, Kidal region, Mali.

The US and UN also designate the group as a terrorist organisation.

Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA) - Proscribed March 2015

JuA is a militant Islamist group that split away from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in August 2014. JuA aims to establish an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan and aspires to extend global jihad into the Indian subcontinent.

The group have claimed responsibility for a number of recent attacks, including on 21 November 2014, a grenade attack on the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Orangi Town area of Karachi that killed 3 members of the Sindh Assembly and injured 50 workers; on 7 November 2014, twin bombings targeting peace committee volunteers in Chinari village of Safi Tehsil in the Mohmand Agency killed at least 6 people. JuA's spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, claimed responsibility and vowed to continue attacking tribal peace committees; and on 2 November 2014, the suicide bomber attack on the Pakistan side of Wagah border crossing, shortly after the famous flag-lowering ceremony had concluded, that killed over 60 people.

In September 2014, Ehsanullah Ehsan released a statement criticising the British government for arresting Al Muhajiroun (ALM) associates and made a threat, stating that "your future security depends upon how nicely you treat the Muslims in Britain".

In March 2015 the group claimed responsibility for fatal attacks on Christian sites in Lahore.

Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) - Proscribed July 2007

JMB first came to prominence on 20 May 2002 when eight of its members were arrested in possession of petrol bombs. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous fatal bomb attacks across Bangladesh in recent years, including suicide bomb attacks in 2005.

Jamaat Ul-Furquan (JuF) - Proscribed October 2005

The aim of JuF is to unite Indian administered Kashmir with Pakistan; to establish a radical Islamist state in Pakistan; the 'destruction' of India and the USA; to recruit new jihadis; and the release of imprisoned Kashmiri militants.

Jaysh al Khalifatu Islamiya (JKI) which translates as the Army of the Islamic Caliphate –proscribed November 2014

JKI is an Islamist jihadist group, consisting predominately of Chechen fighters. JKI is an opposition group active in Syria.

JKI splintered from Jaysh al-Muhajireen Wal Ansar (JAMWA) in 2013. At that point a number of members went with Umar Shishani (aka Umar the Chechen) to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and, the rest of the group stayed distinct and renamed itself Majahideen of the Caucasus and the Levant (MCL) and more recently renamed itself JKI.

Before his death in 2014, JKI was led by Seyfullah Shishani, who had pledged allegiance to the leader of the Al Nusrah Front, Mohammed Al-Jawlani. JKI has assisted ANF and ISIL in conducting attacks.

In February 2014, a British individual linked to the group, carried out a suicide attack on a prison in Aleppo, resulting in prisoner escapes.

Jeemah Islamiyah (JI) - Proscribed November 2002

JI's aim is the creation of a unified Islamic state in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.

Jund al-Aqsa (JAA) which translates as Soldiers of al-Aqsa - Proscribed January 2015 JAA is a splinter group of Al Nusrah Front (ANF), active in Syria against the Syrian government since September 2013. JAA is a foreign fighter battalion of a variety of nationalities, as well as a native Syrian contingent. The group is primarily operating in Idlib and Hama.

JAA is believed to be responsible for the attack on 9 February 2014 in Maan village killing 40 people of which 21 were civilians. JAA and Ahrar al-Sham are reported to have uploaded YouTube footage of their joint offensive against the village, although neither group has claimed responsibility.

JAA has supported the Islamic Front in an operation to seize Hama military airport during July 2014. ANF released a document summarising its operations in August 2014, which included details of an attack that targeted a resort hotel conducted in collaboration with JAA.

Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A) which translates as Soldiers of the Caliphate - Proscribed January 2015

JaK-A is an Islamist militant group believed to be made up of members of

dormant Al Qa'ida (AQ) cells. JaK-A announced its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in a communiqué released on 13 September 2014.

In April 2014, JaK-A claimed responsibility for an ambush on a convoy, that killed 11 members of the Algerian army. On 24 September 2014, the group beheaded a mountaineering guide, Hervé Gourdel, a French national. The abduction was announced on the same day that a spokesman for ISIL, warned that it would target Americans and other Western citizens, especially the French, after French jets joined the US in carrying out strikes in Iraq on ISIL targets.

Kateeba al-Kawthar (KaK) also known as Ajnad al-sham and Junud ar-Rahman al Muhajireen - Proscribed June 2014

KaK describes itself as a group of mujahideen from more than 20 countries seeking a 'just' Islamic nation.

KaK is an armed terrorist group fighting to establish an Islamic state in Syria. The group is aligned to the most extreme groups operating in Syria and has links to Al Qa'ida. The group's leader is described as a Western Mujaadid commander. KaK is believed to attract a number of Western foreign fighters and has released YouTube footage encouraging travel to Syria and asking Muslims to support the fighters.

Lashkar e Tayyaba (LT) - Proscribed March 2001

LT seeks independence for Kashmir and the creation of an Islamic state using violent means.

The government laid an Order in March 2009 which provides that "Jama'at' ud Da'wa (JuD)" should be treated as another name for the organisation which is already proscribed as Lashkar e Tayyaba.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - Proscribed March 2001

The LTTE is a terrorist group fighting for a separate Tamil state in the North and East of Sri Lanka.

Liwa al-Thawra - Proscribed December 2017

Liwa al-Thawra is an extremist group using violent tactics against Egyptian security forces, to fight for political reform and an end to the Egyptian regime. It announced its creation on 21 August 2016 following

an attack in Monofeya, Egypt. The group is responsible for assassination attempts against Egyptian officials. The group have claimed responsibility for attacks including:

- 21 August 2016 the group claimed responsibility for the attack in Monofeya, Egypt
- 22 October 2016 the group claimed responsibility for the assassination of Egyptian Brigadier General Adel Regali
- On 1 April 2017 the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Egyptian police training centre in Tanta, Egypt

Minbar Ansar Deen also known as Ansar al-Sharia UK - Proscribed July 2013

Minbar Ansar Deen is a Salafist group based in the UK that promotes and encourages terrorism. Minbar Ansar Deen distributes content through its online forum which promotes terrorism by encouraging individuals to travel overseas to engage in extremist activity, specifically fighting. The group is not related to Ansar al-Sharia groups in other countries.

Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which translates as Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia - Proscribed July 2016 MIT is Indonesia's most active terrorist group based in the mountainous jungle of Poso, in Central Sulawesi. Its leader, Abu Warda also known as Santoso, is one of Indonesia's most wanted terrorist. The group's modus operandi is to attack the police and the army which includes the use of explosives (including the use of IEDs), and shootings. MIT have been responsible for deaths of more than a dozen police officers in Poso in the last three years. They have also used kidnappings and beheadings of Christian farmers in Poso to dissuade the local populace from assisting the police.

MIT pledged its allegiance to Daesh in July 2014 and are assessed to have links to other Daesh affiliated terrorist groups in the region. MIT has claimed responsibility for a number of recent attacks and has threatened attacks on targets across the country including the capital (specifically the Jakarta police headquarters and the presidential palace in a video uploaded on 22 November 2015).

In September 2015 MIT was banned as a terrorist group by the USA and the UN.

National Action - Proscribed December 2016

National Action is a racist neo-Nazi group that was established in 2013. It

has a number of branches across the UK, which conduct provocative street demonstrations and stunts aimed at intimidating local communities. Its activities and propaganda materials are particularly aimed at recruiting young people.

The group is virulently racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic. Its ideology promotes the idea that Britain will inevitably see a violent 'race war', which the group claims it will be an active part of. The group rejects democracy, is hostile to the British state and seeks to divide society by implicitly endorsing violence against ethnic minorities and perceived 'race traitors'.

National Action's online propaganda material, disseminated via social media, frequently features extremely violent imagery and language. It condones and glorifies those who have used extreme violence for political or ideological ends. This includes tweets posted by the group in 2016, in connection with the murder of Jo Cox (which the prosecutor described as a terrorist act), stating "Only 649 MPs to go" and a photo of Thomas Mair with the caption "don't let this man's sacrifice go in vain" and "Jo Cox would have filled Yorkshire with more subhumans!", as well as an image condoning and celebrating the terrorist attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando and another depicting a police officer's throat being slit. The images can reasonably be taken as inferring that these acts should be emulated and therefore amount to the unlawful glorification of terrorism.

The government laid an Order in September 2017 which provides that "Scottish Dawn" and "NS131 (National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action)" should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed as National Action.

The government laid an Order in February 2020 which provides that "System Resistance Network (SRN)" should be treated as an alternative name for the organisation which is already proscribed as National Action.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad - Shaqaqi (PIJ) - Proscribed March 2001

PIJ aims to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine and to create an Islamic state. It opposes the existence of the state of Israel, the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Authority, and has carried out suicide bombings against Israeli targets.

Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanî (PKK) which translates as the Kurdistan Worker's Party - Proscribed March 2001

PKK/KADEK/KG is primarily a separatist movement that seeks an

independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. The PKK changed its name to KADEK and then to Kongra Gele Kurdistan, although the PKK acronym is still used by parts of the movement.

