



Protokollbilaga

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Signerat av
Cecilia Hector

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Handläggare (Protokollförare)

Cecilia Hector

Undersökningsledare

Karolina Wieslander

Polisens diarienummer

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Personer i ärendet

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Polisen
Swedish Police

Date

September 4th, 2018



Registration number

1 (1)

Swedish Police Authority
National Operations Department
War Crimes Unit
Nina Fetz, Detective Inspector

CIJA

Information requested about Hamo, MOHAMMED, born in 1958

The Swedish Police, under the direction of the National Public Prosecution Department, conducts a preliminary investigation concerning the Syrian citizen Hamo, MOHAMMED, born in 1958.

Hamo worked within the Syrian Army from 1978 until he deserted in July 2012. When Hamo left the army he had, according to himself, rank brigadier. Hamo was stationed at the 11th division in Homs where he had the responsibility for all weapons and ammunition. His division command was Major General Nasib Abo Mahmoud.

The War Crimes Unit would appreciate if CIJA have information about following:

- Information about Hamo, MOHAMMED.
- Information about the 11th division in Homs during the period March 2011-July 2012.
- Military expertise about Hamo's role at the time mentioned above. What authority did he have/did he **not** have as a brigadier with responsibility for weapons and ammunition?

Yours sincerely,

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Mohammed Hamo

On 4 September 2018, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) received a Request for Assistance from the Swedish War Crimes Unit regarding Mohammed Hamo. In particular, the War Crimes Unit requested information on:

- The individual Mohammed Hamo;
- The activities of the 11th Division in Homs during March 2011 – July 2012; and
- Hamo’s role during the aforementioned period.

I. Executive Summary

Brigadier General Mohammed Hamo was the Head of the Armaments Branch in the 11th Division of the Syrian Army. CIJA is in possession of documentation that confirms his position and his defection.

The 11th Division belonged to the Third Corps of the Army and Armed Forces. The 11th Division was a Tank division, and was headquartered in Shamsin, south of Homs City. It was headed by Major General Nassib Ajwad Abu Mahmoud. *Section III* provides a detailed analysis of the structure and membership of the 11th Division.

Most of CIJA’s evidence relating to the activities of the 11th Division in Homs center around the attacks against the city of Ar-Rastan, located 25 kilometers north of Homs City. *Section IV* provides an overview of the attacks on Ar-Rastan, with a focus on the participation of the 11th Division.

II. Mohammed Hamo

Brigadier General Mohammed Hamo was the Head of the Armaments Branch in the 11th Division. An administrative order from the 11th Division’s Political Guidance Branch, dated 20 December 2011, lists Brigadier General “Muhammed Hussein Hamo” as the Head of the

Armaments Branch.¹ A Military Police communication log notes its receipt of a communication from the Military Intelligence's Branch 293 on 4 December 2012, requesting that the Military Police investigate and search for the deserter, Brigadier General "Muhammed Hussein Hamo", mother's name Khadija, born in 1958 in Al-Haffa, Latakia.²

CIJA understands from casual conversation with Hamo that he served in this position for four and a half years, before defecting from the Syrian Army on 22 July 2012. Hamo stated that when combat operations began in 2011, various units of the 11th Division were requesting large amounts of ammunition. For example, during the operation to storm Talbiseh and Ar-Rastan, the 147th Brigade³ was armed with 800 tank shells. The next day, the Brigade asked for refills. Hamo remembers being surprised at the scale of the operation and amount of ammunition used on small towns like Ar-Rastan and Talbiseh.

CIJA does not have further information on the role of Hamo as the Head of the Armaments Branch.

III. 11th Division

The 11th Division belonged to the Third Corps of the Army and Armed Forces. The Third Corps also encompassed the 18th Division and the 17th Division.⁴

The Third Corps was headed by Major General Talal Mustafa Tlass from at least January 2012.⁵ At this time, the Chief of Staff of the Third Corps was Major General Ali Ahmad Suleiman.⁶ By July 2012, the Third Corps was headed by Major General Wajih Yahya Mahmoud.⁷ CIJA is in possession of documents from late 2013 bearing the name and signature of Major General

¹ Administrative Order from the 11th Tank Division, 20 December 2011, SYR.D0124.029.001-005, at SYR.D0124.029.001.

² Circular by the Investigations Section of the Military Police, 15 December 2012, SYR.D0193.044.026.

³ CIJA Analyst Note: CIJA is not aware of the existence of a 147th Brigade in the 11th Division. It is possible that Hamo was in fact referring to the 47th Brigade of the 11th Division.

⁴ See e.g. Communication from 3rd Corps, Division 18 to Infantry College, 9 October 2011, SYR.D0017.089.069; Roster list issued by 17th Division of the Third Corps, 31 January 2012, SYR.D0090.001.022-026, at SYR.D0090.001.026. See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

⁵ Roster list issued by 17th Division of the Third Corps, 31 January 2012, SYR.D0090.001.022-026, at SYR.D0090.001.026. See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

⁶ Roster list issued by 17th Division of the Third Corps, 31 January 2012, SYR.D0090.001.022-026, at SYR.D0090.001.026.

⁷ See e.g. Communication from the Third Corps to the heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb, 25 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.001-002; Communication from the Third Corps to the heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.001 (The documents are signed by Major General Wajih Yahya Mahmoud, Commander of the Third Corps.) See also SYR.WGA.609; SYR.WGA.725

Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim as the Commander of the Third Corps.⁸ However, the name and title are handwritten, and the signature on these documents varies from that of Major General Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim when he was the Commander of the 17th Division.⁹

The 11th Division was a Tank division,¹⁰ and was headquartered in Shamsin, south of Homs City.¹¹ It was headed by Major General Nassib Ajwad Abu Mahmoud.¹² According to a defector from the Artillery Branch of the 11th Division, the Deputy Commander of the Division was Major General Khaled Muhammad.¹³ CIJA is in possession of a document in which ‘Major General Khaled’ is identified as the Deputy Commander of the 11th Division.¹⁴ Witness SYR.WGA.609, a defector from the 11th Division, named Brigadier General Khaled Ali Muhammad as the Division’s Chief of Staff.¹⁵ Another defector claimed that Brigadier General Ahmad Tlass was the Chief of Staff.¹⁶ However, Witness SYR.WGA.725 named Ahmad Tlass as the Deputy Commander of the 11th Division.¹⁷ Two witnesses identified Brigadier General Ghanem Ali Saqqour as the Security Officer of the 11th Division.¹⁸ However, CIJA has a document from May 2013 in which Brigadier General Ghanem Ali Saqqour signs as the Head of the Organization and Supply Branch of the 11th Division.¹⁹

CIJA is in possession of an Administrative Order regarding the distribution of funds in the Division that names 148 members of the 11th Division, including twelve brigadier generals and eight colonels.²⁰

⁸ See e.g. Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013, SYR.D0194.015.025; Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013, SYR.D0194.015.026; Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013, SYR.D0194.015.027.

⁹ See e.g. Memo issued by the 17th Division, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.012.

¹⁰ See e.g. Communication from Division 11/T – Battalion 458/Reconnaissance, ???/2012, SYR.D0124.003.004. (Analyst Note: the ‘T’ annotation next to the 11th Division signifies the specialty of the Division). See also Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.576; SYR.WGA.609.

¹¹ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.609; SYR.WGA.910; SYR.WGA.579.

¹² Administrative Order from the Political Guidance Branch of the 11th Division, 20 December 2011, SYR.D0124.029.001-005 (document signed by Major General Nassib Ajwad Abu Mahmoud, Commander of the 11th Division). See also Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.725; SYR.WGA.576 (The witness identified the Commander as Major General Mahmoud Ajwad Abu Mahmoud. However, he is likely referring to the same individual); SYR.WGA.587; SYR.WGA.609.

¹³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

¹⁴ See also Communication from Police Command Idleb to the Minister of Interior’s Office, 10 November 2011, SYR.D0250.078.001-002, at SYR.D0250.078.002.

¹⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

¹⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.587.

¹⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.725.

¹⁸ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.609; SYR.WGA.587.

¹⁹ Memo issued by the 11th Division, 9 May 2013, SYR.D0242.104.021.

²⁰ Administrative Order issued by the 11th Division’s Political Guidance Branch, 20 December 2011, SYR.D0124.029.001-005.

The 11th Division Command comprised twelve specialized branches,²¹ including the following branches:

- Artillery Branch, headed by Brigadier General Fayez Al-Hussein;²²
- Signals Branch, headed by Brigadier General Fouad Habib Wannous in March 2012;²³
- Organization and Supply Branch, headed by Brigadier General Ghanem Ali Saqqour;²⁴
- Armaments Branch;²⁵
- Operations Branch;²⁶ and
- Political Guidance Branch.²⁷

Further, the 11th Division encompassed several independent battalions, including:

- Reconnaissance Battalion 458, headed by Colonel Muhammad Aziz Saud.²⁸ A defector from the Battalion named Captain Suleiman as the Security Officer in the Battalion.²⁹ He also noted that the Battalion comprised four companies;³⁰
- Engineering Battalion;³¹
- Tanks Battalion;³²
- Chemicals Battalion;³³
- Service/Repairs Battalion;³⁴
- Signals Battalion;³⁵
- Medical Battalion;³⁶

²¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

²² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

²³ Communication from the Signals Branch of the 11th Division to Battalion 458/Reconnaissance, 21 March 2012, SYR.D0124.026.001.

²⁴ Memo issued by the 11th Division, 9 May 2013, SYR.D0242.104.021.

²⁵ Memo issued by 11th Division's Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.011 (included on the distribution list).

²⁶ Memo issued by 11th Division's Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.013 (included on the distribution list).

²⁷ Administrative Order issued by the 11th Division's Political Guidance Branch, 20 December 2011, SYR.D0124.029.001-005.

²⁸ *See e.g.* List issued by Reconnaissance Battalion 458, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.013; List issued by Reconnaissance Battalion 458, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.017 (The documents are signed by Colonel Muhammad Aziz Saud). *See also* Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.910.

²⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

³⁰ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

³¹ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579.

³² Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579.

³³ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579.

³⁴ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.910.

³⁵ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.910; SYR.WGA.579.

³⁶ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.910; SYR.WGA.579.

- Air Defense;³⁷
- Transport Battalion,³⁸ and
- Armament Battalion.³⁹

The 11th Division also included four brigades and one regiment:

- a) Brigade 47/tanks⁴⁰ was stationed on the southern entrance of Hama City. A defector from the Artillery Branch claimed that Brigadier General Ali Mahfoud headed the Brigade in 2011 and 2012.⁴¹ He added that the Chief of Staff during that period was Brigadier General Hassan Ali Hassan.⁴² However, a defector from the 47th Brigade named Brigadier General Ali Hussein Muhammad as the Commander of the Brigade and Brigadier General Jamaledin Al-Shami as the Chief of Staff until 1 June 2011, when he was replaced by Brigadier General Ali Shaheen.⁴³ The same witness claimed that Colonel Jihad Sayouh was the Brigade's Security Officer.⁴⁴
- b) Brigade 87/infantry, stationed in Maar Shahour in eastern Hama.⁴⁵ A defector from the 87th Brigade stated that the Brigade was led by Brigadier General Issa Mahmoud; its Chief of Staff was Brigadier General Ahmed, and its Security Officer was Colonel Chamoun Suleiman.⁴⁶ However, a defector from the 11th Division named Brigadier General Ahmad Khallouf as the Commander of the 87th Brigade and Brigadier General Muhammad Nayef Nusrah as the Chief of Staff.⁴⁷
- c) Brigade 60/tanks, station near Al-Furqlus on the Homs-Palmyra Highway.⁴⁸
- d) Brigade 167/tanks, stationed in Hissia on the Damascus-Aleppo Highway.⁴⁹

³⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

³⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.579.

³⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.579.

⁴⁰ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.725; SYR.WGA.609; SYR.WGA.587.

⁴¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

⁴² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

⁴³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁴⁴ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁴⁵ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.725; SYR.WGA.576; SYR.WGA.587 (this witness referred to Brigade 87 as a tank brigade).

⁴⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.576. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.725 (the witness named 'Brigadier General Issa' as the Commander of the 87th Brigade).

⁴⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.587.

⁴⁸ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.627; SYR.WGA.725; SYR.WGA.587.

⁴⁹ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.627; SYR.WGA.576; SYR.WGA.587 (the witness refers to the Brigade with the number '67').

- e) Regiment 135/artillery, stationed in Al-Shinshar, south of Homs.⁵⁰ According to one defector from the 11th Division, the Regiment was commanded by Brigadier General Amin Shkouhy.⁵¹

Brigade 47/tanks

A defector from the 47th Brigade provided CIJA with the internal structure of the Brigade.⁵² Please note that CIJA is unable to verify the information presented below.

The witness stated that the Brigade was comprised of several specialized sections, including:

- Engineering Section, led by Colonel Mokhles Taqi;
- Operations Section, led by Colonel Ali Muhammad Ali;
- Administrative Affairs Section, led by Colonel Abdulrahman Al-Masri;
- Organization Section, led by Colonel Hassan Abu Al-Shamlat;
- Financial Section, led by Colonel Haitham Suleiman;
- Artillery Section, led by Colonel Ahmad Khaled Beri;
- Reconnaissance Section, led by Colonel Muhammad Shahin;
- Technical Affairs Section, led by Colonel Jihad Sayyauh; and
- Armament Section.

Additionally, the 47th Brigade had several companies, including:

- Reconnaissance Company, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Ali Al-Naqri;
- Engineering Company, headed by Captain Muhammad Issa;
- Signals Company, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman Ismail; and
- Medical Company, headed by First Lieutenant Muhammad Wafa.

The 47th Brigade was further divided into six battalions:

- 393 Mechanized Battalion, based in Baraq, Hama. It was commanded by Colonel Ramez Ahmad Hamamah. The Chief of Staff was Lieutenant Colonel Khaled Ali Deeb, and the Security officer was Captain Rawad Asaad.

⁵⁰ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.578; SYR.WGA.587.

⁵¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.587.

⁵² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609 (the witness defected on 31 July 2012).

- 499 Tanks Battalion in Maareen, Hama. It was commanded by Colonel Abdul Hamid Al-Ahmad. The Chief of Staff was Lieutenant Colonel Yasser Al-Sarem, and the Head of Technical Affairs was Major Bassel Balloul.
- 154 Tanks Battalion, located east of the 47th Brigade headquarters. It was commanded by Colonel Ghassan Abu Ali.
- 152 Tanks Battalion, located on the eastern side of Maarin Al-Jabal in Hama. It was commanded by Colonel Fayeze Ahmad Miyah. Its Chief of Staff was Lieutenant Colonel Yasser Al-Safatli.
- 158 Artillery Battalion, located within the 47th Brigade's headquarters. It was commanded by Colonel Iyad Harfoush.
- 145 Tanks Battalion, located within the 47th Brigade's headquarters.

87th Brigade/Infantry

A defector from the 87th Brigade provided CIJA with the internal structure of the Brigade.⁵³ Please note that CIJA is unable to verify the information presented below.

The witness noted that the 87th Brigade was divided into six battalions, including:⁵⁴

- 673 Infantry Battalion, led by Colonel Munjed Ahmad Mayhoub;
- 674 Infantry Battalion, led by Colonel Naeem Habib;
- 675 Infantry Battalion, led by Colonel Mohammad Ismail;
- 676 Tanks Battalion, led by Colonel Engineer Ali Al-Asaad;
- 677 Artillery Battalion; and
- 678 Air Defense (Shilka⁵⁵) Battalion, led by Colonel Tarek Nuhaylati.

In addition, the 87th Brigade comprised several independent companies and sections. The companies included an engineering company, reconnaissance company, signals company, and headquarters company. The sections including an operations section, engineering section, signals section, artillery section, armament section, technical affairs section, administrative affairs section, organization section, and political guidance section.

⁵³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.576 (the witness defected on 25 March 2012).

⁵⁴ See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.725 (the witness lists the same battalions in the 87th Brigade).

⁵⁵ The ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" is a lightly armored Soviet self-propelled, radar guided anti-aircraft weapon system.

IV. Attacks on Ar-Rastan

Most of CIJA's evidence relating to the activities of the 11th Division in Homs center around the attacks against the city of Ar-Rastan, located 25 kilometers north of Homs City.

CIJA has interviewed several defectors from units of the Syrian Army that participated in attacks on Ar-Rastan. They described three attacks on Ar-Rastan: a siege of Ar-Rastan in May – June 2011; the First Battle of Rastan in September 2011; and the Second Battle of Ar-Rastan in January 2012.

Siege of Ar-Rastan (May – June 2011)

A defector from the 11th Division stated that the Syrian Army stormed Ar-Rastan, following an attack on Talbiseh, between May and June 2011.⁵⁶ He stated that the force included units from the 11th Division and the 18th Division, both of which fell under the Third Corps. The participating units from the 11th Division included the Reconnaissance Battalion, the 60th Brigade, the 167th Brigade, the 47th Brigade, and the 187th Brigade.⁵⁷ The units from the 18th Division included the Reconnaissance Brigade, the 134th Brigade, the 121st Brigade,⁵⁸ and the 125th Regiment.⁵⁹ The witness stated that he was present when a phone conversation took place between Brigadier General Youssef Ismail, the head of the 134th Brigade, and Brigadier General Salah Fneich, the head of the 125th Regiment, during which Ismail told Fneich that they had permission from the Head of the Third Corps to storm Ar-Rastan.⁶⁰

A defector from the 87th Brigade of the 11th Division recalled that the Brigade was mobilized in April and deployed towards the Ar-Rastan Dam.⁶¹ By 3 May 2011, the troops were concentrated around the Ar-Rastan city entrance, where they remained for twenty-five days. After this period, the troops were ordered to encircle Ar-Rastan and protect the troops positioned within the city, which included soldiers from the Special Forces Regiments 41 and

⁵⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.627.

⁵⁷ CIJA Analyst Note: CIJA is not aware of the existence of a 187th Brigade in the 11th Division. It is possible that the witness was in fact referring to the 87th Brigade of the 11th Division.

⁵⁸ CIJA Analyst Note: CIJA is not aware of the existence of a 121st Brigade in the 18th Division. It is possible that the witness was referring to the 120th Brigade of the 18th Division or the 121st Regiment of the 17th Division.

⁵⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.627.

⁶⁰ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.627.

⁶¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.576.

45, as well as from a BMP⁶² Battalion in the 3rd Division.⁶³ The witness learned from other soldiers in the city that they faced intense resistance. However, he stated that the 87th Brigade did not suffer any casualties. The campaign continued for three days, after which the Brigade established checkpoints around the city, one of which was located next to the Imad Talas Library. Following this campaign, many of the Brigade's forces were relocated to Idlib.⁶⁴

Another defector from the 87th Brigade of the 11th Division stated that the Commander ordered that three companies from each battalion be deployed to Ar-Rastan, in addition to eighteen tanks, twenty-nine BMPs, and a technical BMP.⁶⁵ They were stationed near the 11th Division's Engineering Battalion near Ar-Rastan Bridge. There, the witness encountered members from the 120th Brigade of the 18th Division and the 47th Brigade of the 11th Division. After a few days, the commander of the witness's battalion, Colonel Mohammad Ismail, met with the Commander of the brigade, Brigadier General Issa, and they agreed on a plan for invading Ar-Rastan. They ordered that no tank artillery was to be used. However, machine guns were permitted. When the witness received these orders, he ordered the soldiers under his command not to shoot civilians. The next day, the Commander of the Brigade called him in for questioning and sent him to the Military Police Branch in Al-Qaboun. While there, the witness heard that Ar-Rastan was invaded.⁶⁶ The witness does not state when this deployment happened. However, he defected in June 2011, so this deployment took place in the months prior.

A defector from the 47th Brigade of the 11th Division stated that the Brigade was deployed to Ar-Rastan on 27 May 2011.⁶⁷ A company from each battalion in the 47th Brigade was moved, comprising fifty soldiers per company. Each company was equipped with five vehicles. In addition, a 'Shilka',⁶⁸ tank companies, reconnaissance companies, a signal company, engineering company, and medical company were deployed. In total, more than 350 soldiers

⁶² The BMP is a Soviet amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicle. BMP stands for *Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty*.

⁶³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.576.

⁶⁴ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.576.

⁶⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.725.

⁶⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.725.

⁶⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁶⁸ The ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" is a lightly armoured, self-propelled, radar guided anti-aircraft weapon system.

and fifty vehicles were moved to Ar-Rastan.⁶⁹ This effort was coordinated and led by the chief of staff of the 47th Brigade, Brigadier General Ali Shahin.⁷⁰ The witness stated that all the heads of the battalions participated in the attack, except the head of the 158th Battalion, as he was from the area. At the end of the invasion, checkpoints were placed at the entrances to the city and in the city.⁷¹

A high-level defector from the 11th Division confirmed that the 47th Brigade and a mechanized battalion from the 87th Brigade entered the city of Ar-Rastan in June 2011.⁷²

A member of the Special Force's 14th Division said that at the beginning of June 2011, the 554th Regiment was moved to Al-Waar in Homs.⁷³ However, the Commander told his subordinates that there were terrorist groups in Ar-Rastan raising the Israeli flag, so they were redeployed there. In Ar-Rastan, the witness saw the army assaulting civilians and looting property. He did not hear any shootings coming from the residents of Ar-Rastan.⁷⁴

First Battle of Ar-Rastan (September 2011)

A defector from the Reconnaissance Battalion, 'Battalion 458', of the 11th Division stated that he received an order to move to Ar-Rastan from the commander on 25 August 2011.⁷⁵ The 87th and 67th Brigades were already there, and had been since February 2011. The soldiers were distributed on three checkpoints:

- 1- On the entrance of Ar-Rastan next to the Hafez Al-Assad statue, under the leadership of Colonel Mohammad. The checkpoint comprised fifty soldiers, 4 BMPs, and 1 BRDM;⁷⁶
- 2- On the highway, 600 meters after the first checkpoint. The checkpoint was headed by Captain Suleiman and Captain Thaer Al-Hafi. It comprised forty soldiers and 3 BMPs; and

⁶⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁷⁰ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁷¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.609.

⁷² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577.

⁷³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.506.

⁷⁴ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.506.

⁷⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

⁷⁶ The BRDM, the *Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina*, is an amphibious armoured patrol car.

- 3- In front of the Al-Khatib metal factory. It was headed by Captain Thaer Abdul Rahman and First Lieutenant Nizar Al-Safadi.⁷⁷

The checkpoints were tasked with protecting the road and monitoring the individuals entering the city.⁷⁸

A defector from the 44th Regiment of the Special Forces 15th Division reported that in September 2011, Battalion 626 received orders to raise its combat readiness.⁷⁹ A few days later, it was deployed to east Ar-Rastan. Three days after their arrival, the soldiers were told that they should invade Ar-Rastan in order to liberate the residents from the foreign fighters that entered the city.⁸⁰ On 26 September 2011, the troops entered from the southern entrance of Ar-Rastan, near the statue.⁸¹ The 626th Battalion was providing support to the 4th Division, accompanied by *shabiha*⁸² and security agents. The troops were able to invade Ar-Rastan after five days of clashes. They erected checkpoints in the city. The witness was initially stationed at the checkpoint in front of the cement factory. He was then moved to the Al-Amlas checkpoint, led by Major Mustafa Al-Sattouf, who gave orders to tanks and rockets to shell targets. The witness saw the houses of civilians being shelled.⁸³ The tasks assigned to the checkpoints included searching people and crosschecking names against wanted lists. Soldiers on the checkpoints abused civilians, including instances of sexual assault.⁸⁴ Initially, the members of the witness's battalion were told that the operation would last a week. However, it lasted much longer, and they were asked to wear Riot Police uniforms.⁸⁵

Another defector from the Medical Battalion of the Special Forces 15th Division stated that on 24 September 2011, the battalion was ordered to move to the 11th Division's 47th Brigade's headquarters near Ar-Rastan.⁸⁶ Two defectors from the Medical Battalion stated that on 27 September 2011, they were moved to the southern entrance of Ar-Rastan, where the witnesses saw large military formations, including soldiers from the 18th Division, 11th Division, a battalion from the 4th Division equipped with tanks, a battalion from the Special Forces 41st

⁷⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

⁷⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

⁷⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.570.

⁸⁰ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.570.

⁸¹ CIJA Analyst Note: It is likely that the witness is referring to the Hafez Al-Assad statue.

⁸² *Shabiha* is the term used to refer to pro-Assad civilian militias.

⁸³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.570.

⁸⁴ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.570.

⁸⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.570.

⁸⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.569.

Regiment, as well as security agents.⁸⁷ The operation began at 7 AM, when the witness heard sounds of explosions and heavy shooting. After weeks of battles, the Syrian Army entered Ar-Rastan and the Free Syrian Army withdrew.⁸⁸ Battalion 626 of the Special Forces moved into the sports complex building and managed the fifteen checkpoints inside the city.⁸⁹

A defector from the Syrian Air Defence confirmed that the second campaign against Ar-Rastan took place on 27 September 2011.⁹⁰ The witness, who originates from Ar-Rastan, counted 425 armoured vehicles in the city. The houses of several Ar-Rastan residents, including his own, were burned, and a large number of civilians were arrested.⁹¹

Second Battle of Ar-Rastan (January – February 2012)

Defectors interviewed by CIJA give different accounts of events in Ar-Rastan during January and February 2012.

A defector from the 4th Division stated that on 15 January 2012, his unit was told to go to Ar-Rastan for a few hours to break the siege on some checkpoints and bolster some others.⁹² They were stationed near the statue of Hafez Al-Assad and set up mortars. The witness said that the unit was shelling Ar-Rastan haphazardly; around 100 bombs were dropped on Ar-Rastan daily, under the command of Captain Imad Al-Khaled.⁹³ The 4th Division was accompanied by members of the 18th Division and the Special Forces. The troops tried to invade Ar-Rastan during a ten-day operation, but they failed. There was a large number of casualties among the Army, which withdrew entirely from Ar-Rastan after that date.⁹⁴ A defector who originates from Ar-Rastan confirmed that Ar-Rastan was “liberated” on 27 January 2012.⁹⁵

A defector from the 11th Division’s Reconnaissance Battalion said that he received orders to move into Ar-Rastan in December 2011.⁹⁶ They remained stationed on checkpoints outside the

⁸⁷ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.569; SYR.WGA.601.

⁸⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.569.

⁸⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.569.

⁹⁰ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.753.

⁹¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.753.

⁹² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.825.

⁹³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.825.

⁹⁴ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.825.

⁹⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.753.

⁹⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

city, but prevented anyone from going in or out of the city for twenty days. During this deployment, the witness saw tanks, Shilkas, BMPs, and BRDMs entering the city.⁹⁷

He found out from civilians that there were twenty-two checkpoints inside the city. On February 2012, he received wanted lists on checkpoints. Due to clashes in Ar-Rastan, in March 2012, all the checkpoints inside the city were moved out, except the ones located on the highway.⁹⁸ However, another defector stated that checkpoints inside Ar-Rastan were removed on 5 February 2012 after the Free Syrian Army attacked them.⁹⁹

V. Conclusion

This report has provided information on Mohammad Hamo, the structure and membership of the 11th Division of the Syrian Army, and its activities in Homs. Any documents or witness interviews referred to in this brief can be provided if requested. Should any further information become available, CIJA analysts will send a follow-up report. CIJA analysts are also ready to respond to further inquiries regarding this report and answer other requests in the future.

Confidentiality Notice: The information provided in this report, as well as any documents provided in conjunction with this report, are intended solely for the addressee(s). The information is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other Party without the prior written consent of CIJA.

⁹⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

⁹⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.910.

⁹⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.569.



Polisen

PM

1 (2)

Datum

2018-12-04

Diariennr (åberopas)

Polismyndigheten
National Bureau of Investigation
War Crimes Unit
Cecilia Hector, Detective Inspector
Cecilia.hector@polisen.se
+46 10 564 1332

Request regarding Mohammed Hamo

From CIJA the Swedish War Crimes Unit received an answer regarding Mohammed Hamo. The summary regarding Mr Hamo is dated on the 11th of September 2018 and contains information about Mr Hamo and the 11th division in Homs, Syria.

With reference to the earlier answer from CIJA we are kindly asking for the documents listed below which refers to footnote in CIJAs answer.

Footnote 1: "Administrated order from the 11th Tank Division 2011"
SYR.D0124.029.001-005 at SYR.D0124.029.001

Footnote 2: "Circular by the Investigation Section of the Military Police, 15th December 2012. **SYR.D0193.044.026**

Footnote 4: "Communications from 3rd Corps, Division 18 to Infantry College 9th October 2011. **SYRD0017.089.069**
Roster list issued by 17th Division of the Third Corps 31 January 2012
SYR.D0090.001.022-026 at SYR.D0090.001.026

Footnote 5 och 6: Roster list issued by 17th Division of the Third Corps 31 January 2012 **SYR.D0090.001.022-026 at SYR.D0090.001.026**

Footnote 7: Communications from the Third Corps to heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb 25 July 2012. **SYR.D0197.043.001-002**. Communications from the Third Corps to heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb 26 July 2012. **SYR.D0197.043.001**

Footnote 8: Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013.
SYR.D0194.015.025. Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013,
SYR.D0194.015.026. Memo issued by Regiment 93, 10 September 2013,
SYR.D0194.015.027

Footnote 9: Memo issued by the 17th Division 17 June 2011,
SYR.D0090.001.012

Footnote 10: Communications from Division 11/T, **SYR.D0124.003.004**

Nationella operativa avdelningen

2018-12-04

Footnote 14: Communications from Police Command Idleb to the Minister of Interior's Office 10 November 2011 **SYR.D0250.078.001-002** at **SYR.D0250.078.002**

Footnote 19: Memo issued by the 11th Division 9 May 2013, **SYR.D0242.104.021**

Footnote 20: Administrative Order issued by the 11th Division's Political Guidance Branch 20 December 2011. **SYR.D0124.029.001-005**

Footnote 24: Memo Issued by the 11th Division 9 May 2013, **SYR.D0242.104.021**

Footnote 25: Memo issued by the 11th Division Reconnaissance Battalion 2 May 2012, **SYR.D0124.030.011**

Footnote 26: Memo issued by 11th Division's Reconnaissance Battalion 2 May 2012, **SYR.D0124.030.013**

Footnote 27: Administrative Order issued by the 11th Division's Political Guidance Branch 20 December 2011. **SYR.D0124.029.001-005**

We are also kindly asking for the witness statement from SYR.WGA.609, SYR.WGA.587, SYR.WGA.725, SYR.WGA.577, SYR.WGA.627, SYR.WGA.579 and SYR.WGA.576. We are also interested to know if there are any possibilities to conduct an interview with the listed witness above.

This request concerns an ongoing investigation regarding 11th Division, Homs, Syria. All information that needs to be kept confidentially should therefore not be shared with the Swedish War Crimes Unit.

Svar från CIJA 2018-12-06

Request submitted on 4 December 2018 (CIJARCT20181204_007F):

3. SYR.WGA.609 – Syria
4. SYR.WGA.587 – Syria
5. SYR.WGA.725 – Turkey
6. SYR.WGA.577 – Syria/Turkey
7. SYR.WGA.627 – Jordan
8. SYR.WGA.579 – Turkey
9. SYR.WGA.576 – Turkey



Follow-Up Request for Assistance: Documentation

On 4 December 2018, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a follow-up Request for Assistance from the Swedish War Crimes Unit (“the Unit”) regarding the production of CIJA documentation. In particular, the Unit requested the following:¹

- Regime documents (twenty-five in total): SYR.D0017.089.069; SYR.D0090.001.012; SYR.D0090.001.022-026; SYR.D0124.003.004; SYR.D0124.029.001-005; SYR.D0124.030.011; SYR.D0124.030.013; SYR.D0193.044.026; SYR.D0194.015.025-27; SYR.D0197.043.001-002; SYR.D0242.104.02; SYR.D0250.078.001-002;
- Witness interviews (seven in total): SYR.WGA.576; SYR.WGA.577; SYR.WGA.579; SYR.WGA.587; SYR.WGA.609; SYR.WGA.627; SYR.WGA.725; and
- Expressed interest in conducting interviews with the above listed witnesses.

All the documentation requested accompanies this report. CIJA has provided redacted versions of the witness interviews.

I. Witness Identification

CIJA’s Liaison Officer has contacted the selected witnesses and provided an update regarding their locations. Once CIJA receives confirmation from the Unit regarding which witnesses are a priority, CIJA can begin arranging the interviews.

- SYR.WGA.576: The witness is based in Turkey.
- SYR.WGA.577: The witness is in-between Syria and Turkey.
- SYR.WGA.579: The witness is based in Turkey.
- SYR.WGA.587: The witness is based in Syria.

¹ Kindly note, some of the documents listed in the request were repeated.

- SYR.WGA.609: The witness is based in Syria.
- SYR.WGA.627: The witness is based in Jordan.
- SYR.WGA.725: The witness is based in Turkey.

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Svar från CIJA-SYR D0124 029
001 Arabiska/svenska

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtrS NOA

Diariernr

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:36

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Svar från CIJA-SYR D0124.029-001-Arabiska/svenska
Fotnot 1
Administrated order from the 11th Tank Division 2011



Auktoriserad översättning från arabiska

Arabrepubliken Syrien
Högkvarteret för armén och de
väpnade styrkorna
Division 11/D – Grenen för politisk vägledning
Nummer: 1008
Datum: 2011-12-20

[Handskrift:] Inkommande. Nr: 2562.
Datum: 2011-12-21

Administrativ order

Fördelning av medel från produktion i ledningen för division 11/D för 2011 enligt följande:

Nr	För- och efternamn	Grad	Enhet	Tilldelat belopp		Underskrift
				i siffror	med bokstäver	
1	Fayez Ali al-Hussein	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för artillerigren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
2	Adnan Mohammed Mohammed	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för ingenjörsgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
3	Mohammed Ibrahim Subh	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för spaningsgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
4	Fouad Habib Wannous	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för signalgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
5	Malek Mohammed Yousef	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för kemisk gren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
6	Mohammed Hussein Hammou	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för beväpningsgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
7	Ghanem Ali Saqour	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för organiseringsgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
8	Farhan Rashid al-Mohammed	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för vägledningsgren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
9	Abdurrahman Mohammed	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för grenen för administrativa frågor	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
10	Ahmed Tawfiq al-Khedhr	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för grenen för tekniska frågor	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
11	Hussein Ahmed Mahmoud	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för operativ gren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
12	Ahmed Khaled Barri	Stabsbrigadgeneral	Chef för artillerigren	1 000	Ett tusen syriska pund	
13	Nejm Sulaiman Mahmoud	Överste	Grenen för politisk vägledning	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund	
14	Abdullatif Salman	Överste	Beväpningsdepåer	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund	
15	Amer Allouf	Överste	Servicebataljon	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund	

16	Masoud Masoud	Överste	Operativ gren	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
17	Waddah Maqsoud	Överste	Kansliet	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
18	Jawdat Rasouq	Överste	Signalgren	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
19	Mohammed Saoud	Överste	Spaningsbataljon	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
20	Fayez Yousef	Överste	Ingenjörsbataljon	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
21	Ali Daoud	Överstelöjtnant	Signalbataljon	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
22	Asaad Sayyouh	Överstelöjtnant	Kompani [otydlig akronym, ö.a.]	700	Sjuhundra syriska pund
23	Firas Dib	Major	Servicebataljon	500	Femhundra syriska pund
24	Rami Fares	Major	Beväpningsverkstad	500	Femhundra syriska pund
25	Bashar Nauh	Kapten	Beväpningsdepåer	500	Femhundra syriska pund
26	Fadi Masoud	Kapten	Underhållsbataljon	500	Femhundra syriska pund
27	Hazem Sulaiman	Kapten	Underhållsbataljon	500	Femhundra syriska pund
28	Sulaiman Abbas	Kapten	Signalbataljon	500	Femhundra syriska pund
29	Thaer al-Hafi	Kapten	Signalbataljon	500	Femhundra syriska pund

*Den auktoriserade translatorn Sayed Jalabi intygar att
översättningen ovan är en trogen översättning av bifogad
handling.*

Stockholm den 26 april 2021



عدد دفع ٢٠٦٤
سابق ١٤١٠/١١/٢٠١١

الجمهورية العربية السورية
القيادة العامة للحش و القوات المسلحة
الفرقة ١١/د - فرع التوجيه السياسي
الرقم // ١٠٠٨ //
التاريخ ٢٠١١/١١/١٠

أمر إداري

توزيع مبالغ أموال الإنتاجية في قيادة الفرقة ١١/د للعام ٢٠١١ كما يلي :

م	الاسم والشهرة	الرتبة	الوحدة	المبلغ المخصص		التوقيع
				رقماً	كتابة	
١	فايز علي الحسين	عميد ركن	رف. مد	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢	عنان محمد محمد	عميد ركن	رف. هند	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٣	محمد إبراهيم صبح	عميد ركن	رف. سطع	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٤	فؤاد حبيب ونوس	عميد ركن	رف. إشارة	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٥	مالك محمد يوسف	عميد ركن	رف. كيميا	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٦	محمد حسين جمو	عميد ركن	رف. تسليح	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٧	غاتم علي مسفور	عميد ركن	رف. تنظيم	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٨	فرحان رشيد المحمد	عميد ركن	رف. التوجيه	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
٩	عبد الرحمن محمد	عميد ركن	رف. ش ا	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٠	احمد توفيق الخنصر	عميد ركن	رف. ش ا	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
١١	حسين احمد محمود	عميد ركن	رف. عم	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٢	احمد خالد بري	عميد ركن	رامد	١٠٠٠	فقط ألف ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٣	نجم سليمان محمود	عقيد	ف. نو. سياسي	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٤	عبد التطيف سلمان	عقيد	مستودعات التسليح	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٥	عامر ألوف	عقيد	كتيبة الخدمة	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٦	مسعود مسعود	عقيد	فرع العملييات	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٧	وضاح مقصود	عقيد	ديوان	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٨	جودت رسوق	عقيد	فرع الإشارة	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
١٩	محمد سعود	عقيد	كتيبة السطع	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٠	فايز يوسف	عقيد	كتيبة الهندسة	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢١	علي داوود	مقدم	كتيبة الإشارة	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٢	أسعد صبيوح	مقدم	سرية ش.ع	٧٠٠	فقط سبعمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٣	فراس ديب	رائد	كتيبة الخدمة	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٤	رامي فارس	رائد	ورشة تسليح	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٥	بشار نوح	نقيب	مستودعات التسليح	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٦	فادي مسعود	نقيب	كتيبة الإصلاح	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٧	حازم سليمان	نقيب	كتيبة الإصلاح	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٨	سليمان عباس	نقيب	كتيبة السطع	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	
٢٩	ثائر الحافي	نقيب	كتيبة السطع	٥٠٠	فقط خمسمائة ليرة سورية لا غير	

CIJA-SYR D0124.029-001

Syriska arabrepubliken
Försvarsmaktens allmänna befäl
Division 11/P-Avdelningen för politiska orienteringen
Datum 20/12-2011

Inkommande nummer 2562
den 21/12-2111

Administrativorder

Produktionssummorna för ledning i division 11/D för 2011 ska fördelas enligt följande:

Nr.	Fullständigt namn	Rang	Enhet	Tilldelade summan
1	Fayez Ali al Hussein	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning)	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
2	Adnan Mohammad Mohammad	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) ing.	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
3	Mohammad Ibrahim Subuh	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) span.	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
4	Fouad Habib Wannous	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) signal	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
5	Malek Mohammad Yousef	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) Kemi	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
6	Mohammad Hussein Hammou	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) Vapen	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
7	Ghanem Ali Saqour	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) Organisation	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
8	Ferhan Rachid al Mohammad	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning) Oreintering	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
9	Abdulrehman Mohammad	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning)	1000 ett tusen syriska Lira
10	Ahmad Tawfiq al Khoder	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning)	1000 ett tusen syriska liera
11	Hussein Ahmad Mahmoud	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning)	1000 ett tusen syriska liera
12	Ahmad Khaled Barri	Fältgeneral	(otydlig förkortning)	1000 ett tusen syriska liera
13	Najem Slaiman Mahmoud	Överste	Politisk orientering	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
14	Abdullatif Selman	Överste	Vapenförråd	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
15	Amer Alouf	Överste	Servicebataljonen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
16	Masoud Masoud	Överste	Operationsavdelningen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
17	Waddah Maqsoud	Överste	Kansli	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
18	Jawdat Rasouq	Överste	Signal	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
19	Mohammad Saoud	Överste	Spaningsbataljonen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
20	Fayez Yousef	Överste	Ingenjörsbataljonen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
21	Ali Daoud	Överstelöjtnant	Signalbataljonen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
22	Asaad Sayouh	Överstelöjtnant	(otydligt)-bataljonen	700 sjuhundra syriska liera
23	Firas Dib	Major	Servicebataljonen	500 femhundra syriska liera
24	Rami Fares	Major	Vapenverkstad	500 femhundra syriska liera
25	Beshar Nouh	Kapten	Vapenförråd	500 femhundra syriska liera
26	Fadi Massoud	Kapten	Rättelsebataljonen	500 femhundra syriska liera
27	Hazem Slaiman	Kapten	Rättelsebataljonen	500 femhundra syriska liera
28	Slaiman Abbas	Kapten	Spaningsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska liera
29	Thaer al Hafi	Kapten	Spaningsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska liera

(Ytterligare en rad med ”namnteckning” finns till höger, men denna rad är tom)



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.002-Arab

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet
Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtS NOA

iska/svenska

Diarienum
5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum
2018-12-14

Tid
14:39

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot 1

Administrated order from the 11th Tank Division 2011



11	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
01	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
31	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
41	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
81	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
11	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٠1	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
60	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٧0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٨0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٤0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
00	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
30	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
40	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٥0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
١0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٠0	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
63	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٧3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٨3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٤3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
03	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
33	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٤3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٤	تصنيف
٨3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
١3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٠3	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
6٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٧٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٨٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٤٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
0٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
3٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٤٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٨٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
١٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف
٠٨	تصنيف	تصنيف	تصنيف	٠٠٥	تصنيف

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.002

30	Tarrad Abdulmalek	Kapten	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
31	Tareq Ghosna	Löjtnant	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	500 femhundra syriska Lira
32	Rami Mahmoud	Löjtnant	Spaningsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
33	Saad Eidou	Löjtnant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
34	Kenan Ibrahim	Löjtnant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
35	Husam Asaad	Löjtnant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
36	Evan Shaabou	Löjtnant	Servicebataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
37	Mohammad Shejk Omar	Fänrik	Servicebataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
38	Mahmoud al Asaad	Fänrik	Spaningsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
39	Ali Ali	Fänrik	Spaningsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
40	Nuhad Mhaitaoui	Fänrik	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
41	Abdou Ismaiel	Fänrik	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
42	Sadoun al Tahhan	Fänrik	Ingenjörsbataljonen	500 femhundra syriska Lira
43	Hadi Mohammad	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
44	Zakaria Khalil	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
45	Ali Chahin	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
46	Hammoud al Saeid	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
47	Nader Issa	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
48	Ibrahim Rostam	Assistent	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
49	Adnan al Sharif	Sergeant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
50	Ahmad Ramadan	Sergeant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
51	Ghadir Yousef	Sergeant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
52	Ghaleb Ahmad	Sergeant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
53	Hussein Yasin	Sergeant	Ingenjörsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
54	Ahmad al Shekh	Assistent	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
55	Samir Ibrahim	Assistent	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
56	Wasim Bakra	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
57	Walid Darwish	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
58	Hisham Taleb	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
59	Issam Abboud	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
60	Ammar Slaiman	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
61	Ayham Saleh	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
62	Ibrahim Ammouri	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
63	Mohammad Mastou	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
64	Mohammad Salloum	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
65	Ismaiel al Gharb	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
66	Ghaith Khoder	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira

(Ytterligare en rad ”namnteckning” finns till höger men denna är tom)



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.003-Arab

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtS NOA

iska/svenska

Diariernr

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:41

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot 1

Administrated order from the 11th Division 2011

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.003

67	Mohammad Slaiman	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
68	Ahmad al Hassan	Sergeant	Spaningsbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
69	Kifah Ibrahim	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
70	Mohammad al Ahmad	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
71	Ali Tadjour	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
72	Ismaiel Shahin	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
73	Ali Abdou	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
74	Rawad Maarouf	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
75	Issa Massoud	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
76	Mahdi Sayyoum	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
77	Wiam Khalouf	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
78	Adel Ali	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
79	Wasim al Salem	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
80	Wisam al Yousef	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
81	Asaad Abdou	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
82	Hisham Khalil	Sergeant	Signalbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
83	Jihad al Saqqa	Assistent	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
84	Yousef al Hussein	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
85	Hadwan al Muasa	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
86	Ali Doum	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
87	Mohammad Habib	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
88	Asaad Ghanem	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
89	Alaé al Khoder	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
90	Zayed Mahmoud	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
91	Fadi Yousef	Sergeant	Servicebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
92	Muasa Slaiman	Sergeant	Vapenverkstad	300 trehundra syriska Lira
93	Mehran al Ali	Sergeant	Vapenverkstad	300 trehundra syriska Lira
94	Yamen Slaiman	Assistent	Medicinbataljon	300 trehundra syriska Lira
95	Rami Aloh	Sergeant	Transportbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
96	Husam al Yousef	Sergeant	Transportbataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
97	Rami Khoder	Sergeant	Kemibataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
98	Mufid Maraai	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	300 trehundra syriska Lira
99	Nabil Hassoun	Sergeant	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	300 trehundra syriska Lira
##	Ahmad al Hadji	Assistent	Bränsle	300 trehundra syriska Lira
##	Ibrahim Ismaiel	Assistent	(otydlig förkortning)	300 trehundra syriska Lira
##	Mohammad Nasser	Assistent	(otydlig förkortning)	300 trehundra syriska Lira
##	Qusai Hussein	Assistent	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira

(Ytterligare en rad finns till höger ”namnteckning”, denna rad är tom)



Svar från CIJA-SYR D0124 029
004 Arabiska/svenska

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Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtrS NOA

Diariernr

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:43

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot 1

Administrated order from the 11th Tank Division 2011

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.004

Rami Derbouli	Assitent	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Thaér Hashem al Naser	Förste Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Amjad Jawhara	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ayman Shoher	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Loai Hussein	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Khoder Suqour	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ali al Khatib	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ali Shadoud	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Qahtan Abbas	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Mohammad Makhlouf	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Wadie al Nounou	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Hayan Selman	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ahmad habib	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Muasa Habib	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ahmad Isa	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Bashar Ayyoib	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Abdullatif Abdulla	Sergeant	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Mohammad al Waéri	Assistent	Rättelsebataljonen	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Waél al Ak	Assistent	Ingenjörsförrådet	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Mohammad Hmoud	Assistent	Ingenjörsförrådet	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Ghiath Salim	Sergeant	Ingenjörsförrådet	300 trehundra syriska Lira
Mohammad Abdulla	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Mohammad Khoder	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	
Tareq Idris	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Saeid Qusai	Korpral	Transportbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Ammar al Chami	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Ayman Aloush	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Ibrahim Shebat	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Muheii al Din Khalil	Korpral	Servicebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Tamer Shama	Korpral	Kemibataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Wasim Yousef	Korpral	Transportbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Wisam Ibrahim	Korpral	Transportbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Awras Afifa	Korpral	Transportbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Ahmad Abu Obaid	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Khaled Mohammad	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Mohammad Masikh	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Sumar Ibrahim	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira

(Ytterligare en rad ”namnteckning” finns till höger men den är tom)



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.005-Arab

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet
Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtS NOA

iska/svenska

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Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

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2018-12-14

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14:44

Involverad personal
Cecilia Hector

Funktion
Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse
Fotnot 1
Administrated order from the 11th Tank Division 2011

CIJA-SYR.D0124.029.005

Hussein al Ahmad	Korpral	(otydlig förkortning) bataljon	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Talal Shahin	Korpral	Ingenjörsbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Aymen Selloum	Korpral	Ingenjörsbataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Ibrahim Ramadan	Korpral	Rättelsebataljonen	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Khalef Khalef	Menig soldat	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Salim Ghanem	Menig soldat	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Abdulmunem Kashou	Menig soldat	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira
Alaé Hadj Ibrahim	Menig soldat	(otydlig förkortning) skvadron	200 tvåhundra syriska Lira

P.S. Innehållet i denna order ska registreras i löneförteckningen hos officeraren för den politiska orienteringen i bataljonen. Undertecknat av befälhavaren för den elfte divisionen/D
Brigadör Nasib Ajwad Abu Mahmoud



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.D0124.030.011-Arab

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 Uts NOA

iska/svenska

Diarienum

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:45

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot: 25

Memo issued by the 11 th Division 9May 2013

SYR.D0124.030.011



المجلس الأعلى
للدراسات والبحوث
العلمية والتقنية
دمشق - سورية
البريد الإلكتروني: cijsyr@cijsyr.gov.sy

مجلس التعليم والبحث العلمي والتقني
دمشق - سورية
البريد الإلكتروني: cijsyr@cijsyr.gov.sy

٢٦	١	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	١٦	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
١٠٠	١	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	٢٤	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة و٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
٥	٥	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	٢٥	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة و٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
٣	٣	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	٢٥	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة و٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
٨	٨	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	١٣٠	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة و٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
١٢	١	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	٢٥	٧ ع ١٠٠ حرة
حرة	حرة	١٥ خزانة حرة ١٥١ ب ٧٣ ع ١٠٠	الحرة	حرة

مجلس التعليم والبحث العلمي والتقني
دمشق - سورية
البريد الإلكتروني: cijsyr@cijsyr.gov.sy

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البريد الإلكتروني: cijsyr@cijsyr.gov.sy

**Svar från CIJA-SYR.D0124.030.011-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:45 diariernr:
5000-K622888-18**

Syriska arabrepubliken

Försvarsmakten

Division 11/D bataljon 458 spaning

Nummer: 93

Datum: 2/5-2012

Tabell över krigsförluster från förstörd ammunition i bataljon 458 spaning

Kategori Allmänt	Kategori Särskilt	Ammunitionstyp	Antal	Anmärkningar
12	1	Kula 7,62.54 kaliber normal	200	Tvåhundra
	2	Kula 7,62.54 kaliber med tungt bly	1300	Ettusen trehundra
	3	Kula 7,62.54 kaliber Spårlyusammunition	250	Tvåhundrafemtio
	5	Kula 7,62.54 kaliber brännande och genomträngande	250	Tvåhundrafemtio
100	1	Bomb 73 BG 15 Explosiv	24	Tjugofyra
	26	Bomb 73 BG 15 Riktad sprängverkan	16	Sexton

Undertecknat av befälhavaren för bataljon 458 spaning

Fältöversten Mohammad Aziz Saoud

Ett ex. till: Ledningen för division 11/D - vapenfilialen

(otydlig text)



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.D0124.030.013-Arab

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtS NOA

iska/svenska

Diariernr

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:47

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot: 26

Memo issued by 11th Division`s Reconnaissance Battalion 2 May 2012



لجنته ٧٥٣ / ٢٠١٨

مدرسة بصرى - بصرى

الرسالة رقم: ١١١٤

٥	١٨٤٠٣٨٧	مدرسة بصرى	بصرى	
٤	٦٠٨٤٣٨٧٧	مدرسة بصرى	بصرى	
٣	٤٨٧٨٧١٦	مدرسة بصرى	بصرى	
٢	٦٣٠٥١٧٧	مدرسة بصرى	بصرى	
١	٣٠٥٣٤٤٧	مدرسة بصرى	بصرى	
٥	الرقم المسجل	اسم المدرسة	المنطقة	المحافظة

لجنته ٧٥٣ / ٢٠١٨

١٨٤٠٣٨٧ / ٥

٦٠٨٤٣٨٧٧ / ٤

٤٨٧٨٧١٦ / ٣

٦٣٠٥١٧٧ / ٢

٣٠٥٣٤٤٧ / ١

الرقم المسجل

اسم المدرسة

المنطقة

Svar från CIJA-SYR.D0124.030.013-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:47 diariernr: 5000-K622888-18

Syriska arabrepubliken

Försvarsmaktens allmänna befäl

Tredje legionen

Division 11/D

Bataljon 458 spaning

Nummer: 80

Datum: 2/5-2012

Namn på saknade personer på bataljon 458/spaning

Nr	Militära numret	Fullständigt namn	Rang	Anmärkningar
1	8664504	Khaled al Aqoub	Förste sergeant	
2	8815049	Jihad al Hadji	Menig soldat	
3	8879216	Siban Ausi	Menig soldat	
4	8874209	Abdulaziz Jumaz	Menig soldat	
5	8740621	Mohammad Tout	Menig soldat	

Undertecknat av befälhavaren för bataljon 458 spaning

Fältöversten Mohammad Aziz Saoud

Ett ex. till: Operationsfilialen

(otydlig text)



Svar från CIJA-SYR D0193 044
026 Arabiska/svenska

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtrS NOA

Diarienum

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:49

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Svar från CIJA-SYR D0193 044 026 Arabiska/svenska

Fotnot 2

Circular by the Investigation Section of the Military Police, 15 December 2012.

Svar från CIJA-SYR.D0193.044.026- Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:49 diariernr: 500-K622888-18

Syriska arabrepubliken

Försvarsmaktens allmänna befäl

Militärpolisen – Filialen för utredning och fängelser

Utredningssektionen

Nummer//86501

Datum: 15/12-2012

	Nummer	Datum	Källa	Innehåll
1	81486	11/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter en bil Toyota Corolla, vit, Regnr 73270 Arme'. När bilen hittas sak den stoppas. Bilen och dess passagerare skall köras till filial 290 i Aleppo
2	82303	11/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter en bil Peugeot Regnr 73270 Rif Damashq. När bilen hittas sak den stoppas. Bilen och dess passagerare skall köras till filial 227 i Damaskus
3	152338		Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter den deserterade översten Adnan Abdulkader Murad, moderns namn Zaloukh, han är född 1965 i Aleppo/Jabal Somaan. När han hittas skall han arresteras med vapnen som han deserterade med (kort Star pistol kaliber 9 mm, nummer 8085+ett magasin+25 skott), han ska köras till underrättelseavdelningen filial 293
4	80305	2/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter den deserterade majoren Omar Mohammad Dib Derwish, moderns namn Zahra, han är född 1970 i Edleb al Jeser. När han hittas skall han arresteras med vapnen som han deserterade med (polskt automatgevär nummer 04646cl+magasin 7 stycken+120+tjeckisk pistol 9mm Henkel nummer 99215+ 1 magasin+30 skott+25 skott kaliber 8,5). När han hittas skall han arresteras och köras till underrättelseavdelningen filial 293
5	80743	10/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter den deserterade reservläkaren Riad Hassan Shalla moderns namn Hadeyya, han är född 1953 i Rif Damashq-Harasta,. När han hittas skall han arresteras och köras till underrättelseavdelningen filial 293
6	80926	4/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 293	Att utforska och leta efter den deserterade fältgeneralen Mohammad Hussein Hammou, moderns namn Khadidja, han är född 1958 i Latakia-al HaffaRif Damashq-Harasta,. När han hittas skall han arresteras och köras till underrättelseavdelningen filial 293
7	24220	10/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 217	Med hänvisning till vårt meddelande nummer 102904 den 6/12–2012 skall letande efter nedanstående vapenlicens ID-kort upphöras: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1- ID-kort nummer 07469 den 17/4–20111, innehavaren är förste assistenten Alaé Younes Mohammad från filial 222, administrativ, sjunde bataljonen. 2- ID-kort nummer 06491 den 11/3–2009, innehavaren är förste assistenten Samer Hassan al Issa från filial 222, administrativ, sjunde bataljonen ID-korten har hittats
8	103279	10/12–2012	Underrättelseavdelningen Filial 217	Att utforska och hitta nedanstående vapen och tappade vapenlicens ID-kort: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1- Kinesiskt automatgevär kaliber 7,62, nummer 27034881, Den är filial 227:s egendom. 2- Pistol kaliber 9 mm, Browning, nummer 245RN52693, tillhörande licenskort nummer 06183/B den 31/3-2009, används av förste assistenten Husam Mohammad al Mukhrizi från filial 235 3- Kinesiskt gevär kaliber 7,62 med bajonett, ID-kort nummer 453 den 21/4-2012, används av förste assistenten Husam Mohammad al Mukhrizi från filial 235. 4- Modifierat ryskt gevär kaliber 7,62, nummer 954707, tillhörande filial 235 5- Argentinsk pistol kaliber 9 mm, nummer 165525, tillhörande filial 217 6- Kinesiskt gevär kaliber 7,2, nummer 27029429, tillhörande filial 216 I fall att de hittas ska de lämnas över till oss med deras innehavare
9	103716	11/12–	Underrättelseavdelningen	Att utforska och hitta följande vapen:

		2012	Filial 217	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1- Modifierade ryska automatgevär med nummer 945446, 950855 och 943162, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ, bataljon 1532- Ryskt automatgevär kaliber 7,62, nummer SK6620, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ bataljon 1533- Tyska automatgevär kaliber 7,62 med nummer: 7179, 7218 och 2611, tillhörande filial 90, administrativ, bataljon 1534- Kinesiska automatgevär kaliber 7,62 med nummer 27057937, 19011543 och 19009507, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ, bataljon 1535- Browningpistol kaliber 9 mm, nummer 215 RN 35583, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ, bataljon 1536- Mellan automatgevär BKC, nummer NPn 858, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ, bataljon 1537- Rysk mörkerkikare googel nummer 73441, tillhörande filial 290, administrativ, bataljon 153
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Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.0197.043.001-Arabis

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott i Utsi NOA

ka/svenska

Diarienum

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:55

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot 7

Communications from the Third Corps to heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb 26 July 2012



البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

موقفاً /

البيانات الشخصية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

(البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية) انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية والبيانات الوظيفية: انظر الى الصفحة ١٤

البيانات الشخصية / الوظيفية

Svar från CIJA-SYR.0197.043.001-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:55 diariernr: 5000-K622888-18

Svar från CIJA-SYR.0197.043.002-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:57 diariernr: 5000-K622888-18

Syriska arabrepubliken

Mycket hemligt och brådskande

Försvarsmaktens allmänna befäl

Tredje legionen

Nummer /83/

Datum 25/7-2012

Till chefer för säkerhetsgrenarna och polisedningen

Ni är uppmanade till att skicka en daglig rapport exakt klockan 20:00 varje dag om den allmänna situationen i Edleb och dess förort. Rapporten skall skickas till chefen för säkerhetskommittén i Hama och Edleb herr brigadörens fax. Rapporten skall skrivas enligt följande mall:

Ett: Samhällets allmänna situation:

Två: Operationer utförda av säkerhetsapparaterna och arméenheter (de gemensamma enheterna):

Tre: Operationer utförda av beväpnade terrorgrupper:

Fyr: Demonstrationer:

Fem: Antalet personer i arrest:

/ / arresterade

Sex: Martyrer från säkerhetsstyrkorna och armén:

Sju: Skadade personer från säkerhetsstyrkorna och armén:

Åtta: Krigsbyten och konfiskationer:

- 1- Vapen och ammunition
- 2- Fordon och rustningar

Ni är uppmanade att skicka rapporten dagligen och i den angivna tiden

För kännedom och åtgärd vidtagande

Undertecknat av:

Chefen för säkerhetskommittén i Hama och Edleb

Brigadör Wajih Yehya Mahmoud

Tredje legionen befälhavare

(Handskriven text, svårt att tyda; det man kan se är ord som "att vidta åtgärd vid klockan 19:00 varje dag")

(Handskriven text: "assistent Ahmad Assi")



Polisen

Svar från

CIJA-SYR.0197.043.002-Arabis

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott i Utsi NOA

ka/svenska

Diarienum

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2018-12-14

Tid

14:57

Involverad personal

Cecilia Hector

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Fotnot 7

Communications from the Third Corps to heads of the security agencies and the police command in Idleb 25 July 2012



Handwritten signature and Arabic text at the top left.

Handwritten Arabic text in the middle of the page.



Handwritten signature over the official stamp.

Handwritten Arabic text below the signature.

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Handwritten Arabic text below the previous line.

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Handwritten Arabic text at the bottom left.

Handwritten Arabic text below the previous line.

Handwritten Arabic text below the previous line.

Handwritten Arabic text at the bottom left.

Svar från CIJA-SYR.0197.043.001-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:55 diariernr: 5000-K622888-18

Svar från CIJA-SYR.0197.043.002-Arabiska, 2018-12-14 14:57 diariernr: 5000-K622888-18

Syriska arabrepubliken

Mycket hemligt och brådskande

Försvarsmaktens allmänna befäl

Tredje legionen

Nummer /83/

Datum 25/7-2012

Till chefer för säkerhetsgrenarna och polisledningen

Ni är uppmanade till att skicka en daglig rapport exakt klockan 20:00 varje dag om den allmänna situationen i Edleb och dess förort. Rapporten skall skickas till chefen för säkerhetskommittén i Hama och Edleb herr brigadörens fax. Rapporten skall skrivas enligt följande mall:

Ett: Samhällets allmänna situation:

Två: Operationer utförda av säkerhetsapparaterna och arméenheter (de gemensamma enheterna):

Tre: Operationer utförda av beväpnade terrorgrupper:

Fyr: Demonstrationer:

Fem: Antalet personer i arrest:

/ / arresterade

Sex: Martyrer från säkerhetsstyrkorna och armén:

Sju: Skadade personer från säkerhetsstyrkorna och armén:

Åtta: Krigsbyten och konfiskationer:

- 1- Vapen och ammunition
- 2- Fordon och rustningar

Ni är uppmanade att skicka rapporten dagligen och i den angivna tiden

För kännedom och åtgärd vidtagande

Undertecknat av:

Chefen för säkerhetskommittén i Hama och Edleb

Brigadör Wajih Yehya Mahmoud

Tredje legionen befälhavare

(Handskriven text, svårt att tyda; det man kan se är ord som "att vidta åtgärd vid klockan 19:00 varje dag")

(Handskriven text: "assistent Ahmad Assi")

Från: [Tomas Jönsson](#)
Till: ["requests@cijaonline.org"](mailto:requests@cijaonline.org)
Kopia: [Cecilia Hector](#)
Ärende: Request from the War Crimes Unit of the Swedish Police
Datum: den 9 april 2019 14:13:00

Dear Mr/Mrs,

My name is Tomas Jönsson and I work as an investigator at the Swedish police, the War Crimes unit.

The Swedish police and the prosecutor's office are working in an investigation initiated after a complaint from the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights e.V., Civil Rights Defenders, Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research, Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression and Caesar Files Group, together with plaintiffs from Syria. Together they submitted a criminal complaint against high-ranking representatives of Syrian intelligence services and military forces.

In the criminal complaint the sources of information referred to, are among others, information received from the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA). Highlighted below are information of particular interest retrieved from the criminal complaint:

The facts regarding the chain of command and reporting procedures within the Syrian State apparatus presented in the criminal complaint are based on information that ECCHR has received from the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA).

Upon request, the complainants received summaries of the content of this archive from CIJA, but not the original documents as a whole. The documents on which this information is based are referenced with their CIJA reference number in this complaint, e.g. "Circular, 12 March 2008, SYR.D0003.120.002." It would be recommended to request the unredacted documents from CIJA directly for further analysis. CIJA documents referenced in this complaint that have become publicly available through the case are identified by the full CIJA reference number *and* the evidence number used in the expert testimony, e.g. "Ex. C-150, CCMC report on the security situation, 12 April 2011, SYR.E0001.006.064-067".

³⁴ See e.g. Ex. C-150, CCMC report on the security situation in the country, 12 April 2011, SYR.E0001.006.064-067. This report notes that in Homs, the Security Committee 'confirmed that pre-emptive measures will be taken in order to prevent any negative demonstration from happening next Friday'. The Security Committee also 'recommended to track and arrest rioters in Bab Amr, Joret Elarayes, Bab al Sabaa, and Ashirah', see Ex. C-190, Communication from the Head of Political Security Department to the Assistant Regional Secretary of the Baath party, 2 February 2012, SYR.E0013.004.017-031.

It would be extremely useful if you could provide us with the unredacted original documents with requested information, to support the investigation conducted by Swedish Police and Prosecutor authorities.

- **"Circular, 12 March 2008, SYR.D0003.120.002."**
- **"Ex. C-150, CCMC report on the security situation, 12 April 2011,**

SYR.E0001.006.064-067”.

We appreciate your assistance in this case. Should you require further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or Cecilia Hector, copied in this mail, since I am out of office until the 23 of april.

Best regards

Tomas Jönsson

Detective inspector
National Operations Department
Criminal Investigation Section
War Crimes Unit

Phone: +46(0)10-564 14 57
Mobil: +46(0)70-301 16 13
tomash.jonsson@polisen.se

Swedish Police Authority
P.O.Box 12256, SE-102 26 Stockholm
Visits: Polhemsgatan 30, Stockholm
Phone Police: +46 77 114 14 00



polisen.se



Yttrande Svar från CIJA

Signerat av

Signerat datum

Enhet

Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtrS NOA

Diariernr

5000-K622888-18

Originalhandlingens förvaringsplats

Datum

2019-05-29

Tid

15:38

Involverad personal

Tomas Jönsson

Funktion

Uppgiftslämnare

Berättelse

Svar angående begäran om att få ta del av dokument. Totalt 5 sidor har lämnats ut enligt nedan beteckning.

- SYR.D0003.120.002
- SYR.E0001.006.064-067

Reference: CIJARCT20190409_054
Date: 11 April 2019



Request for Assistance: Documentation

On 9 April 2019, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a Request for Assistance from the Swedish Police War Crimes Unit (“the Unit”) regarding the production of CIJA documentation. In particular, the Unit requested two documents totaling five pages, as follows:

- SYR.D0003.120.002
- SYR.E0001.006.064-067

This response is accompanied by all requested documentation.

Confidentiality Notice: The information provided in this report, as well as any documents provided in conjunction with this report, are intended solely for the addressee(s). The information is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other Party without the prior written consent of CIJA.

ذات رسالة خالدة امة عربية واحدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
القطر السوري- القيادة القطرية
مكتب الأمانة القطري
الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأمانة السر

تقرير عن الحالة الأمنية في القطر موقوفا الساعة(20.00) يوم 2011/4/12

فرع دمشق :

حدثت مظاهرة الساعة 12.00 في مبنى كلية العلوم بتاريخ 2011/4/11 وهدفوا هتافات مناوئة للنظام وبعد فترة قامت مظاهرة معاكسة مؤيدة ، وتم اعتقال احد المتظاهرين.
-تم توزيع استمارة في حي جوبر الغربية معنونة (من اجل نصره سورية الحملة الشعبية لمقاواة الفتنه).
تم القاء القبض على احد المشاغبيين في شارع 29 أيار اثناء قيامه بإطلاق عيارات نارية في الطريق.
-قيام مجهولين بتخريب كابلات كاميرات ثانوية بدر الدين عابدين وتم إصلاحها.

فرع ريف دمشق :

-في الساعة الواحدة صباحاً بتاريخ 2011/4/12 تم القبض على مجموعة أشخاص يستقلون سيارة امام مبنى بلدية البلالية.
-يوم 4/11 في بلدة مضايا وأثناء تشييع جنازة شهيد استشهد بحوادث بانياس استغل بعض المندسين ذلك وهدفوا بهتافات مناوئة ورشقوا مقر الناحية ، وباص ايراني بالحجارة.
-قيام سيارات مجهولة بتوزيع سيديات على تجمّع مدارس صحنايا تتضمن أحداث درعا.
-تم طمس بعض الكتابات على جدران بعض المدارس والجوامع والمقابر في مدينة الرحيبة، كما تم العثور في مدينة جبرود على منشورات تطالب بالافراج عن المعتقلين، وانه سيكون هناك حراك شعبي سلمي قريباً

فرع القنيطرة:

الوضع هادئ ولا توجد أي حوادث تذكر

فرع حمص :

-تجمع حوالي /300/ شخصاً بينهم نساء أثناء تشييع جنازة في حي الرعر وهدفوا بهتافات مناوئة للنظام
-أكدت اللجنة الامنية على اتخاذ اجراءات احترازية لمنع أي تظاهرات سلبية يوم الجمعة القادم والترصية بالبحث عن المشاغبيين في حي بابا عمرو وجورة العرايس وباب السباع وحي عشيرة ،والقاء القبض عليهم

Förhör SVAR från CIJA-SYR. E0001.006.064.2019-05-29 15:47 diariernr:5000-K622888-18

1

Arabiska socialistiska Baathpartiet	En enda arabisk nation
Syriska provinsen – Regionala ledarskapet	med ett evigt budskap
Regionala sekretariatskansliet	
Centrala cellen för krisförvaltningen – Sekretariatet	

En rapport om säkerhetsläget i provinsen den 12/4–2011 klockan 20:00

Damaskus filial:

- En demonstration ägde rum den 11/4–2011 klockan 12:00 på Vetenskapshögskolan. Demonстранterna ropade fientliga slagord mot regimen. Efter ett tag ägde en stödjande mot demonstration rum; en av demonstranterna greps.
- En blankett delades ut på Västra Jobers bostadsområde under parollen (För Syriens stöd/ den folkliga kampanjen för åtal mot Fitna). *(Öa: Fitna är ett ord med viktiga historiska konsekvenser. Bortsett från dess användning i Koranen används Fitna som term för de fyra tunga inbördeskrigen inom det islamiska kalifatet från det 7 till det nittonde århundradet).*
- En av huliganerna arresterade på 29 Ayars gata medan han höll på att skjuta skott på vägen.
- Okända personer förstörde kamerakablar på Badr al Din Abdins gymnasium; de har reparerats

Rif Damaskus filial:

- Klockan ett på morgonen den 12/4–2011 blev ett antal personer som var bilburna arresterade utanför byggnaden för al Balalyas kommun.
- Den 11/4 i socken Madaya och under begravningen av en martyr som dog martyrdöden i Banjas passade några infiltratörer på och ropade fientliga slagord och kastade stenar mot sockens kontor och en iransk buss.
- Oidentifierade bilar delade ut CD-skivor som handlar om händelserna i Daraai Sednayas skolor.
- Vissa skrifter på väggarna i skolor, moskéer och begravningsplatser i staden al Ruhaiba raderades, och i staden Jiroud hittades kommunikéer som kräver att fångarna skulle släppas, och att en fredlig folklig rörelse skulle äga rum inom kort.

Al Qunaitaras filial:

Läget i lugnt, finns inga händelser att rapportera om.

Hams filial:

- Cirka 300 personer, bland dem kvinnor, har samlats i samband med en begravning i al Waérs bostadsområde; de ropade fientliga slagord mot regimen.

- Säkerhetskommittén försäkrade om att den har vidtagit förebyggande åtgärder för att stoppa vilken fientlig demonstration som helst nästa fredag. Säkerhetskommitténs direktiv är letandet efter huliganerna i bostadsområdena Hay Babab Amro, Jourat al Arayes, Bab al Sibaé och Hay Ashira; huliganerna skall arresteras.

1

SYR-E0001.006.064

فرع حماه :

- تم نشر دعوة على الانترنت للتظاهر يوم الثلاثاء
- شوهدت كتابات مسيئة للقيادة على بعض الجدران واللوحات الاعلانية وعلى بعض السيارات في حي جنوب الملعب في مدينة حماه ، كما شوهدت كتابات مسيئة على موقف باص دوار عين اللوزة وفوق صورة ورقية للسيد الرئيس فوق المبنى الرئيسي لاتحاد الكتاب العرب.
- توقّع حدوث مظاهرات يوم الجمعة 4/15 بعد صلاة الجمعة ، ووردت معلومات غير مؤكدة أن بعض المتظاهرين سيستخدم السلاح ، كما توجد مؤشرات على اعداد مظاهرة يوم الجمعة القادم في كفر زيتا
- وجود تحرك لقيادات وكوادر تنظيمات معارضة وخاصة حزب العمل الشيوعي ولجان الدفاع عن الحريات الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان لجمع اكبر عدد ممكن من المواطنين للتظاهر في مدينة السلمية يوم الجمعة القادم
- رصدت كتابات مسيئة على جدار الطريق الواصل من المتحف إلى المنطقة الأثرية وعلى جدار مدرسة وجدار مركز الري في قلعة المضيق.
- رصدت كتابات على الشطحات الإسمنتية على أطراف الطريق بين قريتي دوير الأكراد والسرمانية وقد تم إزالتها على الفور

فرع درعا :

- تجمع أمام الجامع العمري مساء اليوم
- حرق مقر بلدية صيدا الساعة 3.00 صباحاً
- حرق محرس الجيش الشعبي في قرية السهوة.
- إطلاق نار على حاجز عسكري على طريق نوى الشيخ مسكين.
- إطلاق نار من بندقية صيد على مركز هاتف الشيخ مسكين
- تخريب في مقر فرقة الصورة التابعة لشعبة ازرع
- تجمع في الساحة العامة بمدينة داعل مساءً
- إحراق كامل فرقة الحزب ببلدة الغارية الشرقية
- إحراق جزء من مقر بلدية علما
- تجمع في الساحة العامة لمدينة انخل مساء
- دعوة لتجمع المتظاهرين ببلدة المسيفرة والاعتصام فيها
- قيام بعض المشاغبين بإخراج طلاب وتلاميذ من المدارس بالإكراه ، والقيام بأعمال التخريب في الحراك والصورة والصنمين وكتابة عبارات مسيئة ، تم طمسها فوراً

Förhör Svar rån CIJA-SYR.E0001.006.065.2019-05-29 15:55 diariernr:5000-K622888-18

1

Hamis filial:

- En kallelse till en demonstration på tisdag har publicerats på Internet.
- Fientliga skrifter mot ledningen sågs på vissa väggar, reklamskyltar och bilar i bostadsområdet söder om stadion i Hama. Fientliga skrifter sågs också på en busshållplats vid Dawwar Ayn al Loéloa, och ovanpå skrifterna en pappersbild på presidenten som var placerad på huvudkontoret för de arabiska författarnas förbund.
- Demonstrationer förväntas äga rum på fredag den 15/4 efter fredagens bönestund. Det har inkommit information som gör gällande att vapen skall användas; och det finns indikationer som tyder på att en demonstration skall ordnas i Kefer Zita nästa fredag.
- Det finns aktiviteter som utförs av ledningen och kader som hör till oppositionella grupper i synnerhet Arbetare kommunistiska partiet samt försvarskommittéerna för demokratiska friheten och mänskliga rättigheterna. Syftet är att samla så många medborgare som möjligt för att demonstrera i staden Selmeyya nästa fredag.
- Smutskastande skrifter sågs på muren som ligger på vägen mellan muséet och det arkeologiska området, och på skolans vägg och på väggen till bevattningscentrum i Qalat al Madiq.
- Skrifter sågs på cementblocken på vägen mellan byarna Dawair al Akrad och al Sermaneyya. Skrifterna raderades på en gång.

Daraas filial:

- Folksamling på kvällen idag utanför al Omaris moské.
- Bränningen av kommunalhuset i Saida idag klockan 3:00 på morgonen.
- Bränningen av den folkliga arméns station i byn al Sahwa.
- Skottlossningar mot en militärpostering på vägen Nawa al Shejk Maskin.
- Skottlossningen från ett jaktgevär mot kommunikationscentrum i Shejk Maskin.
- Sabotage i huvudkvarteret för al Souars pluton som hör till Azraés avdelning.
- Kvällssamling på allmänna torget i staden Daghel.
- Total bränning av partiets pluton i al Gharia al Sharqiyya.
- Bränningen av en del av Almas kommun.
- Kvällssamling på allmänna torget i staden Ankhal.
- En kallelse till demonstration och förskansning i al Musaifra.
- Några huliganer tvingade skoleleverna att lämna skolorna; de satte igång med sabotage i al Hirak, al Soura och al Sanamain; de skrev nedsättande meningar som suddades bort på en gång.

2

SYR.E0001.006.065

فرع طرطوس :

- بدأت قوات الجيش بملاحقة بعض المشاغبين في بعض أحياء بانياس وتطويق قرى (البيضا- العديمة- البساتين)
- تمكنت قوات الجيش من اسكات مصادر النيران والقت القبض على /13/ مطلوباً احدهم مصري الجنسية ، ثم القاء القبض على /100/ شخصاً مشاغبا بينهم عدد من كبار المطلوبين بعد استسلامهم
- اصابة ضابط برتبة عقيد وأربعة عناصر تم نقلهم إلى مشفى الباسل بطرطوس
- لا تزال قوات الجيش متمركزة بالقرب من مدينة بانياس وأحوال المدينة هادئة وتسود حالة من الرضى العام بين السكان

فرع اللاذقية :

محاولة لتمزيق صورة السيد الرئيس في ثانوية شكري الحكيم

فرع حلب

- في الساعة /12.15/ تجمع حوالي /10/ أشخاص في دوار السبع بحرات ورددوا هتافات مسيئة وتم القاء القبض على خمسة منهم
- في الساعة /15.00/ تظاهر حوالي /150/ شخصاً في مدينة عين العرب حملوا ستة أعلام للجمهورية العربية السورية واعلام لكرديستان وصور لعبد الله اوجلان وللمدعو عصمان دادلي وصور لبعض قتلى حزب العمال الكردستاني واطلقوا هتافات باللغة العربية والكردية وتفرقوا الساعة 15.45 ولم يتجاوب المواطنون مع المتظاهرين ولوحظ وجود عدد من الملتئمين بين المتظاهرين وهم من مجموعة انضباط الحزب الكردستاني
- في الساعة /17.00/ تجمع حوالي /200/ شخصاً في حي الشيخ مقصود يحملون اعلاما سورية واعلاما كردية ويهتفون باللغتين العربية والكردية تتضمن المطالبة بحرية السجناء السياسيين وعبد الله اوجلان وتفرقت المظاهرة بعد /45/ دقيقة وساد بعدها الهدوء

فرع ادلب

الوضع هادئ ومستقر ولا توجد حوادث تذكر

فرع دير الزور:

تم تشييع جثمان الشهيد الذي استشهد في بانياس دون اي حوادث اثناء التشييع

فرع الحسكة :

الوضع هادئ ولا توجد اي حوادث تذكر

فرع الرقة

الوضع هادئ ولا توجد اي حوادث تذكر

فرع السويداء

Förhör Svar från CIJA-SYR.E0001.006.066.2019-05-29 15:56 doariernr:5000-K622888-18

1

Tursos filial:

- Arméstyrkorna började jaga några huliganer på några bostadsområden i Banjas samt omringa byarna al Baidaé, al Adima och al Basatin.
- Arméstyrkorna lyckades tysta edskällorna och har arresterat 13 efterlysta personer bland dem en egyptisk medborgare. 100 huliganer har gripits efter att de har överlämnat sig, bland dem finns det stora efterlysta personer.
- En överste och fyra soldater skadades och de fördes till al Basels sjukhus i Tursos.
- Arméstyrkorna är fortfarande grupperade i närheten av staden Banjas; läget i stan är lugnt och det råder en grad av tillfredsställelse bland befolkningen.

Latakias filial:

- Ett försök att riva sönder presidentens porträtt i Shokri al Hakims gymnasium.

Aleppos filial:

- 10 personer samlades klockan 12:15 på Dawwar l Sabé Bahrat; de ropade nedsättande slagord; fem av dem blev gripna.
- 150 personer demonstrerade kring klockan 15:00 i staden Ayn al Arab. De bar på sex syriska arabiska republikens flaggor, Kurdistans flaggor, bilder på Abdulla Ocelan , bilder på den så kallade Osman Dadli samt bilder på stupade medlemmar från PKK. De ropade slagord på arabiska och kurdiska. De avslutade sin demonstration klockan 15:45. Medborgarna svarade inte på demonstranterna. Det har observerats att det fanns några maskerade män bland demonstranterna, de är officerare på PKK.
- 200 personer samlades klockan 7:00 på Shejk Maqsouds bostadsområde. De bar på syriska och kurdiska flaggor. De ropade slagord på arabiska och kurdiska och krävde frihet för de politiska fångarna och Abdulla Ocelan. Demonstrationen avslutades efter 45 minuter; lugnet rådde efter det.

Edlebs filial:

Läget är lugnt och stabilt och det finns ingen nämnvärd händelse.

Dair al Zours filial:

Martyren som dog martyrdöden i Banjas begravdes; ingen incident ägde rum under begravningen.

Hasakas filial:

Läget är lugnt och stabilt och det finns ingen nämnvärd händelse.

Al Raqqas filial:

Läget är lugnt och stabilt och det finns ingen nämnvärd händelse.

Al Swaidaés filial:

SYR.E001.006.066

الوضع هادئ ولا توجد اي حوادث تذكر

مقترحات الفروع:

فرع حماة

اجراء لقاءات وحوارات مع تنظيمات المعارضة في مدينة السلمية للوقوف على مطالبهم واقناعهم بعدم التظاهر يوم الجمعة القادم

تخفيض سعر مادة المازوت

إصدار عفو عام عن المتورطين والمغرر بهم ومثيري الشغب على ان يشمل العفو من يسلم نفسه.

اظهار المخربين والموقوفين على وسائل الاعلام وفضح الجهات التي تقف ورائهم

مقترحات امانة السر:

تكليف اللجان الأمنية في المحافظات بتدقيق خطط حراسة المنشآت الحيوية حسب الأوامر الدائمة الصادرة عن قيادة الجيش والقوات المسلحة واستدراك أي ثغرات في حراستها

الإسراع في اتخاذ إجراءات الاحتواء والتهدئة منعاً لانتساع وتزايد التظاهرات وتلبية المطالب المعقولة بسرعة

توجيه الإعلام ليكون اكثر مصداقية لكسب ثقة المواطنين بحيث يبعدهم عن وسائل الإعلام المغرضة

والخلود لرسالتنا

أمانة سر الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمة

Förhör Svar från CIJA-SYR.E0001.006.067, 2019-05-29 15:58 diariernr:5000-K622888-18

1

Läget är lugnt och stabilt och det finns ingen nämnvärd händelse.

Förslag från filialerna

Hamas filial:

Att hålla möten och dialoger med oppositionella organisationer i staden al Selmeyya för att ta reda på deras krav samt att övertala dem om att inte demonstrera nästa fredag.

Att sänka priset på bilbränslet.

Utfärda amnesti för de inblandade och de som är lurade och upprorsmakare; amnestin ska gälla den personer som överlämnar sig frivilligt.

Visa sabotörerna och fångarna i massmedia och avslöja sidorna som stödjer dem.

Förslag från sekretariatet:

Att ge de säkerhetskommittéerna i uppdrag att kolla planerna gällande bevakningarna av de vitala byggnaderna i enlighet med ordern som har getts ut av de väpnade styrkornas ledning samt att täppa alla luckor i samband med bevakningarna.

Att skynda sig att vidta åtgärder för att skapa lugn, förhindra spridningen av demonstrationerna och att snabbt tillmötesgå visa rimliga krav.

Att styra massmedian så att den blir mer trovärdig för att kunna övervinna medborgarnas förtroende och se till att medborgarna hålla sig borta från tendentiösa massmedier.

Och evighet till vårt budskap

Centrala cellen för krisförvaltningen

4

SYR.E0001.006.067



Polisen
Swedish Police

Date

2 September 2019



1 (1)

Swedish Police Authority
Martin Stein Superintenden

Follow-up request regarding 11Th Armed Division in HOMS

Swedish Police, under the direction of the National Public Prosecutor Department, conducts a preliminary investigation and have previously received from CIJA access to a short summary of witness testimony among some other documents concerning the above mentioned 11Th Armed Division

With reference to the earlier correspondence from CIJA we are kindly asking for the documents listed below which refers to footnotes in CIJA.

Any documents that cannot be disclosed publicly should not be shared with the National Public Prosecutor Department.

Following underlying documents are of interest.

SYR.D0124.008.003-004_ET
SYR.D0124.013.002_ET
SYR.D0124.025.002-003_ET
SYR.D0124.020.003-004_ET

We appreciate as much information CIJA can provide us with due to respect of confidentiality of the documents.

Sincerely yours
Martin Stein

National Bureau of Investigation
War Crimes Unit
Martin Stein, Superintendent
martin.stein@polisen.se
office phone: +46 10 56 36 467
mobile +46 70 590 46 51

Dear Martin Stein,

Thank you for your email. Your request has been logged and the team will provide you with a response shortly.

Reference: CIJARCT20190904_079D

Best,
CIJA RFI Response Team

Reference: CIJARCT20190904_079D

Date: 30 September 2019



Follow-up Request for Assistance: Documentation

On 4 September 2019, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a follow-up Request for Assistance from the Swedish Police Authority regarding the production of documentation related to a CIJA report about the Syrian Army’s 11th Division in Homs Governorate. In particular, the Swedish Police requested:

- Four internal Regime documents totaling seven pages.

This response is accompanied by all requested internal Regime documentation, and also includes English draft translations. Please note that the draft translations are provided for information purposes only.

Confidentiality Notice: The information provided in this report, as well as any documents provided in conjunction with this report, are intended solely for the addressee(s). The information is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other Party without the prior written consent of CIJA.

SYR.D0124.008.003_ET

Inform the Commander

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Department—Branch 261
№: /65678/2/ /acronym not clear what it means/
Date: /6/7/2012

Highly Confidential—Immediate

To Division 11/Tanks

Attached is a copy of our memo № /65678/ of 26/6/2012 containing the decision of Major General Homs Governorate Military and Security General Official.

Be informed, abide by the content and inform the Talbisa Sector Commander.

Sent to: [*Signature: Acting Staff Brigadier General,
Classified archives + Computer to act accordingly Branch 261]
Copy № /1/ 5/7
/acronym not clear what it means/ //

Syrian Arab Republic
The Army and Armed Forces
/illegible words/—Security Officer
№: 1012
Date: 9/7/2012


CIJA
Commission for International Justice and Accountability
*** DRAFT TRANSLATION ***



Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including dates and names.

Handwritten signature and date: 31/10/2019

Handwritten notes: 31/10/2019

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Handwritten text line with dates and numbers.

Handwritten text line.

Handwritten notes and dates.

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SYR.D0124.008.004_ET

Syrian Arab Republic
 General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces
 Intelligence Department- Branch 261
 Number / 65678/2/1 acronym might stand for Security
 Date: 26/06/2012

Highly confidential- Immediately

Mr. Major General**General Military and Security Chief in the Governorate of Homs**

We received information stating the following:

- About /300/-armed men are residing in the house and the storeroom of former commander of the party branch, Mustafa Ayoub, in ar-Rastan town. The house is located to the west of Judge Ali Daher's Villa where a large number of armed men live. The said place is located to the west of the western corniche road (the road begins at the president memorial and continues to the western north side).
- There is another gathering at the house of the arrestee Abdallah Hsein Darwish, located at /600/ meters northwest Darwish petrol station.
- Explosive Manufacturing Location: Dispensary located in the middle of the town in front of the military social institution.
- Proposal: Informing ar-Rastan sector commander through the committee operations office and attacking the locations with fire by the artillery.

Kindly be informed and act accordingly
 Official In charge of the affairs of the branch 261

[Signature: Brigadier General
 25/06]
 [*stamp: not clear]

Mr. Major General Security Officer and the Deputy of the Military Commander in Homs

Kindly approve
 27/6

[*signature: not clear]

Decision

Mr. Major General, the General Military and Security Chief in the Governorate of Homs

Unclear word/ the commander of ar-Rastan sector to verify the location of targets and shell them with the artillery /unclear word/

A copy to /unclear/

Act accordingly

28/6

/أس/ acronyms not clear what it stands for

29/06/2012

Jan. 24 2005 10:34AM P2



Handwritten notes in Arabic script at the top left.

Main body of handwritten Arabic text, including a signature and a circular stamp.



Large block of handwritten Arabic text in the middle section.

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom left.

Small handwritten text at the bottom right.

SYR.D0124.013.002_ET

Unclear Handwritten word

From: Fax no: Jan 27 2005 05:35 Am P1

Syrian Arab Republic
 General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
 Intelligence Department - Branch 261
 No.: 70277/2/⤵ acronym not clear what it stands for/
 Date: 27/6/2012

Highly Confidential-
 Immediate

**To Mr. Major General
 General Military and Security Chief of Homs Governorate**

We received the following information:

Many dissident officers are living in a multiple-story building in ar-Rastan. The ground floor is used as a field hospital while the second floor serves as an operations chamber for the dissident officers who number /15/, led by dissident Colonel Qassem Saad ad-Din.

To the east of the building the ar-Rastan recruitment department is located, and to the north is a veggie market and ar-Rastan kindergarten.

-The basement of a house owned by Abdel Hadi Aniss Saad ad-Din is used as a warehouse for arms.

- Dissident Colonel Qassem Saad ad-Din sleeps at a house owned by the Haj Hussein family.

The house is yellow and is located around /40/ meters to the southern west of the house of Abdel Hadi Aniss Saad.

Proposal:

Forces operating in the area shall use the information

Kindly be informed

[*signature: Staff Brigadier General
 In charge of the affairs of Branch 261
 6/29]

[*Stamp: General Command of Army and Armed Forces /illegible]

Opinion of Mr. Major General, Governorate Security Chief and Adjutant of the Military
 Commander

Accurately locate the location and bombard it immediately

6/29]

[*signature]

Decision of Mr. Major General, Homs General Security and Military Chief

The commander of the ar-Rastan sector, determine the location of the place and strike with artillery immediately.

6/30]

[*signature]

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Handwritten text in Arabic script

SYR.D0124.020.003_ET

For the commander to be informed

Circular
/unclear/

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and the Armed
Forces
Intelligence Department- Branch 261
Number / 43269/2/ Security
Date: 24/04/2012

Highly confidential- Immediately

To:

- Division 11/Tanks
- Division 18/Tanks
- Regiment /554/ Special Forces
- Regiment /41/ Special Forces

- We send you a copy herewith of our warrant number 37270/7 on 10/4/2012.
Kindly be informed of the decision of Mr. General, Deputy Chief of Staff of the General
Command of Army and Armed Forces and Security and Military Official in Homs

Sent to:

Classified + computer for taking necessary
action

Copy number /1/

أع /unclear acronym/ع/acronym not clear what it
stands for


Staff brigadier general
In charge of the affairs in branch 261
[*signature: not clear]
23/4

Syrian Arab Republic
The Army and Armed Forces
/illegible /11/Tanks/ Security Officer
Number 543
Date: 1/5/2012

SYR.D0124.020.003



Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including the number 03/1/19 and other illegible text.



Handwritten signature and text in Arabic script, including the name 'المهندس الركني' and the number '٢٦١'.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including the number '٣ / ١ / ١٩' and the phrase 'المسائل التيهم'.

Handwritten text in Arabic script, mentioning 'المسؤول العام للمركز' and a date '٢٠١٢/٤/١٠'.

Handwritten list of items or dates in Arabic script, including '٢٠١٣/١/٢' and '٢٠١٥/٣/٢'.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including the number '٢٠١٢ / ١ / ١٤' and other illegible text.

Handwritten signature and text in Arabic script, including the name 'م. م. م.' and 'م. م. م.'.

Handwritten text in Arabic script, including the phrase 'توقيع - الخالد'.

SYR.D0124.020.004_ET

From 261

Fax No: 2121387

Apr 10 2012 11:35 Am P

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces
Intelligence Department – Branch 261
Number: /37270/7
Date: /10/4/2012

Highly Confidential - Immediately

To
Mr. Imad Ali Abdullah Ayoub, Deputy Chief of Staff, the
General Military and Security Chief in the Homs Governorate

We received the following information:

- In Al-Warsha neighborhood in Bustan Al-Diwan, there are two pick-up trucks mounted with machine guns. Gunmen driving these vehicles fire at military and security force members, then hide in a narrow street within the aforementioned neighborhood. This street is located behind the Blue Stone Café. Gunmen in the region also set up a mortar in front of the door of the diocese, facing the junction of Al-Warsha and Hameidiyyeh neighborhoods in Bustan Al-Diwan.
- Information also stated that the gunmen retreated to a street called Al-Ozon, leading to the Khaldiyyeh neighborhood. Gunmen also turned the (Julia) restaurant to a field hospital to treat their wounded.
- Proposal: circulate document among security agencies and army units in the aforementioned regions in order to act accordingly.

Kindly be informed

[*signature: Staff Brigadier General
In charge of the affairs of branch 261]

[*stamp: General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces – Intelligence Department –
Branch 261]

Opinion of Mr. Major General
Security Chief in the Governorate and Deputy of the Military Commander
Kindly approve
[Signature] 10/4

Decision of
Mr. Imad Ali Abdullah Ayoub, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Military and Security
Commander in the Homs Governorate.
Approved
[Signature] 11/4/2012

SYR.D0124.020.004_ET

Act accordingly 13/4



13-APR-2012 11:31 From:

To:2122203

Page:5/9

SYR.D0124.020.004



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SYR.D0124.025.002_ET

Syrian Arab Republic
Command of Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Department- Branch 261
No: 34266/ 2 Security
Date: 11/4/2012

Highly Confidential- Immediate

Inform the commander

Circulate

To

Division 11/ Tanks

Division 18/ Tanks

Regiment /554/ Special Forces

Regiment /41/ Special Forces

Attached is a copy of the letter sent by Branch /318/ No. 8589/55/1 of 24/3/2012 including the decision of Mr. Imad, Adjutant Head of Chiefs of Staff, the Military and Security Officer General in Homs on the plan of terrorists to target forces while deployed outside Homs and when entering the city using /B 10/ missiles, capable of destroying /T 72/ tanks.

Kindly be informed

Sent to:
Classified archive+ computer to act
accordingly.
Copy no //
أع /acronym not clear what it stands for/

[*Signature: Staff Brigadier General
Acting Commander of Branch 261]


4/12

[*stamp /unclear/]

Syrian Arab Republic
Army and Armed Forces
Division 11/ Tanks- Security Officer
No: 461
Date: 17/4/2012



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Handwritten number: "٢٦١".

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- List of handwritten items: "مصاريف", "القرية", "القرية", "القرية".

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Handwritten text at the bottom left, including dates and numbers.

Handwritten text at the bottom right: "مركز - قورني".

SYR.D0124.025.003_ET

Syrian Arab Republic
 General Intelligence Directorate
 Branch 318
 No: 8589/55/1
 Date: / / 1433 H.
 That is 24/3/2012

**Mr. Imad, Adjutant Head of Army and Armed Forces' Command of Chiefs of Staff
 Security and Military Officer General in Homs**

We received information from one of our branches on terrorists setting up a plan to target the forces while deployed outside Homs and when entering the city using /B 10/ missiles, capable of destroying /T 72/ tanks.

Proposal of Head of Branch 318: Circulate to all security agencies and army units through Branch 261 to take the needed measures and remain cautious.