The government laid an Order in 2006 which provides that “KADEK” and “Kongra Gele Kurdistan” should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed as PKK.

The UK government proscribed “Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)” in 2006, subsequently an Order was laid in February 2020 which provides that “Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan” (TAK) and “Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG)” should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed as PKK.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) - Proscribed June 2014

PFLP-GC is a left wing nationalist Palestinian militant organisation formed in 1968. It is based in Syria and was involved in the Palestine intifada during the 1970s and 1980s. The group is separate from the similarly named Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

From its outset, the group has been a Syrian proxy. PFLP-GC has been fighting in the Syrian war in support of Assad, including in Yarmouk Refugee Camp in July 2013. The group also issued statements in support of the Syrian government, Hizballah, and Iran.

Revolutionary Peoples' Liberation Party - Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi - Cephesi) (DHKP-C) - Proscribed March 2001

DHKP-C aims to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime in Turkey by means of armed revolutionary struggle.

The government laid Orders in February 2019, which provides that “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party—Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi) (DHKP-C)”, “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front (DHKC)”, “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party (DHKP)” and “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front/Armed Propaganda Units (DHKC/SPB)” should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed DHKP-C.

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) (GSPC) - Proscribed March 2001

Its aim is to create an Islamic state in Algeria using all necessary means, including violence.

Saved Sect or Saviour Sect - Proscribed July 2006

The Saved Sect /Al Ghurabaa is an Islamist group which seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Shariah law. The group first emerged as Al Muhajiroun in the UK, in 1996, led by Omar Bakri Muhammed, who then publicly disbanded the organisation in 2004. The organisation reformed in 2004 under the names Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect. While the Group has some links to groups overseas, it is based and operates within the UK.

The government laid Orders in January 2010 and November 2011, which provides that “Al Muhajiroun”, “Islam4UK”, “Call to Submission”, “Islamic Path”, “London School of Sharia” and “Muslims Against Crusades” should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed under the names Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect.

The government laid an Order in June 2014 recognising “Need4Khilafah”, the “Shariah Project” and the “Islamic Dawah Association” as the same as the organisation proscribed as Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect, which is also known as “Al Muhajiroun”.

Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Aka Millat-e Islami Pakistan (MIP) - SSP was renamed MIP in April 2003 but is still referred to as SSP) and splinter group Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) - Proscribed March 2001

The aim of both SSP and LeJ is to transform Pakistan by violent means into a Sunni state under the total control of Sharia law. Another objective is to have all Shia declared Kafirs and to participate in the destruction of other religions, notably Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism.

Kafirs means non-believers: literally, one who refused to see the truth. LeJ does not consider members of the Shia sect to be Muslim, so concludes they can be considered a ‘legitimate’ target.

The government laid an Order in October 2013 which provides that “Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (ASWJ)” should be treated as another name for the organisation which is already proscribed as Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ).

Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) - Proscribed February 2020

SKD is a white supremacist group that was established in March 2018 as a splinter group of System Resistance Network (an alias of the proscribed group National Action). Members of the group were convicted of encouraging terrorism and possession of documents useful to a terrorist in June 2019. The group has encouraged and glorified acts of terrorism via its posts and images. This includes an image depicting the Duke of Sussex being shot as part of their campaign against 'race traitors' following his marriage to the Duchess of Sussex; and home-made propaganda using Nazi imagery calling for attacks on minorities. The images can reasonably be taken as inferring that these acts should be emulated and therefore amount to the unlawful glorification of terrorism.

Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi (TNSM) - Proscribed July 2007

TNSM regularly attacks coalition and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan and provides direct support to Al Qa'ida and the Taliban. One faction of the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on an army training compound on 8 November 2007 in Dargai, Pakistan, in which 42 soldiers were killed.

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – Proscribed January 2011

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan has carried out a high number of mass casualty attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2007. The group have announced various objectives and demands, such as the enforcement of sharia, resistance against the Pakistani army and the removal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. The organisation has also been involved in attacks in the West, such as the attempted Times Square car-bomb attack in May 2010.

The Base – Proscribed July 2021

The Base is a predominantly US based militant white supremacist group, formed in 2018. It draws influence from a collection of essays by prominent National Socialist, James Mason, which advocate the use of violence to initiate the collapse of modern society through a 'race war' and the subsequent creation of a white ethno-state. This ideology is known as 'accelerationism'.

The Base has links with other internationally based National Socialist groups, such as Atomwaffen Division which was proscribed by the UK in April 2021, and individuals. It seeks to provide terrorist training, guidance and networking.

The Base almost certainly prepares for terrorism. While it outwardly seeks to promote itself as a “self-defence and survivalist” group and refutes any claims of its involvement in terrorist activity, the training it provides is highly likely paramilitary in nature and preparatory for offensive action. This training would almost certainly enhance both the intent and capability of trainees to conduct terrorist acts. Members of The Base have engaged in weapons and explosives training.

The Base has also almost certainly promoted or encouraged acts of terrorism and elements of its membership will almost certainly continue to do so. In late 2017, the group’s founder released a series of videos covering topics such as “lone wolf” activity, leaderless resistance and advocating guerrilla warfare.

Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) also known as East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani (HAAT) – Proscribed July 2016

TIP is an Islamic terrorist and separatist organisation founded in 1989 by Uighur militants in western China. It aims to establish an independent caliphate in the Uighur state of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of North-western China and to name it East Turkestan. TIP is based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, and operates in China, Central and South Asia and Syria. The group has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in China, the latest of these being in April 2014. TIP has links to a number of terrorist groups including Al Qa’ida (AQ).

In November 2015, TIP released the 18th issue of its magazine ‘Islamic Turkestan’ through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), detailing TIP’s jihad against the Chinese authorities. Video footage from September 2015 shows TIP hosting training camps in areas controlled by the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan.

More recently TIP has maintained an active and visible presence in the Syrian war and has published a number of video clips of its activities. Examples of this from March to April 2016 include:

- TIP claiming a joint attack with Jund al Aqsa in Sahl al Ghab and published a video of a suicide bomb attack in April 2016
- a video published in March 2016 which promotes the victories of TIP in Syria and calls for Muslims to join jihad
- a video slide show published in April 2016 which shows fighters and

children in training

TIP has been banned by the UN and is also sanctioned by the USA under the Terrorist Exclusion list.

Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) is also known as the Peoples' Liberation Party/Front of Turkey, THKP-C Acilciler and the Hasty Ones - Proscribed June 2014 THKP-C is a left-wing organisation formed in 1994. The group grew out of the Turkish extreme left Revolutionary Youth Movements which formed in the 1960s and 70s.

THKP-C now also operates as a pro-Assad militia group fighting in Syria and has developed increased capability since the Syrian insurgency. THKP-C is assessed to have been involved in an attack in Reyhanli, Turkey, in May 2013, killing over 50 people and injuring over 100.

The organisation has always been most prominent in the southern province of Hatay. A number of other groups have been formed under the THKP-C umbrella including 'Mukavament Suriye' (Syrian Resistance), which is reported to have been responsible for the recent Baniyas Massacre killing at least 145 people.

List of proscribed groups linked to Northern Ireland related terrorism

- Continuity Army Council
- Cumann na mBan
- Fianna na hEireann
- Irish National Liberation Army
- Irish People's Liberation Organisation
- Irish Republican Army
- Loyalist Volunteer Force
- Orange Volunteers
- Red Hand Commando
- Red Hand Defenders
- Saor Eire
- Ulster Defence Association
- Ulster Freedom Fighters

- Ulster Volunteer Force

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OGI

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Date listed

2005-05-24

Date reviewed

2018-11-21

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Also known as

Kurdistan Workers Party, Partya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Labor Party, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kurdistan People's Congress, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK), People's Congress of Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel

Description

Formally established in Turkey in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK / KADEK) is a Kurdish political party whose main goal is the creation of an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey and in northern Iraq, a region that is part of the traditional territory of the Kurdish people. To reach its goal, the PKK / KADEK has led a campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, especially in Turkey and in northern Iraq. Its activities include attacking the Turkish military, diplomats and Turkish businesses at home and in some western European cities. It has also been known to bomb resorts and kidnap tourists in an attempt to destabilize tourism in Turkey. On April 11, 2017, the PKK bombed a police compound in Diyarbakir, Turkey, resulting in the death of 3 people, including 1 police officer.

Date listed

2002-12-10

Date reviewed

2018-11-21

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)

Also known as

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Jhangvi Army, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi (LeJ), Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Laskar e Jahangvi.

Description

As a radical Islamist group reportedly linked to Al Qaida, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) aims to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan based on Sharia Law – through the use of violence if necessary – and to have all Shiites declared non-believers. It is reputed as being one of the most violent Islamist extremist organizations in Pakistan. Responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites since its formation in 1996, LJ was behind some of the worst incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan's history. In October 2015, for example, a group of LJ members conducted a suicide attack at a Shiite mosque in Bolan, Baluchistan, killing at least 11 people and wounding another 13. More recently, in June 2017, LJ claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing at a crowded market in Parachinar, Pakistan, which killed at least 67 people and wounded over 200 others.

Date listed

2003-06-18

Date reviewed

2018-11-21

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Also known as

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) (Society for Preaching), al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmate-e-Rasool, al Mansoorian (The Victorious), Army of the Pure, Paasban-e-Kashmir (Kashmir Brigade), Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith (Ahle-Hadith Brigade), Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar-i-Toiba (LiT), Lashkar-i-Taiba (Holy Regiment), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taibyya, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure and Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Righteous Army), Lashkar-Taiba (Army of the Good), Lashkar e Toiba, Lashkar e Taiba, Lashkar-E-Tayyaba, Lashkar e Tayyiba

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Foreign Terrorist Organizations

BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Date Designated ↑↓	Name ↑↓
December 1, 2021	Segunda Marquetalia
December 1, 2021	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP)
March 11, 2021	ISIS-DRC

March 11, 2021	ISIS-Mozambique
January 14, 2021	Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM)
January 10, 2020	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
April 15, 2019	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
September 6, 2018	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
July 11, 2018	al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)
May 23, 2018	ISIS-Greater Sahara
February 28, 2018	ISIS-West Africa
February 28, 2018	ISIS-Philippines
February 28, 2018	ISIS-Bangladesh
August 17, 2017	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
July 1, 2016	Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent
May 20, 2016	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)
January 14, 2016	Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)
September 30, 2015	Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)
May 15, 2014	al-Nusrah Front
April 10, 2014	ISIL Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis)

January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi
January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah
January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia
December 19, 2013	al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)
November 14, 2013	Ansaru
November 14, 2013	Boko Haram
March 22, 2013	Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
September 19, 2012	Haqqani Network (HQN)
May 30, 2012	Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
March 13, 2012	Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
September 19, 2011	Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
May 23, 2011	Army of Islam (AOI)
November 4, 2010	Jaysh al-Adl (formerly Jundallah)
September 1, 2010	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
August 6, 2010	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
January 19, 2010	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
July 2, 2009	Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
May 18, 2009	Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

March 18, 2008	al-Shabaab
March 5, 2008	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
June 17, 2005	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
December 17, 2004	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qa'ida in Iraq)
July 13, 2004	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
March 22, 2004	Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
January 30, 2003	Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
October 23, 2002	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
August 9, 2002	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
March 27, 2002	al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
March 27, 2002	Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
March 27, 2002	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
December 26, 2001	Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
December 26, 2001	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
May 16, 2001	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
September 25, 2000	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
October 8,	al-Qa'ida (AQ)

1999	
October 8, 1997	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
October 8, 1997	HAMAS
October 8, 1997	Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
October 8, 1997	Hizballah
October 8, 1997	Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, aka Kongra-Gel)
October 8, 1997	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
October 8, 1997	National Liberation Army (ELN)
October 8, 1997	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
October 8, 1997	Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
October 8, 1997	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
October 8, 1997	PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
October 8, 1997	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
October 8, 1997	Shining Path (SL)

Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Date Removed ^	Name ↑↓	Date Originally
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I↓		Designated ↑↓
May 20, 2022	Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - IG)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Kahane Chai (Kach)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)	August 20, 2014
December 1, 2021	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	October 8, 1997
February 16, 2021	Ansarallah	January 19, 2021
June 1, 2017	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	October 8, 1997
December 9, 2015	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	December 17, 2004
September 3, 2015	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)	October 8, 1997
July 15, 2014	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia	September 10, 2001
May 28, 2013	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	October 11, 2005

September 28, 2012	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)	October 8, 1997
October 15, 2010	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	October 8, 1997
May 18, 2009	Revolutionary Nuclei	October 8, 1997
October 8, 2001	Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement	October 8, 1997
October 8, 2001	Japanese Red Army	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Khmer Rouge	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Hawatmeh Faction	October 8, 1997

Identification

The Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or

retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation

Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed “administrative record,” which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every 2 years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the

determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a 5 year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in **section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B))**, or terrorism, as defined in **section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2))**, or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO. (The term “material support or resources” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as “ any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.

3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

Revocations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

The Immigration and Nationality Act sets out three possible basis for revoking a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation:

1. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation;
2. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation;
3. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time.

Any revocation shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such revocation.

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Appendix E – Statement of Reasons – Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Appendix E – Statement of Reasons – Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

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Appendix E – Statement of Reasons – Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

(Also known as: Freedom and Democratic Congress of Kurdistan, Hezan Parastina Gel (HPG), KADEK, KG, KHK, Kongra Gel, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kurdish Freedom Falcons,

Kurdish Liberation Hawks, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress,

Kurdistan Freedom Brigade, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi,

Kurdistan Labor Party, Kurdistan Ozgurluk Sahinleri, Kurdistan People’s Congress, New PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, People’s Congress of Kurdistan, People’s Defence Force, PKK,

TAK, Teyrbazên Azadiya Kurdistan)

The following information is based on publicly available details about the PKK. To the Australian Government’s knowledge, these details are accurate and reliable and have been corroborated by classified information.

Basis for listing a terrorist organisation

Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- (a) is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, or assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
- (b) advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

Details of the organisation

Objectives

The PKK was formally established by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. The organisation adopted a communist ideology but from its inception was primarily committed to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. After the end of Cold War, the PKK increasingly emphasised its role as a Kurdish nationalist movement. The group periodically has sought to increase its popularity by exploiting the religious sentiment of the Kurdish community, but the organisation remains predominantly secular.

The PKK's objectives have changed over time, in line with Turkey's evolving political environment. The organisation now calls for autonomy for Kurds within Turkey and seeks to promote and advance the rights of Kurds living in Turkey, specifically the right to maintain ethnic identity. The PKK has consistently demonstrated a willingness to use violence in order to achieve these objectives.

Leadership and Membership

Abdullah Ocalan, currently serving life imprisonment in Turkey, is still considered the leader and figurehead of the PKK; however, in practice, the group's day-to-day affairs are run by Murat Karayilan. Other key leaders include Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, Fehman Huseyin and Riza Altun.

The precise strength of the PKK is not known; however, it is widely believed the group numbers approximately four to five thousand militants, the majority of whom are based in northern Iraq. Additionally, the group draws on considerable logistical support from a large number of sympathisers among the Kurdish community, particularly in south-east Turkey, but also in Syria and Iran.

Funding and recruitment

The PKK derives most of its financial resources from drug trafficking, which is reported to generate hundreds of millions of US dollars for the group. At different times, the PKK is assessed to have controlled up to 80 per cent of the European illicit drug market.

In January 2012, under the US State Department's Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated three Moldavia-based individuals as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers for acting for or on behalf of the PKK. One individual was identified as a high-ranking PKK member.

The PKK also generates income through extortion, illegal immigration, human trafficking, money laundering and prostitution rackets. Revenue is also raised by collecting 'taxes', through voluntary means or coercion, from Kurdish diaspora communities around the world. PKK-related criminal activity is especially prevalent in Europe. The European Police Office warned in its European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012 that the PKK remains committed to using Europe as a logistical support base for funding,

as well as for recruitment, training and propaganda. Funds are also raised through publication sales, grants, aid campaigns and fundraising activities organised by PKK branches in Europe.

Most PKK members are recruited from the main Kurdish areas in south-east Turkey; however, some are drawn also from cities in the country's west. In addition, the group recruits from the Kurdish population in Iran and Syria and from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Most recruitment in rural areas of Turkey occurs through personal acquaintance. In urban areas and in Europe, a network of PKK members and sympathisers working in non-governmental organisations and predominantly Kurdish political parties manage the recruitment process. The group's external recruitment practices were highlighted in February 2010 when police in France and Italy detained at least 20 people for alleged involvement in training and recruitment for the PKK.

Terrorist activity of the organisation

Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts

The PKK has continued to have extensive, direct involvement in most terrorist acts occurring in Turkey since the group was last listed in 2009. The group has been particularly active since February 2011 when it ended a unilateral ceasefire in place since April 2009. Most attacks appear to be very specifically targeted, for example, armed assaults against Turkish military forces using small-arms fire. However, there also have been several indiscriminate, mass-casualty attacks employing both suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED). While most attacks have targeted Turkish security forces in the southeast, a number have targeted places frequented by civilians or tourists, including a shopping area in Ankara and a major shopping, tourist and leisure district in Istanbul. The PKK also was responsible for a ferry hijacking in the Marmara Sea, near Istanbul.

The PKK has also conducted kidnappings, including of Westerners. In the latest incident on 2 June 2012, a British tourist reportedly was kidnapped but was released the following day.