[*Signature: Head of General Intelligence Branch in Homs]

[*Stamp: Syrian Arab Republic

Branch 318



General Intelligence Directorate]

Opinion of Mr. Major General, the Security Officer of Homs, and Adjutant Military Commander	I suggest approval 3/25 [*Signature]
Decision of Mr. Imad, Adjutant Head of Army and Armed Forces' Command of Chiefs of Staff	Approved [*Signature]

SYR.D0124.025.003



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Reference: CIJARCT20191227_114F

Date: 9 July 2020



Follow-up Request for Assistance: Mohammed Hamo

On 27 December 2019, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a follow-up Request for Assistance from the Swedish War Crimes Unit (“the Unit”) regarding the preliminary investigation concerning Mohammed Hamo, born 1958, a former Brigadier General in the Syrian Army and Armed Forces, Head of the Armament Branch of the 11th Division. In particular, and following a previous request submitted on 4 September 2018,¹ the Unit requested:

- Information regarding indiscriminate attacks involving the 11th Division between January and July 2012;
- Information regarding the role and responsibilities of the Head of an Armament Branch at Division-level; and
- Information to establish when it could be considered that a non-international armed conflict existed in Syria.

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¹ CIJA Response ‘20180910_Sweden_Hamo’ titled ‘Mohammed Hamo’ referred herein as “Initial Request”.

Reference: CIJARCT20191227_114F

Date: 9 July 2020

I. Summary

CIJA analysts reviewed all documents and witness interviews held by CIJA regarding the 11th Division and found no additional information on indiscriminate attacks involving the 11th Division between January and July 2012, other than that presented in the Initial Request.

Section II of this report presents a brief update to the information provided in the “Initial Request”, based on newly discovered documentation.

Section III of this report presents documents and witness interviews which may aid in establishing the role and responsibilities of a Head of an Armament Branch at Division-level.

Section IV of this report presents an analysis of the escalation of the armed conflict in Syria conducted by CIJA’s Regime Crimes Team leading to the conclusion of the existence of a non-international armed conflict.

II. Update to Initial Request

The Initial Request stated, based on witness interviews, that the 11th Armoured (or Tank) Division consisted of the 47th, 87th, 60th and 167th Brigades, and the 135th Regiment. It appears from a recently discovered piece of documentary evidence dated May 2012 that it was the 67th Armoured Brigade, and not the 167th, that was subordinate to the 11th Division during the relevant period.² This document includes the 167th Brigade as being subordinate to the 18th Division. This is supported by some witness interviews,³ and by other documents in CIJA’s evidentiary holdings.⁴

The document provides further detail on the composition of mechanised and armoured units of the 11th Division:

- The 47th Armoured Brigade comprised the 499th, 152nd and 154th Armoured Battalions, and the 393rd Mechanised Infantry Battalion;

² Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Armoured and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010-011.

³ See e.g. Witness Interview SYR.WGA.575 (a former Sergeant who worked in the 67th Brigade of the 11th Division until 27 May 2012); Witness Interview SYR.WGA.579.(a former Brigadier General with the Northern Regional Command who spent over 25 years of his service with the Army and Armed Forces in the 11th Division).

⁴ See e.g. Table of the Telephone Numbers of Land Forces, undated, SYR.D0014.030.042-043, at SYR.D0014.030.043 (listing the telephone numbers of Army and Armed Forces units, including the commanders of the 11th Division’s 87th, 47th, 60th and 67th Armoured Brigades, and the 135th Regiment).

Reference: CIJARCT20191227_114F

Date: 9 July 2020

- The 60th Armoured Brigade comprised the 841st, 842nd and 843rd Armoured Battalions, and the 819th Mechanised Infantry Battalion;
- The 67th Armoured Brigade comprised the 847th, 848th and 849th Armoured Battalions, and the 821st Mechanised Infantry Battalion; and
- The 87th Mechanised Brigade comprised the 673rd, 674th and 675th Mechanised Infantry Battalions, and the 676th Armoured Battalion.⁵

There are also several documents originating from the Military and Security Committee in Idleb which may be of interest in an investigation concerning the activities of the 11th Division in Idleb.⁶ While these documents are dated February to April 2013, they present the strength, and the location of encampments of Army and Armed Forces units in the area, including units of the 11th Division.

III. Role of a Head of a Division-Level Armament Branch

CIJA analysts could not identify witness interviews or documents which relate to the role and responsibilities of the Head of the 11th Division's Armament Branch. This report includes information on the functions of the Armament Administration of the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces and Armament Branches at division level.

Analysis conducted by CIJA has concluded that there was a consistent and effective chain of command in the Syrian Army and Armed Forces, and information and proposals were sent up the chain of command for decisions.⁷ Analysis of the functions of an Armament Branch at

⁵ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Armoured and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010-011.

⁶ Table of the Forces and Equipment in Idleb Governorate on 11 April 2013, undated, SYR.D0261.005.001-003 (including three rows for units of the 11th Division – the 87th Brigade, 152nd Battalion, and the 135th Regiment – totaling over 500 troops, three tanks, and eight Gvozdika Artillery units); Table Listing the Battalions and Independent Companies in Idleb Governorate on 11 April 2013, undated, SYR.D0261.006.001-003 (including units from the 47th and 87th Brigades, and 135th Artillery Regiment); Table of Deployment Locations of Army and Armed Forces Units in Idleb Governorate on 25 February 2013, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006 (includes 47th Brigade's 151st, 152nd and 153rd Battalions camped at Hamat and on mission in Al-Mastuma and Khan Sheikoun, the 60th Brigade's 819th Battalion camped at Hamat and on mission in Khan Sheikoun, the 87th Brigade's 673rd, 674th, 675th, and 676th Battalions camped at Hamra and on mission at Al-Maarat and Al-Shabiba Camp, and the 135th Regiment's 558th Battalion camped at Hamra and on mission at Al-Ghab); Table of the Artillery Positions in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.007 (including three Gvozdika 122s belonging to the 11th Division in Jourin, Al-Ghab, capable of targeting all directions). See also Table of Cumulative Forces in the Idleb Governorate Military Zone, 11 April 2013, SYR.D0261.008-006-008 (list of units and deployment locations in Idleb, including the 11th Division's 47th and 87th Brigades, and the 135th Regiment).

⁷ Analyst Note: this forms part of an extensive analysis of the Army and Armed Forces which is outside the scope of this report.

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Division-level would therefore give information on the role and responsibilities of the head of such a branch.

The commanding bodies of units of the Army and Armed Forces contained specialised branches or sections,⁸ such as the Armament Branch of the 11th Division, which paralleled the functions of and reported to their equivalent superior unit, up to the staff administrations of the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces.⁹ This section will therefore begin with a presentation of the functions of the Armament Administration of the General Command before presenting division-level-specific evidence.

Armament Administration of the General Command

The function of the Armament Administration of the General Command was to regulate, supply and control the use of arms, ammunition and other military equipment within the Army and Armed Forces, as well as replace the loss of any arms and equipment.¹⁰ For example, following a 17 January 2012 request by the Acting Commander of the Northern Region, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Armed Forces tasked the Armament Administration to deliver three night-vision goggles.¹¹

The Armament Administration contained branches with specific remits, namely the Operations and Planning Branch, the Armament Branch, the Ammunition Branch, and the Organisation and Mobilisation Branch. The Operations and Planning Branch disseminated orders related to the use of armaments by the Army and Armed Forces.¹² The Armament Branch requested units

⁸ Analyst Note: In Syrian Army and Armed Forces commanding bodies, with a few exceptions, a “section” is subordinate to a “branch”, while a “branch” is subordinate to an “administration” or “directorate”. Staff administrations of the General Command are composed of “branches”. Division-level command bodies are also composed of “branches”, while Brigade- and Regiment-level command bodies are composed of “sections”. Each “branch” may be composed of several “sections”, while each “section” may include several “offices”.

⁹ See e.g. Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004 (this a circular disseminated by the Armament Administration ordering commanders to submit reports on ammunition consumption or arms lost to the Armament Administration, through the armament branches in the division commands).

¹⁰ See Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004; Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014; Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016; Communication from the 17th Division, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.019; Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 January 2013, SYR.D0242.108.004.

¹¹ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005.

¹² See e.g. Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004.

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to submit “status” reports describing their holdings of arms and equipment.¹³ The Ammunition Branch monitored ammunition consumption by military units.¹⁴ The Organisation and Mobilisation Branch’s functions included notifying other units regarding defectors from units subordinate to the Armament Administration.¹⁵

Armament Branch at Division Level

CIJA has conducted a witness interview with a defector from the Armaments Branch of the 18th Division. Witness SYR.WGA.632 defected on 12 July 2012 and stated that the Armament Branch was responsible for supplying and securing weapons, missiles and ammunition for the Division. He further stated that the Branch included an Armaments Workshop, an Ammunitions Depot and Armament Sections in units subordinate to the Division. Throughout the interview the witness presented his general knowledge of the operations conducted by the 18th Division. It is particularly notable that the witness was able to give his assessment of the intensity of activities and operations of the Division based on the amount of weapons and ammunitions being used, requested and distributed by his Branch.

This account of the functions of an armament branch appears to be corroborated by documents in CIJA’s evidentiary holdings. The majority of the documents which mention an “Armament Branch” relate to the armament branches of the 5th and the 9th Division. The documents show that a division-level armament branch had duties which involved acting on requests for ammunition from subordinate units and auditing the weapons and ammunition stockpiles of their units. A selection of the most illustrative documents is presented below.

A 7 November 2010 memorandum concerns a request addressed to “Major General” from the Commander of the 5th Division’s “Military Rehabilitation Centre” for weapons and ammunition from the Armament Branch.¹⁶ In addition to the sender’s, there are two signatures

¹³ See e.g. Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014 (requesting the Air Defence Administration to submit a report about the arms, observation tools, and other types of specialised equipment and vehicles in their possession, complete with a table template to be distributed to units).

¹⁴ See e.g. Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016 (communication to the 216th Battalion of the 17th Infantry Division that its ammunition logbook was being returned after an audit). *See also* Communication from the 17th Division to, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.019.

¹⁵ Communication from the Armament Administration, 22 February 2012, SYR.D0240.047.001 (notifying the relevant judicial, police and security bodies of a conscript who defected from the administration). *See also* Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 January 2013, SYR.D0242.108.004.

¹⁶ Memorandum from the Military Rehabilitation Centre of 5th Division, 7 November 2011, SYR.D0159.001.004

Reference: CIJARCT20191227_114F

Date: 9 July 2020

at the bottom of the document. One is the signature of the Major General, Commander of the 5th Division, dated 7 November 2010, with a handwritten note saying “agreed”. The other is the signature of the Head of the Armament Branch, dated 9 November 2010, accompanied by a handwritten note with instructions for implementation. This document shows that the Armament Branch is in charge of acting on requests for weapons and ammunitions from subordinate unit. However, it also appears that the Head of the Armament Branch simply implements the decision of his superior, the Division’s Commander, and does not take the decision himself.¹⁷

CIJA’s holdings contain several “Movement Memoranda” which are handwritten documents on what appears to be a printed template document.¹⁸ The Movement Memoranda identified by CIJA all evidence movements of weapons, ammunition and/or equipment from the 5th Division’s Armament Branch to subordinate units. The documents are signed and stamped by the Head of the 5th Division’s Armament Branch attesting to the delivery of the materials listed in the document to a specified subordinate unit. They are also signed and stamped by the head of the receiving unit’s Armament Section on a later date attesting to the receipt of the materials. These documents are further confirmation that the functions of the Armament Branch at division-level involved the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment to subordinate units. They also evidence the direct involvement and knowledge of the Head of the Armament Branch in this function.

Some documents are related to audits of weapons and ammunition stockpiles held in warehouses. For example, an administrative order dated 10 November 2011 from the Armament Section of the 9th Division’s 52nd Brigade orders the creation of a committee to conduct an audit of the weapons and ammunition stockpiles of the Brigade and its subordinate units and to report back. This is stated to be in accordance with an administrative order from the Armament Branch of the 9th Division. The committee members include the Head of the Operations Section, the Security Officer, the Head of the Armament Section, the Weapons

¹⁷ See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592 (This witness stated that as part of his duties at the Northern Regional Command, he would transfer telegrams and letters received from combat units to the relevant Branch of the Command, based on their specialisation. The witness provided the example of ammunition requests from combat units being transferred to the Armament Branch).

¹⁸ See e.g. Movement Memorandum, 22 October 2007, SYR.D0159.008.015-016.

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Accountant, and the Ammunitions Accountant of the Brigade.¹⁹ The report of the committee, dated 15 January 2012, is several pages long.²⁰

IV. Non-International Armed Conflict in Syria

Analysis of publicly available material²¹ conducted by the CIJA Regime Crimes Team concluded that while there has been to date no conclusive determination as to when the initial crackdown on protests in Syria evolved into a situation of armed conflict, there was nonetheless some consensus that a state of armed conflict existed in Syria by mid-2012.

Evidence in CIJA's possession suggests that the required threshold of "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups" – a requirement of the International Criminal Court's Elements of Crimes – existed, by the latest, from November 2011 onwards, by which time the Free Syrian Army had emerged as a fighting force across the country.²² In response, the Syrian Regime had by November 2011 declared that some governorates in Syria were no longer experiencing riots and internal disorder, but organized armed violence between governmental forces and the armed opposition. On 22 November 2011, the Central Crisis Management Cell²³ decided to establish military checkpoints in Homs

¹⁹ Administrative Order from Armaments Section of 52nd Brigade, 10 November 2011, SYR.D0217.067.003.

²⁰ Report of Weapons and Stockpile Audit Committee established pursuant to 10 November 2011 Administrative Order, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0217.067.003-026.

²¹ See e.g. 'Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintain aid effort amid increased fighting', ICRC Operational Update, 17 July 2012, at <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm> (retrieved on 13 November 2015) (noting that Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assessed a non-international armed conflict to have been present in parts of Syria from June and July 2012, respectively). During his address to the Syrian cabinet, President Al Assad in June 2012 acknowledged that Syria was in "a state of war" (see President Bashar Al-Assad's Address to the Syrian Government, 26 June 2012, available at: http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=303:president-al-assad-s-directions&catid=118&Itemid=496 (retrieved on 18 March 2015)). Assad, however, consistently denied the existence of a civil war and instead called the fighting "terrorism through proxy" or a "foreign war fought with internal tools" (see Bashar Al Assad Speech, 4 June 2012, at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_speech_120604.htm (retrieved on 18 March 2015)). In its 3rd report, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic also dated the commencement of an armed conflict in Syria from February 2012, noting that "[d]uring the reporting period [i.e., 15 February 2012 until 20 July 2012], the ... intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the increased organizational capabilities of anti-Government armed groups, had met the legal threshold for a non-international armed conflict" (see Human Rights Council, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at page 1.).

²² See e.g. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 222, 10 November 2011, SYR.D0010.068.005 (request for information on units and individuals in the Free Syrian Army, and listing units, brigades, commanders and the location of FSA units located throughout Syria).

²³ The Central Crisis Management Cell ("CCMC") comprised senior political, military and security officials and was tasked with coordinating the Syrian regime's response to the deteriorating security situation.

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Governorate and authorized joint operations between military and police units.²⁴ An increase in the activities of armed groups in the governorates of Hama, Homs and Idleb was also noted in a weekly statistical report compiled by a secretary of the CCMC, dated 25 November 2011.²⁵

Other evidence may suggest that an armed conflict existed even prior to this date, with the possibility that this threshold could be satisfied as early as June or July 2011. Protests in Homs, which commenced and continued from February 2011 onwards, were violently suppressed by regime armed and security forces.²⁶ A few sources from this date onwards refer to protesters being protected by “FSA/armed groups.”²⁷ Successively larger numbers of troops and military equipment were transferred to these areas and regime checkpoints were set up in and around Homs city over the course of 2011.²⁸ From mid-May until August 2011, Baba Amro was under opposition control and regime forces surrounded the neighbourhood.²⁹ From June 2011 onwards, armed clashes between regime forces and opposition forces increased in number, scale and intensity, with the aerial bombardment of Baba Amro beginning around then.³⁰ Regime forces further attacked Baba Amro on 27 August 2011 during a four-day battle in which they sought to regain control of the area.³¹ At the beginning of September 2011, the Free Syrian Army attempted to retake the area with around 250 fighters.³²

An armed conflict can thus be said to have existed in Syria from at least November 2011 and arguably from July 2011 onwards.

²⁴ Minutes of Meetings of the CCMC on 21 November 2011, 22 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.074-076, at SYR.P0001.001.075 (point 2).

²⁵ See Weekly Analysis of 25 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.131-134 (stating that terrorist attacks are increasing in Idleb, Hama and Homs).

²⁶ See e.g. Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.633; SYR.WGA.637; SYR.WGA.565; SYR.WGA.656; SYR.WMA.133; SYR.WGA.662; SYR.WMA.134; SYR.WGA.653. Other witnesses stated that the first protests in Baba Amro commenced in April 2011. See e.g. Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.653; SYR.WGC.505; SYR.WGA.638.

²⁷ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.662; SYR.WGA.653.

²⁸ Minutes of Meetings of the CCMC on 20 July 2011, 21 July 2011, SYR.P0001.001.095-096, at SYR.P0001.001.096 (point 4). Videos in the CIJA’s evidence collection show military vehicles in Homs, allegedly on 11 May 2011 (SYR.A0012.068.001; SYR.A0159.150.001). See also Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.628 (suggesting the movement of 1700 elements of 41st Regiment); SYR.WGA.656 (suggesting the movement of 120th Infantry Brigade); SYR.WGA.625 (suggesting the movement of 585th and 586th Battalions of 555th Regiment); SYR.WGA.520 (suggesting the movement of 41st Regiment); SYR.WGA.661 (suggesting the movement of 532nd Battalion of 36th Regiment).

²⁹ Witness Interviews SYR.WMA.134; SYR.WGA.653. Witness SYR.WMA.135 on the other hand states that the free Syrian Army entered Baba Amro in August 2011 only.

³⁰ Witness Interviews SYR.WDA.563; SYR.WGA.548; SYR.WGA.506; SYR.WGA.637.

³¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.653.

³² Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.653; SYR.WMA.134.

Reference: CIJARCT20191227_114F

Date: 9 July 2020

V. **Conclusion**

This report has provided an update to the CIJA Response ‘20180910_Sweden_Hamo’ titled ‘Mohammad Hamo’, and information on the role and responsibilities of a Head of a division level Armament Branch, and an analysis on when a non-international armed conflict could be considered to have started in Syria. CIJA analysts are ready to respond to further enquiries regarding this report and answer other requests in the future.

Confidentiality Notice: The information provided in this report, as well as any documents provided in conjunction with this report, are intended solely for the addressee(s). The information is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other Party without the prior written consent of CIJA.

Reference: CIJARCT20210420_641F
Registration Number: 5000-K62288-18
Date: 16 July 2021



Follow-Up Request for Assistance: Documentation

On 20 April 2021, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a follow-up Request for Assistance from the Swedish Police Authority (“Swedish Police”) regarding CIJA documentation disclosed in response to a prior request dated 4 December 2018.¹ In particular, and concerning an ongoing preliminary investigation related to **Mohammed Hamo**, the Swedish Police requested information on the origin, credibility, and traceability of the following internal Regime documents:

- SYR.D0124.029.001-005
- SYR.D0193.044.026

In addition, the Swedish Police requested assistance with interpreting the abbreviations in SYR.D0124.029.001 that appear in rows 1-12 under column 3, titled “Unit”. This response is accompanied by a draft English translation of SYR.D0124.029.001-005, which includes the full names of the units indicated by those abbreviations. Additional information relating to the documents is provided in the table below.

¹ CIJA Response CIJARCT20181204_007F. *Note also*, CIJA Response: Sweden_Hamo_20180911 titled ‘Mohammed Hamo’ (RCIJARCT20180904_216).

Reference: CIJARCT20210420_641F
 Registration Number: 5000-K62288-18
 Date: 16 July 2021

I. Documents

Document Number	Trans	Chain of Custody Information
SYR.D0124.029.001-005	Yes	In August 2012, an individual (HM) seized documents from a military checkpoint in the city of al-Rastan, Homs Governorate and stored the bundle of documents in a secure location in Syria. In early November 2012, the individual (HM) handed the bundle over to a CIJA team member (AH) who held it in his home in Syria. On 27 November 2013, he gave the bundle to another CIJA team member (MS) who stored it in his home in Syria. On or around 26 July 2014, the CIJA team member (MS) transported the bundle to Ryhanali, Turkey where he handed it over to a CIJA team member (FJ) who transported it to his home in Southern Turkey. On 21 August 2014, the CIJA team member (FJ) handed the bundle to another CIJA team member (DB) who kept it in his hotel room. On 25 August 2014, the CIJA team member (DB) personally transported the bundle to CIJA Headquarters where it was held in a secure location until being processed. These documents were placed into Box SYR.D0124, which was then stored in the CIJA archive.
SYR.D0193.044.026	No	On 10 May 2016, a CIJA team member (MA) seized documents from the offices of the Military Police Branch in Idleb and stored them in his home in Syria. In early October 2016, the CIJA team member (MA) transported the bundle to his home in Southern Turkey. On 11 October 2016, he gave the bundle to a CIJA team member (SR) who then personally transported the bundle to CIJA Headquarters on 24 October 2016 and handed it over to another CIJA team member (DB). The bundle was stored in a safe location at CIJA Headquarters until being processed. These documents were placed into Boxes SYR.D0193 – SYR.D0194, which were then stored in the CIJA archive.

Confidentiality Notice: The information provided in this report, as well as any documents provided in conjunction with this report, are intended solely for the addressee(s). The information is confidential and may not be disclosed to any other Party without the prior written consent of CIJA.

sent out with No: 2562
date 21/12/2011

SYR.D0124.029.001_ET

The Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
11th Tank Division – Political Guidance Branch
No: //1008//
Date: 20/12/2011

Administrative Order

Divide the amount of productivity funds within the command of 11th Tank Division for 2011 as follows:

No	Name and surname	Rank	Unit	Specific amount		Signature
				In figures	In words	
1.	Faiz Ali al-Hussain	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Artillery Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
2.	Adnan Mohammad Mohammad	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Engineer Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
3.	Mohammad Ibrahim Subh	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Reconnaissance Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
4.	Fuad Habib Wanous	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Signals branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
5.	Malik Mohammad Youssef	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Chemical Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
6.	Mohammad Hussain Hamou	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Armament Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
7.	Ghanam Ali Saqour	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Organization Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
8.	Farhan Rashid al-	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Guidance Branch	1000	no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	

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	Mohammad						Syrian pounds	
9.	Abdel Rahman Mohammad	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Administrative Affairs Branch	1000			no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
10.	Ahmad Tawfiq al-Khadar	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Technical Affairs Branch	1000			no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
11.	Hussain Ahmad Mahmoud	Staff Brigadier General	Head of Operations Branch	1000			no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
12.	Ahmad Khaled Barri	Staff Brigadier General	Head of (illegible) Artillery	1000			no more than one thousand Syrian pounds	
13.	Najim Suleiman Mahmoud	Colonel	Head of Political Guidance Branch	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
14.	Abdel Latif Salman	Colonel	Armament Warehouse	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
15.	Amer Alouf	Colonel	Service Battalion	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
16.	Masoud Masoud	Colonel	Operations Branch	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
17.	Wadah Maqsoud	Colonel	Administrative Office	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
18.	Jawdet Rasouq	Colonel	Signals Branch	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
19.	Mohammad Saud	Colonel	Reconnaissance Battalion	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
20.	Faiz Youssef	Colonel	Engineer Battalion	700			no more than seven hundred Syrian pounds	
21.	Ali Daoud	Lieutenant Colonel	Signals Battalion	500			no more than five hundred Syrian pounds	
22.	Asaad Siyouth	Lieutenant Colonel	Company .ع.ش.?	500			no more than five hundred Syrian pounds	

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23.	Firas Deeb	Major	Service Battalion	500	Syrian pounds no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
24.	Rami Fares	Major	Armament Workshop	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
25.	Bashar Nough	Captain	Armament Warehouse	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
26.	Fadi Masoud	Captain	Repair Battalion	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
27.	Hazem Suleiman	Captain	Repair Battalion	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
28.	Suleiman Abbas	Captain	Reconnaissance Battalion	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds
29.	Thair al-Hafi	Captain	Reconnaissance Battalion	500	no more than five hundred Syrian pounds

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30.	Trad Abdel Malik	Captain	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
31.	Tareq Ghasnah	1 st Lieutenant	Company ع.ش.؟	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
32.	Rami Hamoud	1 st Lieutenant	Reconnaissance Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
33.	Saad Aydo	1 st Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
34.	Kenan Ibrahim	1 st Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
35.	Hussam Asaad	1 st Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
36.	Ifan Shaabou	1 st Lieutenant	Service Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
37.	Mohammad al-Shaikh Omar	2 nd Lieutenant	Service Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
38.	Mahmoud al-Asaad	2 nd Lieutenant	Reconnaissance Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
39.	Ali Ali	2 nd Lieutenant	Reconnaissance Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
40.	Nihad Muhithai	2 nd Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
41.	Abdo Ismail	2 nd Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
42.	Saadun al-Tahan	2 nd Lieutenant	Engineer Battalion	500	No more than five hundred Syrian pounds
43.	Hadi Mohammad	Sergeant	Anti-tank Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds

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44.	Zakaria Khalil	Sergeant	Anti-tank Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
45.	Ali Shahin	Sergeant	Anti-tank Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
46.	Hamoud al-Said	Sergeant	Anti-tank Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
47.	Nader Issa	Sergeant	Anti-tank Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
48.	Ibrahim Rustam	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
49.	Adnan al-Sharif	Sergeant	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
50.	Ahmad Ramadan	Sergeant	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
51.	Ghadir Youssef	Sergeant	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
52.	Ghaleb Ahmad	Sergeant	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
53.	Hussain Yassine	Sergeant	Engineer Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
54.	Ahmad al-Shaikh	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
55.	Samir Ibrahim	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
56.	Wassim Boukrah	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds
57.	Walid Darwish	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds

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58.	Hisham Taleb	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
59.	Issam Aboud	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
60.	Omar Suleiman	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
61.	Ayham al-Saleh	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
62.	Ibrahim Amouri	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
63.	Mohammad Mastou	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
64.	Mohammad Saloum	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
65.	Ismail al-Ghareb	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
66.	Ghaith Khader	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	No more than three hundred Syrian pounds	

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67.	Mohammad Suleiman	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
68.	Ahmad al-Hassan	Sergeant	Reconnaissance Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
69.	Kifah Ibrahim	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
70.	Mohammad al-Ahmad	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
71.	Ali Tajur	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
72.	Ismail Shahin	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
73.	Ali Abdo	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
74.	Rawad Maarouf	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
75.	Issa Saud	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
76.	Mehdi Soyoum	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
77.	Winam Khalouf	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
78.	Adel Ali	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds
79.	Wasim al-Salim	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds

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80.	Wissam al-Youssef	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
81.	Asaad Abdo	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
82.	Hisham Khalil	Sergeant	Signals Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
83.	Jihad al-Saqa	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
84.	Youssef al-Hussain	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
85.	Hidwan Moussa	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
86.	Ali Dawm	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
87.	Mohammad Habib	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
88.	Asaad Ghanam	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
89.	Alaa al-Khadar	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
90.	Zaid Mahmoud	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
91.	Fadi Youssef	Sergeant	Service Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
92.	Moussa Suleiman	Sergeant	Armament Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
93.	Mahran al-Ali	Sergeant	Armament Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	

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94.	Yamen Suleiman	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Medical Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
95.	Rami Aloush	Sergeant	Transportation Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
96.	Hussam al-Youssef	Sergeant	Transportation Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
97.	Rami Khadar	Sergeant	Chemical Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
98.	Mufid Marii	Sergeant	Company ع.ش.?	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
99.	Nabil Hasun	Sergeant	Company ع.ش.?	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
100.	Ahmad al-Hajji	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Fuel	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
101.	Ibrahim Ismail	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Administrative Affairs	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
102.	Mohammad Nasser	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Administrative Affairs	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
103.	Qusay Hussain	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	

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104.	Rami Darbouli	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
105.	Thair Hashim al- Nasser	Sergeant major	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
106.	Amjad Jahrah	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
107.	Ayman Shawhar	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
108.	Lui Saqour	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
109.	Khadar Saqour	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
110.	Ali al-Khatib	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
111.	Ali Shadoud	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
112.	Qahtan Abbas	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
113.	Mohammad Makhlouf	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
114.	Wadia al-Nufu	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
115.	Hiyan Suleiman	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
116.	Ahmad Habib	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
117.	Moussa Habib	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	

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118.	Ahmad Issa	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
119.	Bashar Ayoub	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	300	no more than three hundred Syrian pounds	
120.	Abdel Latif Abdullah	Sergeant	Repair Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
121.	Muhu al-Waari	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Repair Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
122.	Warl al-Aak	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Engineer warehouse	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
123.	Mohammad Hamoud	Warrant Officer 3 rd Class	Engineer warehouse	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
124.	Ghiyath Salim	Sergeant	Engineer warehouse	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
125.	Mohammad Abdullah	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
126.	Mohammad Khadar	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
127.	Tareq Idriss	Corporal	Anti-tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
128.	Said Qusay	Corporal	Transportation Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
129.	Omar al-Shami	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
130.	Ayman Aloush	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
131.	Ibrahim Shabat	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	

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132.	Muhedin Khalil	Corporal	Service Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
133.	Tamer Shama	Corporal	Chemical Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
134.	Wasim Youssef	Corporal	Transportation Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
135.	Wisam Ibrahim	Corporal	Transportation Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
136.	Awraf Afifah	Corporal	Transportation Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
137.	Ahmad Abu Obaid	Corporal	Anti-Tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
138.	Khalid Mohammad	Corporal	Anti-Tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
139.	Mohammad Masikh	Corporal	Anti-Tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
140.	Sawmar Ibrahim	Corporal	Anti-Tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	

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141.	Hussain al-Ahmad	Corporal	Anti-tank Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
142.	Talal Shahin	Corporal	Engineer Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
143.	Ayman Saloum	Corporal	Engineer Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
144.	Ibrahim Ramadan	Corporal	Repair Battalion	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
145.	Khalaf Khalaf	Coscript	Company ع.ش.؟	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
146.	Salim Ghanam	Coscript	Company ع.ش.؟	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
147.	Abdel Naim Kashu	Coscript	Company ع.ش.؟	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
148.	Alaa Hajj Ibrahim	Coscript	Company ع.ش.؟	200	no more than two hundred Syrian pounds	
149.	Total			58,400	no more than fifty eight thousand forty hundred Syrian pounds	

Comment:

The content of this order shall be registered in the Remuneration Register at the Political Security Officer in the battalion.

Major General Nasib Ajwad Abu Mahmoud,

Commander of 11th Tank Division

(signature)

(stamp)

Reference: CIJARCT20220329_809
File Number: 5000-K622888-18
Date: 19 August 2022



Follow-up Request for Assistance: Mohammed Hamo

On 29 March 2022, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a follow-up Request for Assistance from the Swedish War Crimes Unit (“the Unit”) regarding **Mohammed Hamo**. The Unit requested information regarding strategic regulations of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces (“Syrian Army”) up to August 2012. In particular, the Unit sought information on:

- Regulations – strategic and/or operational;
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); and
- Army Orders.

I. Findings

CIJA analysts were unable to identify formal Syrian Army regulations or standard operating procedures within CIJA’s evidentiary holdings. Based on contemporaneous Syrian Army communications and orders, CIJA’s Syrian Arab Army and Armed Forces Brief provides an analysis of the key structures and functions of the Syrian Army and includes a section on the effectiveness of the command structure operated by the Syrian Army’s General Command, which discusses various procedural aspects of the chain of command in operation.¹ Copies of selected documentation and witness interviews cited in the Brief can be made available upon request. In addition, if the Unit specifies a topic of interest – i.e., the specific subject matter(s) of the type of regulations/SOPs sought – CIJA may be able to deduce relevant regulations/SOPs based on analysis of Army communications or other operational documents related to that topic.

¹ CIJA Brief “Syrian Arab Army and Armed Forces”, draft of 13 March 2019 (shared with the Unit on 17 June 2020).

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Regarding orders within the Syrian Army, CIJA holdings include thousands of military documents containing various instructions/orders pertaining to a wide range of subject matter. If informed of specific topic(s) of interest (e.g., specific Regime entities, people or places), CIJA may be able to provide further information about relevant orders.

While performing searches for this request, CIJA analysts identified an additional document containing information that is potentially relevant to the role and responsibilities of the Head of an Armament Branch of a Syrian Army Division, and the administrative procedures of the Syrian Army pertaining to armaments. The 14-page document, dated 1 January 2008, is titled “Lecture on Principles of Record-Keeping and Accounting Documents for Armament Equipment” and was prepared by the Head of the Armament Branch of the 5th Division.² The lecture appears to have been addressed to the heads or other personnel of the Division’s armaments warehouses and armament sections of the Division’s regiments, brigades and subordinate units and formations. While the document is titled “Lecture”, it contains detailed instructions, an explanation of various procedures (including, for example, the procedure for requesting armaments), and templates which presumably accompanied a lecture on the topic. The mandatory nature of the document is further reinforced by the presence on the first page of the 5th Division Commander’s signature in addition to that of the Head of the Division’s Armament Branch. In that regard, the document demonstrates the supervisory role of the Head of an Armament Branch of a Syrian Army Division in relation to such armaments-related administrative matters in subordinate units and formations.

II. Conclusion

This report has provided a summary of material held by CIJA that relates to strategic/operational regulations, SOPs, and the issuance of orders within the Syrian Army, as well as a summary of an additional document relevant to the role of the Head of an Armament Branch of a Syrian Army Division. CIJA analysts conducted searches of CIJA evidentiary holdings in Arabic and English using a variety of spellings. CIJA analysts are ready to respond to further enquiries regarding this report and answer other requests in the future.

² Lecture on Principles of Record-Keeping and Accounting Documents for Armament Equipment by the Head of the Armament Branch of the 5th Division, 1 January 2008, SYR.D0159.042.001-014.

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Follow-up Request for Assistance: Documentation

On 9 August 2022, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) received a Request for Assistance from the Swedish War Crimes Unit (“the Unit”) regarding the sharing of CIJA analytical product for use in its preliminary investigation into the Head of the Armament Branch within the 11th Division of the Syrian Arab Army. On 7 November 2022, the Unit identified the following analytical topics of interest:

- The General Command of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces between March 2011 and July 2012;
- The Regional Commands;
- Military and Security Committees;
- The Army; and
- The General Staff.

These topics are discussed in the following report, which can be used by the Unit in support of its investigation.

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I. Introduction

This report is a structural overview of the Syrian Arab Army and Armed Forces (“Army and Armed Forces”), which comprised the land, air and naval forces of the Syrian Arab Republic (“Syria”). It focuses on the period from March 2011 to March 2013.

The report provides an analysis of unprecedented scope and detail of the key structures and functions of the Army and Armed Forces. Where possible, it identifies commanders within commands, headquarters, units and formations. It relies heavily on contemporaneous documentation, currently in the possession of the CIJA, generated by the Regime of Bashar Al-Assad (“Regime”). Where appropriate, the report also relies on witness interviews and publicly available evidence. Because the focus of the report is directed towards structure, functions and key commands, the operations undertaken by the Army and Armed Forces during the conflict are not examined in detail.

In this report, the “Army” means the three Corps and their subordinate units, the independent Special Forces regiments, and the independent divisions, namely the Republican Guard and the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armoured Divisions. The “Armed Forces” refers to all other forces subordinate to the General Command.

This report addresses the structure of the Army and Armed Forces, and the ways that the Regime leadership commanded and controlled it. The report examines three of the major military command structures, namely:¹

- Section II: The General Command. The President had ultimate authority over the General Command. Immediately subordinate to him were the Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The Army and Armed Forces had clear chains of command emanating from the President and senior commanders of the General Command down through commands and staff departments to operational units on the ground, with concomitant lines of reporting conveying information back to those in command. The General Command oversaw the General Staff. There was no Army Command: the Army

¹ This report does not examine the four Commands subordinate to the General Command (the Special Forces Command, Air Force and Air Defence Command, Naval Forces Command and Border Guard Forces Command), nor the other forces subordinate to the General Command (the Popular Army and the Palestine Liberation Army).

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was directly under the General Command. The detailed structure of the Army appears in Section V, and of the General Staff in Section VI.

- Section III: The Regional Commands. These were primarily administrative and logistical bodies. Each covered a distinct area of Syria. At times during the conflict, some Regional Commands took on command and control functions.
- Section IV: The Military and Security Committees. These were a key tool which the Regime leadership used to command and control the Army and Armed Forces, and the security agencies, at the governorate level. This section provides an overview of the events at the national level that led to the creation, in November 2011, of Military and Security Committees in several “hot”, *i.e.*, tense governorates, and the important role which these played in overseeing and directing the suppression of dissent at the governorate level.

The report next details the structure of the Army in Section V, which comprised chiefly the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps and their subordinate units. The Regime exercised control over the Corps Commanders through the General Command.

Finally, the report details the structure of the General Staff in Section VI, including summaries of the functions of each of the principal staff departments, commissions, administrations, directorates, or branches.

While witness interviews have been used in this report, contemporaneous Regime-generated documentary evidence has been the main focus of the analysis. The majority of that evidence relates to the period from early 2011 to early 2013. The charts attached to this report and the organisational structure of the Army and Armed Forces discussed in it therefore reflect this period. The Army and Armed Forces structure altered significantly as the conflict continued. For example, a 4th and 5th corps were created in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Units within the Army and Armed Forces were moved as a result of the dynamics of the conflict.² These events are not discussed in detail, as there is relatively little contemporaneous documentation available for those periods.

² For example, documents show the 47th Special Forces Regiment which was under the Special Forces Command in 2011 referred to as the “Republican Guard – 47th Airborne Regiment” in February 2014, implying that it had been moved from the Special Forces to the Republican Guard.

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The CIJA has a substantial number of documents and witness interviews within its collection, containing a vast amount of information regarding the Army and Armed Forces. In order to keep this report to a manageable length, it does not address all issues in detail. For example, the report discusses the units within corps to the level of brigade/regiment; it does not attempt to cover lower-level structures, such as battalions within brigades or all support or logistics units. The documentation available to the CIJA would allow for the provision of considerably more detail. Further, targeted research can be carried out on identified units or specific individuals at a later date if required.

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II. The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces

Overall Structure

This section addresses the structure and functions of the General Command, which was the supreme military authority of Syria.³

The President, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces (hereafter referred to as “President”), exercised control over the General Command.⁴ Immediately subordinate to him was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces/Minister of Defence (“Deputy Commander”),⁵ who was the most senior operational officer of the General Command.⁶ The Chief of the General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces (“Chief of Staff”), who sat at the head of the General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces (“General Staff”), was the next

³ Some of the powers of the General Command are contained in legislative decrees. *See e.g.* Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Arts 79 (stating that the General Command could order the transfer and appointment of officers), 71 (stating that the General Command could provide exceptional promotions), 108 (stating that the General Command appointed, promoted and gave orders for deployment which were not subject to oversight by any financial or monitoring authority), 147 (allowing the General Command to set the “rules, conditions and periods” for raising punishments on soldiers) and 158 (stating that the General Command had the right to end the service of any non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel for various reasons, including “reasons connected with public interest”).

⁴ Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Art. 188 (giving the Commander in Chief the power to establish, abolish, regulate or modify the agencies of the General Command and determine their powers, competencies and staffing). *See also* Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 103; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 105 (There are two versions of the Constitution that cover the period of the current conflict (1973 to February 2012 and February 2012 to present).

⁵ Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Art. 34 (stating that the Commander in Chief has the power to appoint his own deputies and the deputies of the Chief of Staff); Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129 (stating that the Commander in Chief appoints his Deputy Commander in Chief). Numerous documents also show the Deputy Commander, the most senior operational officer in the General Command, signing documents where his signature is authorised by the President. *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 17 September 2012, SYR.D0181.031.019; Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.001.

⁶ *See e.g.* Telegram from Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048 (showing the signature of the Deputy Commander. He had the power to order the mobilisation of armed forces including Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the Corps, Special Forces, the Military Police, the Regional Commands, the Naval Forces Command and Air Defence); Circular from the Operations Commission, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (signed by the Deputy Commander, ordering that any emergency incidents be immediately reported to the Operations Commission. This order was given to all “heads of commissions, sections and administrations as well as commanders of forces, troops, legions, formations and units”); Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007 (signed by the Deputy Commander, ordering “all commanders of all levels”. This copy of the circular was disseminated not just to the army but also the security agencies, the academies and the military police, at least within the area of responsibility of the Command of the Northern Region); Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010 (demonstrating that information requiring a decision went from the proposing body to a Deputy Chief of Staff, through the Chief of Staff and on to the Deputy Commander. There were, however, occasions when the Chief of Staff took the decision without referring it to the Deputy Commander.

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most senior officer.⁷ He had three Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (“Deputy Chief(s) of Staff”) immediately subordinate to him.⁸

The Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff normally had the rank of *Imad*,⁹ while the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and heads of commands and departments had the rank of Major General, or, rarely, Brigadier General.¹⁰

The General Command exercised authority over the Army and Armed Forces, which incorporated the Ground Forces (“Army”), the Syrian Arab Air Force (“Air Force”), and the Syrian Arab Navy (“Navy”).¹¹ Regarding the Air Force and the Navy, the General Command oversaw a specific command for each of these forces: Air Force and Air Defence Command (“Air Force Command”)¹² and Naval Forces Command.¹³

The Army did not have a separate command; its formations and units were subordinated directly to the General Command.¹⁴ The majority of soldiers were in three Corps: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps, spread throughout Syria. Each of the corps comprised divisions, brigades, battalions, companies,

⁷ See e.g. Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010 (demonstrating that information requiring a decision went from the proposing body to a Deputy Chief of Staff, through the Chief of Staff and on to the Deputy Commander, who made the decision based on the recommendation of the Chief of Staff). In terms of promotion, the Chief of Staff was normally promoted to Deputy Commander. Imad Dawoud Abdullah Rajiha, who had been Chief of Staff (See e.g. Interrogative Investigation Order, 9 June 2011, SYR.D0017.026.001-002) was Deputy Commander by 21 August 2011 (See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 August 2011, SYR.D0071.026.009). Al-Freij, who had been Chief of Staff (See e.g. Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 22 August 2011, SYR.D0017.027.001) then replaced Rajiha as Deputy Commander in July 2012 (See Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129).

⁸ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁹ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.024; Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.020; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147; Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.005-006. The term “*Imad*” refers to a military rank unique to Syria that was above “Major General” and below “Field Marshal”. The term’s most likely equivalent in Western armies would be “Lieutenant-General”.

¹⁰ See e.g. Communication from the Director of the Signal Administration, 16 June 2013, SYR.D0190.059.007; Telegram from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0021.023.036; Circular from the Air Force and Air Defence Command, 29 January 2012, SYR.D0070.011.099.

¹¹ Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Art. 10.

¹² Circular from the Air Force and Air Defence Command, 29 January 2012, SYR.D0070.011.099.

¹³ Telegram from Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048.

¹⁴ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 12 January 2012, SYR.D0220.034.012 (sent straight from the Operations Commission to, in this case, the 1st Corps).

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and platoons.¹⁵ The General Command also oversaw a Special Forces Command¹⁶ and a Border Guard Forces Command,¹⁷ and had independent units directly subordinate to it, including the Republican Guard, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armoured Divisions, as well as other bodies such as the Palestine Liberation Army¹⁸ and the Popular Army.

The Military Intelligence Department and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate were two of the four principal security agencies.¹⁹ These were formally under the authority of the General Command²⁰ but *de facto* reported to the National Security Bureau (“NSB”), and, while it existed, the Central Crisis Management Cell (“CCMC”).²¹

At the governorate level, from late 2011 the CCMC appointed Military and Security Chiefs in at least the governorates of Homs, Idleb, Dar’a, Hama and Aleppo to supervise and later command military and security operations. These Military and Security Chiefs headed Military and Security Committees,²² effectively replacing the governorate Security Committees,²³ and all security

¹⁵ Circular from the Armaments Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004.

¹⁶ Communication from the Special Forces Command 46th Regiment, 23 December 2011, SYR.D0061.008.001.

¹⁷ Presentation Memorandum from the Commander of the Border Guard Forces, 16 April 2012, SYR.D0184.005.019-020; Communication from the Border Guard Forces Command, 6 February 2010, SYR.D0018.001.012.

¹⁸ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 27 November 2012, SYR.D0234.021.011 (one of those to whom the circular was sent was the Palestine Liberation Army).

¹⁹ The four principal security agencies were the Military Intelligence Department, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, the Political Security Department, and the General Intelligence Directorate. At the beginning of the conflict, Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence were formally under the General Command but reported up a separate chain of command to their own superiors and the NSB. Political Security and General Intelligence were formally under the Ministry of Interior but also had separate chains of command and reported *de facto* to the NSB. As the conflict went on, and particularly with the advent of the Military and Security Committees, the Military and Security Chiefs gained control in operational terms over security forces in their certain governorates.

²⁰ See Telegram by the Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048. In documents issued by both security bodies it is indicated by the letterhead that they are part of the General Command. See e.g. Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 294, 2 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.017. See also Communication from the Head of the Air Force Intelligence Northern Region Branch, 8 January 2012, SYR.D0001.009.002.

²¹ The CCMC was the decision-making body comprising the senior political, security and military leadership of the Regime which was established at the beginning of the crisis to deal with the deteriorating security situation. The CCMC was headed by Muhammad Said Bekheitan until October 2011 and by Hassan Turkomani from October 2011 until July 2012. The members of the CCMC were Muhammad Al-Shaar (Minister of Interior), Hisham Ikhtiar (Head of the NSB), Assef Shawkat (Deputy Minister of Defence), Daoud Rajiha (Minister of Defence/Deputy Commander), Ali Mamluk (Head of the General Intelligence Directorate), Abdul Fattah Qudsiyya (Head of the Military Intelligence Department), Jamil Al-Hassan (Head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate), and Muhammad Dib Zeitoun (Head of the Political Security Department).

²² The terms used by the Regime for these *ad hoc* governorate-level Military and Security bodies varied. Terms used included Military Committee, Military and Security Committee, and Security Group.

²³ The Security Committee was a Ba’ath Party institution which historically brought together representatives from the various security agencies, Ba’ath Party political figures (including the Governor), and the police. Until late

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structures, including local Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence branches, in the relevant governorates were subordinated to that military officer.²⁴ The Military and Security Chiefs played an important operational role in the governorates by receiving intelligence and information from the security agencies and coordinating the deployment of Army and Armed Forces units with the security agencies during operations on the ground. The various security agencies retained their key regular security functions. These included the gathering of information on opposition personnel and activity, the dissemination of wanted lists, and the arrest and interrogation of detainees. In these areas, the security agencies continued to maintain intact their own reporting structures.

Key Positions within the General Command

President and Commander-in-Chief

Under the Constitution of Syria, the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces.²⁵ As President, Bashar Al-Assad has held this position since his assumption of power in July 2000.²⁶ He exclusively holds the military rank of Field Marshal,²⁷ the highest officer rank in the Army and Armed Forces.²⁸

The Constitution grants the President the power to set State policy and oversee its implementation,²⁹ pass decisions, decrees and orders,³⁰ and appoint and dismiss both civilian and military employees.³¹ As Commander-in-Chief, the President has extensive powers under the Military Service Law which regulates the Army and Armed Forces.³² He also has extensive powers

2011, governorate-level Security Committees were chaired by the Ba'ath Party Branch Secretary in each governorate.

²⁴ For example, the appointment order for Major General Fuad Hammouda as Chief of the Military and Security Committee in Idleb stated that he was "charged with the command of all military units and formations, the different security forces, the internal security forces, and the government and party authorities in Idleb Governorate and is considered head of the security committee". See Appointment Order from the General Command, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

²⁵ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 103; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 105.

²⁶ See e.g. Biography of Mr. President Bashar Al-Assad issued by Infantry Academy, (undated), SYR.D0015.035.001-002.

²⁷ See e.g. Transfer Order No. 33, 17 April 2013, SYR.D0217.007.015; Transfer Order No. 1, 21 January 2014, SYR.D0217.023.007-008; Extraordinary Promotion Order by the Commander-in-Chief, 3 March 2012, SYR.D0220.039.022-024.