Significant recent attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by or reliably attributed to the PKK include:

- 1 March 2012: Fifteen police officers and a civilian were wounded in a remotely controlled IED attack by suspected PKK militants targeting a police bus in the Imrahor Street area of Istanbul. The explosion reportedly occurred as the bus passed the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party.
- 24 November 2011: Three Turkish employees of a Canada-based energy company were killed by PKK militants in an attack targeting the Selmo oil field at Kozluk, Batman province.
- 11 November 2011: A PKK militant carrying a suspected explosive device hijacked a passenger ferry and took hostage 18 passengers and six crew members in the Marmara Sea, near Istanbul.

- 29 October 2011: At least two people were killed and as many as 20 others wounded when a suspected PKK suicide bomber detonated her explosives outside a teahouse near the office of the Justice and Development Party in the town of Bingol in Bingol province.
- 27 September 2011: PKK militants kidnapped a total of eight teachers and a village guard in five armed attacks in the Pulumur district of Tunceli province; in the village of Gundogdu in Elazig province; and in the villages of Ciftlibahce, Dolunay and Cavundur in Diyarbakir province.
- 17 August 2011: Eight soldiers and a village guard were killed and a further 14 soldiers wounded when suspected PKK militants detonated four IEDs consecutively against a military convoy on the Hakkari-Cukurca highway in the Cukurca district of Hakkari province.
- 14 July 2011: Thirteen soldiers were killed and seven others wounded when PKK militants ambushed a security patrol with small-arms and grenades in Silvan district, Diyarbakir province.
- 26 May 2011: A police officer and seven civilians were wounded when suspected PKK militants detonated an IED at a bus stop near the Akmerkez shopping centre in the Etiler district of Istanbul.
- 4 May 2011: At least one police officer was killed and two others wounded in a combined small-arms and IED attack by suspected PKK militants targeting a bus transporting security force personnel on the outskirts of the city of Kastamonu in Kastamonu province. The attack occurred shortly after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held an election rally in the city.
- 31 October 2010: Thirty-two people were wounded – including 15 police officers – when a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying police officers in Taksim Square, Istanbul. An IED planted nearby failed to explode.
- 19 June 2010: Nine soldiers were killed and 14 others wounded when PKK militants attacked an army border unit in the Semdinli area of Hakkari province. A further two soldiers were killed in a separate IED incident in Hakkari on the same day.

Directly or indirectly preparing or planning the doing of terrorist acts

Under the HPG alias, the group issued a statement in January 2012 declaring that “2012 will be the year of a struggle to ensure a free Leader and Free Kurdistan through an effective resistance and a Popular Revolutionary War”. A military intelligence report, which was made public in mid-February 2012, warned also of a PKK plan to escalate its terrorist campaign. PKK leaders had reportedly discussed their intentions to conduct large-scale attacks throughout the south-east, with the aim of inflicting major losses on the Turkish military. The group also planned to attack police and civilians in urban areas using homemade explosives.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses the PKK continues to directly and/or indirectly engage in, prepare, plan, assist, advocate or foster the doing of terrorist acts involving threats to life and serious property damage. This assessment is corroborated by information

provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources.

In the course of pursuing its objectives, the PKK is known to have committed or threatened action:

- that causes, or could cause, serious damage to property, the death of persons or endangers a person's life; and
- with the intention of advancing the PKK's political, religious or ideological causes; and
- with the intention of intimidating the public and sections of the public.

Other relevant information

Links to other terrorist groups or networks

The PKK maintains close links with its Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Like the PKK, PJAK has training camps in northern Iraq. Iran has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation and both Iran and Turkey are reported to have conducted probable coordinated military operations against both groups in their shared border areas.

Links to Australia

There are no known PKK links to Australia; however, it is likely elements of Australia's Kurdish community remain sympathetic to the Kurdish nationalist cause.

Threats to Australian interests

There are no known direct threats from the PKK to Australian interests. The PKK is not known to be engaged in any peace or mediation processes.

Proscription by the UN and other countries

The PKK is listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by many governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. The organisation is proscribed by the United States government under the name of Kongra Gel. The PKK is listed by the European Union for the purposes of its anti-terrorism measures.

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Australian Government

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

Australian National Security

Also known as: Freedom and Democratic Congress of Kurdistan, Hezan Parastina Gel, HPG, KADEK, Kongra Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan, Kongra Gel, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, Kurdistan Freedom Brigade, Kurdish Freedom Falcons, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi, Kurdistan Labor Party, Kurdish Liberation Hawks, Kurdistan Ozgurluk Sahinleri, Kurdistan People's Congress, New PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, People's Congress of Kurdistan, People's Defence Force, PKK, TAK, Teyrbazên Azadiya Kurdistan.

This statement is based on publicly available information about the Kurdistan Workers' Party. To the Australian Government's knowledge, this information is accurate, reliable and has been corroborated by classified information.

- Basis for listing a terrorist organisation
- Background to this listing
- Details of the organisation
- Other considerations
- Conclusion

Basis for listing a terrorist organisation

Division 102 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code) provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Australian Federal Police Minister (the Minister for Home Affairs) must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:

- is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, or assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act; or
- advocates the doing of a terrorist act.

For the purposes of listing a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code, the doing of a terrorist act includes the doing of a specific terrorist act, the doing of more than one terrorist act and the doing of a terrorist act, even if a terrorist act does not occur.

Background to this listing

The Kurdistan Workers' Party was first listed as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code on 17 December 2005. It was relisted on 28 September 2007, 8 September 2009, 18 August 2012, 11 August 2015 and 4 August 2018.

Details of the organisation

The Kurdistan Workers' Party is an ideologically motivated violent extremist organisation. The group was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a nationalist and revolutionary organisation, based on Marxist Leninist ideals.

Specifically, the Kurdistan Workers' Party's nationalist ideology encompasses the rights of Kurds to maintain their Kurdish ethnic identity. Further to its nationalist objectives, the Kurdistan Workers' Party aims to monopolise Kurdish political power, including by attacking the interests of rival political parties. However, the Kurdistan Workers' Party primarily conducts attacks against the Turkish government and security forces.

Leadership

The Kurdistan Workers' Party founder and leader, Abdullah Ocalan, is currently serving life imprisonment in Turkey. Day to-day affairs are run by Murat Karayilan. The Kurdistan Workers' Party's operational command consists of a three person executive committee, including Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik and Fehman Huseyin. This executive committee manages the Kurdistan Workers' Party from its base in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq.

Membership, recruitment and funding

The precise strength of the Kurdistan Workers' Party is unknown. The majority of the Kurdistan Workers' Party militants are based in northern Iraq.

Most Kurdistan Workers' Party members are recruited from Kurdish areas in south-east Turkey. The group also recruits from the Kurdish population in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The group recruits both men and women for all its activities, and recent recruiting strategies have focused on

youth. In urban areas and in Europe, a network of Kurdistan Workers' Party members and sympathisers reportedly manage financing, propaganda and recruitment processes.

Financing for the group has historically been obtained through fundraising among Kurds in Turkey and the European Kurdish diaspora. Additional sources of funding include criminal activity, such as narcotics smuggling and extortion.

Links to other terrorist organisations

The Kurdistan Workers' Party is not known to maintain formal links with any other listed terrorist organisations. However, the group maintains ties with other pro-Ocalan Kurdish violent extremist organisations across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.

The Turkish government makes little or no distinction between the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Syria based Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). The current level of interconnectivity between the Kurdistan Workers' Party and YPG is unclear.

Directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts

The Kurdistan Workers' Party has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks mainly targeting Turkish authorities and infrastructure in Turkey's south-east, and can be reasonably assessed as responsible for the following terrorist attacks and actions:

- On 28 October 2020, the Kurdistan Workers' Party attacked and destroyed the Botaş oil pipeline in Turkey's Mardin province. There were no injuries or deaths reported. The Kurdistan Workers' Party claimed responsibility for the attack the next day.
- On 31 March 2020, a suicide bombing damaged a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran near the city of Barzagan, Agri province, eastern Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers' Party claimed responsibility, stating it had killed at least 30 Turkish soldiers who were guarding the pipeline.
- On 12 September 2019, seven civilians were killed and 10 were injured when a roadside improvised explosive device detonated in Kulp District, Diyarbakir province, south-east Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers' Party subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack, stating they were targeting 'spies'.

On the basis of these examples, the Kurdistan Workers' Party is assessed as being responsible for directly or indirectly engaging in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts.

Other considerations

Links to Australia and threats to Australian interests

The Kurdistan Workers' Party does not currently pose a direct threat to Australian interests. However, Australians could be incidentally harmed in attacks targeting tourist locations in Turkey, or in Iraq and Syria.

One Australian has been charged with being a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. In May 2019, the NSW Supreme Court sentenced Renas Lelikan to a three-year Community Corrections Order for being a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Mr Lelikan had earlier pleaded guilty to being a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party between April 2011 and August 2013.

Listed by like-minded countries or the United Nations

The Kurdistan Workers' Party is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Engagement in peace or mediation processes

The Kurdistan Workers' Party has engaged in ceasefires and peace talks with the Turkish government at various stages throughout its history.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party's terrorist activities slowed significantly during its most recent ceasefire (2012-2015), though its members continued to conduct occasional attacks against civilian, military and other government targets in Turkey. Following the breakdown of peace talks in June 2015, Kurdistan Workers' Party attacks increased to pre-ceasefire rates but have since dropped significantly.