²⁸ Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Art. 11.

²⁹ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 94; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 98.

³⁰ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 99; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 101.

³¹ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 109; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 106.

³² Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law.

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by virtue of the Military Penal Code over the Military Police, Military Prisons and the Military Justice System.³³

The President has authority to declare war with the approval of the People's Assembly,³⁴ as well as the power to take immediate emergency measures in cases of grave danger threatening national unity and the safety of the "homeland."³⁵ The President has both the authority to command and to delegate his authority:

The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Armed Forces. He issues all the necessary decisions and orders in exercising this authority. He may delegate some of his authority.³⁶

Beyond his *de jure* power, the President exercised effective control of the Army and Armed Forces throughout the conflict, as demonstrated by his personal statements and actions. In an interview with Chinese State television channel CCTV in September 2013, for example, when he was asked whether he took "executive decisions" in "military operations and State policies", Al-Assad responded:

According to the Constitution, the President's prerogatives are clear – he is the supreme commander of the Army and Armed Forces. Therefore, he is the "first decision-maker" in "moving" and commanding the Armed Forces in Syria. At the same time, the President has an essential role in the foreign policy. So, he first bears the responsibility of the foreign policy. According to these prerogatives, yes, he is "exercising them completely", before and during the crisis.³⁷

In April 2017, Al-Assad emphasised his previous and ongoing control over the Army:

the Syrian Army is a regular army, it's not a militia. It's a regular army, it has hierarchy, it has [a] very clear way of orders, so this kind of "rough personnel tried to do something against the will of the leadership of the army" never happened during the last six years of the war in Syria.³⁸

³³ See e.g. Syrian Military Penal Code, Arts 1, 2, 19(2), 34(7), 35(C), 35(D), 36(2), 39, 40(1), 43(2), 45(2), 47(5), 53(1), 53(2), 54, 89, 90, 152.

³⁴ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 100; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 102.

³⁵ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 113; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 114.

³⁶ Syrian Constitution (1973), Art. 103; Syrian Constitution (2012), Art. 105.

³⁷ YouTube, "Interview of the President Bashar Al-Assad with the CCTV", 23 September 2013, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20130924185845/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pCvYZww0fM> (retrieved on 13 February 2023).

³⁸ YouTube, "Bachar al Assad-Interview of AFP", 14 April 2017, SYR.A0472.018.

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In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Figaro* in September 2013, the President also confirmed his control over the most important military decisions. For example, he indicated that the decision “to deploy [chemical weapons] is usually centralised”, implicitly rejecting the argument that someone from his inner circle or officers in the Army and Armed Forces could have taken the decision to deploy chemical weapons without his knowledge.³⁹

The President exercised his constitutional authority to set Regime policy and oversee its implementation. Legislative decrees, for example, were promulgated by the President.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Regime relied on this constitutional authority in its decision-making. For example, on 18 October 2011, in the minutes of the CCMC, it was noted that the CCMC was to:

Draft a memorandum by order of the President clarifying the main downturns that led to the exacerbation of the crisis and delayed the finding of sound solutions. It will also comprise effective suggestions to swiftly end the crisis.⁴¹

On 22 October, a few days later, the CCMC met again and the Head of the CCMC, Hasan Turkomani:

... provided instructions on the work plan for the next phase, whereby the issues and problems would be meticulously and objectively studied, every issue would be soundly analysed, solution-oriented conclusions would be reached, decisions would be taken, recommendations would be raised to Mr. President for ratification and measures would be taken for their accurate implementation.⁴²

The President appointed senior military personnel, such as the Deputy Commander⁴³ and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff,⁴⁴ and ordered the transfer of senior officers between units or administrations.⁴⁵ The President’s comprehensive authority over Syrian forces is demonstrated by

³⁹ Le Figaro, “Le Figaro Interview of Assad”, 3 September 2013, SYR.A0472.014 (Malbrunot: “Is it possible that someone from your inner circle or officers in the Syrian Army took the decision without your knowledge?” President Al-Assad: “Again — regardless of whether we do or do not possess such weapons, in any country that does possess these weapons, the decision to deploy is usually centralised”).

⁴⁰ See e.g. Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, Conscription Law, at <https://archive.ph/yoI69> (retrieved on 6 December 2022).

⁴¹ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 18 October 2011, 19 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.020-021.

⁴² Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023.

⁴³ See e.g. Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129 (appointing *Imad* Fahd Jasem Al-Frej as Minister of Defence. This decree contains the signature block of the President).

⁴⁴ Appointment Order Issued by the Officers’ Affairs Department, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Transfer Order No. 33, 17 April 2013, SYR.D0217.007.015; Transfer Order No. 1, 21 January 2014, SYR.D0217.023.007-008 (transferring, among others, the Deputy Head of the Operations Administration of the

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his appointment of Military and Security Chiefs in late 2011 in certain governorates, delegating his authority over all of the Army and Armed Forces, the security agencies, as well as governmental and Baath Party authorities to these chiefs.⁴⁶ For example, on 26 November 2011, the President appointed Major General Fuad Hammouda, then Special Forces Commander, to the

...command of all military units and formations, the different security forces, the internal security forces and the government and party authorities in Idleb Governorate.⁴⁷

The President authorised similar appointment orders when new officers took over this key role. Major General Fuad Hammouda was later replaced by Major General Wajih Yahya Mahmoud⁴⁸ who, in turn, was replaced by Major General Al-Qawzi.⁴⁹ Major General Al-Qawzi was replaced in August 2013 by Major General Ahmad Asaad Hammouda.⁵⁰ The President made similar appointments in other “hot” governorates. The President exercised his constitutional role to promote officers,⁵¹ and also promoted soldiers posthumously via an “exceptional promotion” process.⁵²

Operations Commission, the Deputy Head of the Supply and Logistics Commission, and the Deputy Commander of the Popular Army).

⁴⁶ The President had a power, granted by the Constitution, to select officers for temporary service away from their units under emergency circumstances. *See also* Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Art. 81.

⁴⁷ Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

⁴⁸ *See e.g.* Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 31 August 2012, SYR.D0186.024.017-019; Communication from the Operations Branch of the 1st Corps, 28 July 2012, SYR.D0181.031.012; Communication from the Operations Branch of the 3rd Corps, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.003.

⁴⁹ Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 17 September 2012, SYR.D0181.031.019.

⁵⁰ Administrative Order from the General Command, 24 August 2013, SYR.D0179.018.001; Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 17 September 2012, SYR.D0181.031.019.

⁵¹ Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129; Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007; Appointment Order Issued by the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008.

⁵² *See e.g.* Extraordinary Promotion Order by the Commander-in-Chief, 3 March 2012, SYR.D0220.039.022-024; Exceptional Promotion Order by the Commander-in-Chief, 8 June 2012, SYR.D0220.055.001; Exceptional Promotion Order by the Commander-in-Chief, 8 August 2012, SYR.D0220.064.001-002.

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The President further exercised his constitutional authority relating to transfers,⁵³ reassignments,⁵⁴ amending the military service laws,⁵⁵ changing the age of conscription,⁵⁶ changing the required length of service,⁵⁷ regulating the use of personal technology devices on army bases,⁵⁸ declaring military holidays,⁵⁹ regulating the provision of military-grade weapons to civilians,⁶⁰ and amending the military penal code.⁶¹

Besides exercising his power directly, the President also delegated his authority to senior commanders. For example, on 27 July 2012, the Operations Commission, a staff department of the General Command, issued a circular⁶² relating to the use of electronic devices by opposition armed groups and the need to supply the command with any captured examples in order to counter these communication devices. This circular was issued under the authority of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief and bore his signature block but was actually signed “by delegation” by the Deputy Commander.⁶³ Other examples include orders relating to

⁵³ See e.g. Transfer Order issued by the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.040.012; Movement Order from the Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032 (concerning the switching of discharged [military] personnel from, and sending of replacement personnel to, Maarrat an-Numann in Idleb Governorate. This order is signed by the Deputy Commander on behalf of “Lieutenant-General, Bashar al-Assad, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces”).

⁵⁴ See e.g. Appointment Order issued by the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 22 July 2012, SYR.D0220.002.002-003; Appointment Order issued by the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 10 January 2012, SYR.D0220.040.022-023; Appointment Order issued by the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 18 December 2011, SYR.D0220.041.012.

⁵⁵ Legislative Decree No. 19 of 2012, SYR.D0019.040.002.

⁵⁶ Legislative Decree No. 35 of 2011, SYR.A0472.060.

⁵⁷ Legislative Decree No. 35 of 2011, SYR.A0472.060.

⁵⁸ Circular Concerning the Use of Personal Mobile Devices, 11 April 2012, SYR.D0220.033.017; Circular Concerning the Use of Personal Mobile Devices, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.039.003.

⁵⁹ Order Declaring a Military Holiday on the Occasion of Easter, 8 April 2012, SYR.D0179.015.042; Order Declaring a Military Holiday on the Occasion of Christmas, 25 December 2012, SYR.D0020.081.003.

⁶⁰ Administrative Order, 21 October 2012, SYR.D0197.057.002 (regarding the arming of civilians).

⁶¹ Legislative Decree No. 31 of 2012, SYR.D0104.158.002; Legislative Decree No. 47 of 2012, SYR.D0019.044.007.

⁶² Circulars appear to be the common format for the distribution of orders from the General Command. Although circulars were not expressly termed as “orders”, commanders and military personnel were to strictly abide by their content, otherwise, they were to be referred to Military Justice (see Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147). General Command was prolific in its distribution of circulars and those covered many subject areas. For example, there are circulars relating to security and safety (See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0180.028.016), deployment of forces (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 25 July 2011, SYR.D0208.062.008), handling of documents and confidential information (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 July 2011, SYR.D0018.071.005), and selection of personnel for security missions (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0021.009.001; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147).

⁶³ Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.001.

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appointments,⁶⁴ promotions,⁶⁵ and an instruction relating to procedures for the provision of weapons for the protection of State buildings.⁶⁶ Officers were required to read a work by the President titled “Quality in Military Practice”.⁶⁷

Deputy Commander

The Deputy Commander was directly subordinate to the President.⁶⁸ He was the most senior officer in the General Command⁶⁹ and concurrently held the position of Minister of Defence.⁷⁰ Documents signed by the Deputy Commander, bearing his signature block and disseminated to subordinate formations and units, indicate that he was the most important operational military officer in the General Command.⁷¹ Pursuant to the Military Service Law, the Deputy Commander was also a

⁶⁴ See e.g. Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 17 September 2012, SYR.D0181.031.019 (appointing Major General Mahmoud Al-Qawzi as Head of the Idleb Military and Security Committee).

⁶⁵ See e.g. Administrative Order, 11 January 2012, SYR.D0220.033.028-031.

⁶⁶ Administrative Order, 21 October 2012, SYR.D0197.057.002.

⁶⁷ See Part Three: Combat Training Tasks, undated, SYR.D0235.005.022. The work written by Al-Assad referenced in that document is not available in the CIJA’s collection.

⁶⁸ Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129 (showing the President was appointing the Deputy Commander).

⁶⁹ See e.g. Telegram from Operations Commission, SYR.D0067.003.048 (signed by the Deputy Commander, stating that the Deputy Commander had the power to order the mobilisation of armed forces including Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the Corps, Special Forces, the Military Police, the Regional Commands, the Naval Forces Command and Air Defence); Circular from the Operations Commission, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (signed by the Deputy Commander, ordering that any emergency incidents to be immediately reported to the Operations Commission. This order was given to all “heads of commissions, sections and administrations as well as commanders of forces, troops, legions, formations and units”); Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007 (signed by the Deputy Commander, giving orders to “all commanders of all levels”. This copy of the circular was disseminated not just to the army but also the security agencies, the academies and the military police, at least within the area of responsibility of the Command of the Northern Region); Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010 (demonstrating that information requiring a decision went from the proposing body to a Deputy Chief of Staff, through the Chief of Staff and on to the Deputy Commander).

⁷⁰ Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129 (this document shows that the person appointed to be Deputy Commander on that day was also appointed to be Minister of Defence). Circulars sent by the Deputy Commander were often signed as “Deputy Commander of the Army and Armed Forces – Minister of Defence”. See e.g. Circular, 28 February 2011, SYR.D0014.004.001 (signed by *Imad* Ali Habib Mahmoud); Circular from the Operations Commission, SYR.D0021.008.015-016 (signed by *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha); Circular, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.014 (signed by *Imad* Fahd Jasem Al-Frej).

⁷¹ See e.g. Information Card from the Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 1 November 2011, SYR.D0184.031.003; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 16 April 2012, SYR.D0183.029.011 (these documents demonstrate that information requiring a decision went from the proposing body to a Deputy Chief of Staff, through the Chief of Staff and on to the Deputy Commander).

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member of the Committee of Officers and the Military Defence Council.⁷² The Deputy Commander had his own Bureau or Office that disseminated instructions on his behalf.⁷³

The Deputy Commander had control over the entire Army and Armed Forces, subject only to the authority of the President.⁷⁴ The sole exceptions were the Military Intelligence Department and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate which were formally under the General Command, but, in operational terms, primarily reported to the NSB/CCMC and had their own chains of command.

a. Personnel

In February 2011, the Deputy Commander was *Imad* Ali Habib Mahmoud.⁷⁵ He held this position from at least 31 October 2009.⁷⁶

On 8 August 2011, Mahmoud was replaced by *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha (“Rajiha”)⁷⁷ who had previously served as Chief of Staff.⁷⁸ Rajiha held the position of Deputy Commander from August 2011 until 18 July 2012, when he was killed in the bombing of the NSB headquarters in

⁷² Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2003, Military Service Law, Arts 2 and 13.

⁷³ See e.g. Report from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 14 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.037; Instruction from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 21 October 2011, SYR.D0224.010.001-002 (enclosing a letter of the NSB dated 20 October 2011).

⁷⁴ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (signed by the Deputy Commander, ordering that any emergency incidents be immediately reported to the Operations Commission. This order was given to all “heads of commissions, sections and administrations as well as commanders of forces, troops, legions, formations and units”); Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007 (signed by Deputy Commander, giving orders to “all commanders of all levels”). However, there were certain orders the Deputy Commander appears only able to give when authorised by the President, such as appointments. See e.g. Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

⁷⁵ See e.g. Circular, 28 February 2011, SYR.D0014.004.001 (signed by *Imad* Ali Habib Mahmoud as Deputy Commander).

⁷⁶ Circular from the Political Administration, 31 October 2009, SYR.D0238.007.001-003, at SYR.D0238.007.003.

⁷⁷ The earliest documentary reference to Rajiha as Minister of Defence currently identified in CIJA documentation is from 21 August 2011 (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 August 2011, SYR.D0071.026.009). The last currently identified reference to *Imad* Ali Muhammad Habib Mahmoud in that position in the CIJA documentation is from 24 July 2011 (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 24 July 2011, SYR.D0020.075.055). See also Reuters, “Syria’s Assad replaces Defence Minister”, 8 August 2011, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-assad-minister/syrias-assad-replaces-defense-minister-idUSTRE7773KX20110808>, (retrieved on 7 March 2019).

⁷⁸ See e.g. Interrogative Investigation Order, 9 June 2011, SYR.D0017.026.001-002 (This document has the signature block of the President and Rajiha as Chief of Staff).

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Damascus.⁷⁹ Following Rajiha's death, the incumbent Chief of Staff, *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej* ("Al-Frej"), was appointed as the new Deputy Commander.⁸⁰

b. Functions

The Deputy Commander routinely disseminated orders through the chain of command.⁸¹ These came in the form of circulars, instructions, and orders.

Some circulars gave general instructions on operational issues. For example, a few days after Al-Frej was appointed, he disseminated a circular calling on commanders at all levels to set up ambushes on roads and routes near vital targets, to shift from a state of self-defence to a "state of action", to attack saboteurs and raid "their dens wherever they are, destroy them and restore the situation to its past state with the utmost speed and urgency".⁸² Further examples include circulars referring to an array of security measures to be taken,⁸³ as well as instructions relating to artillery fire⁸⁴ and the activities of the armed opposition.⁸⁵

Other circulars were more specific on matters of operational procedures. For example, in January 2012, Deputy Commander Rajiha issued a circular ordering that all "emergency incidents" be immediately reported to the General Command with a detailed follow-up report.⁸⁶ His successor, Al-Frej, issued a similar instruction in October 2012.⁸⁷ Other examples relate to informing the General Command in all cases where soldiers were killed,⁸⁸ the protection of equipment,⁸⁹

⁷⁹ Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), "Ministry of Information: News and Photos Broadcast on Terrorist Bombing at National Security HQ", 18 July 2012, SYR.E0009.001.001. *See also* Weekly Political Bulletin from the Political Directorate of the Army and Armed Forces, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0210.022.008-009.

⁸⁰ Presidential Decree No. 275, 18 July 2012, SYR.D0064.020.129.

⁸¹ *See e.g.* Circular, 28 February 2011, SYR.D0014.004.001 (signed by *Imad Ali Habib Mahmoud*); Circular from the Operations Commission, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (signed by *Imad Daoud Abdullah Rajiha*); Circular, 3 October 2012, SYR.D0067.003.004 (signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*).

⁸² Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007 (signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*).

⁸³ *See e.g.* Circular from the Operations Commission, SYR.D0021.008.015-016 (listing a series of security related measures that had been addressed in previously issued Circulars, reinforcing their need to be implemented signed by *Imad Daoud Abdullah Rajiha*).

⁸⁴ Circular, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.014 (signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*).

⁸⁵ *See e.g.* Circular, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.002 (signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*).

⁸⁶ Circular from the Operations Commission, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (signed by *Imad Daoud Abdullah Rajiha*).

⁸⁷ Circular, 3 October 2012, SYR.D0067.003.004 (signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*).

⁸⁸ Circular, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0018.071.008 (signed by *Imad Daoud Abdullah Rajiha*); Circular Organisation and Administration Department, 26 December 2012, SYR.D0064.020.025.

⁸⁹ *See e.g.* Circular, 28 February 2011, SYR.D0014.004.001 (signed by *Imad Ali Habib Mahmoud*).

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regulations regarding the military's relationship with civilians⁹⁰ and the activities of private companies.⁹¹

Aside from circulars, the Deputy Commander also sent telegrams and other written communications to issue operational instructions. For example, in March 2011, he ordered the full mobilisation of numerous units, security agencies and commands “as of 18 March 2011 until further notice”.⁹² On 29 May 2011, the Deputy Commander issued an instruction to a Deputy Chief of Staff to pass instructions to all units to abide by a set of procedures during the search for wanted members of “armed gangs”. These procedures included a prohibition on firing randomly, only firing on armed gangs that fired on the army, taking strict measures to prevent killing and bloodshed during missions, forbidding the mistreatment of civilians (especially women and children), and preventing looting and theft. In the case of “an infringement”, or if there were any complaints, “an investigation committee” was to be set up immediately to investigate the abuse and hold the offenders responsible.⁹³ Other examples of the Deputy Commander dealing with tactical-level operational issues include measures to be taken to avoid ambushes on armoured vehicles,⁹⁴ dealing with defectors,⁹⁵ issuing instructions forbidding the firing of anti-tank missiles except at select target types,⁹⁶ intensifying camouflage procedures,⁹⁷ improving security measures,⁹⁸ operating armed patrols on highways,⁹⁹ and issuing instructions on the protection of personnel travelling on the Hama-Aleppo road.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁰ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.001-002.

⁹¹ See e.g. Circular, 13 September 2011, SYR.D0021.018.004 (signed by *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha).

⁹² Telegram from the Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048 (signed by the Deputy Commander).

⁹³ Instruction from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 29 May 2011, SYR.D0220.002.001. It should be noted that the only investigation committee thus far seen in documentary evidence was set up in May 2011 to investigate whether a checkpoint around Hrak had allowed civilian vehicles to pass. A full investigation was conducted, with punishment being dispensed. See Presentation Memorandum issued by the 9th Armoured Division, 2011, SYR.D0208.007.013-014.

⁹⁴ Circular, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0124.028.004 (signed by *Imad* Fahd Jasem Al-Freij).

⁹⁵ Cover letter from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 25 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.030.

⁹⁶ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 November 2013, SYR.D0190.081.025 (pursuant to the “guidance” of the Deputy Commander/Minister of Defence).

⁹⁷ Instruction from the Operations Commission, 23 August 2012, SYR.D0065.023.049.

⁹⁸ Circular, 22 January 2012, SYR.D0021.008.004-005.

⁹⁹ Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0021.020.021-022.

¹⁰⁰ Instruction from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0021.008.021 (following a decision of the Minister of Defence).

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The Deputy Commander also issued a variety of administrative orders, including orders relating to the punishment of soldiers¹⁰¹ and instructions relating to logistical and security support.¹⁰²

The Deputy Commander was a member of the CCMC. His tasks at CCMC meetings included presenting “a review of the military aspects of the security situation in the country”¹⁰³ and briefing the CCMC on his views.¹⁰⁴ While the Deputy Commander was a member of the CCMC, he was also subordinate to it and could be tasked by it. For example, during a session of 18 July 2011, the CCMC adopted Decision 3417, which stipulated the following:

1. Re-group all formations and units of the armed forces carrying out their tasks to restore the authority of the State in some of the governorates in areas suitable for any subsequent tasks which the aforementioned formations and units are likely to be assigned.
2. Examine and improve the financial situation and the living conditions, and take measures to boost the morale of the elements of those formations and units.
3. Reorganise and carry out training plans for the elements of those formations and units in accordance with the execution of tasks assigned.
4. Examine the material and living situation of the elements manning checkpoints, boost their morale, relieve them periodically and train them in accordance with the execution of tasks assigned.
5. This decision shall be communicated to all competent bodies for implementation.¹⁰⁵

While other members of the CCMC were sent the decision with the instruction to “be informed”, the Deputy Commander was told to “be informed and take the necessary measures”.¹⁰⁶ Six days later, the Deputy Commander disseminated a circular using language similar to the instruction above:

1. Consider re-grouping formations and units in areas that suit the subsequent missions which may be assigned to such formations and units in accordance with the instructions of the General Command,

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Administrative Order, 24 December 2011, SYR.D0220.041.005.

¹⁰² See e.g. Instruction by the Operations Commission, 6 September 2012, SYR.D0220.009.015 (dealing with military assistance in the transportation of fuel to power plants). See also Instruction to the Commanders of the Regions and Heads of Military and Security Committees, 11 July 2013, SYR.D0179.019.077 (regarding support to the transportation of food and other supplies in the governorates).

¹⁰³ Agenda for the CCMC meeting scheduled for 17 November 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.014.015.

¹⁰⁴ Agenda for the CCMC meeting scheduled for 14 December 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.014.020.

¹⁰⁵ Decision of the CCMC No. 3417, 19 July 2011, SYR.E0001.017.004.

¹⁰⁶ Decision of the CCMC No. 3417, 19 July 2011, SYR.E0001.017.004.

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which will be issued in that time, and send the re-grouping proposals to the General Command, while taking into consideration maintaining the security conditions in the areas of deployment.

2. Re-organise and re-implement training plans of formations and units in a manner that suits carrying out the tasks assigned to them, in addition to re-positioning such formations and units.¹⁰⁷

The CCMC further tasked the Deputy Commander on 21 November 2011 to propose appropriate commanders to take control of operations in “hot governorates: Idleb, Hama, Homs, etc.”¹⁰⁸ On 23 November 2011, the CCMC commissioned the Deputy Commander to issue special orders appointing the commanders.¹⁰⁹ Three days later, with the authority of the President, the Deputy Commander issued an order appointing Major General Fuad Hammouda (then Commander of the Special Forces) to command all security forces in Idleb Governorate.¹¹⁰ Similar appointments were made in Homs and Hama governorates.¹¹¹ The Deputy Commander continued to be tasked by the CCMC until the bombing of the NSB building on 18 July 2012.¹¹² There is no reference to any body with similar powers to the CCMC being created after the bombing.

Chief of Staff

The Chief of Staff was directly subordinate to the Deputy Commander in the General Command.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ Circular, 24 July 2011, SYR.D0018.071.001 (also referencing the financial and living conditions for soldiers at checkpoints and married soldiers).

¹⁰⁸ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 21 November 2011, 22 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.074-076.

¹⁰⁹ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 23 November 2011, 24 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.110-111 (high-resolution copy SYR.E0013.002.058-059).

¹¹⁰ Administrative Order from the Deputy Commander, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

¹¹¹ The CIJA does not have the appointment orders of the Military and Security Chiefs in Homs or Hama, but believe that in these governorates, as in Idleb, the appointed Military and Security Chiefs had command and control over the military and security forces, as well as the political bodies through appointment as head of the Security Committee. *See e.g.* Report from General Intelligence Branch 318 to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Homs Governorate Security and Military Official, 13 March 2012, SYR.D0124.027.005 (indicating that there was a Military and Security Chief in Homs by March 2012); Report from the Joint Investigation Committee to the Security and Military Official in Hama, 2012, SYR.E0002.001.001 (demonstrating that at some point after October 2012, there was a Military and Security Chief in Hama).

¹¹² *See e.g.* Letter from the CCMC, January 2012, SYR.E0001.020.004 (note that this letter went to the Office of the Deputy Commander); Instruction from the Head of the CCMC, 2 February 2012, SYR.E0001.020.001 (note that this letter went to the Deputy Commander).

¹¹³ *See e.g.* Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 1 November 2011, SYR.D0184.031.003. These documents demonstrate that information requiring a decision went from the proposing body to a Deputy Chief of Staff, through the Chief of Staff and on to the Deputy Commander.

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a. Personnel

By August 2009, *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha was the Chief of Staff.¹¹⁴ By 22 August 2011 *Imad* Fahd Jasem Al-Frej held the post, following Rajiha's promotion to Deputy Commander and Minister of Defence.¹¹⁵

After Al-Frej's appointment as Deputy Commander in July 2012, *Imad* Ali Abdullah Ayoub ("Ayoub") replaced him as Chief of Staff, assuming the position no later than 25 July 2012.¹¹⁶ Prior to becoming the Chief of Staff Ayoub had been a Deputy Chief of Staff.¹¹⁷ Ayoub retained the position of Chief of Staff until 1 January 2018, when he became Deputy Commander and Minister of Defence.¹¹⁸

The Chief of Staff had his own inner office, with an officer as "Head of the Office of the Chief of Staff".¹¹⁹ In late 2010, this position was occupied by Staff Brigadier General Adnan Mahraz Abdu.¹²⁰ Colonel Mahmoud Ali Nizam held this position by early 2012,¹²¹ and was replaced by Major Jadaan Mahmoud Dali by 16 September 2012.¹²²

b. Functions and Powers

The Chief of Staff issued orders using "circulars", "instructions" and "administrative orders" in a manner similar to the Deputy Commander and sometimes dealing with the same content. For example, on at least one occasion, both the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff disseminated

¹¹⁴ Administrative Order from the Organisation and Administration Department, 8 August 2009, SYR.D0037.065.003; Interrogative Investigation Order, 18 May 2011, SYR.D0017.026.001-002, at SYR.D0017.026.002.

¹¹⁵ Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 22 August 2011, SYR.D0017.027.001 (dealing with the punishment of an officer and signed by "Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej, Chief of General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces").

¹¹⁶ Administrative Order, 25 August 2012, SYR.D0220.038.028.

¹¹⁷ Appointment Order Issued by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008.

¹¹⁸ Reuters, "Syria's Assad Names New Defense and Other Ministers: State TV", 1 January 2018, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-government/syrias-assad-names-new-defense-and-other-ministers-state-tv-idUSKBN1EQ11R> (retrieved on 16 July 2018).

¹¹⁹ See e.g. Letter from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 11 November 2010, SYR.D0020.035.013 (signed by the Head of the Office of the Chief of Staff, referencing a decision of the Chief of Staff).

¹²⁰ Letter from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 11 November 2010, SYR.D0020.035.013.

¹²¹ Letter from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 18 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003.

¹²² Instruction from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 16 September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.002.

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circulars on the same day dealing with the same subject, in almost identical language.¹²³ As with many other circulars, the one disseminated by the Chief of Staff was signed solely by him, and not explicitly on behalf of anyone else.¹²⁴

Many circulars signed by the Chief of Staff provided general instructions in relation to security-related matters. For example, in early February 2012, the Chief of Staff disseminated a circular instructing that measures be implemented in response to the activities of armed groups, including guarding fixed installations and the operation of armed patrols on highways and roads.¹²⁵ Other examples include circulars relating to information and document security,¹²⁶ security measures against “suspicious” military personnel,¹²⁷ the security of roadblocks and checkpoints,¹²⁸ the treatment of civilians,¹²⁹ the guarding of camps, weapons depots and isolated locations,¹³⁰ and checking for explosives placed on vehicles.¹³¹

The Chief of Staff responded to specific security-related problems through direct instructions as well as through circulars. For example, on 12 September 2012, a letter was sent to the Chief of Staff soliciting a decision from him concerning the security situation of a production facility in Aleppo which was coming under attack, with a request that nearby units secure the area. A staff department of the General Command sent the letter for review to a Deputy Chief of Staff, who offered an “opinion”. The letter and “opinion” were then sent to the Chief of Staff who, agreeing with the Deputy Chief of Staff, issued his “decision” instructing the Head of the Security

¹²³ Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 February 2012, SYR.D0070.011.062 (signed on behalf of the Deputy Commander); Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 February 2012, SYR.D0020.053.019 (signed on behalf of the Chief of Staff).

¹²⁴ Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 February 2012, SYR.D0020.053.019. *See also* Circular, 5 June 2012, SYR.D0020.117.008; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147; Circular, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0021.009.003; Instruction from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 16 September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.002; Communication from the Aleppo Security Committee, 16 September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.001 (attaching the Chief of Staff instruction and its annexes).

¹²⁵ Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0021.020.021-022 (signed by the Chief of Staff, Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Freij).

¹²⁶ Circular from the Code and Document Security Branch of the General Command, 5 July 2011, SYR.D0015.039.001-002; Circular from the Code and Document Security Branch of the General Command, 5 June 2012, SYR.D0020.117.008.

¹²⁷ Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147.

¹²⁸ Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0021.009.003.

¹²⁹ Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 February 2012, SYR.D0020.053.019.

¹³⁰ Circular from the Operations Commission, 3 November 2011, SYR.D0021.009.010; Circular from the Operations Commission, 16 January 2012, SYR.D0220.034.017.

¹³¹ Circular, 23 April 2012, SYR.D0124.028.001.

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Committee in Aleppo to coordinate the guarding and defending of the facility.¹³² The instruction was disseminated for implementation.¹³³

The Chief of Staff also engaged more directly in operational issues. For example, on 21 December 2011, the Command of the Northern Region issued an instruction establishing a military force consisting of regular army units, members of Military Intelligence Branch 290 in Aleppo, and the civilian police, and tasking them with guarding and protecting the Aleppo-Saraqab international road.¹³⁴ These Command of the Northern Region instructions were made pursuant to a NSB decision and “on the verbal approval of Mr. *Imad*, Chief of Staff of the Army and Armed Forces”.¹³⁵ A further example from January 2012 shows the Chief of Staff approving the establishment of checkpoints and issuing orders that supplies be sent to the units establishing the checkpoints.¹³⁶ The Chief of Staff also issued an instruction on at least one occasion relating to operational artillery matters.¹³⁷

Alongside the Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff also appeared to have had a role in enforcing discipline. For example, on 25 January 2012, he handed down a twenty-day punishment to an officer by administrative order.¹³⁸

The Chief of Staff had the power to authorise subordinate officers to sign documents on his behalf.¹³⁹

¹³² Memorandum of Proposal issued by the Planning Training and Statistics Department of the Production Projects Administration, 12 September, SYR.D0015.048.003-004.

¹³³ Communication from the Aleppo Security Committee, 16 September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.001 (attaching the Chief of Staff instruction and its annexes).

¹³⁴ Instruction from the Command of the Northern Region, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0012.007.003-004.

¹³⁵ Instruction from the Command of the Northern Region, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0012.007.003-004.

¹³⁶ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005, at SYR.D0018.021.005.

¹³⁷ Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014.

¹³⁸ Administrative Order, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.002.005 (dealing with the punishment of a junior officer for stealing a weapon, inciting defection from the army and disobeying instructions. This order was signed by *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Freij*).

¹³⁹ See e.g. Transfer order No. 165 from the Organisation and Administration Department, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0017.089.051-052.

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Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Deputy Chiefs of Staff were immediately subordinate to the Chief of Staff.¹⁴⁰ There were three Deputy Chiefs of Staff. While not regular members of the CCMC, it appears that a Deputy Chief of Staff attended at least one meeting of the CCMC.¹⁴¹

a. Personnel

Upon the onset of hostilities in early 2011, the three Deputies were *Imad Assef Shawkat*, *Imad Munir Adanof* and *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej*.¹⁴² *Imad Munir Adanof* was replaced by Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub as Deputy Chief of Staff in August 2011.¹⁴³ Al-Frej remained in this position until he was promoted to Chief of Staff, a position which he had assumed by 22 August 2011.¹⁴⁴

In August and September 2011, as part of a reorganisation within the General Command, all three Deputy Chiefs of Staff were replaced: *Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej* was promoted to Chief of Staff,¹⁴⁵ *Imad Assef Shawkat* became Deputy Minister of Defence¹⁴⁶ and *Imad Munir Adanof* was removed.¹⁴⁷ The three new Deputy Chiefs of Staff were Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub,¹⁴⁸ Major General Ibrahim Ahmad Husein and Major General Talal Mustafa Tlas.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁰ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006 (giving supervisory tasks to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff).

¹⁴¹ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 April 2011, 23 April 2011, SYR.D0183.015.018-019, at SYR.D0183.015.019.

¹⁴² Military Thought, Magazine on Strategy and Tactics, Issued Bimonthly by the Political Administration of the Syrian Arab Army, September-October 2009 Issue, SYR.D0035.008.001-120, at SYR.D0035.008.003 (mentioning Shawkat, Adanof and Al-Frej). See also Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.577_AO, at p. 5 (referring to Adanof as Deputy Chief of Staff); SYR.WGA.627_AE, at p. 5 (referring to Adanof as Deputy Chief of Staff); Letter from the Office of the Chief of Staff, 11 November 2010, SYR.D020.035.013 (referencing Al-Frej as Deputy Chief of Staff in the distribution list).

¹⁴³ Appointment Order Issued by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008. See also Witness Interviews SYR.WHA.522_AE, at p. 5; SYR.WHA.563_AE, at p. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 22 August 2011, SYR.D0017.027.001 (dealing with the punishment of an officer and signed by "Imad Fahd Jasem Al-Frej, Chief of General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces").

¹⁴⁵ Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 22 August 2011, SYR.D0017.027.001.

¹⁴⁶ List issued by the CCMC, February 2012, SYR.E0001.020.005-013, at SYR.E0001.020.008 (including the names of "comrades" seconded to the Secretariat of the CCMC).

¹⁴⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.627_AE, at p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Appointment Order Issued by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008. Prior to being appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub was Commander of the 1st Corps. See Communication from the Governor of Dar'a, 12 May 2011, SYR.D0065.002.096.

¹⁴⁹ Appointment order, 27 September 2011, SYR.D0063.010.015 (appointing both Hussein and Tlas).

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By 15 September 2012, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were *Imad* Mahmoud Abdul Wahhab Shawwa, Major General Muwaffaq Muhammad Asad, and Major General Murshid Ali Dhaher.¹⁵⁰

b. Functions and Powers

The generic “powers and duties” of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were specified in a document dated 15 September 2012 and signed by the Chief of Staff.¹⁵¹ Each Deputy was assigned, “within the limits of the powers and obligations” of the Chief of Staff, to supervise the work of the various staff branches in the headquarters of the General Command as well as the branches (“boards” and “administrations”) in the subordinate military regions, formations and units, making them key links between the General Command and the subordinate headquarters. The areas of work were divided among the three deputies as follows:

Imad Mahmoud Abdul Wahhab Shawwa:

- Provisioning and Supply Board.
- General Drafting Directorate.
- Military Records Administration.
- General Mobilisation Administration.
- Production Projects Administration.
- Signal Administration.
- University Training Administration.

And relevant to the expansion of the work of the Board and administrations in districts, formations and units.

Major General Muwaffaq Muhammad Asaad

- Operations Board.
- Training Board.
- Standardisation Administration.
- Cyberwar Administration.
- Automatisation Administration.
- Code and Document Security Branch.

And relevant to the expansion of the work of the boards, administrations and the Code and Document Security Branch in districts, formations and units.

Major General Murshid Ali Dhaher

- Artillery forces and missiles.
- Reconnaissance Administration.
- Armament Administration.

¹⁵⁰ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

¹⁵¹ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

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- Vehicle Administration.
- Chemical Warfare Administration.
- Engineers Administration.
- Headquarters.

And relevant to the expansion of the work of the forces, administrations and headquarters in districts, formations and units.¹⁵²

This instruction also stated that Deputy Chiefs of Staff might be assigned other “missions”.¹⁵³ Although the document does not specify what those “missions” might be, Deputy Chiefs of Staff were sometimes dispatched to the field, especially during significant periods of tension or for specific security incidents.

While the document is dated September 2012, it appears that a similar system existed prior to 2012. For example, in April 2011, *Imad Munir Adanof* was sent to Homs Governorate due to the deteriorating security situation there, and he operated briefly as a senior military figure working closely with the Homs Security Committee.¹⁵⁴ A CCMC report of 19 April 2011, on the same day a number of demonstrators were killed when a sit-in at the clock tower square in central Homs was violently broken up, stated:

The Security Committee gathered with Comrades Dr. Yaser Houriya, member of the Regional Command, and *Imad Munir Adanof* at 11:30. It was stressed that gatherings in public squares (the old and new clock locations – the square of Khaled bin al-Walid mosque) are not allowed. The abidance of not shooting any protesters unless in self-defence was also stressed.¹⁵⁵

Similarly, *Imad Jasem Al-Frej* was dispatched in early June 2011 to Jisr-Ash-Shugur in Idleb in response to unrest in the town that resulted in several deaths.¹⁵⁶ *Imad Jasem Al-Frej* headed the

¹⁵² Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

¹⁵³ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

¹⁵⁴ CCMC reports on the security situation in the country until 19 April 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.129-133, at SYR.E0001.006.131. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.577_AO, at p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ CCMC reports on the security situation in the country until 19 April 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.129-133, at SYR.E0001.006.131. On 1 May, Adanof met representatives from Ar-Rastan (twenty-five kilometres north of Homs) regarding an incident on 29 April 2011 in which a number of people had been killed, discussing proposals to release the wounded, pay blood money regarding victims, offer condolences and hold dialogue with prominent figures when the situation calmed. *See* CCMC reports on the security situation in the country on 19 April 2011, SYR.E0001.006.194-199 and 1 May 2011, SYR.E0001.006.014-016.

¹⁵⁶ Report from the Idleb Police Command, 11 July 2011, SYR.D0178.001.029-030; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 4 June 2011, SYR.D0186.083.003-005; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 6 June 2011, SYR.D0186.082.007-010; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 6 June 2011, SYR.D0186.082.016-026; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 30 June 2011, SYR.D0183.062.001; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 24 June 2011, SYR.D0183.062.015; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 22 June 2011, SYR.D0179.001.087. *See also* CCMC report on the security situation in

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“Military Committee”, established as a response to the events, from its inception in June 2011 until at least 31 July 2011.¹⁵⁷ It is likely that he was then recalled to Damascus amid a reshuffle within the senior ranks of the Army and Armed Forces in August 2011, which included *Imad* Jasem Al-Frej’s promotion to Chief of Staff.¹⁵⁸

It appears that Deputy Chief of Staff *Imad* Ali Ayoub was similarly dispatched to Homs around late 2011, where he became concurrently the Homs Military and Security Official until April 2012.¹⁵⁹

The General Command Operated an Effective Command Structure

The senior officers within the General Command were part of an effective chain of command. A clear indication of this was the process by which orders, instructions, circulars and other reports were disseminated down the chain of command to subordinate formations and units without alteration. The original written instruction itself (with the stamp of the General Command and the signature of the appropriate senior officer) would simply be passed on by the subordinate unit along with its own stamp, signature and annotation. Handwritten annotations would invariably include comments from subordinate commanders instructing their units and formations to be informed, disseminate further, and take action. This process, of passing on the unaltered original instruction, would be repeated down the chain to low levels. For example, on 20 October 2011, the NSB sent a report to the Deputy Commander on the findings based on the monitoring and

Idleb, 22 June 2011, SYR.E0001.008.058-059, at SYR.E0001.008.059 (mentioning attacks on army positions in Khan Sheikhou); CCMC report on the security situation in Idleb, 25 June 2011, SYR.E0001.008.072 (mentioning attacks on Army positions in al-Maraat).

¹⁵⁷ See e.g. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 13 June 2011, SYR.D0186.096.013-016 (mentioning information passed on to Al-Frej); Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 21 June 2011, SYR.D0183.062.022. The latest dated reference available in the CIJA’s collection referencing Al-Frej as the Head of the Military (or Military Security) Committee in Idleb is dated 31 July 2011 (See Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 31 July 2011, SYR.D0183.057.009 (requesting that a named Corporal be sent to the Branch as they have an arrested individual in a case).

¹⁵⁸ Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 22 August 2011, SYR.D0017.027.001. The earliest reference to Rajiha as Deputy Commander is dated 21 August 2011 (See Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 August 2011, SYR.D0071.026.009).

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. Report from General Intelligence Directorate Branch 318, 13 March 2012, SYR.D0124.027.005 (although it does not mention Ayoub by name, the report is addressed to “*Imad* Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces – Homs Governorate Security and Military Official”). See also Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.632_ET, at p. 8; SYR.WHA.527_AE, at p. 7 (indicating that Ayoub was in early 2012 located at the headquarters of the 18th Division which was attacking Homs)

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tracking of communications of “armed terrorist groups”.¹⁶⁰ The dissemination process, and the chain of command, can be identified through the signatures on the lower section of the document. An annotation on the report by the Deputy Commander indicates that the Commander of the Eastern Region, the Commander of the Special Forces, the Commander of the 1st Corps and the Commander of the 18th Division were to “take the necessary action and necessary precautions” based on the NSB report.¹⁶¹ The following day, the report was sent from the Office of the Deputy Commander to these military formations and commanders with a cover letter.¹⁶²

As a further example, on 2 February 2012, the Deputy Commander disseminated a circular¹⁶³ through the Operations Commission of the General Command.¹⁶⁴ It was signed by the Commander of the 1st Corps, and then passed on to the Commander of the 9th Armoured Division who, on 12 February 2012, instructed that all formations under his command were “to be informed and abide by the content of the circular, at the personal responsibility of [the] commander”. On 17 February 2012, the Commander of the 52nd Mechanised Brigade signed the circular instructing that it be circulated to all units and formations of the Brigade.¹⁶⁵

On 9 December 2012, the Operations Branch of the Artillery and Missiles Forces – a branch of a staff department of the General Command – disseminated a circular strictly prohibiting the firing of BM-21 (a multi-barrelled rocket launcher) rockets unless in “extreme necessity” and “upon the command of corps commanders”.¹⁶⁶ This circular was signed by the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces and authorised by the Deputy Commander. The circular was to be disseminated to all Heads of Artillery within the corps and divisions of the army with the express instruction to abide by its content. The signature chain on this document indicates that it was indeed disseminated from the General Command to the 1st Corps, to the divisions and an independent

¹⁶⁰ Report from the Head of the NSB, 20 October 2011, SYR.D0224.010.002.

¹⁶¹ Report from the Head of the NSB, 20 October 2011, SYR.D0224.010.002.

¹⁶² Cover letter from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 21 October 2011, SYR.D0224.010.001.

¹⁶³ Circulars generally contained wide-ranging instructions from a senior officer in the General Command. They could be issued through any of the staff departments. There were two types of circular; one addressed to all personnel, and one addressed to officers only.

¹⁶⁴ Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.009.

¹⁶⁵ Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.009.

¹⁶⁶ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.006-007.

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regiment of that corps, including the 9th Division, and on to the artillery units within its subordinate brigades and regiments.

Annotations on many of the circulars were used to indicate in a variety of language that the Deputy Commander expected subordinates to follow his instructions. This language ranged from the moderate¹⁶⁷ to the emphatic.¹⁶⁸ Irrespective of the language used, it was clear that he expected the circulars to be followed verbatim by subordinates.¹⁶⁹ Some circulars specifically refer to the consequences for non-compliance.¹⁷⁰ Some also indicated that such circulars were to be read out by commanders, with the failure to implement them leading to punishment.¹⁷¹

Specific operational decisions relating to firing artillery also demonstrate decisions taken at senior levels being disseminated down the chain of command. For example, on 17 June 2012, Military Intelligence sent information to the Homs Military and Security Official regarding the location of 150 to 200 opposition fighters.¹⁷² Military Intelligence proposed “impacting them with artillery or aircraft”, and the Homs Military and Security Official agreed, ordering his subordinates to “act accordingly”.¹⁷³ A second example from 26 June 2012 is more explicit. Military Intelligence sent information to the Homs Military and Security Official about various locations of opposition fighters or factories.¹⁷⁴ By 28 June 2012, the Homs Military and Security Official had ordered the Commander of the Ar-Rastan sector to verify the locations and shell them with artillery.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁷ See e.g. Circular from the Officers’ Affairs Administration, 18 August 2012, SYR.D0065.002.013 (signed by *Imad* Fahd Jasem Al-Frej, dealing with the procedures to be followed in relation to injured officers and soldiers. The Officer’s Affairs Administration had not been kept informed in some cases. Specific personal details were to be provided. The circular was annotated “The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces looks forward to full compliance of implementation of the contents of this circular”).

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.001-002.

¹⁶⁹ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 5 November 2011, SYR.D0069.001.041-042.

¹⁷⁰ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.001-002 (noting that “all incompliance will result in penalties”).

¹⁷¹ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, SYR.D0021.008.015-016 (listing a series of security related measures that had been addressed in previously issued Circulars, reinforcing their need to be implemented signed by *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha); Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.009; Circular, 13 September 2011, SYR.D0021.018.004 (signed by *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha).

¹⁷² Communication between Military Intelligence Branch 261 to the Homs Military and Security Chief, 17 June 2012, SYR.D0124.017.002.

¹⁷³ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261 to the Homs Military and Security Chief, 17 June 2012, SYR.D0124.017.002.

¹⁷⁴ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0124.008.004.

¹⁷⁵ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0124.008.004.

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A third example is dated the next day, 27 June 2012. Military Intelligence Branch 261 in Homs sent information to the Homs Military and Security Official that a building was being used to house dissident officers and as a field hospital.¹⁷⁶ On 30 June 2012, the Homs Military and Security Official ordered the “commander of the Ar-Rastan sector” to “strike with artillery immediately”.¹⁷⁷

This was not confined to Homs. For example, on 6 April 2013, Military Intelligence Branch 265 in Dar’a sent information to the Commander of the 1st Corps (who was concurrently the Head of the Dar’a Security Committee) regarding the location of armed men in Dar’a. The Commander of the 1st Corps ordered the Commander of the 15th Division to verify the activity and use “fire effect on any reconnoitered target”.¹⁷⁸ On 25 April 2013, the Political Security Branch in Dar’a sent information to the Commander of the 1st Corps regarding the location of opposition fighters.¹⁷⁹ While it recommended only circulating the information, the 1st Corps Commander ordered the 5th Division Commander to verify the information and bomb the locations using artillery.¹⁸⁰

In another example, on 19 November 2012, the Political Security Branch in Dar’a sent information to the 1st Corps Commander regarding the equipping of a field hospital using foreign funding. While the 1st Corps Commander only signed and circulated the information, it appeared that the Commander of the 9th Division ordered the 52nd Brigade Commander to “identify the location and deal with them with full force and strictness”; the 52nd Brigade Commander then ordered the artillery to “verify and act accordingly”.¹⁸¹

Prima facie illegal orders were disseminated on at least one occasion in the same way as other orders. On 27 February 2014, after receiving intelligence from Air Force Intelligence that “approximately 150 wounded terrorists arrived at a field hospital”, the Chief of Staff recommended “follow-up and fire effect by the Commander of the 1st Corps [...] on the armed individuals’ field hospitals wherever they are”, an opinion that was approved and signed by the Deputy Commander.

¹⁷⁶ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.013.002.

¹⁷⁷ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.013.002 (the order was handwritten at the bottom of the document).

¹⁷⁸ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 265, 6 April 2013, SYR.D0224.007.024.

¹⁷⁹ Communication from Dar’a Political Security Branch, 25 April 2013, SYR.D0217.013.012.

¹⁸⁰ Communication from Dar’a Political Security Branch, 25 April 2013, SYR.D0217.013.012.

¹⁸¹ Communication from Dar’a Political Security Branch, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0208.013.021.

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This *prima facie* illegal order was disseminated to the 1st Corps Commander “to the commanders of formations and heads of security agencies”, and further disseminated by subordinate units.¹⁸²

The Chain of Command Operated Swiftly

Army and Armed Forces communications infrastructure permitted the swift dissemination of orders. For example, a memorandum from Air Force Intelligence regarding wounded “terrorists” was sent on 27 February 2014. It was disseminated to the 1st Corps Commander through the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Commander, who annotated their illegal order to attack terrorists at field hospitals “wherever they are”. It was then circulated down to subordinate units on the same day.¹⁸³

A further example appears in a ledger of the 52nd Mechanised Brigade (part of the 9th Armoured Division, 1st Corps), which notes that circulars from the Operations Commission (through the 9th Division) were received by the Brigade.¹⁸⁴ One of the entries on 22 February 2012 notes that the 52nd Brigade received information from the “Minister of Defence” regarding alleged French intelligence operations. The information had been sent around by circular on 21 February 2012. This demonstrates that the 52nd Brigade, some three steps removed from the Deputy Commander, received his circular the day after he issued it.¹⁸⁵

Information and Proposals were sent up the Chain of Command for Decisions

Subordinate officers would report information, request instructions, and send proposals to senior officers, who would then issue decisions to be carried out. For example, on 17 January 2012, the Acting Commander of the Northern Region dispatched a memorandum to the Chief of Staff which recommended establishing three checkpoints in and around the village of Atarib, west of Aleppo, based on information received from Military Intelligence. He also requested the allocation of men, armoured vehicles and resources for their functioning, including sandbags, night-vision goggles,

¹⁸² Memorandum, 27 February 2014, SYR.D0195.084.013 (including a recommendation from the Chief of Staff and a decision by the Deputy Commander). *See also* Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.013.002.

¹⁸³ Memorandum, 27 February 2014, SYR.D0195.084.013 (including a recommendation from the Chief of Staff and a decision by the Deputy Commander).

¹⁸⁴ *See e.g.* Signals register of the 52nd Mechanised Brigade from 30 January 2012, 30 January 2012 to 9 January 2013, SYR.D0217.020.001-106, at SYR.D0217.020.008 (22 February 2012), SYR.D0217.020.033 (31 May 2012), SYR.D0217.020.069 (21 September 2012). These appear to note information that has come from the General Command and sent down through the chain of command to the Brigade.

¹⁸⁵ Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0250.148.007.

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communications and other logistical support.¹⁸⁶ The next day, the Chief of Staff approved the recommendations and tasked the Engineers Administration (a staff department of the General Command) to deliver one thousand sandbags to the Northern Region, and the Armament Administration (also a staff department) to deliver three night-vision goggles to the Aleppo Infantry Academy for use at the checkpoints.¹⁸⁷ The Office of the Chief of Staff sent this decision back to the Command of the Northern Region with a cover letter and copied it to the Director of the Engineers Administration and the Director of the Armament Administration to take the “necessary action”. A copy was also sent to the Office of the Head of the Military Intelligence Department, likely because the process had been initiated as a result of Military Intelligence security concerns in the wider Aleppo area.¹⁸⁸

Having received the decision from the Chief of Staff dated 18 January 2012, on 22 January 2012, the Operations and Training Branch of the Command of the Northern Region forwarded the cover letter from the Office of the Chief of Staff together with their own original letter (with the Chief of Staff’s decision on it) to various commands including the Aleppo Infantry Academy, the 135th Motorised Brigade, the 46th Special Forces Regiment and Military Intelligence Branch 290.¹⁸⁹ Further handwritten annotations on this document indicate that it was disseminated to lower levels.

As a further example, on 24 June 2012, the Head of the Idleb Military and Security Committee informed his superiors of the desertion on the previous day of one officer and two soldiers from a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division. This report was first sent to a Deputy Chief of Staff who was away “on mission”. It was passed to the Chief of Staff on the same day, who recommended informing Military Intelligence. The report was then passed to the Deputy Commander the following day, who agreed with the recommendation and instructed that the information be passed to Military Intelligence.¹⁹⁰ The report was duly sent to Military Intelligence with a cover letter, along with internal copies to the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff and the

¹⁸⁶ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005.

¹⁸⁷ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005, at SYR.D0018.021.005.

¹⁸⁸ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005, at SYR.D0018.021.004-005.

¹⁸⁹ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 22 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.002.

¹⁹⁰ Report from the Head of the Idleb Military and Security Committee, 24 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.031.

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Deputy Commander.¹⁹¹ The information was later disseminated to Military Intelligence branches, referencing the instruction of the Deputy Commander and stating that they were to take necessary action.¹⁹² Once again, the speed of transmission should be noted; the desertions were reported on 23 June, and by 26 June it had been reported up the chain of command to the Deputy Commander, who had issued a decision and disseminated it back down the chain.

Operational Planning and Execution were Highly Centralised

The General Command had a centralised and rigid system of command and control where senior-level authority (*i.e.*, the highest levels of the General Command) was required even for relatively minor military issues.

For example, on 10 August 2013, the Deputy Commander signed an order relocating two artillery platoons from Damascus to Idleb. The request came after a telephone call from the Commander of the 7th Division. The relocation order indicated that the purpose of the move was “carrying out a mission”. The units involved were a platoon of howitzers from the 78th Armoured Brigade and a platoon of BM-21 (rocket launcher vehicles) from the 137th Artillery Regiment (both part of the 7th Division). This was only five vehicles in total. The vehicles were to travel to the 88th Infantry Brigade (also part of the 7th Armoured Division) that were, at that time, deployed in rural Idleb.¹⁹³

An analysis of this document reveals notable features. Firstly, the units to be moved were from the 7th Armoured Division, part of the 1st Corps, and normally based in the south of the country. Elements of this division, such as the 88th Infantry Brigade, were evidently already deployed to Idleb. Despite this, the 7th Armoured Division Commander still had to request and gain authority from the General Command for the movement of his own forces for a mission that he and his division were engaged in. This suggests that he did not have the authority to do this on his own. The size of the convoy (in military terms) was relatively small (three howitzers and two BM21 launchers), yet the redeployment of this minor force required the authority of the Deputy Commander “acting on behalf” of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. This

¹⁹¹ Cover letter from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 25 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.030.

¹⁹² Cover letter from Military Intelligence Branch 277, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.029.

¹⁹³ Relocation order from the Operations Commission, 10 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.188.

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clearly shows the degree of control held by the Deputy Commander and the lack of authority and initiative given to lower (yet still senior) levels of command.

The aforementioned example regarding desertions also demonstrates this degree of micromanagement. As noted, the Head of the Idleb Military and Security Committee reported the desertion of one officer and two soldiers. This report went to a Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff (who made a recommendation) and, finally, the Deputy Commander. The Deputy Commander agreed with the Chief of Staff's recommendation and instructed that the information be passed to Military Intelligence,¹⁹⁴ with copies going internally to the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Commander.¹⁹⁵

This issue related to the desertion of three junior military personnel, yet it still required the authority of the Deputy Commander for its resolution. The information dissemination process and the proposals of a Deputy Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff prior to a final decision also reinforces this centralised decision-making process and the key role of the Deputy Commander as the final decision-maker in the General Command.

The previously-mentioned request of 17 January 2012 by the Command of the Northern Region further illustrates this. The Acting Commander of the Northern Region recommended the establishment of three checkpoints to the Chief of Staff.¹⁹⁶ The Chief of Staff personally approved the recommendations made and further tasked the Engineers Administration to deliver a thousand sandbags to the Northern Region, and the Armament Administration to deliver three night-vision goggles to the Aleppo Infantry Academy for use at the checkpoints.¹⁹⁷

The fact that the Chief of Staff, one of the most important officers in the military, gave an order to other senior staff officers in the General Command for the distribution of a thousand sandbags and three night-vision goggles confirms the centralised nature of the General Command. If this was the process for such a relatively minor operational matter, operations of greater magnitude and

¹⁹⁴ Report from the Head of the Idleb Military and Security Committee, 24 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.031.

¹⁹⁵ Cover letter from the Office of the Deputy Commander, 25 June 2012, SYR.D0179.007.030.

¹⁹⁶ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005.

¹⁹⁷ Memorandum from the Command of the Northern Region, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.003-005, at SYR.D0018.021.005.

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length were likely planned, known about, directed and overseen by the highest levels of the General Command, in particular, the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff.

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III. The Regional Commands

The Army and Armed Forces had five Regional Commands,¹⁹⁸ divided geographically: Southern, Northern, Eastern, Central, and Coastal.¹⁹⁹ They were directly subordinate to the General Command.²⁰⁰ The Regional Commands primarily played an administrative and logistical role. According to a witness interview, officers sent to the Eastern Regional Command were “unofficially laid off [their] service with the Syrian Army”, and dozens of officers waited there until they reached official retirement age.²⁰¹ Another witness stated that one officer was sent to the Southern Regional Command as a punishment for being too soft on demonstrators,²⁰² suggesting that these bodies had little authority. However, two of them, the Northern Regional Command and the Central Regional Command, appear to have had command and control responsibilities.

Each Regional Command contained specialised branches. Depending on the Command, these included an Operations and Training Branch, Organisation Branch, Reconnaissance Branch, Engineering Branch, Personnel Affairs Section,²⁰³ Artillery Branch, Administrative Affairs

¹⁹⁸ This should be distinguished from the “Regional Command” of the Ba’ath Party. Under pan-Arabist doctrine, the President was the “Regional Commander” of the Ba’ath Party in Syria. The Regional Commands described in this report were military formations.

¹⁹⁹ Document from the 46th Special Forces Regiment, 3 January 2012, SYR.D0061.028.114 (this document is annotated as “Extracted from the Commands and Formations Code Notebook” and gives the communications codes for the various special forces units).

²⁰⁰ See e.g. Table of Passwords and Identification Words for the Month of April 2011 Issued by the Southern Regional Command, 20 March 2011, SYR.D0065.021.099; Cover Letter from the Central Regional Command, 11 August 2011, SYR.D0018.013.021; Administrative Order from the Eastern Regional Command, 30 April 2012, SYR.D0100.028.068; Circular from the Northern Regional Command, 28 August 2011, SYR.D0021.018.006.

²⁰¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.732_AE, at p. 6.

²⁰² Witness Interview SYR.WHA.560_AE, p. 4 (stating that al-Sousi, Commander of the 52nd Brigade, was reassigned on 19 December 2011 because he was being tolerant with demonstrators); Witness Interview SYR.WHA.563_AE, at p. 5 (stating that al-Sousi was reassigned to the Southern Regional Command). See also Transfer Order No. 4, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.040.012 (according to this order by the President, the Commander of the 52nd Brigade, Staff Brigadier General Ali Nadhir Al-Sousi, was transferred from his unit to the Southern Regional Command. It is not clear from the document to which position Al-Sousi was to be assigned). See also Mission Order from Commander of the 9th Division, 14 November 2011, SYR.D0220.038.009.

²⁰³ Report from the 38th Brigade, 2013, SYR.D0156.141.003 (sending a report from the organisation and mobilisation section of the 38th Brigade, through the 24th Division, to the Personnel Affairs Section of the Southern Regional Command).

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Branch, Technical Affairs Branch, Signal Branch, Chemical Branch, Political Orientation Branch, Air Defence Branch, and Armament Branch.²⁰⁴ Regional Commands also had operational units.²⁰⁵

The Northern Regional Command covered Aleppo and Idleb. The Eastern Regional Command covered Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh. The Central Regional Command covered Homs and Hama. The Coastal Regional Command covered Lattakia and Tartous. The Southern Regional Command covered Damascus, Rural Damascus, As-Sweida, Dar'a and Quneitra.²⁰⁶

Personnel

Personnel of the Regional Commands known to the CIJA are set out below.

Northern Regional Command

The Commander of the Northern Region for at least the period from 15 November 2009²⁰⁷ to 28 December 2011²⁰⁸ was Major General Ibrahim Jasem Al-Ghaban. After Al-Ghaban's promotion to Head of the Operations Commission,²⁰⁹ Major General Nazir Suleiman Nuaman became Acting Commander of the Northern Regional Command. He held the position for at least the period from 14 January 2012²¹⁰ to 24 March 2012.²¹¹ By 29 March 2012, Major General Adnan Hamdi Al-

²⁰⁴ See Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at pp. 4-6; Witness Interview SYR.WGA.732_AE, at pp. 5-6. See also Instruction from the Northern Regional Command, 8 May 2011, SYR.D0018.019.001 (sent through the Operations Branch of the Northern Regional Command); List of Numbers for Telephone Centres in Aleppo Governorate, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0015.019.046 (sent through the Signal Branch of the Northern Regional Command); Circular from the Northern Regional Command, 9 February 2011, SYR.D0020.118.012 (sent from the Organisation and Mobilisation Branch of the Northern Regional Command).

²⁰⁵ See Administrative Order from the Training Board, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.008 (the 135th Brigade and 145th Brigades are listed under the Northern and Coastal Regions respectively); Telegram ordering the mobilisation of certain units, March 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048 (orders the Command of the Coastal Region and the 144th Battalion to mobilise by 18 March 2011); Cease search order from Central Regional Command, 26 April 2012, SYR.D0179.047.007 (a warrant to cease searching for a soldier signed by the Commander of the Central Regional Command). See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_ET, at p. 6 (the 135th Brigade and the 159th Battalion were units subordinate to the Command of the Northern Region).

²⁰⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 7.

²⁰⁷ Instruction from the General Command No. 001, 15 November 2009, SYR.D0020.004.031-029; Communication from the Northern Regional Command, 1 November 2010, SYR.D0020.001.010.

²⁰⁸ Table of Passwords and Identification Words for the Units of the Northern Region, 28 December 2011, SYR.D0012.057.001.

²⁰⁹ See Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0250.148.007; Carried Telegram from the Operations Commission, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0197.057.015.

²¹⁰ Handwritten Letter from the Northern Regional Command, 14 January 2012, SYR.D0197.041.011.

²¹¹ Communication from the Northern Regional Command, 24 March 2012, SYR.D0179.025.092.

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Rafia had become Commander of the Northern Region,²¹² a position he held until at least 28 September 2013.²¹³ By 4 December 2013, Major General Paratrooper Mamdouh Ibrahim Ali had assumed command of the Northern Region.²¹⁴

The Chief of Staff of the Northern Region in August 2011 was Major General Nazir Nuaman.²¹⁵

Southern Regional Command

Major General Mahmoud Muhammad Al-Shallash was Commander of the Southern Region in March 2011.²¹⁶ Major General Muhammad At-Taliweh became Commander of the Southern Region on or before 1 April 2012.²¹⁷

Central Regional Command

Major General Mutiya Ibrahim Ibrahim was the Commander of the Central Region for at least the period from 11 August 2011²¹⁸ to 26 April 2012.²¹⁹

Eastern Regional Command

Major General Kasser Younes Al-Kurdi was Commander of the Eastern Region from or before 22 March 2010²²⁰ until at least 30 April 2012.²²¹

Functions of the Regional Commands

Administrative

Except for the Northern Regional Command and the Central Regional Command, the Regional Commands appeared to primarily play an administrative role. They received and passed on

²¹² Circular from the Operations Commission, 25 March 2012, SYR.D0021.020.023 (The document issued by the Operations Commission is dated 25 March. However, the date when it was re-disseminated by the Northern Regional Command with Al-Rafia's signature block on it is 29 March 2012).

²¹³ Communication from the Head of the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo, 28 September 2013, SYR.D0259.001.027.

²¹⁴ Communication from the Command of the Northern Region, 4 December 2013, SYR.D0259.001.026.

²¹⁵ Special Combat Directive for Defence Operations in the Northern Region, 2 August 2011, SYR.D0020.079.033-031.

²¹⁶ Table of Passwords and Identification Words for the Month of April 2011 Issued by the Southern Regional Command, 20 March 2011, SYR.D0065.021.099.

²¹⁷ Administrative order issued by the Southern Regional Command, 1 April 2012, SYR.D0120.095.016.

²¹⁸ Cover Letter from the Central Regional Command, 11 August 2011, SYR.D0018.013.021.

²¹⁹ Memorandum on the End of Search for a Named Conscript, 26 April 2012, SYR.D0179.047.007.

²²⁰ Minutes of Meeting of the Deir-ez-Zor Security Committee No. 3, 22 March 2010, SYR.D0080.051.026-030.

²²¹ Administrative Order from the Eastern Regional Command, 30 April 2012, SYR.D0100.028.068.

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information pertaining to, for example, the death of soldiers,²²² soldiers going on leave,²²³ activities of opposition forces,²²⁴ guarding of facilities,²²⁵ and reporting on injuries sustained by soldiers.²²⁶ They disseminated lists of passwords and codenames, apparently on a monthly basis.²²⁷ They were also copied in on information which affected their areas of responsibility, including orders for operational units to move,²²⁸ prohibitions on the use of mobile phones,²²⁹ punishment of soldiers,²³⁰ and specific events, such as information that a defector was trying to get Turkey to create a buffer zone.²³¹ A witness also stated that the Regional Commands had a role in overseeing and inspecting military formations that were within their areas of responsibility.²³²

²²² See Incoming Cable from Northern Regional Command, 30 September 2011, SYR.D0175.001.026; Telegram from Commander of the Northern Region, 30 April 2012, SYR.D0179.047.116;

²²³ See Report from the 38th Brigade, 2013, SYR.D0156.141.003.

²²⁴ See Circular from Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0021.020.021-022; Circular from Operations Commission, 12 September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.009; Communication from the NSB, 20 October 2011, SYR.D0224.010.002; Circular from Operations Commission, 11 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.008; Circular from Operations Commission, 11 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.010; Circular from Operations Commission, 26 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.011; Circular from Operations Commission, 6 August 2012, SYR.D0197.048.011; Circular from Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.008; Circular from Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.005; Circular from Operations Commission, September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.013; Circular from Operations Commission, 25 March 2012, SYR.D0021.020.023; Memorandum from the Commander of the Eastern Region, 22 February 2012, SYR.D0081.131.003; Report from General Intelligence Branch 327, 9 June 2012, SYR.D0100.067.019; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 223, 12 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.006; Communication from the Eastern Regional Command, 19 April 2012, SYR.D0081.123.006.

²²⁵ Circular from the Northern Regional Command, 28 August 2011, SYR.D0021.018.006; Minutes of Meeting of the Security Committee in Deir-ez-Zor, March 30 2011, SYR.D0080.051.095-099 (noting the Eastern Regional Commander stating that “we continue to take security measures to protect the military facilities”); Letter from the Deputy Commander, 23 March 2012, SYR.D0179.023.028-029 (requesting that various commands protect the area at the Turkish border).

²²⁶ Administrative Order, 1 April 2012, SYR.D0120.095.016.

²²⁷ Table of Passwords and Identification Words for the Month of April 2011 Issued by the Southern Regional Command, 20 March 2011, SYR.D0065.021.099; Table of Passwords and Identification Words for the Month of July 2011 Issued by the Southern Regional Command, 20 June 2011, SYR.D0065.020.212.

²²⁸ Movement Order from Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032. This was copied to the Southern, Central and Northern Regional Commands. See also Movement Order from Operations Commission, 26 March 2012, SYR.D0179.024.048.

²²⁹ Hand-delivered Telegram No. 48563 from the Operations Commission, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0197.057.015.

²³⁰ Administrative Order from Commander of the Damascus Military Police Post, 28 December 2010, SYR.D0070.028.069.

²³¹ Memorandum from the Head of Military Intelligence, 22 March 2012, SYR.D0179.023.028-029 (copying the Eastern, Northern and Coastal Regional Commands, covering the entire Turkish-Syrian border).

²³² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 8.

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The Regional Commands received reports from units within their areas of responsibility. For example, on 8 May 2011, the Northern Regional Command, pursuant to a circular from the General Command, ordered that units send it a daily report at 18.00 hours,²³³ an order that was followed.²³⁴

The Regional Commands sent information back up the chain of command. For example, on 3 April 2012, the Northern Regional Command sent information to the General Command regarding an armed group that was “confront[ing] the army”.²³⁵ Witnesses stated that the Regional Commands would receive reports of incidents such as casualties, kidnappings, defections and the theft of arms and forward these reports on to the Operations Commission of the General Command.²³⁶

Logistical

The Regional Commands were involved in ensuring the supply of food, ammunition, and equipment to military units. For example, in July 2013, the Regional Commands, along with the heads of the Military and Security Committees, were sent an order to “facilitate the transit of trucks carrying food or other supplies from the producing governorates to the non-producing governorates”.²³⁷ Witness testimony confirms that Regional Commands received requests for food and ammunition and that heads of the Armament Branch and the Administrative Affairs Branch of the Northern Regional Command were regularly summoned to the premises of the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo to “guarantee the supplies of combat units on the ground”.²³⁸

There is also evidence of a ceremonial function. For example, the Commander of the Eastern Region represented the President at a Martyrs’ Day commemoration.²³⁹

²³³ Instruction from the Northern Regional Command, 8 May 2011, SYR.D0018.019.001. *See also* Circular from Operations Commission, 20 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.005.

²³⁴ *See e.g.* Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 6 June 2011, SYR.D0186.082.011-015 (containing information regarding the attack on Jisr-Ash-Shugur and almost identical to information the Military Intelligence Branch sent up its own chain of command (*See* Report from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 6 June 2011, SYR.D0186.082.024-016)). *See also* Service List of the Orderly Officer in Aleppo Site Command during April 2012, 15 March 2012, SYR.D0021.006.016; Report from General Intelligence Branch 327, 9 June 2012, SYR.D0100.067.019; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 223, 12 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.006.

²³⁵ Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010.

²³⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.732_AE, at p. 8; Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 6.

²³⁷ Telegram from the Operations Commission, 11 July 2013, SYR.D0179.019.077.

²³⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 6.

²³⁹ *See* Administrative Order, 30 April 2012, SYR.D0100.028.068.

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Regional Commands issued lists of telephone numbers of units within their area of responsibility. For example, in April 2012, the Northern Regional Command issued a list of numbers of “Northern District Formations” within Aleppo Governorate.²⁴⁰

Command and Control

The Regional Commands had a limited degree of command over some Army and Armed Forces units. For example, the 135th and the 145th Brigades were subordinate to, respectively, the Northern Regional Command and the Coastal Regional Command.²⁴¹ However, it appears that the Northern Regional Command had the authority to create checkpoints and use units that were not formally subordinated to it. Initially this role only extended to Army and Armed Forces units from the training academies and the security agencies within the Northern Regional Command’s area of responsibility. For example, on 21 December 2011, the Commander of the Northern Region issued an instruction for the establishment of four checkpoints on the international highway between Aleppo and Saraqab.²⁴² This instruction was issued based on a decision adopted by the NSB, approved by the Chief of Staff.²⁴³ Similar operations took place in January 2012²⁴⁴ and February 2012.²⁴⁵

Later in the conflict, the Northern Regional Command issued orders to commanders of brigades and regiments. On 12 May 2012, the Commander of the Northern Region issued an order to secure a section of the international highway.²⁴⁶ This order was addressed to, among others, the Commander of the 93rd Armoured Regiment, a unit formally subordinated to the 3rd Corps,²⁴⁷ and

²⁴⁰ List of Phone Numbers of the Northern District Formations, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0014.030.013-024.

²⁴¹ See Administrative Order from the Training Board, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.008 (the 135th Brigade and 145th Brigades are listed under the Northern and Coastal Regions respectively).

²⁴² Instructions for Securing and Guarding the Aleppo-Saraqab International Road, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0012.007.003-004.

²⁴³ Instructions for Securing and Guarding the Aleppo-Saraqab International Road, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0012.007.003-004.

²⁴⁴ Memorandum of Suggestions, 17 January 2012, SYR.D0018.021.004-005.

²⁴⁵ Instruction, 8 February 2012, SYR.D0012.003.002-004 (this instruction does not appear to break down the units appointed to each checkpoint, and it is therefore not possible to say who received orders).

²⁴⁶ Instructions for Protecting and Guarding the Aleppo-Azaz Highway, 12 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.004-001.

²⁴⁷ See Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 21 May 2012, SYR.D0180.026.030; Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011.

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the Commander of the 18th Motorised Infantry Brigade, a unit formally subordinated to the 2nd Corps.²⁴⁸ The order was based on an instruction from the General Command, and concerned the establishment of ten fixed guard posts comprising one sector. It designated the Commander of the 93rd Armoured Regiment as Sector Commander and the Commander of the 18th Brigade as Deputy Sector Commander and gave them their instructions.²⁴⁹ The CIJA is unaware of any documentation to suggest that other Regional Commands played a similar role with regard to creating and overseeing checkpoints.

Once the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo was created, it acted in cooperation with, and to some extent issued orders to, the Northern Regional Command. For example, in September 2012 the Director of the Administration for Productive Projects, a staff department of the General Command, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, requesting that the “Command of the Security Group” for Aleppo and the Northern Regional Command coordinate to protect the sixth cooperative in Aleppo, which was being harassed by attackers and was unable to defend itself, using the nearby units from the Aleppo Infantry Academy and the Special Forces.²⁵⁰

The Chief of Staff did not mention the Northern Regional Command, but instead ordered solely the “Head of the Security Committee” in Aleppo to coordinate the Special Forces and the Aleppo Infantry Academy to protect the cooperative.²⁵¹

The Head of the Security Committee in Aleppo then gave an order (an annotation on the same document) to the Infantry Academy²⁵² to “coordinate with Production”. His signature, however,

²⁴⁸ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.001.

²⁴⁹ Instructions for Protecting and Guarding the Aleppo-Azaz Highway, 12 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.004-001, at SYR.D0021.023.004.

²⁵⁰ Presentation Memorandum from the Directorate of Production Projects, September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.003-004.

²⁵¹ Presentation Memorandum from the Directorate of Production Projects, September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.003-004, at SYR.D0015.048.004.

²⁵² This also suggests that the Northern Regional Command was subordinate to the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo. The Northern Regional Command had previously given orders to the Infantry Academy. See e.g. Communication from Northern Regional Command, 25 January 2011, SYR.D0020.084.038; Instructions for Securing and Guarding the Aleppo-Saraqab International Road, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0012.007.003-004; Instructions from the Northern Regional Command, 8 February 2012, SYR.D0012.003.002-004.

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has the stamp of the Northern Regional Command.²⁵³ Further, the covering letter from the Head of the Security Committee to the Infantry Academy was sent by the Operations Branch of the Northern Regional Command.²⁵⁴ This indicates that the Security Committee in Aleppo was using the command structure of the Northern Regional Command to deliver and implement its orders.

A witness has also stated that, following the establishment of the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo, the Commander of the Northern Region moved his own headquarters to that of the Military and Security Committee in Aleppo.²⁵⁵ The same witness stated that the Commander of the Northern Region and the head of the “Operations Branch” of the Northern Regional Command were members of the Military and Security Committee for Aleppo,²⁵⁶ and that the “heads of the Armament and Administrative Affairs branches [of the Northern Regional Command] would go on a daily basis to the headquarters of the Security Committee and that they would be commissioned by the Security Committee itself to secure the requirements of combat units on the ground”.²⁵⁷ This further demonstrates that the Military and Security Committee for Aleppo had a close relationship with the Northern Regional Command.

The Central Regional Command had a role in commanding operational units which were subordinated to it during the crisis. The CCMC on 31 July 2011 decided to “[p]lace a mechanised infantry battalion (BMP) and a Special Forces battalion at the disposal of the commander in charge of the central region”. These were to collaborate with forces in Idleb and prevent a “provisioning” of the city of Hama from the north.²⁵⁸

²⁵³ Presentation Memo from the Directorate of Production Projects, September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.003-004, at SYR.D0015.048.004.

²⁵⁴ Letter from the Northern Regional Command, 16 September 2012, SYR.D0015.048.001.

²⁵⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_ET, at p. 6.

²⁵⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_ET, at pp. 8-9.

²⁵⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 7.

²⁵⁸ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 31 July 2011, 14 August 2011, SYR.E0001.015.008-010, at SYR.E0001.015.010.

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IV. The Military and Security Committees

The Regime exercised control over the Armed and Armed Forces in the governorates to some extent through a pre-crisis Ba'ath Party institution, the governorate-level Security Committee, and, from November 2011 onwards, through Military and Security Committees in the “hot” or tense governorates.

Each contained representatives from the security agencies, the Ba'ath Party, the police and the Army and Armed Forces. As the security situation deteriorated from February 2011 onwards, the CCMC took a series of key decisions, beginning in April 2011, that resulted in the dispatch of senior military (and at times, intelligence and political figures) to supervise and later command military and security operations in tense governorates. The Regime ensured that military and security operations in at least the governorates of Homs, Idleb, Dar'a, Hama and Aleppo were co-ordinated by a senior military commander, who was subordinate to the General Command.

Predominately through the minutes of the CCMC, this section will provide an overview of the events at the national level that led to the creation, in November 2011, of Military and Security Committees²⁵⁹ in these governorates. Thereafter the section will provide an outline of developments in each governorate to demonstrate the specific contextual background and chronology that led to the establishment of each Military and Security Committee.

The terminology with regard to these Committees requires explanation. Prior to the conflict, each governorate had a Security Committee. The Security Committee was a Ba'ath Party institution that historically brought together representatives from the various security agencies, Ba'ath Party political figures (including the governor), and the police. Until late 2011, governorate-level Security Committees were chaired by the Ba'ath Party Branch Secretary of the governorate.

As the conflict grew more militarised, the Regime took various steps to assist or supervise the work of the regular Security Committees. This initially included the dispatch of senior officials to the governorates to either support, oversee or direct the work of the Security Committees. At times, new military or “supreme” committees were also created to deal with specific crises or incidents

²⁵⁹ The terms used by the Regime for these *ad hoc* governorate-level Military and Security bodies varied. Terms used included Military Committee, Military and Security Committee, Military and Security Official.

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(such as in Dar'a and Idleb). As the security situation deteriorated, however, through the summer of 2011, it became evident that relying on the governorate Security Committees alone would not effectively deal with the security problems the Regime faced. As a result of discussions and decisions within the CCMC, the President appointed senior military officers to the command of all military, security and Ba'ath Party forces within specific governorates in November 2011. Identified appointment orders for some of these senior military officers held by the CIJA further state that the officer was also to be considered head of the Security Committee.

These senior military officers were often addressed with different titles, *e.g.*, Head of the Security Committee, Head of the Military Committee, Military and Security Official, or Commander of the Security Group. Eventually, these bodies began to be referred to as Military and Security Committees, and the senior officers as Heads of the Military and Security Committees. This report utilises the term “Chief” as a generic term to describe all of these positions and a selected translation of each of the different titles as appropriate.²⁶⁰

Despite the varying terminology, it is important to realise that it was in November 2011 that the shift in power took place; that is the point when operational command and control at the governorate level became formally concentrated in the hands of one senior military officer.

CCMC Creation of Military and Security Committees

From February 2011 onwards, the spread and magnitude of opposition protest in many areas of Syria significantly increased and the initial security response of the Regime failed to diminish this opposition. In reacting to this challenge, the Regime initially took a series of decisions within the CCMC that sent down senior officials to support certain governorate Security Committees. This action initially began in the Central Region and Latakia then in Dar'a where a senior officer from the General Command was sent to deal with the escalating situation in that governorate. Similar activity happened in Idleb in June.

Later in 2011, other senior Regime figures from the security agencies were also dispatched to oversee the work of the governorate Security Committees and take command at certain times.

²⁶⁰ Translation note: The Arabic words “ra’ees” [رئيس], “mass’oul” [مسؤول], and “qa’ed” [قائد] are translated, respectively, as “Head”, “Official”, and “Commander”

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Although successful, to a degree, this oversight did not have the desired effect of quelling opposition activity which grew as the Regime continued to harden their security response. Finally, in November, senior military officers took charge of all the security structures in certain governorates and were to be seen as the Heads of the Security Committees in the governorates.

The month of April 2011 was important in the chronology of events that culminated in the establishment of the Military and Security Committees in November. On 18 April 2011, the CCMC held a key meeting, following two months of upheaval and anti-Regime demonstrations. The CCMC examined the political and security situation in the country. It concluded that the period of “making allowances and meeting demands was over” and that a “multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators, saboteurs of security and vandals” was to be undertaken. It instructed that offenders were to be arrested, placed in prison and put before the judiciary and “mechanisms for confronting demonstrations” were also to be implemented. It concluded:

- An equipped police force should be prepared to crack down on demonstrations, with the security [agencies] behind it. Demonstrations should be prepared by the Party and organisations to confront them if necessary, according to the situation.
- Armed forces should not be called in *unless in cases of extreme need and for specific tasks*.
- Tasks, responsibilities and the mechanism for cooperation between the different authorities should be precisely defined.²⁶¹

The CCMC also instructed that “supreme committees” were to be established in the governorates “consisting of a command member, senior military officer and security officer, to plan, implement and command, and to which all military, security and party officials in the district shall report”.²⁶²

On 19 April 2011, security forces opened fire on demonstrators in Homs in what became known as the “Clock Tower killings”. The next day, on 20 April 2011, the CCMC met again and stated that “a new phase should be started to counter conspirators by initiating the use of force against them as of this date” to demonstrate “the power and capacity of the state”. The meeting proposed:

- the development of detailed plans “to counter the possibilities of armed and unarmed demonstrations and sit-ins”;

²⁶¹ Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 294, 20 April 2011, SYR.D0183.003.010-011 (referencing the CCMC meeting) [emphasis added].

²⁶² Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 294, 20 April 2011, SYR.D0183.003.010-011.

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- That the General Command would develop overarching plans based on the scenario of a possible spreading of demonstrations and hostile action on a wide scale in all governorates;
- That measures should be taken and cooperation organized with the implementing authorities, in order to implement a part or all of it as the situation develops;
- The mobilisation of some military units;
- Using “all detailed means and methods [...] when surrounding an area, raiding suspects, or countering an anti-Regime protest”; and
- Arresting all wanted persons.²⁶³

The CCMC met again on 23 April 2011. The meeting addressed, among other things, anti-Regime activity in Dar’a. The Head of the NSB:

... suggested addressing the crisis as a whole after careful analysis. Wanted persons should be arrested and prevented from dispersing to and inciting the other governorates. Armed Forces units should enter Dar’a because it is a key focal point, and then move on to the other governorates.²⁶⁴

The CCMC made a series of decisions including that a “high-level political and military committee will be established to command action in the Governorate of Dar’a”.²⁶⁵ The precise details of the “committee” remain unknown.

The conclusions of these key CCMC meetings in April 2011 are important in understanding the context behind the Regime’s subsequent actions at the local level in the governorates. These actions came about due to the Regime’s perception that it was losing control. In Dar’a and later elsewhere, the Regime used the Army and Armed Forces to re-establish its control. The meetings also demonstrated that the national leadership recognised the severity of the security situation, the need to enhance the work of the governorate Security Committees with senior officials, and to take a hardened line through confrontation in order to preserve their authority and maintain power.

In June 2011 the security situation in Idleb deteriorated swiftly. Attacks by opposition figures in early June resulted in approximately seventy Regime security personnel being killed. The Regime responded by dispatching a senior figure, Al-Frej again, to Idleb to command the military operation that followed.

²⁶³ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 20 April 2011, 20 April 2011, SYR.D0183.003.012-013.

²⁶⁴ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 23 April 2011, 23 April 2011, SYR.D0183.015.018-020.

²⁶⁵ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 23 April 2011, 23 April 2011, SYR.D0183.015.018-020.

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In addition to sending a senior military figure to Idleb, the CCMC later took a series of other measures as the conflict escalated. This included the dispatch of members of the CCMC itself to supervise and later command the security elements in the governorates. On 24 August 2011, for example, the CCMC tasked the Director of General Intelligence Directorate to go to Idleb to lead the security agencies in the field and required the Deputy Commander and the Minister of Interior to execute a joint operational plan covering Idleb and Hama.²⁶⁶ Late August 2011 also saw a complete change in the senior leadership within the General Command. The Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff and the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff all changed, with some being promoted and others removed.

The CCMC decision to send the Director of General Intelligence to Idleb Governorate was clarified on 4 September 2011. He was tasked with supervising the implementation of tasks assigned to security elements in the governorate, with special attention to the Jabal Zawiya district. The Deputy Commander and the Minister of the Interior were further tasked to examine a “raid plan and inspection set by the leadership of Jabal Zawiya district in Idleb Governorate, as well as Qalaat Al-Madiq district in Hama Governorate.” They were to go to the area from 6 September 2011 to supervise the implementation of this plan the following day.²⁶⁷

As the security situation continued to deteriorate despite these visits and appointments, the Regime continued to take key measures to address the crisis. This included the replacement of the Chairman of the CCMC and the appointment of Hasan Turkomani to this position around late October 2011.²⁶⁸

On 22 October 2011, in one of the first meetings chaired by Turkomani, the CCMC discussed a wide range of issues related to the security situation throughout the country. Turkomani provided detailed instructions on the plan for the “next phase” of work, stressed that problems would be meticulously and objectively studied, every issue would be “soundly analysed”, solution-oriented conclusions would be reached, decisions would be taken, recommendations would be raised to the President for ratification and measures for the accurate implementation of decisions of the CCMC

²⁶⁶ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 24 August 2011, 25 August 2011, SYR.P0001.001.125-126.

²⁶⁷ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 3 September 2011, 4 September 2011, SYR.P0001.001.093-094.

²⁶⁸ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023 (from 22 October 2011 onwards the meetings are headed by Turkomani).

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would be taken. New work mechanisms, including monitoring and assistance were presented, and it was stressed that implementation of decisions and plans would be followed up with “intervention” when dysfunctions were noted.²⁶⁹

The discussions also centred on the weaknesses of the security apparatus more generally and the importance of requiring the security agencies to “fully and seriously implement” the tasks from the CCMC. The positive effect of fieldwork was studied at the meeting and the need of the CCMC to move to some crisis areas “for a day or two to study the field situation and radically solve the problem” was highlighted. The Head of the NSB gave a presentation on ways to tackle the situation in Homs and tangible issues “on all levels”.

At the end of this meeting, the CCMC agreed to a series of measures. These included conducting a comprehensive “adjustment and meticulous analysis of the tasks that were previously implemented” in order to come up with effective solutions to existing problems and clearly setting the “goals” that were to be reached. To do that, new work mechanisms were to be implemented and controls on all “security agencies, military units, partisan comrades, and organisations” were to be put in place.²⁷⁰

The CCMC re-emphasised the importance of visits. Its members were to carry out field visits to supervise the implementation of tasks in the governorates, crosschecking reports in order to have a clear picture of the situation in the field and to amend plans as necessary. Circulars, personal orders and written orders were to be considered insufficient. The CCMC instructed that tasks were to be clearly specified and “implementing elements” were to set work plans, periodically file follow-up reports and monitor the implementation of plans. The Head of the NSB was assigned to set and draft clear orders to be given to security agencies, specifying the issues and the ways to deal with them, and follow up the implementation of orders daily. The CCMC was to intensify its meetings and a strategy to implement tasks and “solve the crisis” was to be established.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023.

²⁷⁰ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023, at SYR.E0001.015.023.

²⁷¹ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023, at SYR.E0001.015.023.

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This CCMC meeting on the 22 October 2011 clearly demonstrates a CCMC, under a new chairman, attempting to tackle a deteriorating security situation by implementing robust measures to better coordinate the work of the security bodies, inform themselves of the situation on the ground and effectively respond to the security situation.

The final steps leading to the establishment of the governorate Military and Security Committees took place at a further meeting on 26 October 2011. This appeared to place a “commander” in a position to supervise the work of the governorate Security Committees. The minutes note:

The role and importance of implementing decisions made by security committees were examined, and a commander was nominated to be in charge of supervising the implementation of these decisions by security agencies and military units according to the content of each decision.²⁷²

Indicating that the CCMC had begun to implement its own decision of 22 October 2011 concerning field visits, the meeting reinforced the positive impact of “the presence of some or all” of the CCMC members in some governorates to observe the security situation and provide assistance to resolve “errors made”. The final decision of the 26 October 2011 meeting was a re-emphasis that “appropriate decisions” were to be taken to prevent the escalation and spread of civil disobedience.²⁷³

The decisions and measures taken in October, however, did not appear to improve the security situation. Opposition demonstrations continued throughout the country and armed attacks by opposition groups appeared to grow in strength and number, including in Idleb.

On 19 November 2011 the CCMC discussed a series of security issues, in particular relating to operations that were underway in Idleb and Hama. This discussion included:

Reviewing the tasks whose implementation on the ground has started in Idleb and Hama governorates as well as the achievements that have been accomplished so far while forcing the pace so as to reinforce the presence of our forces on the ground especially alongside the borders by means of special operations and innovative and effective initiatives in addition to the importance of securing the roads that connect to the borders with Turkey adjacent to Idleb Governorate.²⁷⁴

²⁷² Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 26 October 2011, 27 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.028-029.

²⁷³ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 26 October 2011, 27 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.028-029.

²⁷⁴ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 19 November 2011, 20 November 2011, SYR.E0001.015.043-045.

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The CCMC also discussed proposals to examine the effect of replacing or transferring some heads of security and police agencies who had “fallen short of fulfilling their professional duties”. The Head of the NSB and the Minister of Interior were tasked with preparing a list with the names of security officers that needed “for the common good” to be transferred and replaced and to submit this list to the CCMC.

The process of improving the command of security operations in the tense governorates was expanded with discussions (seemingly for the first time) on the appointment of military commanders who would take charge of all security bodies. The CCMC on 21 November 2011 discussed:

the positive effect of appointing military commanders known to be competent and experienced in the conduct of operations, especially in the hot governorates, authorised to direct all directors and heads of civilian, military and security agencies in the governorate. To study the importance of thinking about innovative solutions that will help put an end to the crisis.²⁷⁵

The CCMC tasked the Deputy Commander (*i.e.*, *Imad* Daoud Abdullah Rajiha) to propose “the appropriate commanders to take control of operations in the hot governorates: Idleb, Hama, Homs, etc.” Two days later, on 23 November 2011, the CCMC instructed him to “issue orders” granting the “command with the permission to lead the operations in the hot governorates”.²⁷⁶

Three days later, on 26 November 2011, the President appointed Major General Fuad Hammouda as head of the Security Committee in Idleb and stated that he was:

...charged with the command of all military units and formations, the different security forces, the internal security forces and the government and party authorities in Idleb Governorate and is considered head of the security committee.²⁷⁷

Two days later, on 28 November 2011, a communication from the Idleb Police Command was copied to the “Major General, Head of the Security Military Committee in Idleb”, presumably a reference to Hammouda.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 21 November 2011, 22 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.074-076.

²⁷⁶ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 23 November 2011, 24 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.110-111 (high-resolution copy SYR.E0013.002.058-059).

²⁷⁷ Appointment order, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

²⁷⁸ Letter from the Idleb Police Command, 28 November 2011, SYR.D0088.100.008.

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The 26 November 2011 administration order appointing Hammouda merits close review.²⁷⁹ The fact that it came only three days after the CCMC decision of 23 November 2011 allows a clear cause and effect to be identified. It demonstrates an effective chain of command from the CCMC, the Presidency, and the General Command to the governorate. That Major General Fuad Hammouda was chosen would also indicate that the Regime viewed him as a competent commander, as the need to appoint such personnel was the underlying objective of the 21 November 2011 CCMC discussions.²⁸⁰

The signature block noting the authority of the President and the Deputy Commander demonstrates the weight of the order itself, and the high-level decision-making and authority needed to issue it.

The establishment of a military and security body headed by a military officer was not limited to Idleb Governorate. Similar bodies were established in other governorates. For example, on 25 November 2011, the Commander of the 1st Corps began signing documents as Head of the Security Committee in Dar'a.²⁸¹ Other Military and Security Committees were created in Homs,²⁸² Hama²⁸³ and Aleppo.²⁸⁴ It appears the Regime had come to the conclusion that in the governorates where the security situation was unstable, establishing a structure that brought the military and security bodies under the authority of a single military commander was necessary.

The Chiefs of the Military and Security Committees took the primary role in coordinating operations between Army and Armed Forces units and the security forces. The security agencies continued to report up their respective chains of command on matters such as arrest, detention and interrogation.

All the decisions and actions of the CCMC, in particular from the appointment of Turkomani in late October onwards, are of significance. Together they present the context of the decisions in

²⁷⁹ Appointment order, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0178.001.007.

²⁸⁰ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 21 November 2011, 22 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.074-076.

²⁸¹ Telegram from the Commander of the 1st Corps and Head of the Security Committee, Major General Ahmad Suleiman Tlas, undated, SYR.D0220.035.011 (the document appears to have been sent by fax on 25 November 2011).

²⁸² See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 March 2012, SYR.D0124.013.004.

²⁸³ Report from the Hama Joint Investigation Committee, 2012, SYR.E0002.001.001 (the document does not include the day and month of issue but, based on its contents, is believed to be dated between 23 October 2012 and 31 December 2012).

²⁸⁴ Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0197.057.015.

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November 2011 to place experienced senior military officers in charge of all forces, and their assumption of command and control of subsequent security operations, in the tense governorates.

With their decisions in November 2011, the national leaders evidently believed there was a need to centralise control in the tense governorates, and place the command of military and security units in each of those governorates in the hands of a competent and operationally experienced military officer. This is precisely what happened with the appointment of Major-General Hammouda, who, as Deputy Commander of the Special Forces, was both a senior officer and, having been operationally deployed to Idleb in the previous months, was the type of experienced officer that the CCMC had identified as being needed to take control of the security issues in that governorate.

These decisions in November 2011 are of critical importance in marking a shift in the command and control of security operations from civilian and security bodies to senior military commanders, at least in the governorates that were witnessing significant security problems. The national leadership evidently believed that the measures taken in the previous months had not been fully successful and the bodies tasked with controlling the situation had been unable to suppress and defeat all opposition activity. The situation had deteriorated and/or the security response had not been coordinated or successful to such a degree that experienced military commanders were needed to take charge.

The Homs Military and Security Committee

Homs witnessed significant opposition activity from the outset of the conflict. Anti-Regime activity, demonstrations and violence quickly spread. There appear to have been three periods from the beginning of the conflict in which senior military or security personnel were directly involved in overseeing operations in the governorate, outside the regular Homs Security Committee. The first phase involved two senior Damascus-based officials providing assistance, one of them being Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Munir Adanof. The second phase, in October 2011, saw the active involvement of Major General Muhammad Dib Zeitoun, the Head of the Political Security Department. The third and final phase began with the appointment of the Homs Military and Security Official in November 2011.