Conclusion

On the basis of the information above, the Australian Government assesses that the Kurdistan Workers' Party is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts.

Last updated:
17 January 2022

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Designated terrorist entities

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[Lists associated with Resolution 1373](#)

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Lists associated with Resolution 1373

New Zealand currently has 22 non-UN listed entities designated in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Non-UN listed entities have been designated by New Zealand since 10 February 2010.

Cabinet refined the agreed process for proposed designations of non-UN listed entities in October 2010. This paper sets out the legal framework and process for terrorist designations under the TSA after October 2010 and explains the Prime Minister's discretion in making terrorist designations.

The legal framework and process for terrorist designations

[\(/sites/default/files/publications/terrorist-designations-process-legal-framework-paper-03-10-2017.pdf\)](#) [PDF 46KB]

The statement of cases outlining the reasons for the designation of these entities are listed below. As these designations expire three years after designation unless revoked or renewed before this time, the statements of case outlining the reasons for renewing designations are also listed below. The renewals to the terrorist designation have been made pursuant to section 35 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (TSA). Please note, the list of aliases listed below may not be exhaustive.

Alphabetical list of Designated Terrorist Entities in New Zealand pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1373

Terrorist entity	Date of designation as a terrorist entity in New Zealand, including and statement of case for designation	Date terrorist designation was renewed in New Zealand, including statement of case for renewal of designation
<p>Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AAMB)</p> <p>Also known as Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs' Group, Al-Aqsa Brigades, Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Group, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion, Armed Militias of the Al-Aqsa Martyr Battalions.</p>	<p>15 December 2010</p> <p>AAMB statement of case for designation (/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades-terrorist-entity-15-dec-2010.pdf) [PDF 159KB]</p>	<p>28 August 2022</p> <p>AAMB case for renewal of the designation (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-aamb-terrorist-entity-28-aug-2022.pdf) [PDF 451KB]</p> <p>5 September 2019</p> <p>AAMB case for renewal of the designation (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-aamb-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 145KB]</p> <p>26 September 2016</p> <p>AAMB case for renewal of the designation (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-aamb-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 216KB]</p> <p>2 October 2013</p> <p>AAMB case for renewal of the designation</p>

(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-aamb-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 165KB]

Al-Shabaab

Also known as Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Mujahidin Youth Movement, Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement or Young Mujahideen Movement in Somalia.

10 February 2010
Al-Shabaab statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-al-shabaab-terrorist-entity-10-feb-2010.pdf) [PDF 189KB]

14 December 2021
Al-Shabaab case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-al-shabaab-terrorist-entity-17-december-2021.pdf) [PDF 194KB]

30 January 2019
Al-Shabaab case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-al-shabaab-terrorist-entity-30-january-2019.pdf) [PDF 183KB]

2 February 2016
Al-Shabaab case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-al-shabaab-as-terrorist-9-feb-2016.pdf) [PDF 144KB]

11 February 2013
Al-Shabaab case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-al-shabaab-as-terrorist-11-feb-2013.pdf) [PDF 151KB]

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Also known as Continuity IRA.

11 October 2010
CIRA statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati

14 August 2022
CIRA case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati

ons/statement-of-case-continuity-irish-republican-army-terrorist-entity-11-oct-2010.pdf) [PDF 186KB]

ons/renew-cira-terrorist-entity-14-august-2022.pdf) [PDF 266KB]

5 September 2019
CIRA case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-cira-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 109KB]

26 September 2016
CIRA case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-cira-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 104KB]

2 October 2013
CIRA case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-cira-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 148KB]

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)

Also known as Army of National Liberation, National Liberation Army / NLA.

15 December 2010
ELN statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-ejercito-de-liberacion-nacional-terrorist-entity-15-dec-2010.pdf) [PDF 155KB]

14 August 2022
ELN case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eln-terrorist-entity-14-august-2022.pdf) [PDF 138KB]

5 September 2019
ELN case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eln-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 141KB]

26 September 2016
 ELN case for renewal of the designation
 (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eln-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 128KB]

2 October 2013
 ELN case for renewal of the designation
 (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eln-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 167KB]

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Also known as Basque Fatherland and Liberty or Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna.

10 February 2010
 ETA statement of case for designation
 (/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-eta-terrorist-entity-10-feb-2010.pdf) [PDF 209KB]

14 December 2021
 Statement of case contains classified security information pursuant to TSA section 30

30 January 2019
 Statement of case contains classified security information pursuant to TSA section 30

9 February 2016
 ETA case for renewal of the designation
 (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eta-as-terrorist-9-feb-2016.pdf) [PDF 122KB]

11 February 2013
 ETA case for renewal of the designation
 (/sites/default/files/publications/renew-eta-as-terrorist-11-feb-2013.pdf) [PDF 159KB]

Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Also known as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, Islami Dawat-e-Kafela (IDEK), Harakat ul-Jihad e Islami Bangladesh, Harkatul-Jihad-al-Islam, Harkatul Jihad, Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami or Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami Bangladesh.

15 December 2010
HUJI-B statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-harkat-ul-jihad-al-islami-terrorist-entity-15-dec-2010.pdf) [PDF 188KB]

14 August 2022
HUJI-B case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-huji-b-terrorist-entity-14-august-2022.pdf) [PDF 123KB]

5 September 2019
HUJI-B case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-huji-b-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 118KB]

26 September 2016
HUJI-B case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-huji-b-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 110KB]

2 October 2013
HUJI-B case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-huji-b-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 222KB]

Indian Mujahideen (IM)

Also known as Indian Mujahidin.

11 October 2010
Indian Mujahideen statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-indian-mujahideen-terrorist-entity-11-oct-2010.pdf) [PDF 191KB]

14 August 2022
Indian Mujahideen case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-im-terrorist-entity-14-august-2022.pdf) [PDF 141KB]

5 September 2019
Indian Mujahideen case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-im-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 118KB]

ons/renew-im-terrorist-
entity-26-september-
2019.pdf) [PDF 204KB]

26 September 2016
Indian Mujahideen case for
renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-indian-
mujahideen-terrorist-entity-
26sept2016.pdf) [PDF
116KB]

2 October 2013
Indian Mujahideen case for
renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-indian-
mujahideen-2-oct-
2013.pdf) [PDF 207KB]

Islamic Resistance (IR)

Also known as Al-Muqawama al-
Islamiyya, Military Wing of
Lebanese Hizballah, Military
Wing of Hezbollah, Military Wing
of Hizbullah.

11 October 2010
Islamic Resistance
statement case for
designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/statement-of-case-
islamic-resistance-army-
terrorist-entity-11-oct-
2010.pdf) [PDF 223KB]

28 August 2022
Islamic Resistance case for
renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-ir-terrorist-entity-
28-aug-2022.pdf) [PDF
231KB]

5 September 2019
Islamic Resistance case for
renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-ir-terrorist-entity-
26-september-
2019.pdf) [PDF 235KB]

26 September 2016
Islamic Resistance case for
renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-ir-terrorist-entity-
26sept2016.pdf) [PDF
121KB]

2 October 2013
Islamic Resistance case for the renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-islamic-resistance-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 184KB]

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Sinai Province (ISIL Sinai)

ISIL Sinai, formerly designated under the description Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM); also known as Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, Ansar Jerusalem, Jamaat Ansar al-Dalwa al-Islamiyya fi Bayt Al Maqdis, Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, Supporters of the Holy House, Mu'tassim Billah Battalion, Group of Partisans of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, Wilaya of Sinai of the Islamic State, Wilayat Sinai, Wilayah Sinai, Wilayat Sayna, Islamic State-Sinai Province, Sinai Province, Province of Sinai, Islamic State in the Sinai, Daesh Sinai Province, and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Sinai.

4 May 2015
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/ansar-bayt-al-madis-statement-of-case-for-designation-2015.pdf) [PDF 295KB]

25 April 2021
ISIL Sinai case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-islamic-state-iraq-levant-sinai-province-terrorist-entity-25april2021.pdf) (PDF 159KB)

29 April 2018
ISIL Sinai case for renewal of the designation
(https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/renew-islamic-state-iraq-levant-sinai-province-terrorist-entity-29april2018.pdf) (PDF 219KB)

Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB)

Also known as the Military wing of Hamas, Ezzedeem Al-Qassam Brigades (EQB) or Izz al-Din Al-Qassem Brigades (IQB)

11 October 2010
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-izz-

28 August 2022
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati

al-din-al-qassam-brigades-terrorist-entity-11-oct-2010.pdf) [PDF 172KB]

ons/renew-iqb-terrorist-entity-28-aug-2022.pdf) [PDF 165KB]

5 September 2019
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-iqb-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 214KB]

26 September 2016
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-izz-al-din-al-qassam-brigades-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 130KB]

2 October 2013
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-amas-qassam-brigade-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 163KB]

Jaish Al-Adl

JAA, formerly designated under description Jundallah; also known as Jaysh al-Adl, Jeysh al-Adl, Army of Justice, Peoples' Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), Jonbesh-I Moqavemat-i Mardom-I Iran, Popular Resistance Movement of Iran, Soldiers of God, Fedayeen-e-Islam, Former Jundallah of Iran, Jundallah, Jondallah, Jondollah,

12 September 2011
Jundallah statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-jundallah-terrorist-entity-12-sept-2011_0.pdf) [PDF 182KB]

30 June 2020
Jaish Al-Adl case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-jaish-al-adl-terrorist-entity-30june2020.pdf) [PDF 147KB]

13 July 2017
Jaish Al-Adl case for renewal of the designation

Jondallah, Army of God (God's Army), and Baloch Peoples' Resistance Movement (BPRM).