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First Phase: Deployment of Munir Adanof in April/May 2011

In the initial period, Major-General Munir Adanof was sent to Homs following the Clock Tower killings on 19 April 2011. The CCMC was aware of this particular incident; a CCMC security report at the time demonstrated they knew that a shooting had taken place, that the security forces had dispersed some protestors and arrested others, and that deaths had occurred.²⁸⁵ The same security report indicated that Dr. Yasser Houriya, a member of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, and Munir Adanof were present in the governorate:

The Security Committee gathered with Comrades Dr. Yasser Houriya, member of the Regional Command, and *Imad* Munir Adanof at 11:30. It was stressed that gatherings in public squares (the old and new clock locations – the square of Khaled bin al-Walid mosque) are not allowed. The abidance of not shooting any protesters unless in self-defence was also stressed.²⁸⁶

The fact that he was present at all in the governorate at this specific time, bearing in mind he was a Deputy Chief of Staff, is of significance. As discussed above, in April 2011 the CCMC met and gave instructions, among other things, that “supreme committees” were to be established in the governorates “consisting of a command member, senior military officer and security officer, to plan, implement and command, and to which all military, security and party officials in the district shall report”.²⁸⁷ These committees were to be established in the coastal and central regions (which covered Homs) with the CCMC itself overseeing Damascus and Rural Damascus. It appears Adanof’s presence in Homs was a result of this CCMC decision. Dr. Houriya appeared to be the “command member” with Adanof as the “senior” military officer. Witness interviews indicate that a senior security officer, namely Major General Ali Younes, a Deputy to the Director of General Intelligence, was also sent to Homs around this period.²⁸⁸

This “supreme committee” was a joint body consisting of national-level figures as well as governorate-level Security Committee members. This was a move away from simply leaving security matters in Homs to the members of the governorate Security Committee.

²⁸⁵ CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 19 April 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.129-133.

²⁸⁶ CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 19 April 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.129-133.

²⁸⁷ Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 294, 20 April 2011, SYR.D0183.003.010-011.

²⁸⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.820_AE, at p. 9 (indicating that Younes had been appointed as Head of the Security Committee in Homs around 20 April 2011); Witness Interview SYR.WGA.797_AE, at p. 4 (stating that Younes was the first Head of the Homs Security Committee).

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Adanof was still in Homs in early May 2011. On 1 May 2011, the CCMC reported that the Homs Security Committee, Dr. Houriya and Major-General Adanof had met with representatives from Ar-Rastan in relation to another incident two days earlier in which twenty-two people had been killed and a number of others wounded during a demonstration.²⁸⁹

Witness interviews conducted by the CIJA suggest that Adanof had been sent to Homs to command the Army and Armed Forces in the area²⁹⁰ and/or to act as a member of the Security Committee.²⁹¹

The fact that the CCMC instructed the establishment of “supreme committees” in the central and coastal regions, and that a senior military officer from the General Command was sent to Homs, indicates that the Regime had deemed the situation in the governorate to be so severe that it needed this additional senior military presence. It is also a reflection of the increasingly centralised nature of control on situations in the tense governorates.

It remains unclear exactly when Adanof left Homs. Witnesses suggested that he was removed from his position because he had favoured a more conciliatory approach.²⁹² In August 2011, there were significant changes in the senior ranks of the General Command and Adanof was relieved of his position as Deputy Chief of Staff.

Second Phase: Engagement of Major General Muhammad Dib Zeitoun in October 2011

In the second phase, Major-General Muhammad Dib Zeitoun, Head of the Political Security Department, was tasked by the CCMC to take command of all security forces in Homs in October 2011. It is of note that by late October, the Chairman of the CCMC changed with Hasan Turkomani taking over this position. On 22 October 2011, at a meeting of the CCMC, chaired by Turkomani, discussions centred on the weaknesses of the security apparatus more generally and the importance of binding security agencies to “fully and seriously implement” the tasks from the CCMC. The

²⁸⁹ CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 1 May 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.014-016 (noting that there was a large demonstration in Ar-Rastan where the international highway was cut off, “an exchange of fire” between the army and demonstrators in Ar-Rastan and four civilians killed in Ar-Rastan).

²⁹⁰ Witness Interviews SYR.WGC.512_EO, at paras 23-24 (noting that Adanof was the “campaign commander” in the spring of 2011 in Homs); SYR.WGA.627_AE, at pp. 11-12 (indicating that Adanof, along with the 18th and 11th Division Commanders, supervised an operation in Baba Amro in May 2011).

²⁹¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.627_AE, at p. 5 (noting that Adanof was a member of the Homs Security Committee).

²⁹² Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.627_AE, at p. 5 (noting that Adanof was removed for refusing to use excessive force); SYR.WGA.577_ET, at p. 4 (noting that Adanof was opposed to bloodshed and shelling cities, and ordered soldiers at checkpoints not to fire their weapons).

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positive effect of fieldwork was studied and the need for the CCMC to move to some crisis areas “for a day or two to study the field situation and radically solve the problem” was highlighted. The Head of the NSB gave a presentation on ways to tackle the situation in Homs and tangible issues “on all levels”.²⁹³

Some days later, on 26 October 2011, the CCMC decided to appoint Major-General Muhammad Dib Zeitoun to “command security agencies and armed forces units present in the governorate”. The CCMC also charged him with full powers to take the necessary legal measures against “any offender” or anyone who acted with “laxness”, likely a reference to those not assertive enough in implementing the requisite security measures to deal with the problems in the governorate.²⁹⁴ It is implied from these minutes that Zeitoun was appointed as the overall commander for all security operations in Homs.

Third Phase: Appointment of Homs Military and Security Official in November 2011

The third phase saw the replacement of Zeitoun with the appointment of a senior military officer to be the “Homs Military and Security Official”, which appears to have happened in late November 2011. As stated, at the CCMC meeting on 21 November 2011, after discussing appointing competent and experienced military commanders to direct all officials and heads of civilian, military and security agencies in certain governorates, the Deputy Commander was tasked to propose appropriate commanders to take control of operations in “hot” governorates, including Homs.²⁹⁵

The CIJA does not possess the appointment order of the Military and Security Official in Homs. The appointment of Hammouda in Idleb and of the 1st Corps Commander in Dar’a as the military and security chiefs in those governorates took place shortly after the CCMC tasked the Deputy Commander to appoint the military commanders he had identified as suitable. It is therefore likely that the Homs Military and Security Official was appointed at around the same time.

The Homs Military and Security Official from late 2011 and until April 2012 may have been *Imad* Ali Abdullah Ayoub, one of the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Witnesses indicated Ayoub was

²⁹³ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 22 October 2011, 23 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.022-023.

²⁹⁴ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 26 October 2011, 27 October 2011, SYR.E0001.015.028-029.

²⁹⁵ Minutes of Meeting of the CCMC on 21 November 2011, 22 November 2011, SYR.P0001.001.074-076.

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consistently in the headquarters of the 18th Division, which was attacking Homs,²⁹⁶ in early 2012.²⁹⁷ A 13 March 2012 General Intelligence Branch 318 report indicates that Ayoub was the Homs Military and Security Official by then.²⁹⁸ It was addressed to the “*Imad* Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces – Homs Governorate Security and Military Official”. The document was sent first to the Deputy to the Homs Military and Security Official, and was then signed by “*Imad* Deputy Chief of Staff”.²⁹⁹ Although the document does not mention him by name, one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff at this time was Ayoub.

A 28 March 2012 document specifically identified Ayoub as the Homs Military and Security Official. It is a report from Homs Military Intelligence Branch 261 relaying information from the 4th Division Security Officer about armed opposition activity in Ar-Rastan. The document was addressed to “*Imad* Ali Abdullah Ayoub, Deputy Chief of Staff – Homs General Military and Security Official”.³⁰⁰ A 10 April 2012 document also references Ayoub as the Homs General Military and Security Official.³⁰¹ Ayoub’s deputy, the “Security Official in Homs Governorate and Assistant to the Military Commander”, was Major General Rafiq Shahadah,³⁰² a senior officer in the Military Intelligence Department.³⁰³

It appears therefore that *Imad* Ali Abdullah Ayoub held the position of Homs Military and Security Official from around late November 2011 until at the latest 18 May 2012. From 18 May 2012 documents addressing the Homs Military and Security Official name Major-General Naim Jasem Suleiman, the Chief of Staff of 3rd Corps, as the incumbent.³⁰⁴ By the end of 2012, the Homs

²⁹⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.632_ET, at p. 8

²⁹⁷ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.632_ET, at p. 8; SYR.WHA.527_AE, at p. 7.

²⁹⁸ Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 13 March 2012, SYR.D0124.027.005.

²⁹⁹ Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 13 March 2012, SYR.D0124.027.005.

³⁰⁰ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 March 2012, SYR.D0124.013.004.

³⁰¹ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 10 April 2012, SYR.D0124.020.004.

³⁰² Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 13 March 2012, SYR.D0124.027.005 (including a box reserved for the opinion of the “Security Chief in the Homs Governorate and Assistant to the Military Commander” and which signature analysis indicates is signed by Rafiq Shahadah.).

³⁰³ See e.g. Corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 363/2013 of 22 April 2013 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria in Official Journal of the European Union, 9 May 2013, at [http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0363R\(03\)](http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0363R(03)) (Identifying Rafiq Shahadah as “Head of Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 293 (Internal Affairs)”). Signature analysis on documents in the possession of the CIJA also notes Shahadah’s signature as a senior officer in the Military Intelligence Department.

³⁰⁴ See e.g. Report from the Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 18 May 2012, SYR.D0124.012.003; Report from the Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 31 May 2012, SYR.D0124.015.002; Report from

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Military and Security Official was Major General Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim, Commander of the 3rd Corps.³⁰⁵

Functions of the Homs Military and Security Official

The Homs Military and Security Official was the critical link between the governorate-level security agency branches and the Army and Armed Forces units conducting operations in the governorate, namely the 11th Division, 18th Division and Special Forces units.

Documents in the possession of the CIJA sent to the Homs Military and Security Official, mainly dated between March and June 2012, give an indication of his functions.

a. Concentration of Information

The Homs Military and Security Official received information and intelligence from all security agency branches in Homs Governorate: the Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch,³⁰⁶ Military Intelligence Branch 261,³⁰⁷ General Intelligence Branch 318³⁰⁸ and the Political Security Homs Branch.³⁰⁹ The substance of this material varied but often centred on the activity of opposition groups in Homs and Ar-Rastan. The reports would be addressed by the branch in question to the Homs Military and Security Official.³¹⁰ The security agency branches would often make suggestions or recommendations. They would send intelligence and security reports first to the Homs Military and Security Official's Assistant who would agree or offer suggestions before sending them to the Official for the final decision. Two boxes (or signature blocks) would be placed on the original report where the Military and Security Official and Assistant would sign or offer their comments. The boxes would often simply be signed with the word "authorised".³¹¹ On

the Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 18 May 2012, SYR.D0124.016.001; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 May 2012, SYR.D0124.019.006; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 22 May 2012, SYR.D0124.021.002.

³⁰⁵ Mission Order from the Homs Military and Security Official and Commander of the 3rd Corps, undated, SYR.D0066.049.004 (signed by or on behalf of Major General Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim. While the document is not dated, it reports on the death of an individual which occurred on 1 October 2012 according to an attached death certificate). See Death Certificate, undated, SYR.D0066.049.008.

³⁰⁶ See e.g. Report from Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 28 May 2012, SYR.D0124.027.002-003.

³⁰⁷ See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0124.010.003.

³⁰⁸ See e.g. Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 14 March 2012, SYR.D0124.025.003.

³⁰⁹ See e.g. Report from Political Security Homs Branch, 7 June 2012, SYR.D0124.021.006.

³¹⁰ See e.g. Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0124.022.003.

³¹¹ See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 March 2012, SYR.D0124.024.004; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 10 April 2012, SYR.D0124.020.004.

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some occasions it appears that communications went directly to the Military and Security Official himself.³¹² Crucially, however, it was always the Military and Security Official who would issue the final approval for action.

The security agencies provided information to the Homs Military and Security Official on issues such as checkpoints,³¹³ arrests,³¹⁴ confronting armed groups,³¹⁵ and passing on information between branches.³¹⁶

b. Direction of Military Activities

The Homs Military and Security Official sent orders to military units for action based on information and intelligence received. Military Intelligence branches were often the conduit for the circulation of information to Army and Armed Forces units. As an example, on 19 May 2012, General Intelligence Branch 318 submitted a report to the Homs Military and Security Official providing information on buildings in Ar-Rastan which were purportedly being used by armed groups. The Branch proposed to the Homs Military and Security Official that the information be circulated to all security agencies and Army units through Military Intelligence Branch 261 and to “consider these locations targets to be processed”. The Homs Military and Security Official agreed.³¹⁷

General Intelligence Branch 318 disseminated the decision to Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence and Political Security, requesting that Military Intelligence Branch 261 disseminate it to the Army and Armed Forces units (“these targets to be addressed”), and to implement the decision of the Homs Military and Security Official.³¹⁸ As instructed, on 4 June 2012, Branch 261 disseminated the decision to the military commander of the Ar-Rastan Sector, through the 11th

³¹² See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.020.001; Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 18 April 2012, SYR.D0124.020.002.

³¹³ See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 19 June 2012, SYR.D0124.014.001-003; Report from Political Security Homs Branch, 12 June 2012, SYR.D0124.009.001; Report from Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 16 June 2012, SYR.D0124.006.004.

³¹⁴ See e.g. Report from Political Security Homs Branch, 7 June 2012, SYR.D0124.021.006; Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.010.005.

³¹⁵ See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 6 July 2012, SYR.D0124.010.009.

³¹⁶ See e.g. Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 1 June 2012, SYR.D0124.027.001-003; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 11 June 2012, SYR.D0124.021.004.

³¹⁷ Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0124.022.003.

³¹⁸ Report from General Intelligence Branch 318, 28 May 2012, SYR.D0124.022.002.

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Division, referencing the Homs Military and Security Official's decision with instructions to "act accordingly".³¹⁹

As a further example, on 28 May 2012, Branch 261 sent the Homs Military and Security Official a report about the activity of international monitors in Hama, Homs, and Idleb who were meeting with "terrorists to acquire photos, maps, charts, and laser CDs showing security and military locations and airports in some cities". Branch 261 suggested that the information be circulated to Army and Armed Forces units. This was approved by the Homs Military and Security Official with an instruction that the NSB also be informed.³²⁰ Branch 261 then disseminated the report to the units noting the Official's decision.³²¹

The Homs Military and Security Official also ordered units under his command to bombard specific areas, based on intelligence and information he received from the security agencies. As an example, on 28 March 2012, a report was sent from Branch 261 to the Homs Military and Security Official indicating that they had received information about an officer who had defected and who was directing opposition forces. The Branch suggested that the information be circulated and that it be used to launch ambushes. The Assistant suggested that approval be given but that there should be a reliance on military units and "bombardment" in order to deal with the issue. The Homs Military and Security Official approved.³²²

On 27 June 2012, Branch 261 sent a report to the Homs Military and Security Official. It provided information regarding officers who had defected and were at that point living in a multi-story house in Ar-Rastan.³²³ The second floor was being used as a field hospital. To the north of the building it was reported that there was a kindergarten and a vegetable market. The report also mentioned a house that was being used as a weapons store and another house where an officer who had defected was allegedly staying. Branch 261 recommended that forces in the area use this information.

³¹⁹ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 4 June 2012, SYR.D0124.022.001.

³²⁰ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 May 2012, SYR.D0124.019.006.

³²¹ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 23 June 2012, SYR.D0124.019.005. It is not clear why three weeks elapsed between the Homs Military and Security Official disseminating his decision and that decision being passed on by Branch 261.

³²² Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 28 March 2012, SYR.D0124.024.004.

³²³ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.013.002.

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The Assistant recommended to “accurately locate the location and bombard it immediately” and the Homs Military and Security Official instructed that:

The commander of the Ar-Rastan sector, determine the location of the place and strike with artillery immediately.³²⁴

As a final example, on 6 July 2012, Branch 261 sent a letter to the 11th Division attaching a report which it had previously sent to the Homs Military and Security Official. The report contained information on houses and locations in Ar-Rastan where armed individuals were residing, and where an explosives manufacturing facility was suspected of being located. The Branch proposed that the Ar-Rastan sector commander be informed “through the committee operations office and attacking those locations with the artillery”. The Homs Military and Security Official agreed and tasked the Ar-Rastan commander to determine the locations and attack them with artillery.³²⁵

³²⁴ Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 27 June 2012, SYR.D0124.013.002.

³²⁵ Letter from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 6 July 2012, SYR.D0124.008.003; Report from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0124.008.004.

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V. The Army

Introduction

The Regime's leadership exercised control over the Army through the General Command. There was no Army Command. The Corps Commanders were subordinate to the General Command, as described in this section.

At the outbreak of the protests, the Army had three corps: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The 1st Corps was the largest corps³²⁶ and had its headquarters in Dar'a Governorate.³²⁷ The key elements of this corps were armoured and mechanised divisions.³²⁸ The 2nd Corps' headquarters was located in an area west of Damascus.³²⁹ The 2nd Corps comprised a mechanised division, a Special Forces division, an independent motorised brigade³³⁰ and two combat support units, the 67th and 167th Regiments.³³¹ The headquarters of the 3rd Corps was located in Rural Damascus.³³² It comprised

³²⁶ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009-010 (the 1st Corps had the largest number of units under its command).

³²⁷ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.607_ET, at p. 3; SYR.WHA.513_AE, at p. 6; SYR.WGA.605_AO, at p. 4.

³²⁸ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009-010; Communication from the 1st Corps Command, 27 September 2011, SYR.D0217.032.017; Telegram from the Operations Branch of the 1st Corps, 11 June 2012, SYR.D0208.020.011.

³²⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6. The 10th Division was based in Qatana, Rural Damascus (See Communication from the Signals Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 August 2012, SYR.D0226.025.017). The 14th Division was based in Rakhleh, Rural Damascus (See Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006. See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.613_AO, at p. 4).

³³⁰ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.003; Administrative Order, 22 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019. See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6.

³³¹ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 22 March 2011, SYR.D0182.020.031; Log of the Infantry Academy with Sent Mail in the period from 10 January 2011 to 8 May 2011, undated, SYR.D0012.108.001-197, at SYR.D0012.108.015; Numerical Table for the Independent Battalions and Companies in Idleb Governorate as of 11 April 2013, 11 April 2013, SYR.D0261.006.001-003, at SYR.D0261.006.002.

³³² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.070_AO, at p. 1 (the witness was an officer with the rank of captain who defected from the 3rd Corps Command facilities). See also List of Telephone numbers of Units and Commanders of the 3rd Corps, undated, SYR.D0014.030.055-056 (according to this document, the 3rd Corps HQ was in Khan Al-Arous, Al-Qutayfah District).

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three divisions, two armoured and one motorised infantry.³³³ The geographic distribution of the 3rd Corps forces indicates that it was responsible for northern, central and eastern areas of Syria.³³⁴ It appears that the 4th and 5th Assault Corps were established in 2015³³⁵ and 2016³³⁶ respectively. They are not discussed further in this report, due to the scant documentation on them held by the CIJA.

Due to the proximity to Israel, large military formations were deployed in the south-west of the country. However, the city of Damascus and its immediate surroundings were protected by independent units and divisions, namely the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armoured Divisions and the Republican Guard.

The commands of the corps, divisions and subordinate brigades, regiments and battalions each had staff branches or sections which replicated many of the staff departments of the General Command. The administrative structures of the Commands of the 1st Corps and the 9th Division are presented below as examples of the administrative structure of other command bodies.

³³³ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010-011; List of Names of the Injured Officers, NCOs and Elements of the 385th Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.018; Communication from the Commander of the 18th Division, 9 October 2011, SYR.0017.089.069; Presentation Memorandum from the Commander of the 17th Division, 7 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.012.

³³⁴ The 11th and 18th Divisions were headquartered in Homs and Hama Governorates (*See* Witness Interview SYR.WGC.502_EO, at p. 3; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.) while the 17th Division's base was in Ar-Raqqa Governorate (*See* Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005).

³³⁵ See YouTube, "Syrian War 2015 Report – Lt. General Ali Abdullah Ayoub Talks", 8 October 2015, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxRHnno6cvo> (retrieved on 25 February 2019). In this SANA video Ayoub announced that the 4th Assault Corps had been established.

³³⁶ See Reuters, "Syrian Army Forms Volunteer Corps to Fight Militants", 22 November 2016, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-army-idUSKBN13H18J> (retrieved on 25 February 2019).

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Army Corps

1st Corps

a. Headquarters and Area of Responsibility

The 1st Corps' area of responsibility was the governorates of Dar'a, As-Sweida and Quneitra.³³⁷

The headquarters of the 1st Corps was located near Bali Military Airbase, north of the village of Barraq, in the north-east corner of Dar'a Governorate.³³⁸

Although headquartered in the south of Syria, the 1st Corps dispatched forces at various times in 2012 and 2013 to other conflict-ridden governorates. Individual brigades and battalions were sent to locations outside of their traditional areas of responsibility including Aleppo,³³⁹ Hama,³⁴⁰ Idlib,³⁴¹ as well as other governorates.

The 1st Corps Command replicated many of the staff departments at the level of the General Command, including the:

- Operations Branch;³⁴²
- Reconnaissance Branch;
- Signal Branch,³⁴³
- Engineering Branch;
- Chemical Branch;
- Air Defence Branch;
- Air Group Branch;
- Armament Branch;

³³⁷ See Immediate Telegram with Instructions from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 24 September 2013, SYR.D0220.054.016.

³³⁸ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.607_AO, at p. 3; SYR.WHA.513_AE, at p. 6; SYR.WGA.605_AO, at p. 4. The size of the 1st Corps and its composition (armoured and mechanized divisions dominated) is justified by the geographic area of responsibility of the 1st Corps which covered the strategically important border areas with Israel and the capital Damascus.

³³⁹ See e.g. Deployment Order from the Operations Commission, 28 September 2012, SYR.D0180.021.030.

³⁴⁰ See e.g. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 220, 3 May 2012, SYR.D0183.014.032 (referencing an attack on a checkpoint in Kafr Zita, Hama Governorate, manned by units of the 88th Motorised Brigade, 7th Division).

³⁴¹ See e.g. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 8 April 2012, SYR.D0183.078.027-028 (informing that personnel from the 68th Mechanised Brigade, 7th Division were involved in operations in rural Idlib); Deployment Order from the Operations Commission, 10 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.188.

³⁴² See Communication from the 1st Corps, 2011, SYR.D0220.035.016; Administrative Order, 19 January 2012, SYR.D0220.035.007; Telegram from the 1st Corps, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0212.017.001; Communication from the 9th Division, 2 October 2011, SYR.D0217.005.016; Telegram from the 1st Corps, 11 June 2012; SYR.D0208.020.011; Telegram from the 1st Corps, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0208.032.016.

³⁴³ See Communication from the 1st Corps, 11 May 2012, SYR.D0221.089.001.

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- Artillery and Missiles Branch,³⁴⁴
- Administrative Affairs Branch;
- Political Orientation Branch;
- Technical Affairs Branch;
- Electronic Warfare Branch;
- Physical Preparation Branch;
- Organisation Branch;
- Encryption Section;
- Security Section; and the
- Personnel Section.³⁴⁵

b. Personnel

At the start of the protests in 2011, Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub was Commander of the 1st Corps,³⁴⁶ before being promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff on 10 August 2011.³⁴⁷ Major General Kamal Nasser Ayyash then served as Acting Commander of the 1st Corps for a period of several months.³⁴⁸ Major General Ahmad Suleiman Tlas was appointed Commander of the 1st Corps by 12 November 2011.³⁴⁹ Tlas was replaced as Commander of the 1st Corps by Major General Naim Jasem Suleiman at the latest by 8 April 2013.³⁵⁰ Suleiman remained Commander of the 1st Corps

³⁴⁴ See Telegram from the 1st Corps, 24 September 2012, SYR.D0234.021.012; Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.008; Instructions from the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles of the 1st Corps, 24 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.003.

³⁴⁵ See Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.607_AO, at p. 4; SYR.WHA.522_AE, at pp. 4-5; SYR.WHA.513_AE, at p. 6. See also Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 24 June 2013, SYR.D0217.030.008.

³⁴⁶ See Communication from the Governor of Dar'a, 14 May 2011, SYR.D0065.002.096; Communication from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2011, SYR.D0208.062.007; Circular from the Operations Commission, 25 July 2011, SYR.D0208.062.008-009; Witness Interview SYR.WGA.607_AO, at p. 3 (the witness is a former member of the 1st Corps Command and stated that Ayoub became Commander of the 1st Corps in the beginning of 2010).

³⁴⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WHA.522_AE, at p. 5; Appointment Order Issued by the Officers' Affairs Department, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008.

³⁴⁸ Letter from the Acting Commander of the 1st Corps, 27 September 2011, SYR.D0217.032.017; Letter from the Acting Commander of the 1st Corps, 23 October 2011, SYR.D0220.035.016.

³⁴⁹ Circular by the Commander of the 1st Corps, 12 November 2011, SYR.D0063.012.323. Prior to his promotion, Tlas was the Commander of the 9th Armoured Division (See Extraordinary Promotion Order, 17 October 2011, SYR.D0220.041.034).

³⁵⁰ Orders from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 8 April 2013, SYR.D0238.004.007. Prior to his appointment to the 1st Corps, Naim Jasem Suleiman served as the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps in addition to holding the *ad hoc* post of Military and Security Chief in Homs. (See Letter from the Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 16 June 2012, SYR.D0124.006.004; Letter from the Political Security Homs Branch, 10 June 2012, SYR.D0124.019.004).

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until at least 24 September 2013.³⁵¹ Major General Salim Rashid Barakat was Commander of the 1st Corps in 2014.³⁵²

While he was Commander of the 1st Corps,³⁵³ Tlas was concurrently Head of the Dar'a Security Committee. As discussed, this dual function was inherited by later 1st Corps Commanders.³⁵⁴

The Chief of Staff of the 1st Corps in 2011 was Major General Thabet Muhammad. The two documents thus far identified by the CIJA show he was in that position on 20 November 2011 and 4 December 2011.³⁵⁵

c. Principal Units

In the early days of the crisis, the 1st Corps comprised the 5th Mechanised Division,³⁵⁶ the 7th Mechanised Division,³⁵⁷ and the 9th Armoured Division.³⁵⁸ The 15th Special Forces Division also appeared to be under the authority of the 1st Corps with documentation from September 2011 onwards confirming that this was the case.³⁵⁹ Two independent brigades, the 61st and 90th

³⁵¹ See Immediate Telegram, 24 September 2013, SYR.D0220.054.016.

³⁵² See Communication from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 28 November 2014, SYR.D0220.043.013.

³⁵³ See Telegram from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 25 November 2011, SYR.D0220.035.011; Telegram from the Operations Branch of the 1st Corps, 25 August 2012, SYR.D0065.002.016.

³⁵⁴ See e.g. Communication from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 28 November 2014, SYR.D0220.043.013 (note that this document was signed by Major General Salim Rashid Barakat as "Head of the Military and Security Committee in Dar'a"); Communication from General Intelligence Branch 315, 31 October 2013, SYR.D0224.024.010.

³⁵⁵ Telegram from Military Intelligence Department, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0063.012.293; Telegram from the 5th Division, 4 December 2011, SYR.D0220.035.012. See also Witness Interview SYR.WHA.522_AE, at p. 5; Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 293, 8 July 2012, SYR.D0370.019.052 (conditioning departure from Syria of several officers including retired Major General Thabet Ali Muhammad).

³⁵⁶ See Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009.

³⁵⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.605_AO, at p. 3.

³⁵⁸ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

³⁵⁹ The 15th Special Forces Division appears to have been effectively placed within the chain of command of the 1st Corps at the latest by 27 September 2011. See Communication from the Command of the 1st Corps, 27 September 2011, SYR.D0217.032.017; Telegram from the Operations Branch of the 1st Corps, 11 June 2012, SYR.D0208.020.011. See also Witness Interview SYR.WFA.505_AO, at p. 3. See also Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005. It appears very likely that the 15th Division was subordinated to the 1st Corps before the dates of these documents as it is known that elements of the division were deployed to military operations in Dar'a in April 2011 along with elements of the 1st Corps' 7th Division. See e.g. CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 2 May 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.017-019 at SYR.E0001.006.019.

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Motorised Brigades, operated as part of the 1st Corps.³⁶⁰ In terms of combat support units, the 66th Artillery Regiment and the 165th Anti-tank Regiment were subordinate to the 1st Corps.³⁶¹

5th Mechanised Division

The 5th Division was headquartered in the south-eastern end of the town Izra'.³⁶² The 5th Division's key units were the 112th³⁶³ and 132nd³⁶⁴ Mechanised Brigades, the 12th Armoured Brigade,³⁶⁵ the 15th Motorised Brigade,³⁶⁶ and the 175th Artillery Regiment.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁰ The 61st and 90th Motorised Brigades were independent units under the authority of the Commander of the 1st Corps. *See* Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 265 to the Commander of the 1st Corps, 29 May 2011, SYR.D0065.002.097.

³⁶¹ *See* Telegram from the Operations Branch of the 1st Corps, 25 August 2012, SYR.D0065.002.016.

³⁶² *See* Map titled "Plan for Places of Deployment of Forces, Checkpoints, Posts, and Command Headquarters in the 9th Armoured Division", undated, SYR.D0238.001.003.

³⁶³ Communication from the Commander of the 5th Division, 4 September 2011, SYR.D0070.015.099; Circular from the Deputy Commander, 10 December 2011, SYR.D0063.012.135; Instruction from the Commander of the 5th Division, 3 May 2013, SYR.D0065.001.073.

³⁶⁴ Communication from the Commander of the 5th Division, 4 September 2011, SYR.D0070.015.099; Circular from the Deputy Commander, 10 December 2011, SYR.D0063.012.135; Instruction from the Commander of the 5th Division, 3 May 2013, SYR.D0065.001.073.

³⁶⁵ Communication from the Commander of the 5th Division, 4 September 2011, SYR.D0070.015.099; Circular from the Deputy Commander, 10 December 2011, SYR.D0063.012.135; Instruction from the Commander of the 5th Division, 3 May 2013, SYR.D0065.001.073.

³⁶⁶ Communication from the Commander of the 5th Division, 4 September 2011, SYR.D0070.015.099; Circular from the Deputy Commander, 10 December 2011, SYR.D0063.012.135; Instruction from the Commander of the 5th Division, 3 May 2013, SYR.D0065.001.073. *See also* Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009.

³⁶⁷ Communication from the Commander of the 5th Division, 4 September 2011, SYR.D0070.015.099; Circular from the Deputy Commander, 10 December 2011, SYR.D0063.012.135; Instruction from the Commander of the 5th Division, 3 May 2013, SYR.D0065.001.073.

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7th Mechanised Division

The 7th Division was based in Zakyeh, Rural Damascus.³⁶⁸ The 7th Division was composed of the 68th,³⁶⁹ 78th,³⁷⁰ and 121st³⁷¹ Mechanised Brigades, the 88th Motorised Brigade,³⁷² and the 137th Artillery Regiment.³⁷³

9th Armoured Division

The 9th Division had its headquarters in the city of As-Sanamayn, Dar'a Governorate.³⁷⁴ The headquarters of the 9th Division Command consisted of several staff departments. The identified documentation and statements relating to this division, once again, appear to demonstrate that the 9th Division Command closely resembled the staff branches and functions in the 1st Corps Command and (although on a smaller scale) those at the level of the General Command.

An undated document lists the staff branches that existed at the divisional level, including branches for operations, reconnaissance, signal, electronic warfare, code, organisation and administration,

³⁶⁸ See Witness Interview SYR.WGA.605_AO, at p. 3.

³⁶⁹ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009; Letter from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0180.021.001-003, at SYR.D0180.021.001; Stationing and Composition of the Armed Forces Units and Formations Active in the Governorate of Idleb, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

³⁷⁰ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009; Stationing and Composition of the Armed Forces Units and Formations Active in the Governorate of Idleb, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

³⁷¹ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009; Telegram from the Commander of the 7th Division, 5 February 2012, SYR.D0208.027.008.

³⁷² Communication from the 7th Division, 24 March 2012, SYR.D0179.026.045; Communication from the Commander of the 88th Brigade, 27 April 2012, SYR.D0179.048.064; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 4 April 2012, SYR.D0183.080.025-026.

³⁷³ Memorandum to Cease the Search for a Conscript Missing from the Armed Forces, 25 September 2013, SYR.D0242.087.009; Relocation Order, 10 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.188.

³⁷⁴ See Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004.

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topography, and meteorology.³⁷⁵ CIJA documentary holdings and an insider witness interview confirm the existence of several of these staff branches of the 9th Division Command, including:³⁷⁶

- Operations Branch;³⁷⁷
- Reconnaissance Branch;³⁷⁸
- Signal Branch;³⁷⁹
- Engineering Branch;
- Chemical Branch;
- Air Defence Branch;
- Armament Branch;³⁸⁰
- Artillery Branch;³⁸¹
- Administrative Affairs Branch;
- Political Orientation Branch;
- Technical Affairs Branch; and the
- Organisation Branch.

³⁷⁵ Divisional Staff Instructions, undated, SYR.D0208.001.008-014, at SYR.D0208.001.008.

³⁷⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 5 (the witness is a former member of the Artillery Branch of the 9th Division and listed several branches of the 9th Division Command).

³⁷⁷ See Communication from the 9th Division, 2 October 2011, SYR.D0217.005.016; Circular from the 9th Division, 29 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.035; Plan for the Execution of a Scientific Study for 2012 in the 9th Division, 16 April 2012, SYR.D0217.024.008-015.

³⁷⁸ See Staff Reconnaissance Combat Instructions, 3 July 2011, SYR.D0208.052.010-014; Communication from the 9th Division, 29 January 2012, SYR.D0220.034.016.

³⁷⁹ Communication from the 1st Corps, 11 May 2012, SYR.D0221.089.001; Special Instructions for Testing the Warning System in the 9th Division During the Month of September 2012, 2 September 2012, SYR.D0217.006.020.

³⁸⁰ Communication from the 52nd Mechanised Brigade, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0217.067.006-007 (the Armament Branch of the 9th Division is listed as one of the recipients of this document).

³⁸¹ See Telegram from the 1st Corps, 24 September 2012, SYR.D0234.021.012; Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.008; Instructions from the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles of the 1st Corps, 24 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.003 (note however that these documents only reference the “Artillery” of the 9th Division or the “Artillery Commander”). See also Combat Instructions Template from the Artillery Branch of the 23rd Division, undated, SYR.D0235.047.007 (confirming the existence of division-level artillery branches).

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The 9th Division was composed of four key subordinate brigades. Those were the 33rd,³⁸² 34th,³⁸³ and 43rd³⁸⁴ Armoured Brigades, and the 52nd Mechanised Brigade.³⁸⁵ In terms of combat support units, the 9th Division also included the 89th Artillery Regiment.³⁸⁶

15th Special Forces Division

The 15th Special Forces Division was based in Qalat Salkhad, As-Sweida Governorate.³⁸⁷ The 15th Division was composed of the 44th³⁸⁸ and 127th³⁸⁹ Special Forces Regiments, the 404th Armoured Regiment,³⁹⁰ and the 405th Artillery Regiment.³⁹¹

³⁸² Transfer Order No. 53 from the General Command, 19 June 2012, SYR.D0220.038.005-006; Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Division, December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.010; Exceptional Promotion Order, 9 June 2012, SYR.D0220.055.001.

³⁸³ Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Division, December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.010; Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009; Circular from the Commander of the 9th Division, 19 April 2013, SYR.D0220.019.003.

³⁸⁴ Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Division, December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.010; Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009; Circular from the Commander of the 9th Division, 19 April 2013, SYR.D0220.019.003.

³⁸⁵ Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Division, December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.010; Exceptional Promotion Order, 9 June 2012, SYR.D0220.055.001; Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.009.

³⁸⁶ Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Division, December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.010; Circular from the Commander of the 9th Division, 19 April 2013, SYR.D0220.019.003; Administrative Order from the Artillery Branch of the 9th Division, 2 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.016.

³⁸⁷ Witness Interview SYR.WFA.505_AO, at p. 3. *See also* Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

³⁸⁸ Telegram No. 48 from the Operations Branch of the 15th Division, 4 February 2012, SYR.D0208.027.018; Communication from the Commander of the Northern Region, 30 September 2011, SYR.D0175.001.026; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

³⁸⁹ Carried Telegram from the 127th Regiment of 15th Special Forces Division, 30 June 2012, SYR.D0198.017.028; Report by the Commander of the 127th Special Forces Regiment, 30 June 2012, SYR.D0198.017.029 (signed by the Commander Staff Brigadier General Paratrooper Midhat Mahmoud Jannoud, concerning the abduction of a soldier); Administrative Order, 22 November 2010, SYR.D0070.028.130.

³⁹⁰ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 4 November 2011, SYR.D0197.071.002; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 4 November 2011, SYR.D0197.071.031.

³⁹¹ Telegram No. 49 from the Commander of the 15th Special Forces Division, 2 February 2012, SYR.D0208.027.005; Administrative Order, 22 November 2010, SYR.D0070.028.130.

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2nd Corps

a. Headquarters and Area of Responsibility

The 2nd Corps' headquarters were in the area of Sabbura, Rural Damascus.³⁹² The locations of its subordinate units' headquarters suggest that the 2nd Corps was responsible primarily for the area west of Damascus. This covered the Qatana District (10th Mechanised Division)³⁹³ as well as the mountainous areas on the border with Lebanon (14th Special Forces Division).³⁹⁴

b. Personnel

In early 2012, the Commander of the 2nd Corps was Major General Ali Dargham.³⁹⁵ The Chief of Staff was Major General Izzudin Abu Isa.³⁹⁶

³⁹² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6 (the witness was a career artillery officer with the rank of colonel in the Artillery Branch of the 2nd Corps Command until July 2012 who previously served in artillery units of the 4th and 9th Armoured Divisions).

³⁹³ See Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 August 2012, SYR.D0226.025.017.

³⁹⁴ See Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006 (according to this document, the 14th Division's base was in Rakhleh, Qatana District). See also Witness Interview SYR.WGA.613_AO, at p. 4.

³⁹⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6.

³⁹⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6.

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c. Principal Units

The 2nd Corps comprised the 10th Mechanised Division,³⁹⁷ the 14th Special Forces Division,³⁹⁸ the 18th Motorised Brigade,³⁹⁹ the 67th Artillery Regiment,⁴⁰⁰ and the 167th Anti-tank Regiment.⁴⁰¹

10th Mechanised Division

The 10th Mechanised Division was based in Qatana, Rural Damascus.⁴⁰² It comprised the 62nd⁴⁰³ and 85th⁴⁰⁴ Mechanised Brigades, the 51st Armoured Brigade,⁴⁰⁵ and the 122nd Artillery Regiment.⁴⁰⁶

³⁹⁷ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.003; Communication from the 10th Division, 31 December 2010, SYR.D0019.098.087.

³⁹⁸ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.003.

³⁹⁹ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Administrative Order, 22 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6.

⁴⁰⁰ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 22 March 2011, SYR.D0182.020.031.

⁴⁰¹ Log of the Aleppo Infantry Academy with Sent Mail in the period from 10 January 2011 to 8 May 2011, SYR.D0012.108.001-197, at SYR.D0012.108.015; Numerical Table for the Independent Battalions and Companies in Idleb Governorate as of 11 April 2013, 11 April 2013, SYR.D0261.006.001-003, at SYR.D0261.006.002.

⁴⁰² Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 August 2012, SYR.D0226.025.017.

⁴⁰³ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010

⁴⁰⁴ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010

⁴⁰⁵ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010

⁴⁰⁶ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 222 to the Office of the Head of Military Intelligence, 11 August 2013, SYR.D0179.050.246-250, at SYR.D0179.050.248.

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14th Special Forces Division

In 2013, the 14th Division was based in Rakhleh, Rural Damascus.⁴⁰⁷ The division was composed of the 36th,⁴⁰⁸ 554th⁴⁰⁹ and 556th Special Forces Regiments,⁴¹⁰ and the 37th Artillery Regiment.⁴¹¹

18th Motorised Brigade

The 18th Brigade was an independent unit subordinate to the 2nd Corps.⁴¹²

67th Artillery Regiment

The 67th Artillery Regiment was an independent combat support unit subordinate to the 2nd Corps.⁴¹³

167th Anti-Tank Regiment

The 167th Anti-tank Regiment was an independent combat support unit subordinate to the 2nd Corps.⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰⁷ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Witness Interview SYR.WGA.613_AO, at p. 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Witness Interviews SYR.WGA.661_AO, at p. 4; SYR.WGC.504_EO, at p. 2.

⁴⁰⁹ Information Card, 12 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.022; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 13 February 2011, SYR.D0181.043.047.

⁴¹⁰ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006; Movement Order, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 2 April 2012, SYR.D0184.002.006-008; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 29 April 2012, SYR.D0179.047.113-114.

⁴¹¹ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Conscript of the Armed Forces, 22 December 2012, SYR.D0242.058.009; Instruction from the Command of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces, 15 May 2009, SYR.D0223.074.018-039 at SYR.D0223.074.027.

⁴¹² Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Administrative Order, 22 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.626_AO, at p. 6.

⁴¹³ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 22 March 2011, SYR.D0182.020.031.

⁴¹⁴ Log of the Aleppo Infantry Academy with Sent Mail in the period from 10 January 2011 to 8 May 2011, SYR.D0012.108.001-197, at SYR.D0012.108.015; Numerical Table for the Independent Battalions and Companies in Idleb Governorate as of 11 April 2013, 11 April 2013, SYR.D0261.006.001-003, at SYR.D0261.006.002.

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3rd Corps

a. Headquarters and Area of Responsibility

The 3rd Corps' headquarters were in Al-Qutayfah, Rural Damascus.⁴¹⁵ Despite this, the locations of headquarters of its subordinate units suggest that the 3rd Corps was responsible mainly for central and north-east Syria. For example, the 11th Armoured Division was based in Homs Governorate,⁴¹⁶ the 18th Armoured Division was based in Al-Farqalas, Homs Governorate,⁴¹⁷ and the 17th Infantry Division was based in Ein Issa, Ar-Raqqa Governorate.⁴¹⁸

b. Personnel

Major General Talal Mustafa Tlas was Commander of the 3rd Corps in March 2011.⁴¹⁹ Major General Wajih Yahya Mahmoud then became Commander of the 3rd Corps, and assumed that office by 25 July 2012.⁴²⁰ Mahmoud remained in that position until at least 17 September 2012.⁴²¹ Major General Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim had become Commander of the 3rd Corps by the end of 2012.⁴²²

⁴¹⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.070_AO, at p. 1 (the witness was an officer with the rank of Captain who defected from the 3rd Corps Command facilities). *See also* List of Telephone numbers of Units and Commanders of the 3rd Corps, undated, SYR.D0014.030.055-056 (according to this document, the 3rd Corps' HQ was in Khan Al-Arous, Al-Qutayfah District).

⁴¹⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WGC.502_EO, at p. 3.

⁴¹⁷ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

⁴¹⁸ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

⁴¹⁹ Extract from Organisational Instructions for the 17th Division Command and Staff Project Implemented in the Second Half of April 2011, 19 March 2011, SYR.D0090.001.006-007, SYR.D0090.001.026.

⁴²⁰ Communication from the Commander of the 3rd Corps, 25 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.001-002; Communication from the Commander of the 3rd Corps, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0197.043.003; Communication from the Commander of the 3rd Corps, 28 July 2012, SYR.D0181.031.012. Prior to his appointment as Commander of the 3rd Corps, Mahmoud served as Commander of the 18th Division (*See* Communication from the 18th Division to the Infantry Academy, 9 October 2011, SYR.D0017.089.069).

⁴²¹ Administrative Order, 17 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.026.

⁴²² Mission Order from the Homs Military and Security Official and Commander of the 3rd Corps, undated, SYR.D0066.049.004 (signed by or on behalf of Major General Ahmad Jamil Ibrahim. While the document is not dated, it reports on the death of an individual which occurred on 1 October 2012 according to an attached death certificate). *See* Death Certificate, undated, SYR.D0066.049.008.

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The Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps in March 2011 was Major General Ali Ahmad Suleiman.⁴²³ He was promoted to Commander of the Popular Army in March 2012.⁴²⁴ Major General Naim Jasem Suleiman became 3rd Corps Chief of Staff by 31 May 2012.⁴²⁵

c. Principal Units

The 3rd Corps was composed of the 11th Armoured Division,⁴²⁶ the 17th Infantry Division⁴²⁷ and the 18th Armoured Division.⁴²⁸ It also had two independent combat support units: the 64th Artillery Regiment⁴²⁹ and the 168th Anti-tank Regiment.⁴³⁰

⁴²³ Extract from Organisational Instructions for the 17th Division Command and Staff Project Implemented in the Second Half of April 2011, 19 March 2011, SYR.D0090.001.006-026.

⁴²⁴ Hand-delivered Telegram, 26 March 2012, SYR.D0179.024.027.

⁴²⁵ Communication from Air Force Intelligence Central Region Branch, 31 May 2012, SYR.D0124.015.002.

⁴²⁶ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010-011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004; List of Names of the Injured Officers, NCOs and Elements of 385th Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.018; List with the Names of Martyr Officers, NCOs and Members of 458th Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 May 2012, SYR.D0124.030.016; List of Names from the 458th Reconnaissance Battalion with Personnel Who Executed the Mission in Ar-Rastan District, 2011, SYR.D0124.031.002-005.

⁴²⁷ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Administrative Order, 2012, SYR.D0100.026.019.

⁴²⁸ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010-011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Communication from the Commander of the 18th Division, 9 October 2011, SYR.0017.089.069; Communication from the 18th Division, 8 October 2011, SYR.D0017.089.070.

⁴²⁹ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.007.

⁴³⁰ Communication from 168th Anti-tank Regiment, 9 January 2011, SYR.D0019.092.008; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.003. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.546_AE, at p. 3.

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11th Armoured Division

The 11th Armoured Division's headquarters were in Hasyaa, Homs Governorate.⁴³¹

The 11th Armoured Division was made up of the 47th,⁴³² 60th,⁴³³ 67th Armoured Brigades,⁴³⁴ the 87th Mechanised Brigade,⁴³⁵ and the 135th Artillery Regiment.⁴³⁶

⁴³¹ Witness Interview SYR.WGC.502_EO, at p. 3 (prior to his defection, the witness was serving as the Chief of Staff of Artillery for the 11th Division).

⁴³² Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 22 September 2011, SYR.D0175.010.041.

⁴³³ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.010; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004.

⁴³⁴ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 19 April 2011, SYR.D0183.060.006; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 4 April 2012, SYR.D0183.080.028.

⁴³⁵ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004; Daily Report on Incidents That Occurred in Idleb Governorate, 11 April 2012, SYR.D0180.009.067.

⁴³⁶ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.004; Information Card, 22 March 2012, SYR.D0179.023.009; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0185.066.021-030, at SYR.D0185.066.023.

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17th Infantry Division

The 17th Division was headquartered in Ein Issa, Ar-Raqqa Governorate.⁴³⁷ The 17th Division was composed of the 93rd Armoured Regiment,⁴³⁸ 123rd⁴³⁹ and 137th Infantry Regiments,⁴⁴⁰ the 54th Special Forces Regiment,⁴⁴¹ and the 121st Artillery Regiment.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁷ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005.

⁴³⁸ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Communication from the Military and Security Committee in the Governorate of Idleb, 9 April 2012, SYR.D0179.020.080; Presentation Memorandum from the Commander of the 17th Division, 7 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.012.

⁴³⁹ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Ledger with the Names of Deserters from the Area of Al-Maarra No. 2, 13 March 2013, SYR.D0193.011.001-404, at SYR.D0193.011.303.

⁴⁴⁰ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 243, 23 December 2013, SYR.D0180.029.031; Memorandum to Stop the Search for a Defector Conscript from the Armed Forces, 22 February 2013, SYR.D0193.070.005.