(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-jaish-al-adl-terrorist-entity-27july2017.pdf) [PDF 300KB]

20 July 2014

Jundallah case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/jundallah-renewal-september-2014.pdf) [PDF 235KB]

Jamaah Anshrout Daulah

Also known as JAD; Jamaah Anshurut Daulah; Jamaah Ansharut Daulat; Jamaah Ansharut Daulah; Jamaah Ansharut Daulah; Jamaah Anshar Daulah; Jamaah Ansharud Daulah; The Partisans of the State Group; Jamaah Anshar Daulah Khilafah Nusantara; and, Jamaah Anshar Daulah Khilafah Nusantara (JADKN).

21 March 2018

JAD statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-jamaah-anshrout-daulah-jad-21-march-2018.pdf) [PDF 437KB]

20 March 2021

JAD case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-jad-terrorist-entity-20-march-2021.pdf) [PDF 134KB]

Maute Group

Also known as Islamic State in Lanao; Islamic State of Lanao; Islamic State Lanao; IS-Ranao; Lions of IS Ranao; Daulah Islamiyah Fi Ranao; Dawla Islamiya Ranao; Islamic State in the Southern Philippines; Islamic State East Asia; Maute ISIS; Grupong ISIS; Grupo ISIS; and, Khilafah Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM).

21 March 2018

Maute Group statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-maute-group-21-march-2018.pdf) [PDF 553KB]

18 March 2021

Maute Group case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-maute-group-terrorist-entity-18-march-2021.pdf) [PDF 127KB]

**New People's
Army/Communist Party of the
Philippines (NPA/CPP)**

Also known as New People's
Army and the Communist Party
of the Philippines.

11 October 2010
NPA/CPP statement of case
for designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/statement-of-case-
new-peoples-army-
communist-party-
philippines-terrorist-entity-
11-oct-2010.pdf) [PDF
177KB]

14 August 2022
NPA/CPP case for renewal
of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-mpa-cpp-
terrorist-entity-14-august-
2022.pdf) [PDF 128KB]

5 September 2019
NPA/CPP case for renewal
of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-mpa-cpp-
terrorist-entity-26-
september-2019.pdf) [PDF
145KB]

26 September 2016
NPA/CPP case for renewal
of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-mpa-cpp-
terrorist-entity-
26sept2016.pdf) [PDF
124KB]

2 October 2013
NPA/CPP case for renewal
of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-cpp-mpa-2-oct-
2013.pdf) [PDF 197KB]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Also known as Islamic Jihad,
Islamic Jihad (in/of) Palestine,
Islamic Jihad – Palestine Faction
and Islamic Holy War, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad –
Shallah Faction, Harakat al-Jihad
al Islami fi Filistin, Jihad al-Islami,
Abu Ghunaym Squad of the

11 October 2010
PIJ statement of case for
designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/statement-of-case-
palestinian-islamic-jihad-
terrorist-entity-11-oct-
2010.pdf) [PDF 164KB]

28 August 2022
PIJ case for renewal of the
designation
(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-pij-terrorist-
entity-28-aug-2022.pdf)
[PDF 170KB]

Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis, al-Quds Brigades, Saraya al-Quds (Jerusalem Battalions/The Jerusalem Brigades), Saraya al-Mujihadeen or Al-Awdah Brigades, al-Quds Squads, Islamic Jihad Palestine (IJP)

5 September 2019
PIJ case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pij-terrorist-entity-26-september-2019.pdf) [PDF 136KB]

26 September 2016
PIJ case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-palestinian-islamic-jihad-terrorist-entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF 118KB]

2 October 2013
PIJ case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pij-2-oct-2013.pdf) [PDF 153KB]

Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)

Also known as Kurdistan Workers Party, Kongra Gel, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kurdistan Labour Party and Kurdistan People's Congress.

10 February 2010
PKK statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-pkk-terrorist-entity-10-feb-2010.pdf) [PDF 190KB]

14 December 2021
PKK case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-terrorist-entity-17-december-2021.pdf) [PDF 176KB]

30 January 2019
PKK case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-terrorist-entity-30-january-2019.pdf) [PDF 182KB]

2 February 2016
PKK case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-terrorist-entity-2-feb-2016.pdf) [PDF 153KB]

ons/renew-pkk-as-terrorist-
entity-9-feb-2016.pdf) [PDF
137KB]

11 February 2013

PKK case for renewal of the
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-pkk-as-terrorist-
entity-11-feb-
2013.pdf) [PDF 143KB]

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

Also known as Real IRA, New
IRA.

11 October 2010

RIRA statement of case for
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/statement-of-case-real-
irish-republican-army-
terrorist-entity-11-oct-
2010.pdf) [PDF 163KB]

14 August 2022

RIRA case for renewal of the
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-rira-terrorist-
entity-14-august-
2022.pdf) [PDF 139KB]

5 September 2019

RIRA case for renewal of the
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-rira-terrorist-
entity-26-september-
2019.pdf) [PDF 137KB]

26 September 2016

RIRA case for renewal of the
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-rira-terrorist-
entity-26sept2016.pdf) [PDF
117KB]

2 October 2013

RIRA case for renewal of the
designation

(/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/renew-rira-2-oct-
2013.pdf) [PDF 227KB]

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Also known as Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left) and Dev Sol.

12 September 2011
DHKP/C statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-revolutionary-people-liberation-party-terrorist-entity-12-sept-2011_0.pdf) [PDF 150KB]

30 June 2020
DHKP/C case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-dhkp-c-terrorist-entity-30june2020.pdf) [PDF 138KB]

13 July 2017
DHKP/C case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-dhkp-c-terrorist-entity-27july2017.pdf) [PDF 202KB]

20 July 2014
DHKP/C case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/dhkpc-renewal-september-2014.pdf) [PDF 270KB]

Tarrant, Brenton Harrison

DOB 27 October 1990

27 August 2020
Brenton Harrison Tarrant statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-brenton-harrison-tarrant.pdf) [PDF 546KB]

The American Proud Boys

20 June 2022
The American Proud Boys statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-the-american-proud-boys-

terrorist-entity-20-june-2022.pdf) [PDF 381KB]

The Base

20 June 2022
The Base statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-the-base-terrorist-entity-20-june-2022.pdf) [PDF 277KB]

The Shining Path

Also known as SP, Sendero Luminoso, The Peruvian Communist Party, PCP-SL, PCP, SL, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru - By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP - por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, Ejercito Guerrillero Popular, Ejercito Popular de Liberacion, EGP, EPL, People's Aid of Peru, People's Guerrilla Army and People's Liberation Army.

12 September 2011
The Shining Path statement of case for designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-the-shining-path-terrorist-entity-12-sept-2011_0.pdf) [PDF 1.3MB]

30 June 2020
The Shining Path case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-the-shining-path-terrorist-entity-30june2020.pdf) [PDF 136KB]

13 July 2017
The Shining Path case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/renew-the-shining-path-terrorist-entity-27july2017.pdf) [PDF 170KB]

20 July 2014
The Shining Path case for renewal of the designation
(/sites/default/files/publications/shining-path-renewal-september-2014.pdf) [PDF 250KB]

Application for revocation of the designation

A designated entity or a third party with an interest in the designation can apply to the Prime Minister for revocation of the designation (s 34 TSA).

An application must be based on the grounds set out at s 34(3) TSA. Those are:

(a) That the designation should not stand because the entity concerned does not satisfy the test stated in s 20(1) or (3) (for interim designations) or s 22(1) or (3) (for final designations);

or

(b) That the entity concerned is no longer involved in any way in acts of the kind that made, or that would make, the entity eligible for designation.

Applications should be directed to:

Prime Minister

Executive Wing

Parliament Buildings

Wellington 6160

The TSA also allows a designation to be judicially reviewed (s 33).