⁴⁴¹ Presentation Memorandum from the Commander of the 17th Division, 7 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.012; Communication from Political Security Deir-ez-Zor Branch, 28 June 2012, SYR.D0087.006.001-003; Communication from Deputy Military General Prosecutor in Aleppo, 26 June 2012, SYR.D0179.004.032 (mentioning the “54th Special Forces Regiment”). *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WCA.539_AO, at p. 5 (stating that the 54th Special Forces Regiment in which he served became affiliated to the 17th Division in 2007).

⁴⁴² List of Names of the Members of the 178th Missiles Battalion Command Platoon Participating in the Basic Training Examination, 2010, SYR.D0078.007.002; Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 20 August 2013, SYR.D0242.075.004.

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18th Armoured Division

The 18th Armoured Division was based in Al-Farqalas, Homs Governorate.⁴⁴³ It comprised the following units: the 131st,⁴⁴⁴ 134th,⁴⁴⁵ 167th Armoured Brigades,⁴⁴⁶ the 120th Mechanised Brigade,⁴⁴⁷ and the 125th Artillery Regiment.⁴⁴⁸

64th Artillery Regiment

The 64th Regiment was an independent unit within the 3rd Corps.⁴⁴⁹ The 64th Regiment was based in Shinshar, Homs Governorate.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴³ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006.

⁴⁴⁴ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Logbook of Communications by Military Police in Idleb, 2011, SYR.D0188.009.001-394, at SYR.D0188.009.211; Interrogations of the Joint Security Committee with Arrestees at the Idleb Central Prison as a Result of the Incidents in the Governorate of Idleb on 26 September 2011, undated, SYR.D0175.012.006-014, at SYR.D0175.012.012.

⁴⁴⁵ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Communication from 18th Division to 134th Brigade, SYR.D0017.089.068.

⁴⁴⁶ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 19 October 2012, SYR.D0180.036.003; Telegram from Military Police Branch in Homs to the Military Prosecutor in Homs, 3 September 2014, SYR.D0194.001.023.

⁴⁴⁷ Instructions for Collaboration of Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, Formations of the Naval Forces and Coastal District, and Airdrop Groups after Landing, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-013, at SYR.D0220.005.011; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.007; Telegram from the Homs Police Command, 31 October 2011, SYR.D0088.010.005; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 261, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0185.066.021-030, at SYR.D0185.066.023.

⁴⁴⁸ Table with the Names of Military Deserters, 1 March 2012, SYR.D0180.010.020-025, at SYR.D0180.010.023; Interrogation Files of Individuals by Political Security Deir-ez-Zor Branch, 1 June 2012, SYR.D0100.041.001-015, at SYR.D0100.041.003.

⁴⁴⁹ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.007.

⁴⁵⁰ Table Showing Units and Formations Operating in Idleb Governorate, 25 February 2013, SYR.D0261.006.004-006, at SYR.D0261.006.005.

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168th Anti-tank Regiment

The 168th Anti-tank Regiment was an independent unit within the 3rd Corps.⁴⁵¹ The 168th Regiment was based near Shinshar, Homs Governorate.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵¹ Communication from 168th Anti-tank Regiment, 9 January 2011, SYR.D0019.092.008; Administrative Order, 26 December 2011, SYR.D0019.011.001-019, at SYR.D0019.011.003. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.546_AE, at p. 3.

⁴⁵² Witness Interview SYR.WGA.546_AE, at p. 3.

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VI. The General Staff (*heiat al-arkan al-aamma*)

Every command or formation headquarters within the Army and Armed Forces had administrative staffs. An undated document with division-level staff instructions states that “staff carry out their tasks based on the decisions and instructions of the commander and instructions issued by the higher-level staff”.⁴⁵³ The General Staff is identified in this document as the highest level staff body.

This section presents the staff departments⁴⁵⁴ of the General Staff.

Structure

The General Staff consisted of at least twenty different bodies (departments, directorates, commissions, administrations, branches, including headquarters).⁴⁵⁵ Their functions were generally indicated by their title, including reconnaissance and intelligence gathering,⁴⁵⁶ evaluation of combat operations,⁴⁵⁷ provision of military equipment⁴⁵⁸ and food supplies,⁴⁵⁹ instructions on the usage of certain types of arms and munitions,⁴⁶⁰ mobilisation of military

⁴⁵³ Divisional Staff Instructions, undated, SYR.D0208.001.008-014, at SYR.D0208.001.008.

⁴⁵⁴ The term “department” is used in this report as a generic reference to the various staff bodies of the Army and Armed Forces whether they are formally a “department” (in Arabic, “*shoaba*” [شعبة]), an “administration” (in Arabic, “*idara*” [إدارة]), a “commission” (in Arabic, “*heiat*” [هيئة]), or a “directorate” (in Arabic, “*mudiriya*” [مديرية]). Please note that each of these Arabic words may have several translations in English. For example, *heiat* can be translated as “body”, “commission”, “board”, or “authority”.

⁴⁵⁵ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁴⁵⁶ See e.g. Letter from Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.041; Security Information Report on the Latest Incidents in Syria from the Director of Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.042-044.

⁴⁵⁷ See e.g. Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014.

⁴⁵⁸ See e.g. Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade, March 2011, SYR.D0226.024.005; Communication from the Signal Administration, 14 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.008.

⁴⁵⁹ See e.g. Communication from the Operations Commission, 21 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.013.

⁴⁶⁰ See e.g. Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014.

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units,⁴⁶¹ training of personnel and exercises,⁴⁶² and protection of documents and communications.⁴⁶³ The majority of these bodies were overseen by a Deputy Chief of Staff.⁴⁶⁴

Each department within the General Staff had a head or director and ran its own administration.⁴⁶⁵ Documents issued by the staff departments, particularly wide-ranging circulars, were often signed by the Deputy Commander or the Chief of Staff without the name of the head of the department appearing;⁴⁶⁶ some were also signed by the head of department.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶¹ See e.g. Carried Telegram by the Strategic Operational Planning Administration of the Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048 (according to this document, on 18 March 2011, the Strategic Operational Planning Department issued a notice signed by the then Minister of Defence, *Imad* Mahmoud, placing key Regime forces at “100% mobilization”). See also Administrative Order, 10 April 2011, SYR.D0067.003.046.

⁴⁶² See e.g. Circular from the Educational Facilities Administration of the Training Commission, 14 March 2012, SYR.D0063.033.080.

⁴⁶³ See e.g. Circular from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 5 July 2011, SYR.D0015.039.001-002, at SYR.D0015.039.001; Circular from the Signal Administration, 23 December 2011, SYR.D0236.004.041.

⁴⁶⁴ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁴⁶⁵ See e.g. Communication from the Operations Commission, 23 June 2010, SYR.D0019.052.004; Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016; Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.013; Communication from the Chemical Warfare Administration, 12 April 2010, SYR.D0019.061.001; Transfer Order No. 165, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0017.089.051-052; Circular by the Wireless Communication Branch of the Signal Administration, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0002.184.001.

⁴⁶⁶ See e.g. Circular from the Wired Communication Branch of the Signal Administration, 15 June 2013, SYR.D0065.001.078; Circular from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 5 July 2011, SYR.D0015.039.001-002; Circular from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 5 June 2012, SYR.D0020.117.008; Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004; Circular from the Armament Administration, 9 February 2012, SYR.D0021.024.016; Circular from the Operations Commission, Operations Directorate, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 2 September 2012, SYR.D0181.030.039; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 13 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.022; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.005; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.014; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0070.011.034; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.011; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 1 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.016; Circular from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission, 25 March 2012, SYR.D0021.020.010.

⁴⁶⁷ See e.g. Letter from Reconnaissance Administration, 20 August 2013, SYR.D0179.030.005-006; Letter from Reconnaissance Administration, 24 March 2012, SYR.D0179.026.088; Communication from the Service Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department, 4 August 2013, SYR.D0180.014.110; Circular from the Supply Branch of the Signal Administration, 24 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.030; Circular from the Wireless Communication Branch of the Signal Administration, 2012, SYR.D0214.034.008; Letter from the Stamps Office of the Code and Documents Security Branch, 29 January 2011, SYR.D0018.059.009; Administrative Order by the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 10 October 2010, SYR.D0234.024.008; Guidance of the Commander of Artillery and Missiles Forces, 11 November 2010, SYR.D0234.024.013-018; Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014; Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016.

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Departments of the General Staff often disseminated orders, circulars, instructions or information to their counterparts in subordinate commands. For example, on 9 December 2012, the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces of the General Staff issued an Administrative Order giving detailed instructions on the firing of artillery. This order was circulated directly to the “Heads of Artillery of the Corps, Divisions and Independent Regiments” in subordinate formations.⁴⁶⁸ Similarly, on 24 January 2012, the Signal Administration sent a circular through its Logistics Branch giving orders on how to protect switchboards. This was circulated to the 1st Corps Command “Signal (Section – Branch)”, and then to the 9th Division Signal Branch and on to the Brigades.⁴⁶⁹ Other staff departments worked in a similar fashion.⁴⁷⁰

Information also went from subordinate staff departments to their counterparts in the General Staff. For example, on 14 December 2011, the Deputy Commander ordered that reports on ammunition consumed or lost were to be submitted within twenty-four hours to the Armament Administration through the armament branches in the subordinate units.⁴⁷¹ Requests for signal equipment also went from the branches in subordinate units to their counterparts in the General Staff.⁴⁷²

There were at least twenty General Staff departments. Most were overseen by a Deputy Chief of Staff, but there were at least three that were not: the Officers’ Affairs Administration, the Political Administration and the Organisation and Administration Department.⁴⁷³

This report will discuss only some of the departments, based on the availability of documentation and the relative importance of the department in question. This report will discuss the Operations Commission, Artillery and Missiles Forces, Signal Administration, Reconnaissance Administration, Armament Administration, Chemical Warfare Administration, Electronic Warfare Administration and the Code and Documents Security Branch, all of which were overseen by

⁴⁶⁸ Administrative Order, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.005. The reference in this document to the “Divisions” appears to be a reference to the independent divisions, such as the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armoured divisions. This is demonstrated by the recipient list.

⁴⁶⁹ Circular from the Signal Administration, 24 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.030. *See also* Circular from the Signal Administration, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0236.004.025.

⁴⁷⁰ *See e.g.* Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016; Communication from the Armament Branch of the 17th Division, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.019.

⁴⁷¹ Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004.

⁴⁷² *See e.g.* Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade, 25 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.016; Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade, March 2011, SYR.D0226.024.005.

⁴⁷³ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

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Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It will also discuss the Organisation and Administration Department, the Officers' Affairs Administration and the Political Administration.

Staff Departments Supervised by a Deputy Chief of Staff

Operations Commission

The Operations Commission of the General Command was the primary staff department used to disseminate instructions from the President,⁴⁷⁴ the Deputy Commander⁴⁷⁵ and the Chief of Staff⁴⁷⁶ to subordinate units, including other departments within the General Command.⁴⁷⁷

a. Personnel

Major General Amin Mahmoud Zaidan became Head of the Operations Commission on or before 23 June 2010.⁴⁷⁸ Major General Ibrahim Jasem Al-Ghaban, previously Commander of the Northern Region,⁴⁷⁹ replaced Major General Amin Mahmoud Zaidan at some point between 4 January 2012⁴⁸⁰ and 21 February 2012.⁴⁸¹ Major General Ibrahim Jasem Al-Ghaban remained Head of the Operations Commission until at least 19 November 2012.⁴⁸² Major General Admoun Wadia Sayegh became Acting Head of the Operations Commission by 17 January 2013⁴⁸³ and remained Acting Head until at least 8 June 2013.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁴ See e.g. Administrative Order by the Operations Commission, 10 April 2011, SYR.D0067.003.046; Movement Order by the Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032 (This order was issued by the Deputy Commander on behalf of the President).

⁴⁷⁵ See e.g. Circular by the Operations Commission, 20 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.005; Carried Telegram from the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.015.

⁴⁷⁶ See e.g. Circular by the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0179.020.052-053; Circular by the Operations Commission, 16 January 2012, SYR.D0234.027.017.

⁴⁷⁷ See e.g. Circular by the Operations Commission, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014; Circular by the Operations Commission, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0070.011.028.

⁴⁷⁸ Communication from the Operations Commission, 23 June 2010, SYR.D0019.052.004.

⁴⁷⁹ See e.g. Communication from the Operations and Training Branch of the Northern Regional Command, 15 December 2011, SYR.D0021.008.032; Table Containing Password and Engagement Words for Units in the Northern Region from 1 January 2012 Until 31 January 2012, 28 December 2011, SYR.D0012.057.001 (signed by or on behalf of the Commander of the Northern Region, Major General Ibrahim Al-Ghaban).

⁴⁸⁰ Table Containing Password and Engagement Words for Units in the Northern Region from 4 January 2012 Until 31 January 2012, 4 January 2012, SYR.D0012.057.001 (this is the latest document identified showing the signature block of Major General Ibrahim Al-Ghaban as Commander of the Northern Region).

⁴⁸¹ Circular by the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0250.148.007 (this is the earliest document identified showing the signature block of Major General Ibrahim Al-Ghaban as Head of the Operations Commission).

⁴⁸² Hand-delivered Telegram No. 48563, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0197.057.015.

⁴⁸³ Hand-delivered Telegram No. 53835, 17 January 2013, SYR.D0208.056.008.

⁴⁸⁴ Hand-delivered Telegram from the Acting Head of the Operations Commission, 8 June 2013, SYR.D0190.033.029.

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b. Functions and Structure

While there is no direct evidence detailing the functions of the Operations Commission at the level of the General Staff, there is a document outlining the responsibility of the Operations Section of the 46th Special Forces Regiment. In that document, the Operations Section is described as the “main and leading section in the staff” and has, among others, the following general tasks:

- a. “collect and study data of situations, prepare tactical and operational calculations and submit the necessary recommendations to the commander so as to enable him to take decisions”;
- b. “draft the commander’s decision, prepare combat instructions and deliver missions to the forces in the right time”;
- “plan operations”;
- c. “record verbal combat orders and instructions issued by the commander and prepare combat reports for submission to the higher level”; and
- d. “keep the combat actions book/combat actions map”.⁴⁸⁵

The Operations Commission of the General Command likely had similar functions. It was likely the “main and leading section in the staff”, as the majority of circulars from the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff, covering a wide variety of topics, were issued through the Operations Commission. For example, the Operations Commission was the department used to disseminate general instructions and information.⁴⁸⁶ It sent out operational instructions regarding the shifting of units from one geographical area to another.⁴⁸⁷ Almost all the circulars disseminated by the Operations Commission were authorised by or on behalf of the Deputy Commander or the

⁴⁸⁵ Organisational Order for Officer and Non-commissioned Officers of the Operations Section in the 46th Special Forces Regiment during Peacetime, 1 January 2012, SYR.D0061.026.020-027, at SYR.D0061.026.020.

⁴⁸⁶ *See e.g.* Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.005-006; Circular from the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0217.030.005-006; Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007; Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 September 2012, SYR.D0181.030.039; Circular from the Operations Commission, 13 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.022; Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.005; Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.014; Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0070.011.034; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147; Circular from the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.011; Circular from the Operations Commission, 1 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.016; Circular from the Operations Commission, 25 March 2012, SYR.D0021.020.017.

⁴⁸⁷ *See e.g.* Movement Order from Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032 (This was copied to the Southern, Central and Northern Regional Commands); Movement Order from Operations Commission, 26 March 2012, SYR.D0179.024.048.

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Chief of Staff.⁴⁸⁸ On rare occasions, the Head of the Operations Commission would sign a document.⁴⁸⁹

The Operations Commission received information from subordinate units which it passed on to senior officers in the General Command,⁴⁹⁰ and was also the body designated to receive information from subordinate units and other staff departments in emergency situations.⁴⁹¹ On 7 May 2011, the Northern Regional Command issued a circular through its Operations and Training Branch, based on instructions from the General Command, which required subordinate units to provide daily reports.⁴⁹² This suggests a desire by the General Command to get more up-to-date information, and using the Operations Commission chain to do so.

As well as collating information for senior officers in the General Command, the Operations Commission provided information to the CCMC on at least one occasion. In Dar'a Governorate, the Regime initiated a military offensive after losing control of certain areas of Dar'a City.⁴⁹³ CCMC minutes state that there was "no contact" from the local Ba'ath Party branch,⁴⁹⁴ the body which was to provide information to the CCMC.⁴⁹⁵ While it was unable to do so, the Operations

⁴⁸⁸ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 20 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.005; Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 June 2012, SYR.D0197.041.013-014; Circular from the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0179.020.052-053; Circular from the Operations Commission, 16 January 2012, SYR.D0234.027.017.

⁴⁸⁹ See e.g. Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0250.148.007; Hand-delivered Telegram No. 48563, 19 November 2012, SYR.D0197.057.015.

⁴⁹⁰ See e.g. Information Card from the Operations Commission, 1 November 2011, SYR.D0184.031.003; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 16 April 2012, SYR.D0183.029.011; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 12 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.041; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.038.

⁴⁹¹ See Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0220.035.002; Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0070.011.028; Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 January 2012, SYR.D0018.071.014 (a document with the same content but seized from a separate source); Circular from the Operations Commission, 20 May 2012, SYR.D0021.023.005; Order by the Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032 (moving units are ordered to report to the Operations Commission concerning implementation of the order and if any emergency arises).

⁴⁹² Instruction from the Northern Regional Command, 8 May 2011, SYR.D0018.019.001.

⁴⁹³ See e.g. CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 2 May 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.017-019, at SYR.E0001.006.019.

⁴⁹⁴ CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 02 May 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.017-019, at SYR.E0001.006.019, at SYR.E0001.006.017.

⁴⁹⁵ See e.g. CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 22 April 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.006-013, at SYR.E0001.006.008.

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Commission took on the role of providing information to the CCMC.⁴⁹⁶ This took place from 2 May 2011 to 7 June 2011.⁴⁹⁷

However, it was not consistent practice for the Operations Commission to assume this role. For example, in early August 2011, the Hama Governorate Security Committee ceased providing reports to the CCMC due to rebels overrunning the city, and there was again a military offensive by the Regime to retake the city. However, CCMC minutes do not reflect any information being received by the CCMC from the Operations Commission during this time.⁴⁹⁸

The Operations Commission had various branches within it which dealt with issues according to their remit, including the Operations Administration, *Diwan* Branch, Strategic Operational Planning Administration, Information Branch Electromagnetic Coordination Branch and the Theatres Branch. These are now discussed.

Operations Administration

The Operations Administration was the principal branch of the Operations Commission through which the General Command disseminated orders and information.

Circulars disseminated through the Operations Administration gave general orders on specific issues. For example, on 8 May 2011, the Deputy Commander cautioned all in the armed forces “to be vigilant and cautious” due to the proliferation of incidents of random shooting.⁴⁹⁹ On 2 July 2011, the Deputy Commander issued another circular in which he gave concrete instructions in ten points on how military personnel were to handle confidential documents and information.⁵⁰⁰ On 12 January 2012, the Deputy Commander disseminated a five-point plan of measures for Army

⁴⁹⁶ Note that this did not involve skipping any levels in the chain of command; the Deputy Commander was a member of the CCMC and part of its decision-making process.

⁴⁹⁷ CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 2 May 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.006.017-019, at SYR.E0001.006.019; CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 7 June 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.008.022-024, at SYR.E0001.008.024.

⁴⁹⁸ See e.g. CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 3 August 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.001.012-016, at SYR.E0001.001.013 (showing that there was no contact in Hama); CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 4 August 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.001.017-018, at SYR.E0001.001.018; CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 5 August 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.001.015-016, at SYR.E0001.001.016; CCMC report on the security situation in the country on 6 August 2011, undated, SYR.E0001.001.019-020, at SYR.E0001.001.020.

⁴⁹⁹ Circular from the Operations Commission, 8 May 2011, SYR.D0220.037.018.

⁵⁰⁰ Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 July 2011, SYR.D0015.033.009-008.

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and Armed Forces units conducting security tasks.⁵⁰¹ On 2 February 2012, the Deputy Commander ordered “periodic and surprise inspections” regarding personnel using military as opposed to civilian identification.⁵⁰² On 2 June 2012, the Deputy Commander issued a ten-point plan covering, among other things, the raising of morale, the maintenance of equipment and the monitoring of opposition forces.⁵⁰³ In September 2012, orders were issued to abide by previous circulars.⁵⁰⁴ There are many more examples of orders from the Operations Administration of the Operations Commission,⁵⁰⁵ including repeated circulars on the proper treatment of civilians at checkpoints.⁵⁰⁶ The General Command also disseminated circulars with more specific orders through the Operations Administration, covering matters such as restricting public traffic on a specific road,⁵⁰⁷ or facilitating the passage of members of the security agencies through checkpoints.⁵⁰⁸ The Operations Administration also used to send telegrams with direct orders to specific units⁵⁰⁹ and to inform other branches of decisions made.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰¹ Circular from the Operations Commission, 12 January 2012, SYR.D0220.034.012.

⁵⁰² Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.009.

⁵⁰³ Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 June 2012, SYR.D0197.041.013-014.

⁵⁰⁴ Circular from the Operations Commission, September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.013.

⁵⁰⁵ Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0234.027.005-006; Circular from the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0217.030.005-006; Circular from the Operations Commission, 23 July 2012, SYR.D0197.048.007; Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 September 2012, SYR.D0181.030.039; Circular from the Operations Commission, 13 September 2012, SYR.D0197.050.022; Circular from the Operations Commission, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.051.005; Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.014; Circular from the Operations Commission, 21 November 2011, SYR.D0070.011.034; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0070.011.147; Circular from the Operations Commission, 7 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.011; Circular from the Operations Commission, 1 April 2012, SYR.D0021.020.016; Circular from the Operations Commission, 25 March 2012, SYR.D0021.020.017.

⁵⁰⁶ Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 February 2012, SYR.D0070.011.062; Circular from the Operations Commission, 11 June 2012, SYR.D0234.027.015; Circular from the Operations Commission, 10 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.001-002.

⁵⁰⁷ Circular from the Operations Commission, 16 August 2012, SYR.D0197.049.001.

⁵⁰⁸ Circular from the Operations Commission, 30 August 2012, SYR.D0197.049.023.

⁵⁰⁹ Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 6 September 2012, SYR.D0220.009.015; Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0063.033.015 (it was disseminated to the 24th Air Defence Division, going through the appropriate channels); Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 6 September 2012, SYR.D0220.009.016; Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 4 August 2012, SYR.D0197.048.009. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WGA.592_AO, at p. 5 (The witness, who is a former colonel in the Northern Regional Command, stated that there were communications that were “confidential” and were opened by the regional commander himself).

⁵¹⁰ Communication from the Operations Commission, 21 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.013.

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Diwan Branch

The *Diwan* (which can be translated as the “Office”) Branch of the Operations Commission appears to have had a lesser role in the distribution of circulars from the General Command as compared to that of the Operations Administration. The distinction between the role of the *Diwan* Branch and the Operations Administration is however difficult to assess, other than the volume of work.⁵¹¹ The *Diwan* Branch issued circulars dealing the security of information,⁵¹² the “re-grouping of formations and units in areas that suit the subsequent missions”⁵¹³ and reminding commanders to implement the content of previously issued circulars.⁵¹⁴

Strategic Operational Planning Administration

The Strategic Operational Planning Administration of the Operations Commission dealt with planning for future events. For example, on 18 March 2011, the Deputy Commander placed certain Regime forces on “100 percent mobilization”,⁵¹⁵ including the Military Intelligence Department, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, the 1st Corps of the Army, the 15th Special Forces Division, certain other smaller Special Forces battalions and regiments, the Military Police in certain governorates and personnel from the Coastal Regional Command, the Air Defence Command and the Navy Command.⁵¹⁶ The Strategic Operational Planning Administration also used to issue warnings of potential attacks from abroad,⁵¹⁷ strategic planning documents which formed a basis for units to deploy regarding potential attack from abroad,⁵¹⁸ and the movement of military personnel.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹¹ The respective numbers of documents in the CIJA’s custody issued by the Operations Administration and the *Diwan* Branch suggest that the Operations Administration issued many more circulars than the *Diwan* Branch.

⁵¹² Circular from the Operations Commission, 2 July 2011, SYR.D0015.033.009-008.

⁵¹³ Circular from the Operations Commission, 24 July 2011, SYR.D0018.071.001.

⁵¹⁴ Circular from the Operations Commission, 5 November 2011, SYR.D0069.001.041-042.

⁵¹⁵ Hand-delivered Telegram by the Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048. *See also* Communication from the Operations Commission, 21 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.013 (According to this document, as of 10 June 2011, forces of the 17th Division were also “100% mobilized”).

⁵¹⁶ Hand-delivered Telegram by the Operations Commission, 2011, SYR.D0067.003.048. *See also* Administrative Order, 10 April 2011, SYR.D0067.003.046.

⁵¹⁷ Hand-delivered Telegram from the Operations Commission, 21 February 2012, SYR.D0021.023.036.

⁵¹⁸ *See* Order by the Operations Commission, 1 January 2012, SYR.D0061.028.120-125.

⁵¹⁹ *See* Order by the Operations Commission, 25 September 2011, SYR.D0175.013.032; Movement Order from Operations Commission, 26 March 2012, SYR.D0179.024.048.

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Information Branch

The Information Branch received information from subordinate units through a template called the “information card”. The substance of the information dealt with specific issues, for example desertions⁵²⁰ or the presence of armed groups.⁵²¹

The information cards included the name of the unit sending the information, the date and time when an incident report was received, as well as the type of communication system used to transfer the message.⁵²²

The information card would be presented to the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff to review and issue opinions, then to the Deputy Commander for his decision, normally by handwritten note on the document itself.⁵²³ The document would then be sent back through the Operations Commission to relevant units for the decision to be carried out.⁵²⁴

Electromagnetic Coordination Branch

The Electromagnetic Coordination Branch addressed issues related to communications and signal issues in the Army and Armed Forces.⁵²⁵

For example, on 26 July 2012, the Deputy Commander, issued a circular through the Electromagnetic Coordination Branch in which he asked that samples of all seized electronic devices be submitted to a special committee formed by the Electronic Warfare Administration.⁵²⁶ The purpose of this committee was to study the devices and find ways to disturb and jam opposition communications. On the same day, 26 July 2012, the Deputy Commander disseminated another

⁵²⁰ Information Card from the Operations Commission, 1 November 2011, SYR.D0184.031.003; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 16 April 2012, SYR.D0183.029.011; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 12 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.041; Information Card from the Operations Commission, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.038.

⁵²¹ Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010.

⁵²² See e.g. Information Card from the Operations Commission, 1 November 2011, SYR.D0184.031.003.

⁵²³ See e.g. Information Card from Operations Commission, 3 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.010.

⁵²⁴ Communication from the Commander of the Northern Region, 4 April 2012, SYR.D0021.023.009.

⁵²⁵ At present, the CIJA is only aware of two documents issued by the Electromagnetic Coordination Branch. See Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.001; Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.039.003.

⁵²⁶ Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.001. The document was issued on behalf of the President.

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circular through the Electromagnetic Coordination Branch in which he ordered all users of wireless communication devices in the Army and Armed forces to use codes and encryption in order to guarantee confidentiality.⁵²⁷

Theatres Branch

The Theatres Branch appears to have dealt with the maintenance and administration of certain military facilities and infrastructure, such as housing estates for military personnel⁵²⁸ or training grounds.⁵²⁹

For example, on 17 January 2011, the Deputy Commander issued an administrative order through the Theatres Branch, which stipulated the establishment of a commission that was to be led by the Head of the Theatres Branch.⁵³⁰ The purpose of the commission was to evaluate all files received by the Theatres Branch from the Ministry of Local Administration in relation to a property planning scheme.⁵³¹ On 17 May 2012 the Deputy Commander gave instructions, through the Theatres Branch, to commanders on what should be done with vacant apartments previously occupied by personnel who had deserted.⁵³²

Artillery and Missiles Forces

The Artillery and Missiles Forces gave instructions on all matters relating to artillery, as well as keeping records of artillery training undertaken by individual soldiers and officers. Documents were signed by either the Chief of Staff⁵³³ or the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces.⁵³⁴

⁵²⁷ Circular from the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.039.003.

⁵²⁸ See e.g. Administrative Order from the Theatres Branch of the Operations Commission, 17 May 2012, SYR.D0021.021.031.

⁵²⁹ See e.g. Communication from the Operations Commission, 23 June 2010, SYR.D0019.052.004; Committee Report from the Northern Regional Command, 28 April 2011, SYR.D0021.003.008.

⁵³⁰ Administrative Order from the Operations Commission, 17 January 2011, SYR.D0181.032.003.

⁵³¹ Administrative Order from the Operations Commission, 17 January 2011, SYR.D0181.032.003.

⁵³² Administrative Order from the Operations Commission, 17 May 2012, SYR.D0021.021.031.

⁵³³ See e.g. Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014 (It is presumed that the Deputy Commander was also able to sign and disseminate orders through this department).

⁵³⁴ See Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 24 June 2013, SYR.D0217.030.008.

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a. Personnel

The Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces from at least 10 October 2010 was Major General Muhammad Yousef Mahmoud.⁵³⁵ He remained in that position until at least 21 December 2011.⁵³⁶ For at least the period 22 August 2012⁵³⁷ to 24 June 2013,⁵³⁸ Major General Jumaa Muhammad Al-Jasem was Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces.

b. Functions and Structure

The Artillery and Missiles Forces dealt with the use of artillery throughout the Army and Armed Forces. Its branches dealt with specific functions and included an Operations Branch (*i.e.*, its own operations section that was different to the Operations Commission of the General Command), a Training Branch and the Missiles Administration.

Operations Branch

The Operations Branch of the Artillery and Missiles Forces was the main vehicle through which the General Command gave operational instructions to subordinate artillery units. The subject-matter of these instructions included the regulation of weapons,⁵³⁹ prohibition of the use of certain types of artillery systems and ammunition,⁵⁴⁰ the use of ammunition,⁵⁴¹ prohibition of use of artillery without observation,⁵⁴² a detailed list of instructions on how to fire artillery properly,⁵⁴³ and instructions on combat preparedness for artillery units.”⁵⁴⁴ The Operations Branch also had a

⁵³⁵ See Administrative Order by the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 10 October 2010, SYR.D0234.024.008; Guidance of the Commander of Artillery and Missiles Forces, 11 November 2010, SYR.D0234.024.013-018.

⁵³⁶ Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.013.

⁵³⁷ Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014.

⁵³⁸ Circular by the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 24 June 2013, SYR.D0217.030.008.

⁵³⁹ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 24 June 2013, SYR.D0217.030.008.

⁵⁴⁰ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.007; Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 November 2013, SYR.D0190.081.025.

⁵⁴¹ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.008. See also Telegram from the Artillery and Missiles Branch of the 1st Corps Command, Artillery and Missiles Branch, 24 September 2012, SYR.D0234.021.013.

⁵⁴² Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 22 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.014. This order was disseminated down the chain of command. See Communication from the Commander of the Artillery of the 9th Armoured Division, 30 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.015. It was also reissued some months later by the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces. See Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 9 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.007.

⁵⁴³ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 27 November 2012, SYR.D0234.021.011.

⁵⁴⁴ Administrative Order from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 2 August 2012, SYR.D0234.021.016.

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role in the resupply of certain missiles. For example, on 9 December 2012, the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces issued a circular ordering that rear covers, of BM-21 rockets in particular, should be sent to the Scientific Studies and Research Centre's Manufacturing Branch for use in future manufacturing, and that rockets would only be delivered to the units according to the number of rear covers sent.⁵⁴⁵

Training Branch

The Training Branch provided training to commanders of subordinate units and issued guidance on artillery issues.⁵⁴⁶ It also provided feedback on training carried out in subordinate formations,⁵⁴⁷ and requested information on training carried out by them.⁵⁴⁸

Missiles Administration

The only identified documents from the Missiles Administration concern communications with the Aleppo Infantry Academy about an award for a junior officer serving in the 157th Missiles Brigade. From this series of documents, it appears that Major General Jawdat Salibi Muwwas was the Director of the Missiles Administration in December 2011 and that the Missiles Administration had at least one independent unit, the 157th Missiles Brigade, directly subordinated to it that was specialised in the use of missiles.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁵ Circular from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 27 November 2012, SYR.D0234.021.009. The Deputy Commander issued a circular with similar content on 6 December 2012. *See* Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0234.021.002.

⁵⁴⁶ Administrative Order from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 10 October 2010, SYR.D0234.024.008.

⁵⁴⁷ Guidance of the Commander of the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 11 November 2010, SYR.D0234.024.013-018.

⁵⁴⁸ Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 21 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.013; Request for information by the Training Branch of the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 18 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.005.

⁵⁴⁹ Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 15 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.001; Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 18 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.010; Communication from the Artillery and Missiles Forces, 19 December 2011, SYR.D0017.066.011.

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Signal Administration

The General Command used the Signal Administration to coordinate the work of all signal branches in subordinate units, ensuring that communications were effective, supplying equipment and providing training. A Deputy Chief of Staff supervised the Signal Administration.⁵⁵⁰

a. Personnel

Major General Khaled Tajuddin Al-Tawil was Director of the Signal Administration from or before 3 February 2008⁵⁵¹ until at least 3 May 2011.⁵⁵² Major General Shafiq Suqour Othman became Acting Director at some point between 3 May 2011 and 16 June 2011.⁵⁵³ He was thereafter appointed Director, holding that position until at least 22 January 2012.⁵⁵⁴ Major General Ali Saqr Adla became Acting Director of the Signal Administration from at least 14 July 2012.⁵⁵⁵ Staff Brigadier General Sharif Hasan Hamad then became Director of the Signal Administration by 18 October 2012,⁵⁵⁶ remaining there until at least 16 June 2013.⁵⁵⁷

b. Functions and Structure

The Signal Administration's primary function was to supply the Army and Armed Forces with communication equipment and ensure that all matters of communications were dealt with in the subordinated units. For example, the Director of the Signal Administration received requests for⁵⁵⁸ and approved the transfer of equipment to units.⁵⁵⁹ The Signal Administration also conducted surprise visits⁵⁶⁰ and received at least one annual report from heads of signal branches and sections

⁵⁵⁰ Instructions of Regulation No.5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁵⁵¹ Circular from the Wired Communication Branch, 30 February 2008, SYR.D0236.004.010.

⁵⁵² Communication from the Signal Administration, 3 May 2011, SYR.D0182.013.234.

⁵⁵³ Circular from the Signal Administration, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0002.184.001.

⁵⁵⁴ Circular from the Director of Signal Administration, 22 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.037.

⁵⁵⁵ Communication from the Signal Administration, 14 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.008.

⁵⁵⁶ Annual Plan for Use of Fixed Motors by the Groups in the 89th Anti-Tank Regiment, 18 October 2012, SYR.D0208.047.008.

⁵⁵⁷ Communication from the Director of the Signal Administration, 16 June 2013, SYR.D0190.059.007 (signed by or on behalf of Major General Sharif Hasan Hamad. Hamad appears to have been promoted at some point in 2012-2013 to the rank of Major General).

⁵⁵⁸ Communication from the Signal Section of the 52nd Brigade to the Supply Branch of the Signal Administration, 21 April 2015, SYR.D0236.003.001.

⁵⁵⁹ See e.g. Communication from the Signal Administration, 14 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.008. See also Communication from the Signal Administration, 23 December 2012, SYR.D0226.027.001.

⁵⁶⁰ See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.011.

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with an account of equipment in signal units.⁵⁶¹ The Signal Administration had at least one brigade-level unit directly subordinated to it, the 240th Signal Brigade.⁵⁶²

The Signal Administration had numerous branches dealing with specific areas of communication, including the Wired Communications Branch, Wireless Communications Branch, Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communications Branch, Frequencies Branch, Supply Branch, Technical Exploitation and Repairs Branch, Training Branch and the Organisation and Mobilisation Branch.

Wired Communications Branch

The Wired Communications Branch dealt with issues related to wired communications,⁵⁶³ the preferred method of communication for the Army and Armed Forces.⁵⁶⁴ Orders were issued through it to secure telephone lines for military use.⁵⁶⁵ Wired communications in the Army and Armed Forces relied on a network consisting of underground optical and copper cables used for both military and civilian purposes.⁵⁶⁶ This cable network connected the switchboards of the military communication nodes and TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio, a form of secure communications) stations distributed across military regions to secondary switchboards and military formations.⁵⁶⁷ For example, the 52nd Brigade (part of the 9th Division, 1st Corps) used underground civilian lines and fibre optic cables to remain in contact with its forces.⁵⁶⁸ Telephone switchboards used by the Army and Armed Forces were of the “Korean”,⁵⁶⁹ “Telsis” and

⁵⁶¹ See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.011.

⁵⁶² See Communication from the Signal Administration, 3 May 2011, SYR.D0182.013.234 (At present, it is unclear how the 240th Brigade was used or the locations where it was deployed).

⁵⁶³ See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 15 June 2013, SYR.D0065.001.078; Circular from the Wired Communications Branch, 30 February 2008, SYR.D0236.004.010. See also Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 20 October 2012, SYR.D0208.044.005.

⁵⁶⁴ Circular from the Signal Administration, 23 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.013-014 (point 8: Rely on wired communications primarily. Do not shift to guided wireless and wireless unless wired communication is lost”); Circular from the Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communication Branch, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0236.004.025 (“Return to wired communications as soon as the lines are repaired”).

⁵⁶⁵ See e.g. Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 20 October 2012, SYR.D0208.044.005; Circular from the Signal Administration, 15 June 2013, SYR.D0065.001.078.

⁵⁶⁶ Circular from the Operations Commission, 18 March 2012, SYR.D0220.034.004.

⁵⁶⁷ Circular from the Operations Commission, 18 March 2012, SYR.D0220.034.004.

⁵⁶⁸ Plan of a Guarded Area Under the Responsibility of the 52nd Brigade, undated, SYR.D0226.024.002-003.

⁵⁶⁹ Circular from the Signal Administration, 24 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.030; Circular from the Signal Administration, 30 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.019; Communication from the Technical Exploitation and Repair Branch, 27 August 2011, SYR.D0226.027.019.

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SELTA⁵⁷⁰ types. Spare parts for the “Korean” devices were supplied by the Syrian-Korean Company.⁵⁷¹

Wireless Communications Branch

The Wireless Communications Branch regulated the use of wireless communications, including radio and cellular devices, which the Army and Armed Forces could use as an alternative system of communication.⁵⁷² For example, in March 2012, the Operations Commission instructed that when wired communications broke down, wireless communications were to be used “in addition to direct lines and special circuits for encrypted faxing”.⁵⁷³

The Branch sent out circulars regarding the rules of communication⁵⁷⁴ and required users of wireless communication devices in the Army and Armed forces, including the security agencies, to use coding and symbols when employing such methods of communication.⁵⁷⁵

Military reports and insider witness interviews indicate that the following communication devices were used by the Army and Armed Forces:

- Motorola GP-338;
- Racal 349 wireless device;
- PRC 77;
- PRC 78;
- PRC 638 wireless device;
- PRC 146 wireless device;
- R-123 radio transceiver;
- AR 123 wireless device;
- KD 3188 radio set;
- FMT-450 radio set;
- PUMA handheld radio;

⁵⁷⁰ Circular from the Signal Administration, 24 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.030.

⁵⁷¹ Circular from the Signal Administration, 30 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.019.

⁵⁷² See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 23 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.013-014; Circular from the Signal Administration, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0002.184.001.

⁵⁷³ Circular from the Operations Commission, 18 March 2012, SYR.D0220.034.004.

⁵⁷⁴ See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 2012, SYR.D0214.034.008. See also Circular by the Signal Administration, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0002.184.001.

⁵⁷⁵ See Circular from the Signal Administration, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0002.184.001; Circular from the Signal Administration, 3 February 2012, SYR.D0236.004.029 See also the following document with similar date and content: Circular from the Signal Administration, 2012, SYR.D0214.034.008 (In this circular it appears that personnel of the security agencies are also addressed and urged to “abide by address and identification rules and limit the call time”).

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- SYRONICS handheld switchboard;
- “Bulgarian telephone”;
- Russian handheld telephone 57;
- Ukrainian field telephone 57;
- 1000m KKM metal roll;
- GP338 handheld wireless device;
- Racal 349 wireless antenna; and
- Guided Russian 10 switchboard.⁵⁷⁶

Military personnel, including both officers and soldiers, used mobile telephones, in spite of a strict ban on these devices.⁵⁷⁷ A list with telephone numbers of officers from the 52nd Brigade gave the names and mobile numbers of the thirty-two most senior officers in the unit.⁵⁷⁸ Following an inspection of checkpoints, monitoring posts and deployed units in Dar’a in May 2012, Major General Ahmad Tlas, the Commander of the 1st Corps, complained about the failure of officers to reduce the use of mobile phones by military personnel.⁵⁷⁹

The Army and Armed Forces employed the TETRA system throughout the military. The TETRA system allows for secure, encrypted, mobile communications from either static locations, or on vehicles and helicopters. TETRA radios were used in several settings, including on armoured vehicles,⁵⁸⁰ on desks in the operations headquarters of the Brigade’s command⁵⁸¹ and between

⁵⁷⁶ Witness Interview SYR.WHA.512_AE, at p. 10. *See also* List of Faulty Signal Equipment in the 159th Battalion, 20 April 2013, SYR.D0226.027.009; Report Concerning Device GP 338 by the Commander of Signal Company, 25 September 2012, SYR.D0220.083.013; Instructions of the Commander of 52nd Mechanised Brigade 28 August 2012, SYR.D0217.036.004; Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 237, 10 December 2013, SYR.D0180.045.055; Circular from the Signal Administration, 29 May 2012, SYR.D0236.004.014; Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 23 November 2012, SYR.D0226.025.018; Report on the Available Signal Equipment in 327th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, 21 March 2013, SYR.D0226.027.011; Report on the Available Signal Equipment in the 52nd Brigade, 2011, SYR.D0226.027.016-018, at SYR.D0226.027.016; Report on the Available Signal Equipment (New Stations) in the 52nd Brigade, 2011, SYR.D0226.027.028.

⁵⁷⁷ Circular from the Signal Administration, 10 March 2012, SYR.D0236.004.017-018, at SYR.D0236.004.018. *See also e.g.* Instructions of the Commander of 52nd Mechanised Brigade, 28 August 2012, SYR.D0217.036.004.

⁵⁷⁸ List of Telephone Numbers of Officers from the 52nd Brigade, undated, SYR.D0189.144.014 (Key personalities listed in this document, one of which was Staff Brigadier General Muhammad Yousef Al-Khatib, indicate that the document was issued at some point within the period 25 January 2012 – 20 January 2013. Al-Khatib, who is mentioned as Commander of the 52nd Brigade, assumed that position on 25 January 2012, by an appointment order by the Commander in Chief, Bashar Al-Assad. *See* Transfer Order No. 4, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.040.012).

⁵⁷⁹ Circular from the Commander of the 1st Corps, 13 May 2012, SYR.D0236.004.011.

⁵⁸⁰ Handwritten Note, 24 August 2012, SYR.D0224.026.016 (referencing the destruction of a BMP vehicle).

⁵⁸¹ Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 21 April 2015, SYR.D0236.003.001.

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ground and air forces.⁵⁸² Military Intelligence Department branches also used TETRA devices.⁵⁸³ According to the Signal Administration, TETRA radios were their most secure wireless devices.⁵⁸⁴

Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communications Branch

The Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communications Branch managed a wireless system which also served as an alternative means of communication if wired communications were not available. In February 2012, the Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communications Branch provided the signal branches and sections with wireless routers, to be used temporarily as an alternative to wired communication systems until these were repaired. The “new channels” were to be communicated to the Signal Administration.⁵⁸⁵ The Deputy Commander ordered that units should rely on “wired communications primarily”, but that, if wired communication systems were unavailable, guided wireless and wireless could be used in cases of necessity.⁵⁸⁶

Frequencies Branch

The Frequencies Branch reviewed requests for new equipment and supplied wireless devices of different types and spare parts to Army and Armed Forces units. For example, on 25 July 2012, the 52nd Mechanised Brigade Signal Section sent a communication to the Frequencies Branch, in which it requested approval for the delivery of spare parts for TETRA devices.⁵⁸⁷ In another example, the Frequencies Branch received a receipt from the Signal Branch of the 9th Division for batteries and parts for PUMA radios.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸² See e.g. Instructions for Collaboration Communication Between Helicopters and the Commanders of Tanks and Mechanised Battalions of the Ground Forces, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.005.002-008 (dealing with the Coastal Region but clearly identifies the use of the TETRA in communications between air and ground forces).

⁵⁸³ See e.g. Military Intelligence Memorandum with Codes of TETRA Devices, 30 August 2012, SYR.D0197.050.001-013.

⁵⁸⁴ Circular from the Signal Administration, 3 February 2012, SYR.D0236.004.029.

⁵⁸⁵ Circular from the Guided Radio and Tropospheric Communication Branch, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0236.004.025.

⁵⁸⁶ Circular from the Signal Administration, 23 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.013-014, at SYR.D0236.005.014.

⁵⁸⁷ Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 25 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.016. See also Receipt for Delivered Equipment, 2011, SYR.D0226.025.019.

⁵⁸⁸ Communication from the 52nd Brigade, 23 November 2012, SYR.D0226.025.018.

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Supply Branch

The Supply Branch also appeared to have a role similar to that of the Frequencies Branch, in that it was responsible for the distribution of technical equipment such as radios, cables, and power supply units.⁵⁸⁹ Requests for new equipment were sent to the Supply Branch by Army and Armed Forces units.⁵⁹⁰ The Branch oversaw the delivery of new equipment⁵⁹¹ and disseminated instructions on how best to maintain it.⁵⁹²

Technical Exploitation and Repairs Branch

The Technical Exploitation and Repairs Branch was responsible for the repair of broken or malfunctioning communication equipment.⁵⁹³ In one report, it urged subordinate units to undertake regular maintenance and keep technical logs when maintenance was undertaken.⁵⁹⁴

Training Branch

The Training Branch provided training and technical support to Army and Armed Forces personnel in order to improve their capability in using communication equipment. In the sole document thus far identified as coming from the Training Branch, the Director of the Signal Administration distributed a report on 3 March 2011 through the Training Branch of the Signal Administration which detailed the results of a surprise visit carried out by officials from the Signal Administration to the Signal Section and Signal Company of the 52nd Brigade, outlining the main omissions in the conduct of training and the use of communication equipment by personnel. Specific recommendations to rectify these shortcomings were provided.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁸⁹ See e.g. Communication from the 52nd Brigade, March 2011, SYR.D0226.024.005; Communication from the Signal Administration, 14 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.008. See also Circular from the Signal Administration, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.011.

⁵⁹⁰ See e.g. Communication from the 52nd Brigade, March 2011, SYR.D0226.024.005; Circular from the Signal Administration, 10 February 2011, SYR.D0236.004.005.

⁵⁹¹ See e.g. Letter from the Supply Branch of the Signal Administration, 14 July 2012, SYR.D0226.025.008.

⁵⁹² See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 22 January 2012, SYR.D0236.004.037.

⁵⁹³ See e.g. Circular from the Signal Administration, 30 November 2011, SYR.D0236.005.019.

⁵⁹⁴ Order for General Distribution from the Signal Administration, 27 August 2011, SYR.D0226.027.019.

⁵⁹⁵ Report on Inspection Conducted by the 52nd Mechanised Brigade, 2 March 2011, SYR.D0196.023.005-008.

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Organisation and Mobilisation Branch

The Organisation and Mobilisation Branch appeared to be involved in the administrative matters of the Signal Administration. In the sole document identified as originating from this branch, the Director of the Signal Administration issued a communication on 3 May 2011 requesting security agencies to cease searching for a member of the Signal Administration who had deserted his post.⁵⁹⁶

Reconnaissance Administration

The Reconnaissance Administration provided information to the General Command and worked closely with Military Intelligence.

a. Personnel

Major General Murshid Ali Dhaher was the Director of the Reconnaissance Administration from at least 1 April 2011.⁵⁹⁷ Major General Samir Ibrahim Al-Shaikh became the Director on or before 24 March 2012⁵⁹⁸ and remained in that position at least until 20 August 2013.⁵⁹⁹

b. Functions and Structure

The Reconnaissance Administration provided information to the General Command⁶⁰⁰ and conducted reconnaissance missions on both internal⁶⁰¹ and external targets.⁶⁰² It frequently worked closely with Military Intelligence, through the Deputy Commander.⁶⁰³

The Reconnaissance Administration provided reports on Israel on at least two occasions, detailing political, military and economic news, including personnel changes and information about

⁵⁹⁶ See e.g. Communication from the Signal Administration, 3 May 2011, SYR.D0182.013.234.

⁵⁹⁷ See Information Report on the Activity of the Israeli Forces in March 2011, 1 April 2011, SYR.D0020.088.030 (only the cover page of the report has been identified in CIJA evidentiary holdings).

⁵⁹⁸ See Information Report on the Activity of the Israeli Forces in August 2012, 1 September 2012, SYR.D0015.046.001-022.

⁵⁹⁹ Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 20 August 2013, SYR.D0179.030.005.

⁶⁰⁰ See e.g. Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.041-044.

⁶⁰¹ Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 20 August 2013, SYR.D0179.030.005-006.

⁶⁰² Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 24 March 2012, SYR.D0179.026.088.

⁶⁰³ Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 24 March 2012, SYR.D0179.026.088; Report from the Reconnaissance Administration, 13 April 2012, SYR.D0183.040.009; Report from the Reconnaissance Administration, 18 April 2012, SYR.D0183.030.065.

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manoeuvres.⁶⁰⁴ There is no indication on the documents regarding who the addressee was, but at least one was seized from the Aleppo Infantry Academy.⁶⁰⁵

The Reconnaissance Administration may have had one battalion subordinate to it, the 48th Special Missions Battalion.⁶⁰⁶

The Reconnaissance Administration had at least two branches, the Research and Studies Branch and the Electronic and Wireless Reconnaissance Branch.

Research and Studies Branch

The CIJA has identified one document from the Research and Studies Branch. On 28 June 2011, the Research and Studies Branch sent a three-page security report to the Office of the Deputy Commander, concerning the activities of opposition activists in Idleb based on the report of a volunteer sergeant from the 48th Special Missions Battalion who had been on leave.⁶⁰⁷

Electronic and Wireless Reconnaissance Branch

The Electronic and Wireless Reconnaissance Branch gathered and processed information on opposition groups operating inside Syria and produced reports based on that information. From the designation of this branch alone, it would seem likely that it received its information from the intercept of communications. As examples of the work it did, on two occasions in April 2012, the Electronic and Wireless Reconnaissance Branch sent reports to the office of the Head of the Military Intelligence Department detailing the activities of certain armed groups in Idleb Governorate.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁴ Information Report on the Activity of the Israeli Forces in March 2011, 1 April 2011, SYR.D0020.088.030; Information Report on the Activity of the Israeli Forces in August 2012, 1 September 2012, SYR.D0015.046.001-022. These documents are dated with a month and year, indicating they may be issued on a monthly basis.

⁶⁰⁵ See Sending List from Reconnaissance Administration, 1 April 2011, SYR.D0020.088.031.

⁶⁰⁶ Security Information Report on the Latest Incidents in Syria from the Director of the Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.041-044, at SYR.D0183.015.042.

⁶⁰⁷ Security Information Report on the Latest Incidents in Syria from the Director of the Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.041-044; Letter from the Reconnaissance Administration, 28 June 2011, SYR.D0183.015.041.

⁶⁰⁸ Report from the Reconnaissance Administration, 13 April 2012, SYR.D0183.040.009; Report from the Reconnaissance Administration, 18 April 2012, SYR.D0183.030.065.

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Armament Administration

The function of the Armament Administration of the General Command was to regulate, supply and control the use of arms, ammunition and other military equipment within the Army and Armed Forces, as well as replace the loss of any arms and equipment.⁶⁰⁹ Instructions and circulars from the Armament Administration were signed by the Deputy Commander and/or the Director of the Armament Administration.⁶¹⁰ The Armament Administration was supervised by a Deputy Chief of Staff.

a. Personnel

The Director of the Armament Administration was Major General Salahuddin Mahmoud Ali for at least the period 1 August 2011⁶¹¹ to 1 October 2013.⁶¹² The Deputy Director of the Armament Administration in August 2011 was Major General Muhiddin Hamdan.⁶¹³

b. Functions and Structure

As with the other departments of the General Staff, the Armament Administration contained branches with specific remits, namely the Operations and Planning Branch, the Armaments

⁶⁰⁹ See Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004; Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014; Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016; Communication from the 17th Division, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.019; Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 January 2013, SYR.D0242.108.004.

⁶¹⁰ See Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004 (the Deputy Commander sent this circular through the Armament Administration); Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014 (sent by the Director of the Armament Administration); Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016 (signed by the deputy Director on behalf of the Director).

⁶¹¹ See Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016. See also Communication from the Armament Administration, 31 August 2010, SYR.D0182.013.102 (signed by Major General Salahuddin Mahmoud Ali as Acting Director of the Armament Administration).

⁶¹² Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 October 2013, SYR.D0351.009.058; Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 January 2013, SYR.D0242.108.004.

⁶¹³ Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016.

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Branch, the Ammunition Branch and the Organisation and Filing Branch. Subordinated to the Armament Administration were warehouses,⁶¹⁴ workshops,⁶¹⁵ and the Armament Academy.⁶¹⁶

Operations and Planning Branch

The Operations and Planning Branch disseminated orders related to the use of armaments by the Army and Armed Forces. For example, on 14 December 2011, the Deputy Commander disseminated a circular through the Operations and Planning Branch ordering commanders to submit reports on ammunition consumption or arms lost within twenty-four hours to the Armament Administration, through the armament branches in the division commands.⁶¹⁷ In the same circular, the Deputy Commander noted that commanders were to control the firing of ammunition in a manner that limited wasteful consumption.⁶¹⁸ On 9 February 2012, the Deputy Commander re-issued the circular from 14 December 2011.⁶¹⁹

Armaments Branch

According to the available documentation, one of the functions of the Armaments Branch was to monitor units' armaments holdings. It did so by requesting units to submit status reports describing their holdings of arms and equipment. For example, on 13 May 2014, the Data Section of the Armaments Branch sent a request to the Air Defence Administration, asking it to submit a report

⁶¹⁴ Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 August 2013, SYR.D0345.022.096 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 583); Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 October 2013, SYR.D0351.009.058 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 558); Communication from the Armament Administration, 31 March 2012, SYR.D0355.030.091 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 551); Communication from the Armament Administration, 27 March 2012, SYR.D0355.030.088 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 402); Communication from the Armament Administration, 31 July 2012, SYR.D0370.018.026 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 397); Communication from the Armament Administration, 19 March 2012, SYR.D0355.030.054 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 396); Communication from the Armament Administration, 19 March 2012, SYR.D0355.030.052 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 380); Communication from the Armament Administration, 31 March 2012, SYR.D0355.030.089 (relating to a deserter from Warehouse 1/41).

⁶¹⁵ Communication from the Armament Administration, 24 May 2012, SYR.D0372.014.077 (relating to a deserter from Workshop 625); Communication from the Armament Administration, 31 August 2010, SYR.D0182.013.102 (relating to a deserter from Workshop 633); Communication from the Armament Administration, 26 March 2012, SYR.D0357.003.017 (relating to a deserter from Workshop 637).

⁶¹⁶ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 13 August 2013, SYR.D0345.023.004 (signed by the Director of the Armament Academy, Brigadier General Hafez Ahmad Karoum).

⁶¹⁷ Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004.

⁶¹⁸ Circular from the Armament Administration, 14 December 2011, SYR.D0210.029.004.

⁶¹⁹ Circular from the Armament Administration, 9 February 2012, SYR.D0021.024.016.

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about the arms, observation tools, and other types of specialised equipment and vehicles in their possession, complete with a table template to be distributed to units.⁶²⁰

Ammunition Branch

The Ammunition Branch monitored ammunition holdings and consumption by military units. For example, on 1 August 2011, the Armament Administration, through the Ammunition Custody Control Section of the Ammunition Branch, informed the 216th Battalion of the 17th Infantry Division that its ammunition logbook was being returned after an audit.⁶²¹ In another example, the Ammunition Branch sent a circular confirming the requirement to replace certain old ammunition.⁶²²

Organisation and Mobilisation Branch

The Organisation and Mobilisation Branch's functions included notifying other units regarding deserters from units subordinate to the Armament Administration. For example, on 22 February 2012, the Director of the Armament Administration issued a communication through the Organisation and Mobilisation Branch to various bodies including Military Intelligence, General Intelligence, Political Security, Military Police, and civilian police to notify them of a conscript who had deserted Warehouse 396 of the Armament Administration.⁶²³

⁶²⁰ Communication from the Armament Administration, 13 May 2014, SYR.D0189.029.014.

⁶²¹ Communication from the Armament Administration, 1 August 2011, SYR.D0090.001.016. *See also* Communication from the 17th Division, 17 June 2011, SYR.D0090.001.019 (cover letter for the 17th Division's logbook being sent to the Armament Administration's Ammunition Branch).

⁶²² Circular from the Armament Administration, 12 January 2010, SYR.D0155.046.001 (this copy of the circular was, according to handwritten annotations at the bottom of the document, disseminated to subordinate units of the 5th Division through its Armament Branch).

⁶²³ Communication from the Armament Administration, 22 February 2012, SYR.D0240.047.001. *See also* Communication from the Armament Administration, 28 January 2013, SYR.D0242.108.004.

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Other Staff Departments of the General Command

a. Chemical Warfare Administration

The Chemical Warfare Administration was a staff department⁶²⁴ based in Damascus.⁶²⁵ It appears that the Chemical Warfare Administration was renamed the “Chemical Protection Administration” by 2014.⁶²⁶

Major General Hasan Jajan Al-Husein was the Director of the Chemical Warfare Administration at least between 12 April 2010 and 19 May 2011.⁶²⁷

The 28th Regiment was directly subordinate to the Chemical Warfare Administration.⁶²⁸ As confirmed by a witness,⁶²⁹ the 28th Regiment was commanded by Brigadier General Ali Ahmad Abbas between at least January 2013 and February 2014.⁶³⁰ It was previously commanded by Brigadier General Fadl Said Al-Mansour between at least February and April 2011.⁶³¹

⁶²⁴ Instructions of Regulation No.5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁶²⁵ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.918_AO, at p. 5 (stating that prior to his defection, the witness was a senior officer at the Chemical Warfare School where he taught a course for battalion commanders)..

⁶²⁶ See Extract from Log Listing Military Deserters in the Al Ma’ra District, undated, SYR.D0193.011.381 (a listing from 27 April 2014 indicates that the 28th Regiment was part of the “Chemical Protection Administration”); Communication from Military Intelligence, 14 April 2014, SYR.D0195.074.025 (referring in handwritten text to the “Chemical Protection Administration”). The change in nomenclature is believed to have occurred in the summer of 2013. See Memorandum Ceasing the Search for a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 4 June 2013, SYR.D0242.055.003 (signed by the Commander of the 684th Battalion of the Chemical Warfare Administration); Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 29 September 2013, SYR.D0299.019.102 (signed by the Commander of the 684th Battalion of the Chemical Protection Administration).

⁶²⁷ See Communication from the Chemical Warfare Administration, 12 April 2010, SYR.D0019.061.001; Operational Data Implementation Plan for University Student Barracks in 2010 by the Training Branch of the Chemical Warfare Administration, 22 July 2010, SYR.D0019.081.008; Circular from the Operations Branch of the Chemical Warfare Administration, 20 February 2011, SYR.D0236.003.033-034; Communication from the Training Branch of the Chemical Warfare Administration, 19 May 2010, SYR.D0019.115.009.

⁶²⁸ See Telegram from the Military Police, 9 April 2011, SYR.D0182.013.183; Telegram from the Military Police, 12 February 2011, SYR.D0182.013.069; Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 29 August 2012, SYR.D0185.083.020; Extract from Log Listing Military Deserters in the Al Ma’ra District, undated, SYR.D0193.011.381.

⁶²⁹ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.918_AO, at p. 5.

⁶³⁰ Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 17 January 2013, SYR.D0242.052.006 (signed by the Commander of the 28th Regiment of the Chemical Warfare Administration, Brigadier General Ali Ahmad Abbas); Memorandum Ceasing the Search for a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 2 February 2014, SYR.D0242.093.006 (signed by the Commander of the 28th Regiment of the Chemical Protection Administration, Brigadier General Ali Ahmad Abbas).

⁶³¹ Memorandum Ceasing the Search for a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 2 February 2011, SYR.D0182.013.071; Memorandum Ceasing the Search for a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 5 April 2011, SYR.D0182.013.184.

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The Chemical Warfare Administration also had an independent battalion, the 684th Battalion commanded by Colonel Muhammad Khairbek at least between June and September 2013.⁶³² Witness SYR.WGA.918 referred to the Chemical Warfare Administration's subordinate battalion commanded by Khairbek as the "Smoke" Battalion.⁶³³

"Chemical" branches and sections were attached to various military formations, and these likely reported and received instructions from the Chemical Warfare Administration through the usual chain of command. The Northern, Central, and Eastern Regional Commands, the Naval Forces Command and the 17th and 18th Brigades all, for example, had a Chemical Branch which received instructions from the Chemical Warfare Administration.⁶³⁴

The function of the Chemical Warfare Administration was defensive. For example, a February 2011 circular from the Chemical Warfare Administration circulated information received from the Reconnaissance Administration on the potential use of chemical weapons by Israel in future wars.⁶³⁵ Another document from the Chemical Warfare Administration dated 12 April 2010 indicates that it was involved in the detection of toxic substances following a nuclear explosion.⁶³⁶ In addition, a document dated 10 January 2012 from the 46th Special Forces Regiment refers to the "relevant orders from the Chemical Warfare Administration's warehouses in Nabak" regarding protection and equipment and the establishment of necessary precautions against a chemical attack.⁶³⁷ Furthermore, a witness stated that the Chemical Warfare Administration held warehouses "where protection gear [from] chemical weapons were stored (anti-toxic masks and clothing)".⁶³⁸

⁶³² Memorandum Ceasing the Search for a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 4 June 2013, SYR.D0242.055.003 (signed by Colonel Muhammad Khairbek, the Commander of the 684th Battalion of the Chemical Warfare Administration); Memorandum for the Search and Arrest of a Deserter from the Armed Forces, 29 September 2013, SYR.D0299.019.102 (signed by Colonel Muhammad Khairbek, the Commander of the 684th Battalion of the Chemical Protection Administration).

⁶³³ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.918_AO, at pp. 4-5.

⁶³⁴ Operational Data Implementation Plan for University Student Barracks in 2010 by the Training Branch of the Chemical Warfare Administration, 22 July 2010, SYR.D0019.081.008 (listing Northern, Central and Eastern Regional Commands, the 17th and 18th Brigades and the Naval Forces as being responsible for implementation of the plan).

⁶³⁵ Circular from the Operations Branch of the Chemical Warfare Administration, 20 February 2011, SYR.D0236.003.033-034.

⁶³⁶ Communication from the Chemical Warfare Administration, 12 April 2010, SYR.D0019.061.001 (listing camera types for toxic substances in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion).

⁶³⁷ Chemical Safety Instructions for the 46th Regiment in Case of Full Combat Readiness from the Chemical Section of the 46th Regiment, 10 January 2012, SYR.D0061.028.004-005, at SYR.D0061.028.005.

⁶³⁸ Witness Interview SYR.WGA.918_ET, at p. 5.

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b. Electronic Warfare Administration

The Electronic Warfare Administration was another staff department of the General Command.⁶³⁹

Instructions from 2007 indicate that the functions of the electronic warfare units included reconnaissance work with aerial and ground targets, radar stations and weapons, scrambling the Army and Armed Forces' communications, and obstructing enemies' electronic devices.⁶⁴⁰ The Electronic Warfare Administration established a committee on 2 February 2012 to examine the communication technologies being employed by opposition forces to "find a way to disrupt them".⁶⁴¹

Electronic warfare units were attached⁶⁴² to various military formations⁶⁴³ and electronic warfare personnel were deployed in strategic locations.⁶⁴⁴

⁶³⁹ See e.g. Publication from the Special Working Group of the Military Intelligence Department, 13 February 2012, SYR.D0181.046.007 (mentioning that a conscript from the "Electronic Warfare Administration subordinate to the army" was kidnapped); Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 5 April 2012, SYR.D0183.080.008 (referring to a "military conscript" from the Electronic Warfare Administration); Transfer order from the Organisation and Administration Department, 9 October 2012, SYR.D0017.089.061-058, at SYR.D0017.089.060 (mentioning a conscript who was transferred from the Military Intelligence Department to the Electronic Warfare Administration).

⁶⁴⁰ Instructions on Electronic Warfare Number 001 from the Command of the 9th Division, 23 January 2007, SYR.D0237.057.024-034, at SYR.D0237.057.027-030.

⁶⁴¹ Circular from the Electromagnetic Coordination Branch of the Operations Commission, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0015.036.001.

⁶⁴² Instructions on Electronic Warfare Number 001 by the Command of the 9th Division, 23 January 2007, SYR.D0237.057.024-034, at SYR.D0237.057.029 (indicating that electronic warfare units were attached to army units like the air force, the missile forces, and the artillery forces.).

⁶⁴³ Register of documents received and issued, January 2012, SYR.D0263.001.021 (indicating that there was an electronic warfare unit under the 3rd Corps); Notebook, 9 April 2012, SYR.D0247.116.184 (a communication has been received by the 9th Regiment, Electronic Warfare); Fax from Military Police Commander Idleb, 9 December 2013, SYR.D0180.019.063 (to execute a punishment against two conscripts from the 3rd Electronic Warfare Regiment); Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 243, 2 February 2013, SYR.D0175.024.019-020 (mentioning a volunteer Sergeant from 904th Electronic Warfare Battalion in Ar-Raqqa); Communications Record, 24 May 2011, SYR.D0188.009.074 (mentioning a communication addressed to the Commander of the 3rd Electronic Warfare Regiment); Administrative Order from the Training Commission, 21 July 2011, SYR.D0019.094.044-046, at SYR.D0019.094.045 (mentioning a conscript from the Navy's 111th Brigade, specialised in Electronic Warfare); Instructions on Electronic Warfare Number 001 by the Command of the 9th Division, 23 January 2007, SYR.D0237.057.024-034 (Indicating that the 52nd Brigade was involved in electronic warfare. The document also indicates that the Air Force and Air Defence participate in electronic warfare, at SYR.D0237.057.028).

⁶⁴⁴ Communication from the Northern Regional Command, 29 June 2011, SYR.D0020.075.037 (requesting to put on maps the deployment of units from Battalion 1199 Electronic Warfare on listed "defensive points" in the northern region).

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The Administration had an Electronic Warfare College.⁶⁴⁵ Further, Army and Armed Forces personnel were trained in the field of electronic warfare,⁶⁴⁶ although this was carried out by the Training Commission, another department of the General Staff.⁶⁴⁷

c. Code and Documents Security Branch

The Code and Documents Security Branch of the General Command regulated the procedure relating to the handling and security of classified documentation and materials. Staff Brigadier-General Muhriz Abdullah Al-Hasan was the Head of the Branch from at least April 2009.⁶⁴⁸ The Branch was overseen by a Deputy Chief of Staff.⁶⁴⁹

Instructions relating to information security were disseminated from this specialist branch. As an example, on 5 July 2011, the Chief of Staff issued a circular through the Code and Documents Security Branch with the rules and procedures to be observed when dealing with confidential documentation and materials.⁶⁵⁰

The Branch included a Stamps Office, that dealt with Army and Armed Forces stamps and seals, and a Personnel, Special Training and Inspection Section. To date, the CIJA has only one identified document for each of these bodies. The Stamps Office appeared to deal with issues related to Army and Armed Forces stamps and seals⁶⁵¹ while the Personnel, Special Training and Inspection Section dealt with the question of lost or stolen classified military information.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁵ Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 271, 20 April 2012, SYR.D0183.040.030 (mentioning that three Captains from the Electronic Warfare Academy have deserted).

⁶⁴⁶ Administrative Order from the Training Commission, 12 August 2011, SYR.D0012.011.001-002 (containing two tables of monitors in training courses; one of the courses being electronic warfare); Administrative Order from the Training Commission, 11 May 2011, SYR.D0019.096.001-015, at SYR.D0019.096.008 (listing conscripts who passed training courses, one of them being electronic warfare).

⁶⁴⁷ The Training Commission is not discussed in this report.

⁶⁴⁸ Telegram No. 2002 from Code and Documents Security Branch, 13 April 2009, SYR.D0020.120.012.

⁶⁴⁹ Instructions of Regulation No.5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁶⁵⁰ Circular from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 5 July 2011, SYR.D0015.039.001-002 (including, among others, the commander's responsibility for document security, a requirement for security clearance for personnel, and restrictions on the placement, use and distribution of equipment). *See also* Telegram No. 2002 from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 13 April 2009, SYR.D0020.120.012.

⁶⁵¹ Letter from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 29 January 2011, SYR.D0018.059.009.

⁶⁵² Circular from the Code and Documents Security Branch, 5 June 2012, SYR.D0020.117.008.

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Staff Departments Subordinate to the Chief of Staff

Organisation and Administration Department

The Organisation and Administration Department distributed promotions and transfers, enforced military law, and supplied military equipment to Army and Armed Forces units. Unlike other staff departments of the General Command, supervision of the Organisation and Administration Department was not delegated to a Deputy Chief of Staff and thus fell under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff.⁶⁵³ Documents issued by the Organisation and Administration Department bear the stamp and signature of the President,⁶⁵⁴ the Deputy Commander⁶⁵⁵ or the Chief of Staff.⁶⁵⁶ The Head of the Department could also sign documents on behalf of senior officers.⁶⁵⁷

a. Personnel

On 5 August 2009, the head of the Organisation and Administration Department was Major General Ibrahim Ahmad Husein.⁶⁵⁸ Major General Faisal Berri Berri replaced Major General Ibrahim Ahmad Husein by 26 November 2011,⁶⁵⁹ and remained Head of the Department until at least 2 September 2012.⁶⁶⁰ By 14 October 2012, his position as Head of the Department had been taken by Major General Hasan Suleiman Al-Khallaf,⁶⁶¹ who remained until at least 4 August 2013.⁶⁶²

b. Functions and Structure

The Organisation and Administration Department had a role in authorising the supply of some equipment to units. The Supply Branch of the Signal Administration stipulated that requests for

⁶⁵³ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁶⁵⁴ See e.g. Exceptional Promotion Order by the President, 2 January 2012, SYR.D0220.040.020.

⁶⁵⁵ Administrative Order by the Deputy Commander, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.002.005; Administrative Order by the Deputy Commander, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.002.005.

⁶⁵⁶ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁶⁵⁷ See e.g. Transfer Order No. 165, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0017.089.051-052; Transfer Order No. 58, 5 May 2012, SYR.D0220.039.007; Carried Telegram, 26 February 2012, SYR.D0255.083.001.

⁶⁵⁸ Administrative Order, 5 August 2009, SYR.D0037.065.003. See also Administrative Order, 7 May 2011, SYR.D0241.042.001.

⁶⁵⁹ Transfer Order No. 165, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0017.089.051-052.

⁶⁶⁰ Administrative Order, 2 September 2012, SYR.D0220.055.015.

⁶⁶¹ Administrative Order, 14 October 2012, SYR.D0217.006.012.

⁶⁶² Communication from the Organisation and Administration Department, 4 August 2013, SYR.D0180.014.110.

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new equipment should be first “authorised by the Command (Organisation and Administration Department)”.⁶⁶³

As with the other staff departments, the Organisation and Administration Department had subordinate branches carrying out specialised functions including the Service Branch, Military Justice and Discipline Branch, Organisation and Armament Branch, Ceremonies Branch and the Mobilisation Branch.

Service Branch

The Service Branch dealt primarily with the transfer and promotion of personnel.⁶⁶⁴

Transfer orders of personnel were issued through the Transfers Section of the Service Branch by authority of the Deputy Commander or the Chief of Staff.⁶⁶⁵

The Promotion Section of the Service Branch issued orders for the promotion⁶⁶⁶ and commendation⁶⁶⁷ of personnel. It could also issue an “exceptional promotion” for personnel killed in service.⁶⁶⁸

Military Justice and Discipline Branch

The Organisation and Administration Department contained the Military Justice and Discipline Branch.

⁶⁶³ Circular from the Signal Administration, 10 July 2011, SYR.D0236.004.005.

⁶⁶⁴ See e.g. Transfer Order No. 68, 22 May 2012, SYR.D0181.036.016-017; Transfer Order No. 71, 29 May 2012, SYR.D0220.033.015. It appears that the Service Branch of the Organisation and Administration Department dealt with the transfer and promotion of soldiers and warrant officers, while the Officers’ Affairs Administration (a separate department under the General Command) dealt with the transfer and promotion of commissioned officers.

⁶⁶⁵ See e.g. Transfer Order No. 78, 11 June 2012, SYR.D0220.055.002; Transfer Order No. 165, 26 November 2011, SYR.D0017.089.051-052 (this order was issued by the Head of the Organisation and Administration Department on behalf of the Deputy Commander); Transfer Order No. 101, 26 July 2012, SYR.D0220.038.027.

⁶⁶⁶ Administrative Order, 11 January 2012, SYR.D0220.033.028-031 (issued by the Deputy Commander on behalf of the President).

⁶⁶⁷ Commendation, 27 July 2013, SYR.D0240.091.012-013.

⁶⁶⁸ See Exceptional Promotion Order by the President, 9 June 2012, SYR.D0220.055.001; Exceptional Promotion Order by the President, 15 May 2012, SYR.D0220.039.005; Exceptional Promotion Order by the President, 11 March 2012, SYR.D0220.039.021; Exceptional Promotion Order by the President, SYR.D0220.040.020.

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Documents issued by the Military Justice and Discipline Branch were signed by the Head of the Organisation and Administration Department, on behalf of either the Chief of Staff⁶⁶⁹ or the Deputy Commander.⁶⁷⁰ Some documents sent from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch were signed by the Deputy Commander directly.⁶⁷¹

The Military Justice and Discipline Branch oversaw, and at times directly imposed, disciplinary punishments on military personnel.

On 8 June 2011, the Deputy Commander issued a circular from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch to all military commanders regarding unauthorised absences and defections. It mandated that punishments were to be imposed by the individual's commander, except when an individual's absence exceeded nine to fourteen days, in which case it would be referred to the Military Justice and Discipline Branch to impose punishment. It also stated that desertion would be prosecuted by the "Military Justice"⁶⁷² and reiterated the provisions of Article 100 of the Military Penal Code defining a desertion.⁶⁷³

Punishments were generally imposed by the immediate commanders,⁶⁷⁴ but in some cases by superior commanders.⁶⁷⁵ In almost all cases, administrative orders imposing punishment were copied to the Military Justice and Discipline Branch.⁶⁷⁶

The Military Justice and Discipline Branch was also able to impose punishment directly. For example, on 8 August 2012, the Military Justice and Discipline Branch issued an administrative order imposing twenty days "harsh imprisonment" against eight non-commissioned officers from

⁶⁶⁹ See e.g. Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 21 May 2013, SYR.D0190.008.027; Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 11 December 2012, SYR.D0190.053.001; Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, SYR.D0156.093.007.

⁶⁷⁰ See e.g. Telegram from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 16 April 2011, SYR.D0020.050.003; Circular from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 13 December 2014, SYR.D0195.047.011.

⁶⁷¹ Circular from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 16 June 2011, SYR.D0220.038.001; Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 25 August 2011, SYR.D0220.036.022.

⁶⁷² All references to "military justice" are taken to refer to the Military Justice Administration.

⁶⁷³ Circular from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 8 June 2011, SYR.D0022.048.009.

⁶⁷⁴ See e.g. Administrative Order from the 52nd Brigade, 16 July 2013, SYR.D0220.031.001.

⁶⁷⁵ See e.g. Administrative Order from 9th Division, 2 July 2013, SYR.D0220.031.016.

⁶⁷⁶ See e.g. Administrative Order from 1st Corps Commander, 6 July 2013, SYR.D0217.014.035; Administrative Order from the 52nd Brigade, 16 July 2013, SYR.D0220.031.001; Administrative Order from the Commander of the 9th Division, 14 June 2012, SYR.D0220.056.031; Administrative Order from the Commander of the 52nd Brigade, 17 July 2012, SYR.D0220.041.036.

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the 52nd Brigade for “security reasons and breaching military instructions”. It was then sent to the 9th Division and the 52nd Brigade.⁶⁷⁷

Superior commanders could alter punishments imposed by subordinates. For example, in July 2013, the Commander of the 1st Corps issued an administrative order adjusting a punishment allocated by the 9th Division Commander from twenty to thirty days of “harsh imprisonment”.⁶⁷⁸ The Military Justice and Discipline Branch could also amend punishments imposed by local commanders. For instance, on 22 September 2013, the Military Justice and Discipline Branch issued an administrative order increasing the punishment against a Corporal from the 52nd Brigade from sixteen to thirty days of “normal imprisonment”.⁶⁷⁹

Military personnel were given disciplinary punishments for a number of offences, including neglect of duty,⁶⁸⁰ absence without permission,⁶⁸¹ theft of military equipment,⁶⁸² conspiring to desert,⁶⁸³ attempted or successful desertion,⁶⁸⁴ communication with deserters,⁶⁸⁵ exhibiting undisciplined attitudes in public or in the presence of higher-ranking officers (*e.g.*, intoxication, fighting),⁶⁸⁶ and “security reasons”.⁶⁸⁷

Prison sentences for disciplinary violations were classified either as “normal”⁶⁸⁸ or “harsh”.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁷⁷ Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 8 August 2012, SYR.D0220.056.003.

⁶⁷⁸ Administrative Order from 1st Corps Commander, 6 July 2013, SYR.D0217.014.035.

⁶⁷⁹ Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 22 September 2013, SYR.D0220.031.030.

⁶⁸⁰ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Commander of the 9th Division, 3 June 2011, SYR.D0208.007.013-014 (Soldiers allowed civilians to pass through a checkpoint against orders).

⁶⁸¹ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 24 December 2012, SYR.D0220.041.005; Administrative Order from the Director of the Infantry Academy, undated, SYR.D0017.031.001.

⁶⁸² *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 23 October 2011, SYR.D0220.061.002.

⁶⁸³ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Chief of Staff, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0220.002.005.

⁶⁸⁴ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Commander of the 9th Division, 14 June 2012, SYR.D0220.056.031.

⁶⁸⁵ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 31 February 2014, SYR.D0220.008.007.

⁶⁸⁶ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Commander of the 52nd Brigade, 17 July 2012, SYR.D0220.041.036.

⁶⁸⁷ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 18 March 2014, SYR.D0220.008.001.

⁶⁸⁸ Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 15 October 2012, SYR.D0217.006.014.

⁶⁸⁹ *See e.g.* Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 8 August 2012, SYR.D0220.056.003.

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Those giving a punishment – including commanders and the Military Justice and Discipline Branch – were able to dictate where an individual had to serve their sentence.⁶⁹⁰

The Military Justice and Discipline Branch issued directives to release detainees serving disciplinary punishments from military prisons. On 16 April 2011, the Deputy Commander ordered, through the Military Justice and Branch, the release of everyone serving a disciplinary punishment of less than thirty days of imprisonment in “the central military prison, or harsh imprisonment, or normal imprisonment, so long as the reasons are not egregious and do not involve combat operations”.⁶⁹¹

The Military Justice and Discipline Branch issued and oversaw the implementation of directives issued to military units. On 13 November 2014, it issued a circular, signed on behalf of the Deputy Commander, noting an increase in personnel from certain units leaving their units and joining other units closer to their hometowns without facing legal repercussions. The Branch ordered all commanders to hand over those officers to the Military Police to take legal action against them; commanders who failed to do so would themselves face legal action. It was sent to the Head of Military Intelligence.⁶⁹²

On 28 December 2014, the Chief of Staff issued a follow-up to this circular through the Military Justice and Discipline Branch. He ordered the commanders of all military units at all levels to explain the details of the circular to their officers and ensure its full implementation. It was received and signed by the Head of the Military Intelligence Department. Handwritten notes indicate that it was then sent to the Head of Military Intelligence Branch 265, and that the Commander of the 9th Division was sent copies of the circular which had been sent to Branch 265, which he in turn recirculated for implementation.⁶⁹³

⁶⁹⁰ See e.g. Administrative Order from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 11 August 2012, SYR.D0220.056.001; Administrative Order from the 9th Division, 5 June 2012, SYR.D0220.056.028.

⁶⁹¹ Communication from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 16 April 2011, SYR.D0020.050.003.

⁶⁹² Circular from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 13 December 2014, SYR.D0195.047.011.

⁶⁹³ Memorandum from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 28 December 2014, SYR.D0195.047.010 (It is not clear why the 9th Division Commander appeared to receive copies of these two circulars, one dated 13 December 2014 and the other dated 28 December 2014, until 24 January 2015, and from Military Intelligence as opposed to the normal method, through the 1st Corps Command. It is possible that they did not receive them down the General Command chain of command and simply obtained copies from Military Intelligence).

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The Military Justice and Discipline Branch appeared to be able to demand information from the Military Police in relevant circumstances. On one occasion, a telegram issued from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch to the Prisons and Investigations Branch of the Military Police required that a list of individuals who had been released as a result of a general amnesty be sent to the Military Justice and Discipline Branch “immediately upon receipt of this telegram”.⁶⁹⁴

Organisation and Armament Branch

Three documents issued by the Organisation and Armament Branch suggest that it had two purposes. In one document, the Chief of Staff used the Organisation and Armament Branch to outline the specific “powers and duties” of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff.⁶⁹⁵ In two other documents, the Branch issued an instruction regarding the distribution of weapons⁶⁹⁶ and a circular related to the possession of weapons by military personnel.⁶⁹⁷

Ceremonies Branch

The Ceremonies Branch performed minor administrative functions, such as announcements related to public holidays and religious celebrations.⁶⁹⁸

Mobilisation Branch

The Mobilisation Branch appears to have handled administrative matters related to the assignment of personnel to various posts, such as the training of junior personnel.⁶⁹⁹ For example, on 1 October 2012, the Deputy Commander, on behalf of the President, issued an order through the Mobilisation

⁶⁹⁴ Telegram from the Military Justice and Discipline Branch, 31 October 2013, SYR.D0193.006.034.

⁶⁹⁵ Instructions of Regulation No. 5/2012, 15 September 2012, SYR.D0197.060.005-006.

⁶⁹⁶ Annex No. 1 for Organisation Instructions No. 3/2011, 14 April 2011, SYR.D0021.002.019; Annex No. 1 for Organisation Instructions No. 3/2011, 14 April 2011, SYR.D0151.064.002 (assigning two soldiers with “two automatic rifles” to each sleeping vehicle, or one soldier with one “automatic rifle” to any other type of sleeping vehicle).

⁶⁹⁷ Circular from the Organisation and Administration Department, 29 March 2011, SYR.D0021.003.018 (banning personnel of certain ranks from taking their personal weapons outside of their units or their deployment areas).

⁶⁹⁸ Telegram No. 384, 27 April 2011, SYR.D0020.090.027; Telegram from the Organisation and Administration Department, 27 March 2013, SYR.D0197.060.003; Telegram from the Organisation and Administration Department, 29 April 2012, SYR.D0197.060.001.

⁶⁹⁹ Hand-delivered Telegram No. 550, 14 April 2012, SYR.D0183.038.009 (referencing that the order is taken pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, Conscription Law); Administrative Order, 1 October 2012, SYR.D0197.055.014.

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Branch cancelling the enrolment in training for reserve non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, warning that any who failed to join their units would be “pursued judicially”.⁷⁰⁰

Political Administration

The Political Administration was a staff department of the General Command that oversaw the dissemination of propaganda and political bulletins as a means of boosting morale within the Army and Armed Forces.⁷⁰¹ Both the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff used the Political Administration to disseminate circulars.⁷⁰²

a. Personnel

In February 2010, Major General Riyad Haddad was Director of the Political Administration.⁷⁰³

b. Functions and Structure

The Political Administration consisted of various branches, including the Psychological and Propaganda Studies Branch,⁷⁰⁴ the Planning and Training Branch,⁷⁰⁵ and the Culture and Orientation Branch.⁷⁰⁶

As part of its functions, the Political Administration issued a weekly newsletter titled “The Weekly Political Bulletin”, which contained propaganda and political messages in support of the Regime

⁷⁰⁰ Administrative Order, 1 October 2012, SYR.D0197.055.014.

⁷⁰¹ Weekly Political Bulletin, 10 October 2011, SYR.D0202.011.007. *See also* Circular from the Political Administration, 25 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.012; Circular from the Political Administration, 10 May 2012, SYR.D0133.118.010.

⁷⁰² *See e.g.* Circular from the Political Administration, 25 October 2012, SYR.D0197.056.012; Circular from the Political Administration, 26 September 2011, SYR.D0035.039.022; Circular from the Political Administration, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0180.036.049.

⁷⁰³ *See e.g.* Media Plan Coverage of the 47th Annual Celebration of the 8 March Revolution issued by the Political Administration, 28 February 2010, SYR.D0002.136.001; Communication from the Political Administration, 1 February 2011, SYR.D0185.042.014.

⁷⁰⁴ *See e.g.* Circular from the Political Administration, 19 May 2012, SYR.D0180.036.049 (including instructions on how to counter propaganda from opposition media. The latter are referred to in the document as “the strife-mongering and provocative [media] channels” pursuing a “despicable conspiracy” and “biased campaign against Syria”).

⁷⁰⁵ Schedule of the third training course to be conducted between 14-16 March 2009, February 2009, SYR.D0020.018.008; Telegram from the Political Administration, 29 December 2011, SYR.D0187.088.024; Circular from the Political Administration, 16 July 2012, SYR.D0247.120.003.

⁷⁰⁶ Communication from the Political Administration, 12 May 2012, SYR.D0133.118.004-005; Publication by the Political Administration, 19 July 2011, SYR.D0035.039.004; Publication by the Political Administration, 8 September 2010, SYR.D0247.171.005.

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and projecting the views of the Regime on current affairs.⁷⁰⁷ The bulletins often included quotations from the President⁷⁰⁸ and his father, Hafez Al-Assad,⁷⁰⁹ praising the military. The Political Administration also issued a magazine once every two months entitled “Military Thought”, which examined strategy, operations, and tactics in war.⁷¹⁰

The Political Administration also appears to have overseen the activities of “Political Orientation” units within subordinate commands. For example, the Northern Regional Command,⁷¹¹ the 52nd Brigade,⁷¹² the 38th Brigade,⁷¹³ Military Police units⁷¹⁴ and the Air Force Command⁷¹⁵ each had a Political Orientation branch or section. These Political Orientation units implemented instructions or orders from the Political Administration.⁷¹⁶ The role of these units is indicated in a document from the Political Orientation Section of the 52nd Brigade. According to this document, their role included explaining the military political stance and following its development, organising proper media coverage with political orientation officers, distributing and explaining General Command documentation, receiving high command visits to certain locations, taking precautions to deflect hostile rumours and publications, and monitoring the morale of friendly and opposition forces.⁷¹⁷ Political orientation sections in subordinate formations also conducted examinations of soldiers’ knowledge of historical events, geography, and past wars.⁷¹⁸ In addition, documents suggests that

⁷⁰⁷ See e.g. Weekly Political Bulletin, 27 June 2011, SYR.D0014.050.018; Weekly Political Bulletin, 4 July 2011, SYR.D0035.029.047.

⁷⁰⁸ Weekly Political Bulletin, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0035.029.009-012.

⁷⁰⁹ See e.g. Weekly Political Bulletin, 15 August 2011, SYR.D035.029.009-012; Weekly Political Bulletin, 25 April 2011, SYR.D0035.029.074-076; Weekly Political Bulletin, 9 May 2011, SYR.D0035.029.058.

⁷¹⁰ Military Thought, undated, SYR.D0191.001.004; Military Thought, undated, SYR.D0191.019.017.

⁷¹¹ Circular from the Operations Commission, 6 August 2012, SYR.D0197.048.011.

⁷¹² Report from the Political Orientation Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 January 2011, SYR.D0196.026.001. *See also* Witness Interview SYR.WHA.563_ET, at p. 4.

⁷¹³ Morning Check Card from the Political Orientation Section of the 38th Brigade, 3 August 2011, SYR.D0064.003.036.

⁷¹⁴ Communication from the Political Orientation unit of the Military Police in Idlib, 24 April 2014, SYR.D0187.089.008.

⁷¹⁵ Circular from the Political Administration, 26 September 2011, SYR.D0035.039.022 (forwarded by the Political Orientation Branch of Air Force Command).

⁷¹⁶ Report by the Political Orientation Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 January 2011, SYR.D0196.021.006. *See also* Administrative Order from the Political Orientation Branch of Military Police Command, 15 May 2014, SYR.D0187.089.014.

⁷¹⁷ Report from the Political Orientation Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 January 2011, SYR.D0196.026.001.

⁷¹⁸ Communication from the Political Orientation unit of the Military Police in Idlib, 24 April 2014, SYR.D0187.089.008.

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they requested reports on the levels of discipline and the behaviour of soldiers,⁷¹⁹ ensured the Ba'ath anthem was played during assemblies⁷²⁰ and issued letters of gratitude to soldiers.⁷²¹ One circular from the Political Orientation Branch of the 5th Division stressed the importance of keeping soldier morale up to decrease the number of deserters, suicide attempts and self-harm among soldiers.⁷²²

Officers' Affairs Administration

The Officers' Affairs Administration dealt with officer-related administrative matters,⁷²³ including promotions, transfers, records and demobilisation. The President often disseminated administrative orders through the Officers' Affairs Administration.⁷²⁴

a. Personnel

In early 2010, Major General Mahmoud Abdul Wahhab Shawwa was the Director of the Officers' Affairs Administration.⁷²⁵ He held this position until late 2011.⁷²⁶ At least for the period from 7 February 2012⁷²⁷ to 28 July 2013,⁷²⁸ Staff Brigadier-General Bassam Tawfiq Warda was Director of the Officers' Affairs Administration.

b. Functions and Structure

The main function of the Officers' Affairs Administration was to process, train and allocate officers to specific units within the Army and Armed Forces. Among other functions, it maintained

⁷¹⁹ Communication from the Political Orientation Branch of Military Police, 26 June 2013, SYR.D0187.089.006. *See also* Communication from the Political Orientation Branch of Military Police, 30 December 2013, SYR.D0187.089.007.

⁷²⁰ Report by the Political Orientation Section of the 52nd Brigade, 1 January 2011, SYR.D0196.021.006.

⁷²¹ Letter of Gratitude from the Political Orientation Section of a Brigade, undated, SYR.D0196.073.002 (based on the context in which this document was found, it is believed to have been issued by the 52nd Brigade).

⁷²² Circular from the Political Orientation Branch of the 5th Division, 8 August 2011, SYR.D0065.002.059.

⁷²³ There is a separate Officers' Affairs Administration under the Ministry of the Interior. *See e.g.* Communications from the Ministry of Interior's Officers Affairs Administration, 23 August 2011, SYR.D0249.128.002 (it dealt with "military armed forces connected to the Minister of the Interior."); Legislative Decree No. 1 of 2012, The Law of the Military Service of the Interior Security Forces, SYR.A0472.068, at Art. 6 and Arts 2-4 (structure of the Interior security forces).

⁷²⁴ Decision No.143 of 2011 by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 30 November 2011, SYR.D0063.010.003. *See also* Exceptional Promotion order by the Officers Affairs Administration, 3 March 2012, SYR.D0220.039.022-024.

⁷²⁵ *See e.g.* Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 10 January 2010, SYR.D0018.059.012.

⁷²⁶ *See e.g.* Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 22 September 2011, SYR.D0017.032.015.

⁷²⁷ Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 7 February 2012, SYR.D0120.102.001.

⁷²⁸ Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 28 July 2013, SYR.D0179.050.069.

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detailed records on the officers, including information on their marital status, number of children, and political activities before joining the service.⁷²⁹ It was also informed of any casualties among officers.⁷³⁰

The Officers' Affairs Administration contained the Transfers Branch,⁷³¹ the Conscripted Officers Section,⁷³² the Officers' Files Branch,⁷³³ the Reserve Officers Branch⁷³⁴ and the Preparation and Missions Branch.⁷³⁵

⁷²⁹ See e.g. Extract of Officer's Service Booklet, undated, SYR.D0024.005.001-006; Extract of an Officers Service Booklet, undated, SYR.D0024.006.003-014; Information Form issued by the Officers' Affairs Administration, undated, SYR.D0023.021.083.

⁷³⁰ Circular from the Operations Commission, 20 November 2011, SYR.D0020.082.032.

⁷³¹ Appointment Order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 17 October 2011, SYR.D0063.010.011; Transfer order by the Officers Affairs Administration, 10 April 2012, SYR.D0220.039.019 (signed by the Minister of Defence on behalf of the President); Transfer order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 6 September 2012, SYR.D0181.031.015; Appointment Order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 10 August 2011, SYR.D0063.010.008 (appointing Major General Ali Ayoub as Deputy Chief of Staff).

⁷³² Communication from the Ar-Rastan Conscription Department to the Officers' Affairs Administration, 23 January 2010, SYR.D0034.008.015.

⁷³³ Communication from the 38th Brigade, 25 January 2012, SYR.D0120.122.003; Communication from the Officers Affairs Administration, 7 February 2012, SYR.D0120.102.001.

⁷³⁴ Communication from the Organisation and Administration Department, 25 July 2005, SYR.D0031.155.002; Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 6 December 2012, SYR.D0028.012.046; Mobilisation order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 9 April 2003, SYR.D0120.074.009; Communication from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 25 May 2003, SYR.D0120.074.016; Demobilisation order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 14 April 2010, SYR.D0119.174.012; Demobilisation order by the Officers' Affairs Administration, 2 January 2011, SYR.D0120.063.002.

⁷³⁵ Circular from the Officers' Affairs Administration, 1 July 2010, SYR.D0018.047.063; Instructions no.10 issued by the Officers Affairs Administration, 13 October 2011, SYR.D0019.014.004; Communication from the Officers Affairs Administration, 19 May 2005, SYR.D0156.075.005.


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VII. Organisational Charts


The General Command and the General Staff



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
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The Army and Armed Forces Full Order of Battle*1st Corps*

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
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
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3rd Corps

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Independent Units and the Special Forces Command

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VIII. Conclusion

This report has provided analysis of evidence collected by CIJA as it pertains to the General Command of Syria's Army and Armed Forces during the period March 2011 to July 2012; its Regional Commands; its Military and Security Committees; the Army; and the General Staff. CIJA analysts are ready to respond to further enquiries regarding this report and answer other requests in the future.

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Bilaga - Skäligen misstänkt

Enhet
Nationella Operativa Avdelningen, Krigsbrott 1 UtrS NOA

Diariernr
5000-K622888-18

Skäligen misstänkt person
Hamo, Mohammed

Personnr
19581020-0559

Identifierad Kontrollsätt
Ja ID-kort bank

Kommentar
9752272696701164645



Personalia och dagsbottsavgift

Utskriftsdatum
2023-02-24

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Utbildning			
Yrke / Titel			
Arbetsgivare		Telefonnr	
Anställning (nuvarande och tidigare)			
Arbetsförhet och hälsotillstånd			
Kompletterande uppgifter			
Uppgiven inkomst	Bidrag	Hemmavarande barn under 18 år	
Försörjningsplikt		Skulder	
Förmögenhet			
Kontroll utförd			
Taxerad inkomst		Taxeringsår	
Taxeringskontroll utförd av		Datum - -	