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[\(/https://www.linkedin.com/company/nz-police/\)](https://www.linkedin.com/company/nz-police/)

[\(/https://www.govt.nz\)](https://www.govt.nz)

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STATEMENT OF CASE TO RENEW THE DESIGNATION OF PARTIYA KARKEREN KURDISTAN AS A TERRORIST ENTITY

PURPOSE

1. This paper sets out the case demonstrating Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), also known as Kurdistan Workers Party, Kongra Gel, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kurdistan Labour Party and Kurdistan People's Congress meets the statutory criteria for the renewal of its designation as a terrorist entity within New Zealand pursuant to the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (TSA).

STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER

2. This paper sets out updated information about PKK's continued involvement in terrorist activity and covers any relevant changes or developments to the organisation since its original designation in February 2010¹ and renewals in February 2013,² February 2016,³ and 30 January 2019,⁴ including to PKK's objectives, structure, weapons and tactics and includes recent attacks which meet the definition of a terrorist act under the TSA.
3. This updated information, together with information contained in the original designation paper and previous renewal papers, provides the basis for the conclusion that PKK meets the legal criteria for renewal of its designation as a terrorist entity under the TSA.

STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION RENEWAL UNDER THE TSA

4. Section 35(1) of the TSA provides that a designation of a terrorist entity expires three years after the date of designation unless it is earlier renewed by the Prime Minister. The original designation is made pursuant to s 22 of the TSA, which provides that the Prime Minister may designate an entity as a terrorist entity if the Prime Minister believes on reasonable grounds that the entity has knowingly carried out, or has knowingly participated in the carrying out of, one or more terrorist acts. Carrying out a terrorist act includes the planning, preparation or credible threat to carry out the act, whether it is actually carried out or not (s 5A(1)(a) and (b)) and also includes attempts to carry out the act (s 5A(1)(c)).
5. The Prime Minister may renew that designation for a further three years under s 35(2) if satisfied that there are still reasonable grounds as set out in s 22 for the entity to be designated under that section.
6. Before the expiry of an order made under s 35(2), the Prime Minister may make another order under s 35(3) renewing the designation concerned for a further three years. The Prime Minister may make any number of orders under s 35(3) in respect of the same designation (s 35(5)).

CREDIBILITY OF SOURCES

7. This paper has been prepared using open or unclassified sources which have a reputation for careful and unbiased reporting. These include The Guardian, The Washington Post, Al Jazeera, DW News, Europol, The Defense Post, US Department of State, Routledge, Australian National Security, and Reuters.

8. A range of think tanks were referred to including International Crisis Group, The Jamestown Foundation, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Human Rights Association, and Human Rights Watch.
9. A range of regional news sources were also referred to including TRT World, Kurdistan 24, Rudaw, Daily Sabah, ANF News, Ekurd Daily, and Anadolu Agency.
10. Other sources utilised include Xinhua News Agency, and websites PKK online, and Marxist Leninist Communist Party.

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DESIGNATION RENEWAL UNDER THE TSA

Continued involvement in terrorist activity

11. Since January 2019, PKK has had continued involvement in armed clashes with Turkish and Peshmerga forces. The Human Rights Association reported that between January and October 2020, fourteen security officers, fifteen civilians and seventy-eight PKK militants were killed during clashes.⁵ Conflict has centred on armed clashes between the Turkish military and PKK in Turkey's eastern and south eastern region and the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
12. Turkish security forces initiated operations against PKK in 2019. The PKK reacted to these incursions by narrowing their radius of operations and beginning to deploy into residential areas. Reports suggest that PKK also plans on slowing down operations as a tactical move to increase their influence.⁶ Between June and September 2020, increased Turkish military operations against the PKK deployed in these residential areas resulted in an increase of civilian harm. The PKK deployment resulted in approximately thirty-three civilians reportedly being killed and twenty-three injured, more than double the number of civilians killed in 2019.⁷
13. On 31 March 2020, a PKK fighter detonated a suicide improvised explosive device (IED) on a pipeline in Agri province near the Turkey-Iran border. PKK issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, and saying that at least thirty Turkish soldiers were killed, dozens more were injured, and five armoured vehicles were destroyed. The Turkish forces were guarding a pipeline which was damaged in the attack, disrupting Iranian gas exports to Turkey.⁸
14. On 12 September 2020, seven civilians were killed and ten were injured when a roadside IED detonated in Kulp District, South-East Turkey. PKK claimed responsibility for the attack stating that they were "targeting spies".⁹
15. On 28 October 2020, PKK attacked and destroyed the Botaş oil pipeline in Turkey's Mardin province, which exports oil from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. There were no casualties reported. PKK claimed responsibility for the attack the following day, stating that they had carried out a successful sabotage attack.¹⁰
16. On 14 February 2021, thirteen civilians who had recently been abducted by PKK were found dead in one of the group's hideouts when it was captured during an operation by Turkish troops. Twelve of the civilians had been shot in the head and one was shot in the shoulder. Two of the PKK members captured by Turkish troops told them that the civilians had been "martyred" when the operation began. A subsequent statement on a PKK website said that some of the prisoners it was holding (who included Turkish intelligence, police, and military personnel) died during clashes in the area but denied it had ever hurt prisoners.¹¹

17. On 5 June 2021, five Peshmerga fighters (a military force in Kurdish region of Iraq) were killed, and four others wounded when PKK launched an attack in Duhok Province, Iraq.¹² PKK used rocket fire to ambush Peshmerga forces who were establishing a new military point to maintain security in local villages. PKK-linked media claimed the attack.¹³
18. On 5 August 2021, Peshmerga forces defused sixty-five kilograms of explosives on an intercity road in Duhok Province. A security source was quoted as saying PKK were responsible for planting the explosive material which was planned to be detonated near a Peshmerga outpost which was used by Turkish and Asayish forces in the area.¹⁴

Ideology and objectives

19. PKK's predominant objective is to uphold the rights of Kurds, and to protect Kurdish ethn0-national identity. Objectives also include PKK's aims to monopolise their political power, including attacking the interests of rival political parties.¹⁵ Although PKK have previously indicated a willingness to negotiate with Turkey, tensions have resurfaced following an increase in Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led operations against the PKK.¹⁶
20. PKK continues to be a dominant organisation shaping the discourse of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the region. The group has developed a monopolistic ideological bond with sympathisers that has allowed them to action violent strategies while maintaining public support. PKK have also developed close relations with political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade unions both in Turkey and internationally that claim to represent Kurdish minority rights.¹⁷
21. On 27 July 2021, an article posted on PKK's website addressing the attacks against the PKK stated "Time for freedom against fascism, occupation and isolation. Those who disrespect our values in Amed, Afrin, Garzan and many other places and the Kurds who are partners to those who carry out these attacks should receive an answer from the young women and men who believe in the freedom struggle." The article also stated "it should be known that the Turkish fascist state wants to impose a dishonourable life through these attacks. It wants to render us worthless. That's why today is the day to reclaim our honour. All democratic forces, especially our patriotic people, should take to the streets to oppose these immoral attacks of the Turkish state and those who act as their servants. The whole of Kurdistan must turn into a field of rebellion against these immoral attacks." The article also advocates for the occupation regime to be overthrown to protect Kurdistan identity.¹⁸

Organisation and structure

22. There has been no significant change to PKK's leadership. Abdullah Ocalan, who is serving life imprisonment in Turkey remains PKK's leader, with operations and day-to-day affairs being run by Murat Karayilan. The PKK's operational command consists of a three-person executive committee comprising Karayilan, Cemil Bayik and Fehman Huseyin. The committee manages the PKK from its base in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq.¹⁹ Turkish forces regularly conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq which target these PKK bases.²⁰

Weapons, tactics, and capability

23. While sporadic armed clashes between the military and PKK occur in Turkey's eastern and south eastern region, the focus of the conflict predominantly lies in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
24. PKK use a range of weapons to carry out attacks against Turkish forces, including small arms, hand grenades and IEDs.²¹ The PKK is also in possession of at least some heavy weapons. In August 2021, PKK was found to have used anti-tank rockets produced by the US and Sweden, along with French-German joint productions. For example, the PKK used more than 40 AT-4 and MILAN anti-tank ammunition during attacks on Turkish forces between 2017-2021.²²
25. The Turkish military has targeted more high-ranking PKK members in this period predominantly through drone strikes. More than one-third of PKK militants killed in June and July were high ranking members.²³
26. PKK has also experienced a significant loss of members, decreasing by 83% over the past four years. As of 2020, only fifty-three people joined PKK, down from 132 in 2019 and only a reported two joined in 2021.²⁴ In an attempt to increase member numbers, PKK has resorted to conscripting minors. The group has been accused of abducting, threatening, and deceiving hundreds of vulnerable minors for recruitment. An estimated 440 minors have escaped from PKK and returned to their families over the past five years.²⁵
27. PKK has also been assessed as using European territory for propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and logistical support activities. Europol's 2020 *Terrorism Situation and Trend report* stated that PKK is actively engaged in propaganda activities as well as raising money in European countries, operating under the guise of legally recognised entities such as Kurdish associations.²⁶
 - 27.1. In 2020, several individuals travelled from Europe to Syria or Iran to join Kurdish forces. Belgium reported a total of nine Belgians joined the conflict in Iraq via PKK recruitment networks. Similarly, a man in the UK was sentenced to one year in prison for attending PKK terrorist training camps in Iraq.²⁷
 - 27.2. On 05 October 2019, it was reported that five German citizens were receiving consular support after they were detained in Turkey following accusations of being linked to PKK and spreading propaganda.²⁸
 - 27.3. A Europol report revealed that PKK-linked associations, foundations, and media groups in France were easily able to disseminate the group's propaganda.²⁹
28. PKK continues to engage in drug trafficking to finance the organisation. Reports estimate that up to 80% of illicit drug markets in Europe are supplied by PKK controlled trafficking networks. Europol reported that narcotics operations generated an annual income between \$1.5 billion to \$3 billion for PKK. The taxation of drug transfers, as well as payments from traffickers and smugglers at borders, serves as a crucial income source for the group.³⁰
29. PKK continues to utilise online platforms such as the group's websites, PKK online and Hezen Parastina to disseminate propaganda and report on recent attacks. PKK also posts on their video channel Gerilla TV, YouTube, Twitter, and other social media platforms to broadcast operations and gain support.³¹

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC)

30. Section 5(4) of the TSA states that an act is not a terrorist act if it “if it occurs in a situation of armed conflict and is, at the time and in the place that it occurs, in accordance with rules of international law applicable to the conflict.”
31. For the 5(4) exception to apply, there must be a state of armed conflict involving the PKK, and that its attacks within that armed conflict comply with the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also known as international humanitarian law.
32. An international armed conflict involves a conflict between the armed forces of two states. A non-international armed conflict exists where the conflict is fought between government forces and opposing non-state forces, or amongst armed non-state forces who do not qualify as a legitimate government. The level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity and continuity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions (such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence).
33. The clashes between the PKK and Turkish armed and security forces have increased in frequency and intensity in recent years, such that it may now reach the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.³²
34. However, regardless of the status of the conflict, the acts of the PKK do not conform with LOAC and so still qualify as terrorist acts. This is for two reasons:
 - 34.1. In accordance with LOAC, only combatants have the right to conduct attacks. The PKK would have to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while engaged in an attack or operations preparatory to an attack, which they do not;
 - 34.2. Some of the acts outlined involve the PKK targeting civilians and civilian objects. This breaches the principle of distinction, which means that attacks on enemy combatants and military objectives are lawful, but attacks on the civilian population and civilian objects are prohibited.
35. Therefore, the exception in s 5(4) of the TSA does not apply to the PKK attacks outlined above, so they can properly be characterised as terrorist acts.

CONCLUSION

36. On the evidence set out above, this paper concludes that there are still reasonable grounds as set out in s 22 of the TSA for PKK to be designated under that section.
37. Since its designation in February 2010, and renewals in February 2013, February 2016 and January 2019, PKK has continued to carry out activities which meet the definition of terrorist acts in ss 5 and 25 of the TSA (paragraphs 13–18). Accordingly, given there are still reasonable grounds to believe PKK has knowingly carried out terrorist acts as set out in s 22 of the TSA, PKK meets the legal criteria for renewal of its designation as a terrorist entity under s 35.
38. The designation must be renewed by 30 January 2022 to be effective.

- ¹ The statement of case, dated 10 February 2010 can be accessed at <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-pkk-terrorist-entity-10-feb-2010.pdf>
- ² <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-as-terrorist-entity-11-feb-2013.pdf>
- ³ <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-as-terrorist-entity-9-feb-2016.pdf>
- ⁴ <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/renew-pkk-terrorist-entity-30-january-2019.pdf>
- ⁵ 08/03/2021 “Turkey 2020 Department of State Human Rights Report”, Department of State, accessed via <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/TURKEY-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf> on 21/09/2021
- ⁶ 05/01/2021 “The PKK’s New Strategy in Iraq”, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, accessed via <https://orsam.org.tr/en/the-pkks-new-strategy-in-iraq/> on 22/09/2021
- ⁷ 04/04/2021 “Kurds in ‘mountain prison’ cower as Turkey fights PKK with drones in Iraq”, The Guardian, accessed via <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/04/iraq-turkey-pkk-drones-kurds-kurdistan> on 21/09/2021
- ⁸ 01/04/2021 “PKK claims suicide attack on Turkey-Iran pipeline killing 30 Turkish soldiers”, Rudaw, accessed via <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/01042020> on 21/09/2021
- ⁹ 04/08/2021 “Kurdistan Worker’ Party (PKK)”, Australian National Security, accessed via <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx> on 21/09/2021
- ¹⁰ 31/10/2021 “Iraqi Kurdistan says oil exports to Turkey halted after pipeline attack: statement”, Ekurd Daily, accessed via <https://ekurd.net/iraqi-kurdistan-oil-exports-2020-10-31> on 20/09/2021
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- ¹² The Peshmerga are the Kurdish branch of the Iraqi Armed Forces and are the military force of the autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq.
- ¹³ 03/09/2019 “Peshmerga”, DW, accessed via <https://www.dw.com/en/peshmerga/t-41075281> on 1/10/2021
- ¹⁴ 05/06/2021 “PKK rocket attack in Duhok kills 5 Peshmerga, injures 4”, Kurdistan24, accessed via <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/24666-PKK-rocket-attack-in-Duhok-kills-5-Peshmerga,-injures-4> on 28/09/2021
- ¹⁵ 05/08/2021 “Peshmerga forces diffuse explosives planted by PKK on road in Kurdistan Region’s Duhok: Source”, Kurdistan24, accessed via <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/25183-Peshmerga-forces-diffuse-explosives-planted-by-PKK-on-road-in-Kurdistan-Region%27s-Duhok:-Source> on 21/09/2021
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- ¹⁷ 25/11/2020 “Will KDP-PKK tensions ever end in reconciliation?”, Rudaw, accessed via <https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/25112020> on 23/09/2021
- ¹⁸ 26/07/2021 “The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in London: Countering Overseas Terrorist Financing and Support with “Nudge” and Situational Approaches”, Routledge, accessed via <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10132301/1/The%20Kurdistan%20Worker%20Party%20PKK%20in%20London%20Countering%20Overseas%20Terrorist%20Financing%20and%20Support%20with%20Nudge%20and%20Situational%20Approaches.pdf> on 23/09/2021
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Bilaga - Skäligen misstänkt

Myndighet
Säkerhetspolisen

Enhet
Utredningsenheten

Diariennr
0105-K5-23

Skäligen misstänkt person
Güngör, Yahya

Personnr
19820665-4991

Identifierad
Ja

Kontroll sätt
Annat

Kommentar
Polisanställd i tjänst



Personalia och dagsbottsavgift

Utskriftsdatum
2023-05-31

Namn Güngör, Yahya		Personnummer 19820665-4991	
Tilltalsnamn	Kallas för	Öknamn	Kön Man
Födelseförsamling	Födelselän	Födelseort utland	
Medborgarskap	Hemvistland	Telefonnr	
Postadress Krällingegränd 15 163 62 Spånga			
Folkbokföringsort			
Föräldrars/Vårdnadshavares namn och adress (beträffande den som inte fyllt 20 år)			
Utbildning			
Yrke / Titel			
Arbetsgivare		Telefonnr	
Anställning (nuvarande och tidigare)			
Arbetsförhet och hälsotillstånd			
Kompletterande uppgifter			
Uppgiven inkomst	Bidrag	Hemmavarande barn under 18 år	
Försörjningsplikt		Skulder	
Förmögenhet			
Kontroll utförd			
Taxerad inkomst		Taxeringsår	
Taxeringskontroll utförd av		Datum - -	



Underrättelse/Delgivning jml RB 23:18a

Myndighet
Säkerhetspolisen

Enhet
Utredningsenheten

Ärende

Diariennr
0105-K5-23

Underrättad av
70697, Säkerhetspolis

Gärning
Grovt vapenbrott mm

Berörd person

Personnr
19820665-4991

Efternamn
Güngör

Förnamn
Yahya

Underrättelsesätt
Muntlig underrättelse

Datum för muntlig underrättelse
2023-05-29

Yttrande senast (rådrum)
2023-06-08

Notering

Misstänkt har getts möjlighet att ta del av materialet från den slutförda utredningen (RB 23:18a § / FUK 12 §)

Häktet Kronoberg kl 13:45

Resultat av slutunderrättelse

Information gällande erinran

Försvarare

Namn
Aydin, Ilhan

Underrättelsesätt
Muntlig underrättelse

Datum för muntlig underrättelse
2023-05-29

Yttrande senast (rådrum)
2023-06-08

Notering

Häktet Kronoberg 2023-05-29 kl13:45

Resultat av slutunderrättelse

Information gällande erinran



Involverade personer i protokoll

Upprättad enligt bestämmelserna i 21§ 3st och 21a§ förundersökningskungörelsen (1947:948)

Diarienummer
0105-K5-23

Handläggare

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